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Abstract 
	  
This	  thesis	  resolves	  around	  problems	  arising	  for	  the	  existing	  legal	  framework	  from	  
the	  use	  of	  novel	  software-­‐based	  policing	  tools	  during	  criminal	  investigations.	  The	  
increasing	  dependence	  on	  information	  and	  communication	  technologies	  and	  the	  
Internet	  means	  that	  more	  aspects	  of	  people’s	  lives	  move	  online,	  and	  crime	  follows	  
them.	  This	  has	  triggered	  the	  development	  of	  innovative,	  autonomous	  investigative	  
technologies	  that	  are	  increasingly	  replacing	  human	  officers	  for	  the	  policing	  of	  the	  
online	  sphere.	  While	  only	  recently	  discussions	  of	  the	  legal	  status	  of	  embodied	  and	  
unembodied	  robotical	  devices	  have	  gained	  more	  widespread	  attention,	  discussions	  
of	  the	  legal	  status	  of	  autonomous	  agent	  technology	  are	  not	  new.	  They	  have	  focussed	  
however	  in	  the	  past	  on	  applications	  in	  the	  private	  domain,	  enabling	  contract	  
formation	  online.	  No	  systematic	  study	  has	  so	  far	  been	  carried	  out	  that	  looks	  at	  the	  
use	  of	  autonomous	  agent	  technology	  when	  deployed	  by	  state	  actors,	  to	  fulfil	  core	  
state	  functions.	  This	  thesis	  starts	  with	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  the	  use	  of	  automated,	  
intelligent	  devices	  to	  replicate	  core	  police	  functions	  in	  the	  online	  world	  will	  
increase	  in	  the	  future.	  Looking	  at	  first	  emerging	  technologies,	  but	  with	  an	  eye	  
towards	  future	  deployment	  of	  much	  more	  capable	  software	  tools	  that	  fulfil	  policing	  
functions	  on	  the	  Internet,	  this	  thesis	  looks	  at	  the	  challenges	  this	  poses	  for	  
regulators	  and	  software	  developers.	  Based	  on	  extensive	  qualitative	  research	  
interviews	  with	  stakeholders	  from	  two	  different	  jurisdictions	  (Germany	  &	  UK)	  this	  
thesis	  finds	  that	  these	  novel	  policing	  technologies	  challenge	  existing	  legal	  
frameworks,	  which	  are	  still	  premised	  on	  the	  parameters	  of	  the	  offline	  world.	  It	  
therefore	  develops	  an	  alternative	  governance	  model	  for	  these	  policing	  tools,	  which	  
enables	  their	  law-­‐compliant	  use	  and	  prevents	  rights	  violations	  of	  suspects.	  In	  doing	  
so	  it	  draws	  upon	  both	  worlds,	  the	  technical	  and	  the	  legal,	  while	  also	  incorporating	  
the	  empirical	  research	  results	  from	  the	  interviews	  with	  experts.	  The	  first	  part	  of	  
this	  thesis	  analyses	  the	  technical	  foundations	  of	  these	  software-­‐based	  policing	  
tools.	  Here,	  one	  of	  the	  key	  findings	  is	  that	  the	  current	  governance	  system	  focuses	  on	  
ex-­‐ante	  authorisation	  of	  very	  specific,	  individual	  software	  tools	  without	  developing	  
a	  systematic	  classification.	  This	  contradicts	  the	  principle	  of	  sustainable	  law	  making.	  
To	  overcome	  this	  piecemeal	  approach,	  as	  a	  first	  contribution	  to	  existing	  research	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this	  work	  defines	  a	  new	  class	  of	  investigative	  technologies	  –	  mobile,	  intelligent	  and	  
autonomous	  (MIA)	  policing	  tools-­‐	  based	  on	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  technical	  analysis.	  
Identifying	  such	  a	  natural	  class	  of	  present	  and	  future	  technologies	  that	  pose	  the	  
same	  type	  of	  legal	  issues	  should	  facilitate	  the	  sustainable	  governance	  of	  these	  new	  
policing	  tools.	  The	  second	  part	  of	  this	  thesis	  analyses	  two	  specific	  legal	  issues:	  
cross-­‐jurisdictional	  investigations	  and	  the	  evidentiary	  value	  of	  the	  seized	  data.	  
These	  issues	  were	  identified	  as	  most	  pressing	  by	  the	  experts	  interviewed	  for	  this	  
work.	  This	  analysis	  reveals	  that	  investigative	  activities	  of	  MIA	  tools	  are	  potentially	  
in	  conflict	  with	  international	  law	  principles	  and	  criminal	  procedure	  law.	  In	  order	  to	  
gain	  legitimacy,	  these	  new	  policing	  tools	  need	  to	  operate	  within	  the	  parameters	  of	  
the	  existing	  legal	  framework.	  This	  thesis	  argues	  that	  given	  the	  unique	  technical	  
capabilities	  of	  MIA	  tools,	  the	  primary	  approach	  to	  achieving	  this	  is	  to	  assign	  legal	  
responsibility	  to	  these	  tools.	  The	  third	  part	  of	  this	  thesis	  develops	  a	  novel	  
governance	  approach	  to	  ensure	  that	  MIA	  tools	  operate	  within	  the	  parameters	  of	  the	  
legal	  framework,	  and	  therefore	  obtain	  legitimacy	  and	  relevance,	  also	  with	  regard	  to	  
the	  investigative	  results.	  This	  approach	  builds	  on	  existing	  research	  identifying	  code	  
as	  a	  regulatory	  modality	  and	  contributes	  to	  the	  field	  of	  legal	  theory.	  It	  constitutes	  a	  
solution	  for	  the	  governance	  problems	  of	  MIA	  tools,	  however,	  it	  requires	  currently	  
lacking	  collaboration	  among	  stakeholders	  and	  cross-­‐disciplinary	  research.	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Have	  you	  realised	  your	  computer’s	  a	  spy?	  




a)	  Dreaming	  Futures:	  From	  Fiction	  to	  Fact	  
	  
In	  Roadside	  Crosses	  by	  the	  American	  crime	  novelist	  Jeffrey	  Deaver,1	  a	  police	  detective	  
together	  with	  an	  expert	  in	  computer	  forensics	  search	  for	  a	  young	  murder	  suspect	  who	  
has	  disappeared	  before	  he	  could	  be	  arrested.	  What	  they	  know	  about	  him	  is	  his	  
obsession	  with	  a	  MMORPG,	  a	  Massively	  Multiplayer	  Online	  Role-­‐Playing	  Game,	  and	  the	  
skill	  and	  knowledge	  he	  acquired	  in	  the	  game	  may	  also	  inform	  his	  criminal	  activity	  in	  
the	  brick	  and	  mortar	  world.	  To	  discover	  his	  whereabouts,	  and	  also	  to	  collect	  evidence	  
about	  his	  motives,	  character,	  abilities	  and	  connections	  to	  the	  victims,	  the	  two	  
investigators	  too	  acquire	  game	  characters	  (avatars)	  and	  enter	  the	  online	  world.	  In	  their	  
quest	  for	  evidence,	  they	  interact	  not	  only	  with	  the	  avatars,	  digital	  representations,	  of	  
other	  human	  players	  who	  knew	  the	  suspect’s	  online	  persona.	  They	  also	  interact	  with	  a	  
non-­‐player	  character	  (NPC),	  an	  Artificial	  Intelligence	  (AI)	  construct	  provided	  by	  the	  
platform	  operators,	  in	  the	  shape	  of	  an	  elf	  princess.	  NPCs	  like	  this	  can	  populate	  the	  
fictional	  world	  of	  a	  game.	  They	  can	  be	  allies	  or	  competitors	  to	  the	  player	  characters.	  
Sometimes,	  they	  are	  just	  parts	  of	  the	  scenery.	  Crucially	  though,	  they	  can	  also	  carry	  out	  
routine	  refereeing	  tasks,	  warning	  for	  instance	  a	  player	  that	  he	  is	  infringing	  one	  of	  the	  
rules	  of	  the	  game	  world	  such	  as	  attacking	  players	  who	  are	  deemed	  too	  new	  or	  too	  weak	  
–	  and	  if	  necessary	  even	  enforcing	  a	  sanction	  at	  the	  edge	  of	  their	  digital	  swords.	  In	  that	  
case,	  the	  NPC	  will	  be	  completely	  defined	  through	  their	  statistics,	  “skills”,	  and	  “gear”	  
which	  can	  mean	  for	  instance	  that	  the	  NPC	  is	  powerful	  enough	  to	  “kill”	  any	  player	  
character	  in	  combat.2	  NPCs	  can	  also	  collect	  data	  about	  other	  player	  and	  communicate	  it	  
to	  third	  parties,	  acting	  in	  this	  case	  like	  an	  animated	  road	  sign.	  It	  is	  this	  function	  that	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  J	  Deaver,	  Roadside	  Crosses	  (New	  York:	  Simon	  &	  Schuster,	  2009).	  
2	  On	  Non-­‐player	  characters	  in	  general	  see	  B	  Mac	  Namee,	  P	  Cunningham,	  “A	  Proposal	  for	  an	  
Agent	  Architecture	  for	  Proactive	  Persistent	  Non-­‐Player	  Characters”	  in	  D	  O’Donoghue	  (ed)	  
Proceedings	  of	  the	  12th	  Irish	  Conference	  on	  AI	  and	  Cognitive	  Science	  (Dublin:	  Trinity	  College	  
Dublin,	  Department	  of	  Computer	  Science,	  TCD-­‐CS-­‐2001-­‐20)	  221-­‐232;	  On	  the	  use	  of	  NPCs	  as	  
“referees”	  see	  G	  Sukthankar,	  K	  Sycara,	  “Policy	  Recognition	  for	  Multi-­‐Player	  Tactical	  Scenarios”	  
(2007)	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  6th	  International	  Joint	  Conference	  on	  Autonomous	  Agents	  and	  
Multiagent	  Systems	  (AAMAS	  '07),	  ACM,	  New	  York,	  1-­‐8.	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two	  detectives	  use	  in	  their	  investigation,	  and	  the	  NPC	  duly	  directs	  them	  to	  the	  virtual	  
house	  of	  the	  suspect.	  Learning	  that	  in	  the	  online	  world	  he	  plays	  a	  witch	  doctor,	  who	  
dedicates	  his	  “life”	  helping	  other	  player	  recover,	  they	  reassess	  his	  psychological	  
evaluation.	  Seeing	  how	  other	  human	  players	  in	  the	  game	  related	  to	  him	  further	  
convinces	  them	  that	  he	  had	  not	  the	  deranged	  personality	  displayed	  by	  the	  killer	  in	  the	  
offline	  world.	  Too	  poor	  to	  study	  medicine	  in	  the	  real	  world	  and	  subject	  to	  irreconcilable	  
demands	  by	  parents,	  peers	  and	  authorities,	  he	  was	  only	  able	  to	  create	  a	  “coherent	  life	  
plan”	  in	  a	  virtual	  setting	  which,	  free	  from	  the	  constraints	  of	  his	  offline	  life	  –	  poverty,	  
gang	  culture,	  physical	  appearance	  etc	  –	  resulted	  in	  a	  life	  that	  in	  many	  ways	  was	  more	  
true	  to	  his	  self	  than	  that	  permitted	  by	  the	  physical	  world.	  It	  is	  there	  that	  he	  can	  interact	  
with	  others	  without	  prejudice	  or	  undue	  favour,	  and	  there	  that	  he	  can	  contribute	  to	  the	  
good	  of	  his	  chosen	  community.	  3	  
	  
From	  this	  story,	  several	  important	  lessons	  can	  be	  learned,	  and	  together	  they	  describe	  
the	  aim	  and	  focus	  of	  this	  thesis.	  	  
The	  technologies	  described	  by	  Deaver	  are	  already	  available	  and	  used	  for	  gaming	  
purpose.	  This	  thesis	  develops	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  future	  of	  online	  policing	  will	  soon	  (have	  
to)	  follow	  similar	  lines.	  There	  is	  a	  natural	  extension	  from	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  “referee”	  to	  
that	  of	  a	  police	  officer	  or	  even	  a	  judge	  –	  all	  of	  them	  are	  in	  the	  business	  of	  applying	  and	  
enforcing	  rules.	  One	  reason	  for	  this	  trajectory	  is	  movingly	  described	  in	  the	  story,	  and	  
has	  found	  recently	  a	  legal	  expression	  in	  a	  decision	  of	  the	  German	  Federal	  Constitutional	  
Court:	  as	  we	  conduct	  more	  and	  more	  of	  our	  lives	  online,	  it	  becomes	  an	  essential,	  not	  
just	  accidental	  aspect	  of	  our	  lives	  and	  our	  identity.4	  We	  are	  to	  a	  great	  extend	  defined	  by	  
the	  relations	  we	  have	  with	  others.	  If	  all	  one’s	  friends	  are	  Facebook	  friends,	  or	  avatars	  
encountered	  in	  an	  online	  game,	  then	  one’s	  digital	  identity	  determines	  a	  large	  part	  of	  
who	  we	  are.	  Attacks	  on	  this	  digital	  identity,	  by	  criminals	  or	  states,	  threaten	  therefore	  
the	  core	  of	  our	  being.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  For	  the	  role	  and	  importance	  of	  coherent	  life	  plans	  for	  law	  and	  legal	  reasoning	  about	  human	  
rights,	  see	  J	  Finnis,	  Fundamentals	  of	  Ethics	  (Washington:	  Georgetown	  University	  Press,	  1983)	  
103-­‐126.	  For	  the	  application	  of	  this	  idea	  to	  the	  regulation	  of	  technology,	  see	  R	  Black,	  “Ethics	  and	  
the	  Products	  of	  Science”,	  in	  R	  E	  Spier	  (ed)	  Science	  and	  Technology	  Ethics	  (London:	  Routledge,	  
2002)	  39-­‐59.	  
4	  BVerfGE,	  NJW	  2008,	  822.	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Gathering	  the	  information	  that	  describes	  these	  relationships	  allows	  an	  observer	  to	  
form	  a	  complete	  picture	  of	  a	  person.5	  Living	  online	  lives	  therefore	  creates	  new	  
vulnerabilities	  that	  the	  law	  needs	  to	  address.	  It	  creates	  also	  new	  possibilities	  for	  
criminals.	  The	  digital,	  virtual	  nature	  of	  this	  environment	  makes	  some	  of	  the	  constraints	  
that	  operate	  in	  the	  offline	  world	  redundant.	  One	  and	  the	  same	  natural	  person	  can	  use	  
simultaneously	  several	  online	  identities	  in	  different	  online	  “worlds”,	  -­‐	  from	  games	  to	  
Facebook	  to	  newsgroups	  to	  online	  banks	  or	  shops	  –	  and	  by	  virtually	  replicating	  himself	  
also	  multiply	  his	  ability	  to	  violate	  laws.	  This	  thesis	  argues	  that	  AI	  systems,	  such	  as	  the	  
NPC	  encountered	  in	  online	  games,	  will	  therefore	  be	  needed	  to	  create	  a	  corresponding	  
multiplication	  of	  police	  officers,	  collecting	  and	  analysing	  the	  increasing	  amount	  of	  data,	  
and	  also	  performing	  at	  least	  some	  basic	  policing	  function	  such	  as	  issuing	  warnings	  (or	  
possibly	  fines),	  seizing	  evidence	  and	  preventing	  certain	  types	  of	  rule	  transgressions.	  
Virtual	  and	  physical	  spheres	  will	  increasingly	  leak	  into	  each	  other.	  	  
In	  the	  Deaver	  story,	  information	  about	  the	  virtual	  life	  of	  the	  suspect	  gave	  them	  vital	  
clues	  about	  his	  offline	  existence	  needed	  to	  solve	  the	  case.	  In	  the	  same	  way	  in	  which	  in	  
the	  story,	  the	  suspect’s	  “real”	  life	  and	  identity	  can	  be	  said	  to	  be	  his	  virtual	  ID,	  the	  
dividing	  line	  between	  the	  virtual	  and	  the	  real	  will	  continue	  to	  get	  blurred,	  creating	  new	  
social	  and	  legal-­‐regulatory	  problems.	  	  Psychologists	  and	  sociologists	  have	  for	  some	  
time	  described	  the	  impact	  of	  this	  virtualisation	  of	  life,	  where	  everything	  becomes	  
essentially	  information.6	  Law	  by	  contrast	  is	  still	  catching	  up	  with	  this	  development.	  
Even	  from	  the	  short	  description	  of	  the	  novel,	  some	  immediate	  legal	  questions	  arise:	  
Should	  (or	  could)	  the	  officers	  have	  identified	  themselves	  as	  police	  officers	  when	  
“interrogating”	  the	  AI	  about	  the	  suspect,	  and	  does	  failure	  to	  do	  so	  render	  the	  evidence	  
it	  gives	  them	  inadmissible?	  	  Is	  it	  even	  reasonable	  to	  use	  the	  analogy	  of	  an	  
“interrogation”	  in	  this	  context?	  What	  steps	  could	  and	  should	  have	  the	  officers	  taken	  to	  
create	  a	  record	  of	  the	  online	  interaction	  that	  is	  reliable	  and	  admissible?	  If	  the	  game	  
platform	  was	  owned	  by	  a	  foreign	  company	  and	  the	  server	  located	  in	  a	  foreign	  country,	  
did	  they	  violate	  that	  state’s	  territoriality	  by	  carrying	  out	  an	  investigation	  that	  involved	  
“copying”	  their	  avatars	  on	  that	  server’s	  drive?	  Is	  data	  about	  an	  avatar	  (“He	  lives	  in	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  As	  we	  will	  see	  in	  chapter	  2,	  it	  was	  this	  ability	  to	  form	  a	  complete	  picture	  of	  a	  person	  by	  
analysing	  the	  data	  about	  them	  that	  led	  the	  German	  Federal	  Constitutional	  Court	  to	  argue	  that	  
online	  lives	  need	  the	  full	  protection	  of	  the	  “Human	  dignity”	  provision	  of	  the	  German	  
Constitution.	  	  
6	  See	  e.g.	  S	  Turkle,	  The	  Second	  Self:	  Computers	  and	  the	  Human	  Spirit	  (Cambridge:	  MIT	  Press,	  
2005);	  S	  Turkle,	  Life	  on	  the	  Screen:	  Identity	  in	  the	  Age	  of	  the	  Internet	  (New	  York:	  Simon	  and	  
Schuster,	  1995);	  S	  Turkle,	  Simulation	  and	  Its	  Discontents	  (Cambridge:	  MIT	  Press,	  2009).	  
	   12	  
cave	  in	  the	  next	  village	  and	  is	  a	  green	  ogre”)	  of	  the	  type	  the	  AI	  gave	  the	  officers	  
“personal	  data”	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  Data	  Protection	  Act,	  is	  it	  “about”	  a	  natural	  person,	  
or	  “about”	  another	  type	  of	  entity,	  an	  avatar,	  that	  the	  law	  still	  has	  to	  define	  adequately?	  	  
All	  these	  questions	  concern	  the	  interaction	  of	  human	  police	  officers	  with	  an	  AI,	  but	  
what	  legal	  issues	  arise	  if	  the	  AI	  carries	  out	  police	  functions	  itself?	  Some	  writers	  have	  
advocated	  that	  autonomous	  and	  intelligent	  systems	  may	  have	  one	  day	  to	  be	  recognised	  
as	  juristic	  persons	  by	  the	  law,7	  but	  a	  much	  less	  contentious	  question	  can	  be	  posed:	  
should	  such	  a	  system	  have	  a	  “rank”	  that	  integrates	  it	  into	  the	  chain	  of	  command	  of	  the	  
police,	  and	  circumscribes	  its	  rights	  towards	  citizens?	  	  
If	  I,	  as	  a	  human	  computer	  user,	  am	  suddenly	  confronted	  with	  a	  pop-­‐up	  of	  an	  avatar	  
(similar	  to	  the	  one	  that	  greets	  customers	  on	  the	  IKEA	  website)	  that	  identifies	  itself	  as	  
controlled	  by	  the	  police	  and	  asks	  me	  for	  information,	  can	  I	  refuse	  until	  a	  human	  officer	  
makes	  the	  request,	  or	  can	  the	  computer,	  following	  its	  pre-­‐programmed	  algorithm,	  have	  
the	  power	  to	  change	  my	  legal	  status	  and	  create	  a	  duty	  to	  cooperate	  for	  me?	  How	  can	  we	  
create	  functional	  equivalents	  of	  police	  activity	  through	  online	  simulations,	  what	  gets	  
lost	  in	  this	  process,	  what	  is	  added,	  and	  how	  should	  the	  law	  react	  to	  this	  necessary	  
distortion?	  	  
Human	  police	  officers	  interacting	  with	  citizens,	  suspects	  or	  victims,	  will	  for	  instance	  
have	  a	  noticeable	  physical	  presence,	  which	  can	  intimidate	  or	  reassure.	  Even	  though	  
reference	  to	  this	  aspect	  of	  policing	  will	  not	  normally	  be	  found	  in	  primary	  legislation	  
regulating	  police	  work,	  common	  human	  experience	  of	  physical	  spaces	  and	  their	  
invasion	  will	  have	  silently	  informed	  these	  laws.	  	  Interest	  in	  “non	  verbal”,	  not	  text	  based	  
aspects	  of	  law	  and	  legal	  reasoning	  have	  only	  recently	  come	  to	  the	  attention	  of	  legal	  
theorist,	  for	  instance	  in	  the	  AHRC	  funded	  “Beyond	  Text”	  programme	  and	  the	  
forthcoming	  collection	  of	  “Beyond	  Text	  in	  Legal	  Education.”8	  	  
How	  the	  disappearance	  of	  such	  a	  shared	  understanding	  of	  the	  physicality	  of	  space	  is	  
going	  to	  change	  the	  nature	  of	  Internet	  policing	  through	  autonomous	  systems	  that	  
simulate	  police	  officers,	  and	  what	  it	  means	  for	  their	  regulation,	  will	  go	  beyond	  the	  
remit	  of	  this	  thesis.	  It	  will	  however	  outline	  nonetheless	  a	  wider	  conceptual	  framework	  
within	  which	  the	  analysis	  here	  is	  located:	  As	  some	  of	  the	  empirical	  studies	  carried	  out	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  See	  e.g.	  L	  Solum,	  “Legal	  Personhood	  for	  Artificial	  Intelligences”	  (1992)	  70	  North	  Carolina	  Law	  
Review,	  1231-­‐1287;	  W	  Adams,	  “Machine	  Consciousness:	  Plausible	  Idea	  or	  Semantic	  Distortion?”	  
(2004)	  11:9	  Journal	  of	  Conscious	  Studies,	  46-­‐56;	  D	  J	  Calverley,	  “Imagining	  a	  Non-­‐Biological	  
Machine	  as	  a	  Legal	  Person”	  (2008)	  22	  Artificial	  Intelligence	  &	  Society,	  523-­‐537.	  
8	  Z	  Bankowski,	  M	  Del	  Mar,	  P	  Maharg	  (eds)	  Beyond	  Text,	  vol	  1:	  The	  Arts	  and	  the	  Legal	  Academy	  
(Farnham,	  Surrey:	  Ashgate	  Publishing,	  2012).	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for	  this	  PhD	  indicate,	  lawyers	  will	  always	  tend	  to	  reason	  by	  analogy	  from	  traditional,	  
well	  established	  legal	  concepts	  to	  new,	  technology	  mediated	  phenomena.	  Indeed,	  they	  
often	  prefer	  this	  approach	  to	  new,	  “tailor	  made”	  legislation.	  Part	  of	  this	  thesis	  will	  
address	  the	  issue	  how	  we	  can	  through	  computer	  code	  represent	  those	  aspects	  of	  offline	  
police	  work	  in	  the	  online	  environment	  that	  is	  necessary	  to	  make	  these	  analogies	  more	  
likely	  to	  succeed,	  while	  advocating	  legal	  reform	  where	  the	  difference	  between	  
disembodied	  and	  embodied	  policing	  becomes	  too	  wide	  to	  be	  bridged	  by	  computer	  code	  
alone.	  	  
These	  research	  issues	  therefore	  deal	  also	  with	  the	  legal	  regulation	  of	  autonomous	  
agents.	  Over	  the	  past	  decade,	  there	  has	  been	  an	  increased	  interest	  in	  this	  issue,	  with	  
debate	  stimulated	  through	  the	  AGENTLINK	  network	  of	  the	  European	  Union9	  and	  the	  
”Law	  of	  Electronic	  	  Agents”	  workshop	  series.10	  However,	  this	  research	  focussed	  mainly	  
on	  commercial	  applications	  of	  autonomous	  agent	  technology	  and	  the	  legal	  issues	  that	  
this	  raises.11	  This	  is	  understandable,	  since	  most	  of	  the	  working	  applications	  are	  at	  
present	  in	  this	  field.	  	  For	  these	  applications,	  the	  law	  of	  agency	  and	  its	  associated	  
liability	  regimes	  proved	  flexible	  enough	  to	  allow	  for	  equitable	  solutions	  for	  most	  
scenarios	  without	  the	  need	  for	  substantial	  legal	  intervention.	  In	  private	  law	  settings,	  
there	  is	  an	  underlying	  symmetry	  between	  the	  involved	  parties,	  an	  organising	  bi-­‐polar	  
relation	  exemplified	  e.g.	  by	  	  “seller”	  and	  “buyer”	  (or	  injured	  party	  and	  injurer).12	  These	  
however	  are	  not	  natural	  kinds	  with	  mutually	  exclusive	  membership	  –	  we	  all	  can	  be	  
sometimes	  buyers,	  and	  sometimes	  sellers,	  and	  sometimes	  we	  are	  both	  in	  the	  same	  
transaction.	  The	  cooperative	  aspect	  of	  private	  law	  and	  the	  commutability	  of	  legal	  roles	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  http://www.agentlink.org/index.php.	  
10	  http://www.lea-­‐online.net/;	  see	  e.g.	  F	  Andrade,	  P	  Novais,	  J	  Neves,	  “Will	  and	  Declaration	  in	  
Acts	  Performed	  by	  Intelligent	  Software	  Agents	  -­‐	  Preliminary	  Issues	  on	  the	  Question”	  in	  A	  
Oskamp,	  C	  Cevenini	  (eds)	  The	  Law	  and	  Electronic	  Agents:	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  LEA	  04	  workshop	  
(Nijmegen:	  Wolf	  Legal	  Publishers,	  2005)	  53-­‐55;	  M	  Zwanenburg,	  H	  Boddens	  Hosang,	  N	  
Wijngaards,	  “Humans,	  Agents	  and	  International	  Humanitarian	  Law:	  Dilemmas	  in	  Target	  
Discrimination”	  in	  A	  Oskamp,	  C	  Cevenini	  (eds)	  The	  Law	  and	  Electronic	  Agents:	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  
LEA	  04	  workshop	  (Nijmegen:	  Wolf	  Legal	  Publishers,	  2005)	  45-­‐51.	  
11	  See	  e.g.	  A	  Rotolo,	  G	  Sartor,	  C	  Smith,	  “Formalization	  of	  a	  'Normative	  Version'	  of	  Good	  Faith”	  in	  
A	  Oskamp,	  C	  Cevenini	  (eds)	  The	  Law	  and	  Electronic	  Agents:	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  LEA	  04	  workshop	  
(Nijmegen:	  Wolf	  Legal	  Publishers,	  2005),	  65-­‐76;	  J	  Gelati,	  R	  Riveret,	  “DRM	  in	  a	  Multi-­‐Agent	  
System	  Marketplace”	  in	  A	  Oskamp,	  C	  Cevenini	  (eds)	  The	  Law	  and	  Electronic	  Agents:	  Proceedings	  
of	  the	  LEA	  04	  workshop	  (Nijmegen:	  Wolf	  Legal	  Publishers,	  2005)	  123-­‐139;	  J	  Calmet,	  R	  Endsuleit,	  
in	  A	  Oskamp,	  C	  Cevenini,	  “An	  Agent	  Framework	  for	  Legal	  Validation	  of	  E	  -­‐Transactions”	  (eds)	  
The	  Law	  and	  Electronic	  Agents:	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  LEA	  04	  workshop	  (Nijmegen:	  Wolf	  Legal	  
Publishers,	  2005)	  181-­‐184	  
12	  	  See	  e.g.	  E	  J	  Weinrib	  The	  Idea	  of	  Private	  Law	  (Harvard:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1995).	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means	  that	  there	  is	  no	  identifiable	  group	  that	  would	  benefit	  from	  a	  one-­‐sided	  
prohibition	  against	  extending	  e.g.	  the	  law	  of	  agency	  to	  autonomous	  agents.	  
In	  a	  criminal	  law	  setting	  however,	  these	  are	  not	  operative.	  We	  cannot	  simply	  apply	  the	  
law	  of	  agency,	  as	  a	  police	  officer	  cannot	  normally	  confer	  his	  rights	  and	  duties	  to	  a	  
civilian	  third	  party.	  Police	  officers	  often	  have	  certain	  rights	  not	  available	  to	  ordinary	  
citizens	  –	  searching	  premises	  and	  seizing	  goods	  for	  instance.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  they	  
might	  be	  under	  legal	  obligations	  that	  go	  beyond	  of	  what	  is	  required	  of	  ordinary	  citizens,	  
such	  as	  a	  duty	  to	  act	  on	  knowledge	  of	  criminal	  activity.	  Unlike	  in	  private	  law,	  these	  
special	  rights	  and	  duties	  that	  people	  have	  in	  virtue	  of	  their	  public	  law	  function	  create	  
relatively	  fixed,	  mutually	  exclusive	  interest	  groups,	  e.g	  “state”	  vs	  “citizen”.	  Regulation	  
through	  markets,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  prominent	  modes	  of	  regulation	  of	  commercial	  
technology,	  is	  therefore	  of	  limited	  applicability.13	  
The	  thesis	  is	  premised	  on	  a	  vision	  of	  the	  future	  where	  core	  policing	  functions	  are	  
carried	  out	  by	  autonomous	  entities.	  Nonetheless,	  most	  of	  the	  discussion	  in	  the	  thesis	  
will	  look	  at	  less	  sophisticated	  technology.	  This	  will	  not	  only	  ground	  this	  work	  in	  a	  
present	  day,	  real	  life	  scenario,	  it	  will	  also	  facilitate	  the	  development	  of	  a	  more	  abstract	  
concept	  of	  computer	  assisted	  online	  policing	  that	  is	  less	  dependent	  on	  any	  specific	  
technology.	  This	  thesis	  argues	  in	  particular	  that	  the	  use	  of	  Trojans,	  a	  piece	  of	  software	  
that	  shares	  some,	  but	  not	  all	  features	  with	  an	  autonomous	  agent,	  is	  already	  raising	  all	  
those	  legal	  issues	  that	  the	  more	  “excotic”	  future	  that	  we	  glimpsed	  from	  Deaver’s	  novel	  
raises.	  	  
	  
b)	  From	  Fact	  to	  Fiction	  
 
The	  increasing	  dependence	  on	  information	  and	  communication	  technologies	  (ICTs)	  has	  
profoundly	  affected	  the	  lives	  of	  people	  and	  changed	  society	  in	  many	  ways.	  	  
	  
“Often,	  the	  Internet	  allows	  people	  to	  do	  exactly	  what	  they	  have	  done	  before,	  yet	  
with	  much	  greater	  efficiency.	  Such	  activities	  do	  not	  raise	  any	  genuinely	  new	  legal	  
issues	  in	  the	  strict	  sense	  and	  at	  first	  seem	  wholly	  unremarkable,	  yet	  their	  
ordinariness	  is	  deceptive,	  as	  they	  question	  the	  efficacy	  of	  legal	  regimes	  which	  had	  
previously	  relied	  upon	  the	  impracticability	  of	  engaging	  in	  certain	  conduct.”14	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  See	  in	  particular	  B	  Schafer,	  M	  Rodriguez-­‐Rico,	  W	  Vandenberghe,	  “Undercover	  Agents	  and	  
Agents	  Provocateur-­‐	  Evidence	  Collection	  by	  Autonomous	  Agents	  and	  the	  Law”,	  in	  A	  Oskamp,	  C	  
Cevenini	  (eds)	  The	  Law	  and	  Electronic	  Agents:	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  LEA	  04	  workshop	  (Nijmegen:	  
Wolf	  Legal	  Publishers,	  2005)	  155-­‐170.	  
14	  U	  Kohl,	  Jurisdiction	  and	  the	  Internet	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2007)	  37.	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Maybe	  the	  most	  drastic	  transformation	  has	  occurred	  in	  the	  area	  of	  communication,	  and	  
especially	  data	  exchange	  and	  processing.	  The	  networked	  design	  of	  the	  Internet	  has	  
prompted	  the	  transition	  to	  an	  information	  society	  that	  increasingly	  depends	  upon	  
digital	  communication	  and	  computation	  infrastructures.15	  In	  this	  networked	  world,	  
physical	  distance	  and	  country	  borders	  are	  irrelevant,	  and	  instant	  communication	  and	  
data	  exchange	  primary	  functions.	  Everything	  that	  is	  online	  is	  data,	  and	  in	  this	  sense,	  all	  
Internet	  laws	  are	  laws	  about	  the	  flow	  of	  information.	  	  
This	  development	  has	  significantly	  changed	  the	  way	  people	  interact	  and	  communicate,	  
and	  exchange	  information	  and	  data.	  As	  a	  result,	  more	  aspects	  of	  people’s	  lives	  have	  
moved	  to	  digital	  networks	  and	  with	  this	  shift	  to	  the	  digital	  sphere,	  people	  have	  
developed	  a	  life	  online.	  This	  virtual	  living	  space	  has	  created	  entirely	  new	  opportunities,	  
with	  sometimes	  unprecedented	  consequences	  for	  societies	  and	  governments.	  16	  
	  
However,	  this	  shift	  has	  also	  created	  a	  dependency	  on	  the	  Internet	  and	  digital	  networks,	  
and	  this	  has	  created	  new	  vulnerabilities	  and	  prompted	  new	  ways	  for	  criminals	  to	  
exploit	  these.	  17	  Many	  existing	  crimes	  can	  be	  replicated	  in	  online	  environments,	  18	  and	  
new	  types	  of	  criminal	  behaviour,	  exploiting	  the	  digital	  infrastructure,	  have	  emerged.	  19	  
Criminals	  have	  become	  more	  mobile	  in	  their	  operation,	  using	  ICTs	  and	  the	  Internet	  to	  
form	  international	  networks	  that	  cross	  the	  borders	  of	  nation	  states.	  Terrorism	  in	  
particular	  has	  moved	  away	  from	  strict	  hierarchies	  to	  flexible	  organisations	  that	  mimic	  
modern	  business	  models	  and	  allow	  small	  groups	  high	  degrees	  of	  autonomy.20	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  For	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  technical	  foundations	  and	  the	  history	  of	  the	  Internet	  see	  e.g.	  J	  Bing,	  
“Building	  Cyberspace:	  A	  Brief	  History	  of	  Internet”	  in	  L	  A	  Bygrave,	  J	  Bing	  (eds.)	  Internet	  
Governance:	  Infrastructure	  and	  Institutions	  (Oxford,	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2009)	  8-­‐
48.	  
16	  One	  recent	  example	  for	  this	  is	  the	  use	  of	  social	  media	  applications	  during	  the	  Middle	  East	  
revolutions.	  See	  e.g.	  P	  Beaumont,	  “The	  Truth	  about	  Twitter,	  Facebook	  and	  the	  Uprisings	  in	  the	  
Arab	  World”	  Guardian,	  25	  February	  2011,	  available	  online	  at:	  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/25/twitter-­‐facebook-­‐uprisings-­‐arab-­‐libya.	  
17	  See	  e.g.	  D	  S	  Wall,	  “The	  Internet	  as	  a	  Conduit	  for	  Criminal	  Activity”	  in	  A	  Pattavina	  (ed)	  
Information	  Technology	  and	  the	  Criminal	  Justice	  System	  (London:	  Sage	  Publications,	  2005)	  77-­‐
98,	  stating	  that	  the	  Internet	  has	  had	  a	  major	  impact	  upon	  criminality.	  
18	  See	  e.g.	  S	  Balganesh,	  “Common	  Law	  Property	  Metaphors	  on	  the	  Internet:	  The	  Real	  Problem	  
with	  the	  Doctrine	  of	  Cybertrespass”	  (2006)	  12	  Michigan	  Telecommunications	  and	  Technology	  
Law	  Review,	  265,	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  problems	  of	  applying	  real	  world	  legal	  concepts	  to	  the	  
online	  world.	  
19	  See	  e.g.	  P	  Hunton,	  “The	  Growing	  Phenomenon	  of	  Crime	  and	  the	  Internet:	  A	  Cybercrime	  
Execution	  and	  Analysis	  Model”	  (2009)	  25:6	  Computer	  Law	  &	  Security	  Review,	  528-­‐535	  for	  an	  
analysis	  and	  discussion	  of	  cybercrime.	  
20	  See	  e.g.,	  B	  Tupman,	  “Where	  has	  all	  the	  money	  gone?	  The	  IRA	  as	  a	  profit-­‐making	  concern”	  
(1998)	  1:4	  Journal	  of	  Moneylaundering	  Control,	  32-­‐40;	  A	  Zelinsky,	  M	  Shubik,	  “Terrorist	  Groups	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This	  shift	  to	  the	  digital	  sphere	  also	  alters	  the	  understanding	  of	  crime	  in	  different	  ways,	  
an	  idea	  that	  is	  expressed	  in	  this	  thesis	  through	  a	  focus	  on	  “blurred	  borders”.	  	  Arguably	  
the	  most	  significant	  change	  is	  the	  shift	  of	  the	  crime	  scene	  from	  the	  physical	  to	  the	  
digital	  sphere,	  and	  a	  blurring	  between	  physical	  reality	  and	  simulation.	  This	  
development	  challenges	  existing	  police	  organisation	  and	  legal	  process	  because	  the	  
characteristics	  of	  the	  digital	  world	  differ	  significantly	  from	  those	  of	  the	  physical	  world.	  
	  
When	  thinking	  about	  the	  future	  of	  policing	  and	  law	  in	  an	  age	  of	  such	  porous	  borders,	  
what	  comes	  to	  mind	  first	  are	  the	  geographical	  borders	  between	  states.	  “In	  cyberspace,	  
events	  occur	  almost	  instantaneously	  across	  large	  distances,	  network	  boundaries	  do	  not	  
align	  with	  physical	  and	  political	  boundaries,	  and	  everyone	  on	  the	  network	  is	  your	  
neighbour.”21	  
Physical	  crime	  scenes	  do	  not	  travel	  well	  –	  which	  is	  why	  we	  sometimes	  bring	  jurors	  to	  
the	  actual	  scene	  of	  a	  crime,	  as	  the	  direct	  experience	  conveys	  information	  that	  its	  
translation	  into	  witness	  statements	  or	  expert	  transcripts,	  that	  is	  data,	  can’t.	  Digital	  
evidence,	  generated	  in	  cyberspace,	  however	  will	  often	  exist	  on	  servers	  distributed	  over	  
several	  countries,	  and	  can	  therefore	  be	  accessed	  and	  collected	  from	  more	  than	  one	  
country.	  Crime	  in	  cyberspace	  is	  not	  bound	  by	  physical	  geography	  and	  can	  inflict	  harm	  
across	  jurisdictional	  borders.	  This	  complicates	  the	  investigation	  process	  and	  reduces	  
the	  chances	  of	  successful	  prosecution.	  
In	  conceptualising	  the	  porous	  borders	  between	  cyberspace	  and	  physical	  space,	  the	  
question	  changes	  from	  one	  of	  geographical	  territory	  to	  that	  of	  “conceptual	  spaces”.	  
Geographical	  metaphors,	  while	  heuristically	  helpful,	  quickly	  reach	  here	  the	  limits	  of	  
their	  usefulness.22	  More	  generally,	  the	  real	  issue	  is	  often	  one	  of	  conceptual	  borders	  
between	  abstract	  legal	  contexts	  more	  than	  one	  of	  geographical	  borders.	  For	  example,	  it	  
does	  not	  matter	  so	  much	  where	  Guantanamo	  Bay	  is	  located	  geographically,	  but	  where	  
it	  is	  located	  “conceptually”,	  that	  is	  within	  or	  outside	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  US	  courts	  and	  
their	  habeas	  corpus	  protection.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
as	  Business	  Firms:	  A	  New	  Typological	  Framework”	  (2009)	  21:2	  Terrorism	  and	  Political	  
Violence,	  327-­‐336.	  
21	  J	  M	  Balkin,	  N	  Kozlovski,	  “Introduction”	  in	  J	  M	  Balkin,	  J	  Grimmelmann,	  E	  Katz,	  N	  Kozlovski,	  S	  
Wagman,	  T	  Zarsky	  (eds)	  Cybercrime:	  Digital	  Cops	  in	  a	  Networked	  Environment	  (New	  York,	  
London:	  New	  York	  University	  Press,	  2007)	  1-­‐12,	  2.	  
22	  One	  could	  think	  in	  this	  context	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  “safe	  harbour”,	  in	  data	  protection	  contexts,	  a	  
problematic	  metaphorical	  use	  of	  a	  geographical	  notion	  taken	  from	  traditional	  international	  
public	  law	  and	  applied	  to	  the	  conceptual	  issue	  of	  data	  transfer	  across	  borders	  in	  cyberspace.	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The	  example	  of	  evidence	  collected	  from	  cyberspace	  indicates	  a	  second	  porous	  border,	  
this	  time	  a	  border	  between	  the	  virtual	  and	  the	  real,	  digital	  evidence	  and	  concrete	  
physical	  evidence.	  In	  a	  highly	  complex	  process,	  electronic	  traces	  are	  eventually	  
transformed	  into	  hard,	  tangible	  printouts.23	  In	  crossing	  the	  border	  between	  the	  digital	  
and	  the	  physical,	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  evidence	  changes,	  raising	  numerous	  problems	  for	  
procedural	  law.	  Where,	  exactly,	  in	  this	  process	  is	  “the”	  evidence	  located?	  What	  is	  “the”	  
original	  piece	  of	  evidence?	  
	  
Traditional	  investigative	  measures,	  designed	  for	  the	  offline	  world,	  are	  more	  than	  often	  
insufficient	  for	  the	  investigation	  of	  the	  online	  world.	  Thus	  the	  blurring	  of	  the	  digital	  and	  
the	  physical	  world	  has	  prompted	  the	  development	  of	  a	  new	  cyber-­‐policing	  system	  and	  
new	  software-­‐based	  investigative	  tools.	  	  
This	  indicates	  another	  porous	  border,	  which	  in	  the	  past	  was	  perceived	  as	  rock	  solid:	  
the	  border	  between	  normative	  and	  descriptive	  discourses.	  Lessig’s	  influential	  work	  on	  
“code	  as	  code”	  has	  alerted	  us	  to	  the	  potential	  of	  cyberspace	  to	  replace	  traditional	  
normative	  and	  legal	  debates	  with	  questions	  of	  software	  programming.24	  The	  design	  of	  
the	  Internet,	  its	  networked	  software	  and	  hardware	  environment,	  is	  a	  central	  device	  for	  
regulating	  network	  activity.	  Where	  traditional	  normative	  legal	  thinking	  analysed	  for	  
instance	  copyright	  law	  as	  including	  a	  set	  of	  sanctions	  for	  copyright	  violations,	  norms	  
that	  required	  application	  of	  the	  law	  by	  courts	  to	  a	  situation,	  digital	  rights	  management	  
can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  self-­‐applying,	  descriptive	  version	  of	  the	  same	  law	  that	  makes	  violation	  
of	  the	  legal	  norm	  physically	  impossible.	  This	  also	  has	  an	  enormous	  influence	  on	  the	  
practical	  liberty	  and	  privacy	  that	  people	  enjoy	  online.25	  
	  
This	  thesis	  predicts	  that	  the	  new	  cyber-­‐policing	  system	  will	  take	  this	  to	  another	  level,	  
by	  complementing	  or	  even	  replacing	  human	  police	  officers	  and	  traditional	  forms	  of	  
policing	  with	  software-­‐based	  investigative	  tools	  and	  cyber-­‐policing.	  This	  new	  cyber-­‐
policing	  system	  will	  have	  to	  be	  at	  least	  partly	  automated	  –	  one	  has	  just	  to	  consider	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  For	  an	  analysis	  that	  also	  analyses	  the	  “borders”	  between	  physical	  and	  digital	  evidence	  see	  B	  
Carrier,	  E	  Spafford,	  “Getting	  Physical	  with	  the	  Digital	  Investigation	  Process	  (2003)	  2	  
International	  Journal	  of	  Digital	  Evidence,	  1-­‐20.	  	  
24	  L	  Lessig,	  Code	  and	  Other	  Laws	  of	  Cyberspace	  (New	  York:	  Basic	  Books,	  1999).	  
25	  L	  Tien,	  “Architectural	  Regulatioin	  and	  the	  Evolution	  of	  Social	  Norms”in	  J	  M	  Balkin,	  J	  
Grimmelmann,	  E	  Katz,	  N	  Kozlovski,	  S	  Wagman,	  T	  Zarsky	  (eds)	  Cybercrime:	  Digital	  Cops	  in	  a	  
Networked	  Environment	  (New	  York,	  London:	  New	  York	  University	  Press,	  2007)	  37-­‐58.	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amount	  of	  “crime	  data”	  Nigerian	  spam	  emails	  alone	  generate,	  something	  that	  makes	  
every	  private	  computer,	  doctrinally,	  a	  potential	  crime	  scene.	  It	  is	  much	  more	  pervasive	  
than	  traditional	  forms	  of	  policing	  and	  mainly	  preventive.	  It	  calls	  for	  ubiquitous	  policing	  
of	  online	  activities	  to	  monitor,	  detect,	  prevent	  and	  control	  potentially	  malicious	  
activities.	  	  
The	  architecture	  of	  this	  virtual	  cyber-­‐policing	  environment	  is	  designed	  to	  enable	  
ubiquitous	  surveillance	  and	  targeted	  monitoring	  of	  suspects.	  	  
The	  new	  cyber-­‐cops	  are,	  contrary	  to	  human	  police	  officers,	  invisible	  and	  operate	  
according	  to	  software-­‐design	  paradigms	  instead	  of	  a	  mix	  of	  formal	  laws	  and	  human	  
discretion.	  
	  
With	  these	  new	  forms	  of	  policing	  and	  surveillance	  come	  new	  dangers	  for	  civil	  liberties.	  
The	  new	  cyber-­‐policing	  system	  is	  largely	  emerging	  without	  a	  dedicated	  legal	  
framework.	  There	  is,	  as	  shown	  later	  in	  this	  thesis,	  an	  increasing	  danger	  that	  existing	  
laws	  and	  regulations	  governing	  police	  operations	  can	  be	  sidelined	  debates	  about	  
fundamental	  rights	  transformed	  into	  technical	  discussions	  about	  software	  protocols.	  
The	  use	  of	  the	  investigative	  results	  of	  these	  cyber-­‐policing	  systems	  is	  therefore	  highly	  
questionable,	  and	  it	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	  whether	  the	  results	  they	  deliver	  would	  stand	  up	  
in	  court.	  
	  
It	  is	  therefore	  critical	  to	  develop	  approaches	  to	  resolve	  this	  uncertain	  situation.	  At	  this	  
stage,	  the	  legal	  framework	  is	  ill-­‐equipped	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  new	  policing	  system.	  
Criminal	  procedure	  law	  fulfils	  the	  dual	  task	  of	  enabling	  policing	  operations	  on	  the	  one	  
hand,	  and	  restricting	  them	  on	  the	  other	  to	  protect	  citizens	  from	  arbitrary	  state	  power.	  
It	  aims	  to	  allow	  those	  policing	  actions	  that	  are	  reasonable,	  proportional,	  and	  
accountable.	  Criminal	  procedure	  law	  is,	  however,	  deeply	  rooted	  in	  the	  traditional	  
policing	  system,	  which	  is	  mainly	  reactive	  to	  crime	  and	  is	  tailored	  to	  the	  physical	  crime	  
scene	  and	  evidence.	  It	  also	  assumes	  that	  human	  officers	  execute	  the	  policing	  actions	  
and	  is	  premised	  on	  concepts	  such	  as	  “human	  discretion”,	  “reasonable	  suspicion”,	  
“balance”	  and	  other	  concepts	  that	  refer	  explicitly	  to	  mental	  states.	  It	  thus	  struggles	  
equally	  with	  the	  enabling	  and	  restraining	  of	  the	  new	  cyber-­‐policing	  system,	  and	  
particularly	  the	  use	  of	  cyber-­‐cops.	  
	  
In	  this	  thesis	  I	  draw	  upon	  both	  worlds,	  the	  technical	  and	  the	  legal,	  to	  develop	  a	  solution	  
for	  the	  uncertain	  state	  of	  cyber-­‐cops	  and	  cyber-­‐policing.	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I	  argue	  that	  the	  time	  to	  develop	  new	  legal	  mechanisms	  is	  now,	  while	  the	  cyber-­‐policing	  
technologies	  are	  still	  being	  developed	  to	  avoid	  rushed	  and	  ill-­‐drafted	  legislation	  and	  
policies,	  as	  well	  as	  illegitimate	  use	  of	  new	  powers.	  
	  
I	  draw	  upon	  a	  recent,	  well-­‐documented	  example	  of	  a	  new	  software-­‐based	  investigative	  
power	  to	  determine	  how	  the	  law	  currently	  handles	  the	  use	  of	  these	  technologies.	  One	  
outcome	  of	  this	  analysis	  is	  that	  the	  precise	  technical	  nature	  of	  these	  new	  technologies	  
needs	  to	  be	  determined	  to	  develop	  an	  adequate	  regulatory	  framework	  for	  their	  use.	  
	  
By	  analysing	  recent	  findings	  in	  computer	  science	  and	  artificial	  intelligence,	  I	  develop	  a	  
new	  class	  of	  policing	  technologies	  –mobile,	  intelligent	  and	  autonomous	  policing	  tools	  –	  
and	  determine	  how	  these	  cyber-­‐cops	  operate	  and	  what	  their	  policing	  environment	  is.	  	  
	  
Based	  on	  these	  results	  and	  the	  findings	  of	  empirical	  research	  conducted	  for	  this	  work,	  I	  
examine	  how	  the	  law	  deals	  with	  the	  two	  most	  pressing	  problems	  of	  the	  use	  of	  these	  
new	  investigative	  technologies:	  cross-­‐jurisdictional	  policing,	  and	  the	  use	  of	  
“technologically	  mediated	  data”	  as	  evidence	  of	  the	  investigative	  results.	  I	  argue	  that	  
these	  new	  software-­‐based	  policing	  and	  surveillance	  tools	  are	  potentially	  in	  conflict	  
with	  existing	  international	  law	  principles	  and	  criminal	  procedure	  laws.	  	  
	  
I	  argue	  that	  the	  primary	  approach	  to	  achieving	  legitimacy	  for	  digital	  investigators	  is	  an	  
application	  of	  the	  “equivalence	  principle”:	  Just	  as	  for	  citizens,	  what	  is	  prohibited	  offline	  
is	  also	  prohibited	  online,	  so	  for	  the	  state	  and	  its	  agents.	  Technology	  must	  not	  be	  used	  to	  
circumvent	  rules	  that	  restrain	  police	  power,	  just	  because	  it	  is	  not	  necessarily	  wielded	  
any	  longer	  by	  a	  physical	  being.	  One	  such	  response	  is	  to	  assign	  legal	  responsibility	  for	  
their	  actions	  to	  these	  cyber-­‐cops.	  Just	  like	  their	  human	  counterparts,	  these	  cyber-­‐cops	  
must	  adhere	  to	  the	  rules	  enabling	  and	  restraining	  their	  actions,	  but	  unlike	  human	  
beings,	  at	  least	  some	  of	  these	  rules	  will	  have	  to	  be	  integrated	  into	  the	  software	  design	  
itself,	  to	  get	  as	  close	  as	  possible	  to	  the	  functional	  online	  equivalent,	  for	  legal	  purposes,	  
of	  a	  human	  state	  of	  mind.	  	  
	  
So	  far,	  software-­‐based	  investigative	  and	  surveillance	  tools	  have	  been	  developed	  with	  
no	  attention	  to	  their	  unique	  programmability	  to	  ensure	  legality	  and	  legitimacy.	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Legislators	  and	  courts	  have	  further	  contributed	  to	  this	  deficit	  by	  refusing,	  or	  ignoring	  
the	  option,	  to	  collaborate	  with	  technical	  disciplines	  on	  this.	  	  
	  
By	  combining	  legal	  and	  technical	  findings,	  I	  therefore	  develop	  a	  novel	  approach	  to	  
ensure	  that	  the	  software-­‐based	  investigative	  and	  surveillance	  tools	  operate	  within	  the	  
parameters	  of	  the	  legal	  framework,	  and	  therefore	  obtain	  legitimacy	  and	  relevance,	  also	  
with	  regard	  to	  the	  investigative	  results.	  
1.1 Background and Motivation 
Ever	  since	  the	  9/11	  terrorist	  attacks,	  many	  western	  governments	  investigated	  ways	  to	  
improve	  national	  security.	  	  
Among	  the	  measures	  implemented	  in	  the	  US	  were	  the	  USA	  Patriot	  Act26	  and	  the	  
foundation	  of	  the	  Total	  Information	  Awareness	  Office	  (TIA),	  which	  was	  later	  renamed	  
to	  the	  less	  ominously	  sounding	  (Terrorist)	  Information	  Awareness	  Office.27	  	  
In	  the	  UK,	  the	  Anti-­Terrorism,	  Crime	  and	  Security	  Act	  2001	  was	  introduced	  as	  a	  reaction	  
to	  the	  attacks.28	  However,	  it	  has	  since	  been	  replaced	  by	  the	  Prevention	  of	  Terrorism	  Act	  
2005.29	  In	  addition,	  as	  a	  response	  to	  the	  2005	  London	  bombings	  the	  Terrorism	  Act	  2006	  
was	  introduced	  in	  the	  Uk.30	  
In	  Germany,	  the	  Gesetz	  zur	  Bekämpfung	  des	  internationalen	  Terrorismus	  
(Terrorismusbekämpfungsgesetz	  –	  Law	  to	  fight	  terrorism)	  was	  introduced	  in	  the	  
aftermath	  of	  the	  9/11	  attacks	  as	  a	  measure	  to	  combat	  terrorism.31	  
One	  reason	  for	  the	  rushed	  legislation	  in	  these	  countries	  was	  the	  inability	  of	  intelligence	  
agencies	  to	  predict	  and	  prevent	  the	  9/11	  terrorist	  attacks.	  It	  became	  clear	  that	  the	  
intelligence	  infrastructure	  was	  unable	  to	  cope	  with	  terrorism	  as	  a	  form	  of	  low-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  The	  USA	  Patriot	  Act	  was	  signed	  into	  law	  on	  October	  26,	  2001.	  The	  title	  of	  the	  act	  is	  an	  
acronym	  that	  stands	  for	  “Uniting	  (and)	  Strengthening	  America	  (by)	  Providing	  Appropriate	  Tools	  
Required	  (to)	  Intercept	  (and)	  Obstruct	  Terrorism	  Act	  of	  2001.	  
27	  The	  Terrorist	  Information	  Awareness	  Office	  was	  discontinued	  when	  funding	  was	  repealed	  in	  
September	  2003	  (Conference	  Report	  on	  H.R.	  2658,	  Department	  of	  Defense	  Appropriations	  Act	  
2004,	  House	  Report	  108-­‐283).	  
28	  It	  was	  formally	  introduced	  in	  Parliament	  on	  10	  November	  2001	  and	  came	  into	  force	  on	  14	  
December	  2001.	  
29	  The	  2005	  Act	  was	  a	  reaction	  to	  the	  Law	  Lord’s	  ruling	  of	  16	  December	  2004	  that	  Part	  4	  of	  the	  
Anti-­Terrorism,	  Crime	  and	  Security	  Act	  2001	  was	  incompatible	  with	  European	  human	  rights	  
laws.	  The	  2005	  Act	  stands	  to	  be	  repealed	  by	  the	  Terrorism	  Prevention	  and	  Investigation	  Measures	  
Bill	  2011.	  
30	  The	  Act	  was	  introduced	  on	  12	  October	  2005	  and	  came	  into	  force	  on	  30	  March	  2006.	  
31	  The	  Law	  came	  into	  force	  on	  1	  January	  2002.	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intensity/low-­‐density	  warfare.32	  The	  main	  problem	  was	  that	  different	  agencies	  
involved	  in	  detecting	  the	  information	  trails	  that	  terrorists	  usually	  leave	  behind	  were	  
unable	  to	  recognise,	  collect,	  and	  share	  the	  available	  information.	  This	  was	  also	  partly	  
due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Internet	  and	  ICTs	  have	  changed	  the	  way	  terrorist	  networks	  are	  
structured.33	  They	  operate	  as	  covert	  networks,	  oftentimes	  with	  the	  single	  links	  of	  the	  
network	  uninformed	  about	  the	  others.	  
In	  2007,	  German	  law	  enforcement	  authorities	  officially	  introduced	  a	  new	  investigative	  
method	  to	  address	  the	  difficulties	  faced	  by	  these	  new	  structures:	  the	  remote	  and	  
automatic	  online	  searching	  of	  computers	  and	  other	  ICT	  devices	  using	  a	  specifically	  
designed	  piece	  of	  software.	  34	  The	  aim	  of	  introducing	  this	  new	  investigative	  method	  was	  
to	  clandestinely	  monitor	  web	  communications	  and	  information	  stored	  on	  ICT	  devices.	  
The	  introduction	  of	  this	  method	  caused	  much	  discussion	  and	  debate	  among	  both	  legal	  
and	  technical	  experts.	  	  
The	  idea	  of	  deploying	  a	  piece	  of	  software	  to	  undertake	  investigative	  actions	  was	  
unprecedented	  and	  issues	  concerning,	  among	  others,	  privacy	  and	  data	  protection	  
rights	  of	  affected	  suspects,	  as	  well	  as	  concerns	  regarding	  the	  sophistication	  of	  the	  piece	  
of	  software	  arose.	  	  
However,	  the	  idea	  of	  clandestinely	  monitoring	  suspects	  online	  and	  searching	  the	  data	  
stored	  on	  their	  ICT	  devices	  was	  compelling	  not	  only	  to	  German	  authorities	  but	  also	  to	  
other	  governments	  in	  Europe	  and	  beyond.35	  	  
The	  idea	  that	  information	  plays	  a	  key	  role	  in	  fighting	  terrorism	  (or	  any	  other	  form	  of	  
criminal	  conduct)	  stems	  from	  the	  Baconian	  idea	  that	  ‘knowledge	  is	  power’.36	  Modern	  
society,	  with	  its	  widespread	  use	  of	  ICTs,	  provides	  unprecedented	  possibilities	  to	  obtain	  
data	  and	  communicate,	  and	  thus	  it	  seems	  that	  Bacon’s	  aphorism	  is	  especially	  relevant	  
within	  our	  networked	  ‘information	  society’.	  Gaining	  access	  to	  this	  data	  is	  therefore	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  F	  G	  Hoffman,	  “Complex	  Irregular	  Warfare:	  The	  Next	  Revolution	  in	  Military	  Affairs”	  (2005)	  
105:1	  The	  Military	  Balance	  411-­‐420.	  
33	  See	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  this	  V	  E	  Krebs,	  “Uncloaking	  Terrorist	  Networks”	  (2002)	  7:4	  First	  
Monday.	  
34	  See	  chapter	  2	  for	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  this.	  
35	  See	  chapter	  2	  for	  a	  more	  extensive	  discussion	  of	  this,	  and	  for	  an	  example	  the	  
recommendation	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  on	  this	  topic,	  ‘Council	  Conclusions	  on	  a	  
Concerted	  Work	  Strategy	  and	  Practical	  Measures	  Against	  Cybercrime’,	  2987th	  Justice	  and	  Home	  
Affairs	  Council	  meeting,	  27	  –	  28	  November	  2008,	  available	  at	  
http://www.ue2008.fr/webdav/site/PFUE/shared/import/	  
1127_JAI/Conclusions/JHA_Council_conclusions_Cybercrime_EN.pdf.	  
36	  F	  Bacon,	  “Meditationes	  Sacrae”	  (1597),	  in	  J	  Spedding,	  R	  Ellis,	  D	  Heath	  (eds),	  The	  Works	  of	  
Francis	  Bacon	  (1887-­‐1901),	  Vol.	  7,	  253.	  
	   22	  
utmost	  interest	  for	  law	  enforcement	  agencies,	  and	  potential	  legal	  and	  technical	  issues	  
of	  new	  investigative	  methods	  are	  oftentimes	  ignored	  until	  acute	  problems	  emerge.	  	  
Most	  of	  the	  times	  these	  are	  then	  addressed	  individually	  and	  frequently	  with	  rushed	  or	  
ill-­‐drafted	  measures,	  which	  do	  not	  sufficiently	  address	  the	  technical	  issues	  at	  hand,	  as	  
well	  as	  the	  technological	  development	  of	  the	  foreseeable	  future.	  	  
This	  is	  also	  true	  for	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  online	  searching	  of	  ICTs	  in	  Germany.37	  On	  
this	  occasion	  the	  highest	  German	  Court	  for	  constitutional	  matters,	  the	  
Bundesverfassungsgericht	  (German	  Constitutional	  Court)	  was	  called	  to	  decide	  upon	  the	  
constitutionality	  of	  the	  measure.	  However,	  such	  high	  court	  reasoning	  only	  very	  rarely	  
provides	  a	  detailed	  framework	  for	  the	  use	  and	  regulation	  of	  a	  new	  investigative	  
measure.	  	  
On	  this	  occasion,38	  the	  reasoning	  was	  technically	  even	  exceptionally	  well	  grounded.	  The	  
result,	  however,	  was	  a	  highly	  conceptual	  judgment	  about	  the	  protection	  of	  fundamental	  
rights	  (particularly	  privacy	  and	  data	  protection	  rights)	  online.	  The	  judgment	  in	  itself	  is	  
of	  great	  importance	  for	  future	  regulation	  of	  ICTs	  and	  the	  Internet.	  However,	  as	  court	  
decisions	  often	  do,	  it	  addressed	  mainly	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  right	  that	  was	  infringed,	  and	  
the	  question	  of	  legal	  consequences	  for	  such	  an	  infringement.	  It	  is	  less	  helpful	  to	  direct	  
the	  actions	  of	  future	  software	  developers	  and	  police	  agencies	  to	  develop	  law	  compliant	  
strategies,	  a	  “middle	  ground”	  between	  the	  highly	  abstract	  and	  conceptual	  reasoning	  of	  
the	  German	  Federal	  Constitutional	  Court	  and	  the	  purely	  technical	  issues	  of	  
programming	  standards	  that	  this	  thesis	  tries	  to	  cover.	  Hence	  at	  present,	  the	  legal	  
questions,	  concerns	  and	  issues	  pertaining	  to	  the	  use	  of	  this	  investigative	  tool	  persist.	  39	  
	  
The	  importance	  of	  the	  online	  search	  and	  similar	  investigative	  measures	  for	  future	  
police	  investigations	  is	  evident	  given	  the	  importance	  that	  ICTs	  and	  the	  Internet	  have	  
gained	  in	  societies.	  This	  is	  also	  confirmed	  by	  recent	  disclosure	  about	  the	  ongoing	  
deployment	  of	  this	  investigative	  measure	  in	  Germany	  and	  other	  countries	  despite	  the	  
unsolved	  legal	  and	  technical	  issues.	  This	  has	  been	  heavily	  criticised	  and	  it	  has	  been	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  See	  for	  more	  details	  chapter	  2.	  
38	  BVerfG,	  NJW	  2008,	  822.	  	  
39	  See	  e.g.	  H	  Bleich,	  “Staatstrojaner:	  Mehr	  als	  50	  Einsätze	  bundesweit”	  heise,	  16.10.2011,	  
available	  online	  at	  http://heise.de/-­‐1361857	  ,	  discussing	  that	  the	  online	  searching	  of	  computers	  
was	  undertaken	  more	  than	  50	  times	  since	  its	  introduction.	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stated	  that	  further	  research	  into	  the	  legal	  and	  technical	  aspects	  of	  this	  investigative	  
measure	  is	  necessary	  before	  it	  can	  be	  deployed	  legally.40	  	  	  
These	  acute	  problems	  combined	  with	  the	  future	  relevance	  of	  this	  new	  investigative	  
method	  were	  the	  motivation	  for	  focusing	  on	  the	  topic	  of	  new	  mobile,	  intelligent	  and	  
autonomous	  policing	  tools	  and	  the	  legal	  and	  technical	  problems	  thereof.	  
1.2 Precise Formulation, Research Goals and Questions 
The	  question	  this	  thesis	  answers	  is	  whether	  existing	  legislation	  regulating	  police	  
investigations	  and	  evidence	  gathering,	  and	  the	  admissibility	  and	  interpretation	  of	  this	  
evidence	  in	  court	  is	  sufficient	  and	  adequate	  to	  regulate	  the	  use	  of	  mobile,	  intelligent	  
and	  autonomous	  (MIA)	  policing	  tools.	  
1.2.1 Research Goals 
	  
1. Development	   of	   a	   definition	   of	   MIA	   policing	   tools	   as	   a	   generic	   concept	   that	  
covers	   present-­‐day	   Trojans	   and	   any	   possible	   future,	   more	   intelligent	   and	  
autonomous,	  agent	  technology,	  and	  evaluate	  this	  technology	  and	  its	  use	  during	  
investigations;	  
2. Evaluation	   of	   the	   existing	   legal	   framework	   regulating	   police	   investigations	   in	  
the	  light	  of	  MIA	  policing	  tools;	  
3. Development	  of	  a	  novel	  regulatory	  model	  to	  adequately	  govern	  the	  use	  of	  MIA	  
policing	  tools	  that	  demonstrates	  how	  specific	  legal	  provisions	  can	  be	  embedded	  
in	   software	   code,	   while	   for	   other	   issues	   a	   conceptual	   rethink	   of	   legislative	  
responses	  may	  be	  needed	  
1.2.2 Research Questions 
1. What	  are	  MIA	  policing	  tools	  and	  how	  are	  they	  being	  used	  by	  law	  enforcement	  
and	  secret	  service	  agencies?	  
2. How	  will	  the	  use	  of	  MIA	  policing	  tools	  influence	  police	  investigations?	  
3. How	  will	   the	   use	   of	  MIA	   policing	   tools	   impact/challenge	   the	   legal	   framework	  
regulating	  police	  investigations.	  
4. In	  order	  to	  safeguard	  privacy	  and	  security	  of	  suspects	  and	  the	  integrity	  of	  police	  
investigations	   and	   findings	   how	   must	   the	   use	   of	   MIA	   policing	   tools	   be	  
regulated?	  
5. How	  can	  we	  represent	  key	  legal	  concepts	  from	  evidence	  law	  and	  police	  practice	  
into	  computer	  code	  to	  bridge	  the	  gap	  between	  offline	  and	  online	  policing?	  
6. What	   legal	   responses	   are	   conceivable	   to	   address	   those	   remaining	   issues	   that	  
cannot	  be	  addressed	  through	  code	  based	  solutions?	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  See	  e.g.	  J	  Kuri,	  “Staatstrojaner:	  Von	  der	  ‘rechtlichen	  Grauzone’	  zur	  Grundrechtsverletzung”	  
heise,	  10.10.2011,	  available	  online	  at	  http://heise.de/-­‐1357873.	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1.3 Methodology 
Most	  of	  the	  research	  for	  this	  thesis	  is	  traditional	  doctrinal	  text-­‐based	  research.	  
However,	  this	  research	  methodology	  has	  two	  significant	  shortcomings	  for	  adequately	  
assessing	  this	  specific	  topic.	  Firstly,	  publicly	  available	  information	  about	  the	  details	  of	  
the	  envisaged	  investigative	  tools	  is	  scarce	  and	  oftentimes	  based	  on	  speculation	  rather	  
than	  facts.	  Secondly,	  as	  identified	  above,	  the	  problem	  that	  legal	  scholars	  and	  
practitioners	  are	  ignoring	  the	  technical	  aspects	  of	  the	  topic	  at	  hand.	  	  
This	  required	  a	  deviation	  from	  the	  traditional	  text-­‐based	  legal	  research	  methodology.	  	  
To	  ensure	  that	  the	  research	  conducted	  for	  this	  thesis	  is	  based	  on	  valid	  facts	  and	  
therefore	  timely	  and	  well-­‐grounded,	  empirical	  research	  in	  form	  of	  interviews	  with	  
relevant	  stakeholders	  from	  Germany	  and	  the	  UK	  was	  conducted.41	  	  
Given	  the	  confidential	  nature	  of	  police	  and	  secret	  service	  investigations	  exact	  details	  
about	  the	  new	  software-­‐based	  investigative	  tools	  for	  investigations	  of	  the	  virtual	  living	  
space	  were	  not	  released	  to	  the	  public	  domain.	  However,	  relevant	  research	  is	  only	  
possible	  when	  based	  on	  facts	  and	  sufficiently	  detailed	  and	  reliable	  information.	  This	  is	  
particularly	  the	  case	  if	  the	  research	  is	  focused	  on	  an	  entirely	  novel	  technology,	  in	  this	  
case	  the	  new	  investigative	  software	  designed	  to	  conduct	  investigations	  of	  the	  virtual	  
living	  space.	  	  
The	  stakeholders	  relevant	  for	  this	  work	  are	  representatives	  from	  relevant	  
governmental	  departments	  (e.g.	  Ministry	  of	  Justice),	  law	  enforcement,	  regulatory	  
authorities	  and	  Internet	  Service	  Providers	  (ISPs).	  In	  addition,	  to	  gain	  a	  better	  
understanding	  of	  the	  technical	  aspects	  of	  this	  investigative	  measure,	  a	  technical	  expert	  
from	  the	  Chaos	  Computer	  Club	  with	  a	  relevant	  background	  and	  understanding	  of	  the	  
topic	  was	  selected.	  
These	  interview	  results	  significantly	  shaped	  the	  structure	  and	  foci	  of	  the	  thesis,	  making	  
it	  highly	  relevant	  for	  current	  policymaking	  and	  practice.42	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  empirical	  research	  element,	  to	  ensure	  that	  sufficient	  technical	  
expertise	  was	  incorporated	  into	  the	  technical	  part	  of	  the	  thesis,	  a	  study	  visit	  to	  the	  
Leibniz	  Center	  for	  Law	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Amsterdam	  was	  incorporated	  into	  the	  PhD	  
study.	  The	  Leibniz	  Center	  for	  Law	  is	  a	  world-­‐renowned	  research	  hub	  for	  studies	  in	  law	  
and	  artificial	  intelligence.	  Collaboration	  with	  researchers	  there	  ensured	  that	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41	  See	  chapter	  3	  for	  details.	  
42	  See	  below	  section	  1.4	  for	  an	  outline	  of	  the	  thesis.	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technical	  parts	  of	  the	  thesis	  are	  correct	  and	  relevant.	  Feedback	  and	  discussions	  also	  
influenced	  and	  shaped	  the	  technical	  analysis.	  
Furthermore,	  empirical	  research	  conducted	  as	  a	  partner	  on	  two	  European	  Union	  
projects	  has	  backed	  up	  the	  interview	  results	  and	  the	  legal	  analysis.43	  
These	  deviations	  from	  traditional	  legal	  research	  ensured	  that	  the	  thesis	  is	  significant	  
and	  of	  relevance	  for	  the	  current	  and	  future	  debate	  of	  ICT	  based	  investigative	  tools,	  as	  
well	  as	  useful	  to	  stakeholders	  faced	  with	  the	  legal	  and	  technical	  issues	  surrounding	  
these	  novel	  investigative	  tools.	  
1.4 Thesis Outline 
The	  structure	  of	  this	  thesis	  reflects	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  cross-­‐disciplinary	  approach	  
of	  the	  chosen	  research	  topic.	  It	  also	  highlights	  the	  relevance	  of	  the	  empirical	  research	  
results	  and	  reflects	  how	  these	  are	  incorporated	  into	  the	  work.	  	  
Accordingly,	  the	  chapters	  are	  structured	  as	  follows:	  
	  
Chapter	  2	  The	  Case	  Study	  –	  The	  German	  Federal	  Trojan	  
This	   chapter	   introduces	   the	  main	   focus	  of	   the	   thesis:	   the	  policing	  of	   the	  virtual	   living	  
space	  and	  technical	  and	  legal	  problems	  thereof.	  It	  does	  so	  by	  discussing	  an	  example	  in	  
point:	   the	  recent	   introduction	  of	  a	  new	  software-­‐based	   investigative	  power	   for	  police	  
and	  secret	  services	  in	  Germany,	  and	  the	  legal	  and	  technical	  problems	  resulting	  thereof.	  
	  
Chapter	  3	  Empirical	  Research	  Results	  
This	  chapter	  summarises	  the	  findings	  from	  interviews	  with	  different	  stakeholders	  from	  
the	  UK	  and	  Germany	   involved	   in	   the	  regulation	  of	   the	  online	  world	  (government,	   law	  
enforcement,	   industry,	   technical	  experts,	  and	  regulators).	  These	  findings	  highlight	  the	  
theoretical	   assumptions	   of	   this	   thesis,	   and	   in	   addition	   identify	   the	   problems	   and	  
challenges	  stakeholders	  are	  currently	  facing.	  
	  
Chapter	  4	  Software-­Based	  Investigative	  Tools	  
This	   chapter	   determines	   the	   technical	   nature	   of	   the	   proposed	   new	   software-­‐based	  
investigative	  tools	  to	  undertake	  investigations	  of	  the	  virtual	  living	  space,	  such	  as	  online	  
searches	  of	  ICT	  devices.	  In	  addition,	   it	   illustrates	  how	  the	  use	  of	  these	  software-­‐based	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43	  See	  chapter	  3,	  p.	  77	  for	  more	  details.	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investigative	   tools	   and	   other	   related	   technologies	   change	   the	   nature	   of	   criminal	  
investigations.	  	  
	  
Chapter	  5	  MIA	  Policing	  Tools	  
This	  chapter	  develops	  a	  new	  class	  of	  future	  software-­‐based	  investigative	  tools	  –	  mobile,	  
intelligent	  and	  autonomous	  (MIA)	  policing	  tools.	  
	  
Chapter	  6	  Cross-­Jurisdictional	  MIA	  Investigations	  
This	  chapter	  discusses	  the	  problem	  of	  intentional	  and	  unintentional	  cross-­‐jurisdictional	  
investigations	  of	  ICT	  devices	  resulting	  from	  the	  deployment	  of	  MIA	  tools.	  
	  
Chapter	  7	  Double	  Digitality	  
This	   chapter	  discusses	   the	  problems	  of	  digital	   evidence	   for	   the	   law,	   and	   in	  particular	  
the	  problems	  arising	  from	  the	  “double-­‐digital	  paradigm”,	  meaning	  software	  tools	  (MIA	  
tools)	  seizing	  digital	  data	  without	  direct	  human	  supervision.	  
	  
Chapter	  8	  MIA	  Law	  
This	  chapter	  builds	  on	   the	   technical	  possibilities	  of	  MIA	  tools,	  and	   the	   legal	  problems	  
identified	   above.	   It	   develops	   the	   regulatory	  model:	  MIA	   law,	   and	   analyses	   in	   how	   far	  
endowing	  MIA	  tools	  with	  legal	  reasoning	  capabilities	  is	  a	  suitable	  reguklatory	  approach	  
for	  the	  new	  class	  of	  investigative	  technologies,	  building	  on	  findings	  in	  legal	  theory	  and	  
computational	  legal	  theory.	  
	  
Chapter	  9	  Soft	  MIA	  Law	  
Building	   on	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   a	   novel	   approach	   of	   regulation	   through	   code	   is	  
introduced	   here.	   The	   specific	   legal	   problems	   identified	   in	   the	   previous	   chapters	   are	  
taken	  into	  account.	  
	  
Chapter	  10	  Conclusion	  
This	  chapter	  summarises	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  thesis	  and	  the	  contributions	  made	  to	  the	  
field	  of	  research.	  It	  also	  discusses	  issues	  that	  are	  relevant	  but	  not	  discussed	  in	  this	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2 THE CASE STUDY – THE GERMAN FEDERAL TROJAN 
	  
The	  nature	  of	  crime	  has	  partially	  changed	  due	  to	  the	  shift	  from	  the	  physical	  to	  the	  
digital	  world,	  and	  the	  increased	  dependence	  of	  people	  on	  the	  Internet	  and	  ICTs.	  Crime	  
scenes	  and	  evidence	  are	  now	  often	  located	  in	  the	  digital	  sphere,	  where	  the	  parameters	  
of	  the	  physical	  world	  are	  not	  applicable.	  	  
	  
A	  recent	  example	  illustrating	  this	  is	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  new	  software-­‐based	  
investigative	  tool	  for	  police	  and	  secret	  services	  in	  Germany,	  which	  allows	  the	  remote	  
online	  searching	  of	  ICT	  devices,	  and	  particularly	  computers	  with	  a	  piece	  of	  specifically	  
designed	  software.44	  	  
	  
This	  example	  serves	  as	  the	  main	  case	  study	  for	  this	  thesis	  and	  is	  discussed	  and	  
analysed	  in	  detail	  in	  this	  chapter.	  The	  reasons	  for	  selecting	  this	  example	  as	  the	  main	  
case	  study	  are	  twofold.	  	  
Firstly,	  this	  example	  has	  generated	  a	  (comparatively)	  large	  amount	  of	  policy	  
discussions45	  and	  case	  law	  from	  both,	  the	  German	  Federal	  Court	  of	  Justice	  
(Bundesgerichtshof	  -­‐	  BGH)46	  and	  the	  German	  Federal	  Constitutional	  Court	  
(Bundesverfassungsgericht	  -­‐	  BVerfG).47	  These	  publicly	  available	  discussions	  are	  
important	  examples	  of	  the	  approach	  currently	  adopted	  for	  the	  regulation	  of	  the	  new	  
cyber-­‐policing	  system,	  where	  the	  focus	  is	  often	  solely	  on	  individual	  new	  policing	  tools.	  
Even	  though	  the	  technology	  is	  comparatively	  task-­‐oriented	  and	  simple,	  as	  will	  be	  
shown	  it	  exhibits	  already	  all	  the	  problematic	  aspects	  that	  future,	  more	  intelligent	  and	  
more	  autonomous	  systems	  will	  also	  have	  to	  address.	  
Remarkably,	  this	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  spotted	  by	  the	  BVerfG	  in	  its	  judgment,	  which	  went	  
beyond	  focusing	  solely	  on	  the	  legality	  or	  illegality	  of	  the	  specific	  new	  investigative	  
power	  but	  developed	  important	  legal	  concepts	  and	  a	  new	  basic	  right	  pertaining	  to	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  See	  e.g.	  D	  Fox,	  “Realisierung,	  Grenzen	  und	  Risiken	  der	  ‘Online-­‐Durchsuchung’”	  (2007)	  31:11	  
Datenschutz	  und	  Datensicherheit,	  827-­‐834;	  C	  Herrmann,	  Das	  Grundrecht	  auf	  Gewährleistung	  der	  
Vertraulichkeit	  und	  Integrität	  –	  Entstehung	  und	  Perspektiven	  (Frankfurt/Main:	  Peter	  Lang,	  
2010);	  H	  Pohl,	  “Zur	  Technik	  der	  heimlichen	  Online-­‐Durchsuchung,	  (2007)	  31:9	  Datenschutz	  und	  
Datensicherheit,	  684-­‐688.	  
45	  See	  e.g.	  Kleine	  Anfrage	  Deutscher	  Bundestag,	  “Online-­‐Durchsuchungen”	  (2007)	  Deutscher	  
Bundestag	  Drucksache	  16/4795;	  Kleine	  Anfrage	  Deutscher	  Bundestag,	  “Bilanz	  der	  Online-­‐
Durchsuchung”	  (2010)	  Deutscher	  Bundestag	  Drucksache	  17/1629.	  
46	  BGH,	  NJW	  2007,	  930.	  
47	  BVerfG,	  NJW	  2008,	  822.	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use	  of	  the	  Internet,	  data	  online	  and	  the	  (cyber-­‐)	  policing	  thereof.	  This	  judgment	  in	  
particular	  is	  therefore	  of	  great	  importance	  for	  this	  thesis,	  because	  it	  serves	  as	  a	  first	  
indicator	  of	  how	  the	  cyber-­‐policing	  system	  as	  a	  whole	  changes	  under	  the	  influence	  of	  
technology,	  and	  can	  be	  classified	  and	  regulated.	  
Secondly,	  this	  example	  provides	  details	  about	  the	  type	  of	  software-­‐based	  investigative	  
tools,	  and	  highlights	  how	  these	  cyber-­‐cops	  are	  deployed	  and	  operate	  during	  criminal	  
investigations.	  
	  
In	  addition,	  the	  introduction	  of	  this	  particular	  new	  investigative	  method	  has	  also	  been	  
discussed	  on	  European	  level,	  and	  other	  countries	  such	  as	  the	  UK	  have	  indicated	  to	  
deploy	  it,	  which	  adds	  to	  the	  significance	  of	  this	  example.	  
	  
In	  section	  2.1	  of	  this	  chapter	  the	  new	  investigative	  method	  is	  briefly	  introduced.	  This	  is	  
followed	  by	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  initial	  German	  judgments	  by	  the	  BGH,	  highlighting	  the	  
problems	  with	  the	  current	  approach	  to	  regulating	  cyber-­‐policing	  techniques	  in	  section	  
2.2.	  Section	  2.3	  analyses	  the	  judgment	  of	  the	  BVerfG.	  In	  section	  2.4	  the	  newly	  developed	  
basic	  right	  to	  confidentiality	  and	  integrity	  of	  information	  technology	  systems	  is	  
discussed.	  Section	  2.5	  analyses	  the	  reasoning	  process	  of	  the	  BVerfG.	  Section	  2.6	  
critically	  evaluates	  the	  judgment	  and	  identifies	  its	  shortcomings	  and	  existing	  research	  
gaps.	  Section	  2.7	  determines	  the	  relevance	  of	  this	  investigative	  method	  by	  briefly	  
looking	  at	  its	  wider	  European	  use.	  Section	  2.8	  concludes	  with	  the	  main	  findings	  of	  the	  
chapter.	  
2.1   The Investigative Measure 
Several	  terms	  exist	  in	  Germany	  for	  the	  new	  investigative	  measure:	  “online	  search”,	  
“remote	  searching”,	  “remote	  forensic	  tool”,	  or	  “Federal	  Trojan”.	  These	  different	  names	  
might	  suggest	  that	  different	  investigative	  methods	  are	  referred	  to,	  and	  in	  some	  cases,	  it	  
can	  be	  seen	  that	  problematic	  connotations	  of	  the	  chosen	  term	  can	  result	  in	  legal	  
distinctions	  that	  are	  not	  necessitated	  by	  the	  actual	  features	  of	  the	  software.	  	  
The	  names	  online	  search	  and	  remote	  searching	  suggest	  a	  measure	  similar	  to	  a	  
traditional	  search	  of	  premises.	  	  
Remote	  forensic	  tool	  suggests	  that	  the	  name	  refers	  to	  an	  investigative	  tool	  that	  seizes	  
evidence	  remotely	  in	  a	  forensically	  sound	  way,	  and	  results	  can	  be	  used	  as	  evidence	  in	  
court.	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By	  contrast	  Federal	  Trojan	  has	  a	  negative	  connotation	  and	  implies	  the	  use	  of	  malware-­‐
like	  software	  tools	  by	  law	  enforcement	  agencies	  (LEAs).	  While	  this	  may	  have	  been	  an	  
intended	  outcome	  of	  coining	  the	  term,	  a	  rhetorical	  ploy	  to	  delegitimise	  it	  from	  the	  
outset,	  this	  carries	  the	  danger	  that	  any	  legal	  response	  will	  be	  restricted	  to	  software	  that	  
has	  Trojan-­‐like	  features,	  overlooking	  the	  more	  worrisome	  aspects	  of	  the	  technology.	  	  
In	  fact,	  all	  refer	  to	  the	  remote	  and	  clandestine	  infiltration	  of	  a	  computer	  or	  other	  ICT	  
device	  through	  technical	  means,	  using	  a	  piece	  of	  software	  to	  access	  and	  copy	  the	  data	  
stored	  on	  the	  device,	  monitor	  communication	  and	  transfer	  all	  results	  back	  to	  the	  
investigating	  authority.	  	  	  
The	  existence	  of	  these	  different	  names	  for	  one	  and	  the	  same	  investigative	  method	  is	  an	  
indicator	  for	  the	  insecurity	  and	  lack	  of	  knowledge	  surrounding	  this	  topic.	  
The	  proposed	  new	  investigative	  method	  has	  caused	  extensive	  discussion	  and	  
speculation	  on	  academic48	  and	  political49	  level	  in	  Germany,	  because	  little	  publicly	  
available,	  factual	  information	  about	  the	  technical	  and	  practical	  details	  of	  the	  measure	  
exist.	  	  	  
At	  the	  core	  of	  the	  discussion	  were	  concerns	  pertaining	  to	  the	  classification	  of	  the	  
measure	  and	  its	  integration	  into	  the	  existing	  rights	  canon	  regulating	  police	  
investigations	  and	  protecting	  privacy	  and	  data	  protection	  rights	  of	  affected	  persons,50	  
and	  its	  technical	  feasibility.	  	  Both,	  the	  German	  Federal	  Court	  of	  Justice	  
(Bundesgerichtshof	  -­‐	  BGH)	  and	  the	  Federal	  Constitutional	  Court	  
(Bundesverfassungsgericht	  -­‐	  BVerfG)	  were	  called	  to	  decide	  on	  this	  matter	  and	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  See	  e.g.	  Fox,	  note	  44;	  Pohl,	  note	  44;	  K	  Leipold,	  “Die	  Online-­‐Durchsuchung”,	  (2007)	  4	  Neue	  
Juristische	  Wochenschrift	  Spezial	  135;	  U	  Buermeyer,	  “Die	  ‘Online-­‐Durchsuchung’	  –	  Technischer	  
Hintergrund	  des	  verdeckten	  hoheitlichen	  Zugriffs	  auf	  Computersysteme”,	  (2007)	  4	  
Höchstrichterliche	  Rechtsprechung	  im	  Strafrecht	  154;	  A	  Roßnagel,	  “Verfassungspolitische	  und	  
verfassungsrechtliche	  Fragen	  der	  Online-­‐Durchsuchung”	  (2007)	  8	  Deutsche	  Richterzeitung,	  229-­‐
230;	  J	  Rux,	  “Ausforschung	  privater	  Rechner	  durch	  die	  Polizei-­‐	  und	  Sicherheitsbehörden	  –	  
Rechtsfragen	  der	  ‘Online-­‐Durchsuchung’”	  (2007)	  6	  Juristenzeitung,	  285-­‐295;	  M	  Kutscha,	  
“Verdeckte	  ‘Online-­‐Durchsuchung’	  und	  Unverletzlichkeit	  der	  Wohnung”	  (2007)	  Neue	  Juristische	  
Wochenschrift,	  1169;	  G	  Hornung,	  “Ermächtigungsgrundlage	  für	  die	  Online-­‐Durchsuchung	  und	  –
Beschlagnahme”	  (2007)	  31	  Datenschutz	  und	  Datensicherheit,	  575;	  Hansen/Pfitzmann,	  
“Technische	  Grundlagen	  von	  Online-­‐Durchsuchung	  und	  –Beschlagnahme”	  (2007)	  8	  Deutsche	  
Richterzeitung,	  225-­‐228;	  M	  Gercke,	  “Heimliche	  Online-­‐Durchsuchung:	  Anspruch	  und	  
Wirklichkeit”	  (2007)	  23:4	  Computer	  und	  Recht	  245-­‐253.	  
49	  See	  e.g.	  S	  Krempel,	  “Bundesregierung	  gibt	  zu:	  Online-­‐Durchsuchungen	  laufen	  schon”	  (2007)	  
heise,	  available	  online	  at	  http://www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung/88824;	  D	  Borchers,	  
“Schäuble	  heizt	  nach	  BGH-­‐Urteil	  Debatte	  um	  Online-­‐Durchsuchung	  an”	  (2007)	  heise,	  available	  
online	  at	  http://www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung/Schaeuble-­‐heizt-­‐nach-­‐BGH-­‐Urteil-­‐
Debatte-­‐um-­‐Online-­‐Durchsuchung-­‐an-­‐142623.html.	  
50	  See	  e.g.	  Hornung,	  note	  48.	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establish	  legal	  certainty.51	  To	  prepare	  the	  ground	  for	  the	  analysis	  of	  these	  
developments	  in	  the	  next	  sections	  of	  this	  chapter,	  a	  short	  introduction	  of	  the	  proposed	  
measure	  is	  given	  here.	  This	  description	  purposefully	  remains	  brief	  since	  a	  more	  
detailed	  analysis	  of	  the	  relevant	  technologies	  will	  follow	  in	  chapters	  4	  and	  5	  of	  this	  
thesis.	  
	  
Generally,	  this	  novel	  investigative	  method	  tries	  to	  accommodate	  the	  difficulties	  during	  
investigations	  that	  emerge	  if	  criminal	  offenders,	  in	  particular	  those	  from	  extremist	  and	  
terrorist	  groups,	  use	  the	  Internet	  for	  communication	  and	  the	  planning	  and	  commitment	  
of	  criminal	  offences.52	  The	  purpose	  of	  remotely	  infiltrating	  a	  computer	  is	  to	  enable	  
investigators	  to	  search	  the	  data	  stored	  on	  the	  hard	  disk	  and	  the	  working	  memory	  of	  the	  
computer,	  to	  intercept	  the	  email	  traffic,	  and	  monitor	  web	  browsing	  habits	  and	  instant	  
messaging.53	  	  
To	  accomplish	  this,	  a	  specifically	  designed	  piece	  of	  software	  is	  planted	  on	  the	  suspect’s	  
computer	  without	  his	  knowledge.54	  This	  software	  tool	  is	  capable	  of	  autonomously	  
searching	  and	  copying	  specific	  data	  stored	  on	  the	  computer	  and	  subsequently	  
transferring	  this	  back	  to	  the	  investigating	  authority	  for	  evaluation.	  This	  requires	  the	  
software	  tool	  to	  be	  equipped	  with	  certain	  key	  abilities,	  such	  as	  mobility	  to	  move	  across	  
platforms,	  acting	  with	  a	  degree	  of	  autonomy,	  and	  possessing	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  
intelligence	  to	  undertake	  the	  selection	  and	  monitoring	  process.	  
Hence,	  such	  a	  tool	  shares	  crucial	  features	  with	  well-­‐known	  malware,	  particularly	  
viruses	  and	  Trojans.55	  The	  latter	  in	  particular	  can	  be	  used	  to	  access	  and	  extract	  
personal	  data	  from	  targets,	  and	  hence	  is	  equally	  suitable	  for	  data	  collection	  by	  police	  
authorities.	  As	  indicated	  above,	  this	  is	  why	  the	  software	  is	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  “Federal	  
Trojan”	  in	  Germany.	  	  
The	  advantage	  of	  deploying	  this	  new	  investigative	  software	  is	  that	  it	  can	  be	  installed	  
clandestinely,	  and	  without	  access	  to	  the	  suspect’s	  house	  or	  physical	  premises.	  It	  is	  
designed	  to	  be	  disguised	  as	  something	  harmless,	  when	  it	  actually	  includes	  malicious	  or	  
harmful	  code,	  and	  therefore	  tricks	  the	  suspect	  into	  installing	  it.	  Therefore,	  as	  with	  their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51	  See	  BGH,	  NJW	  2007,	  930,	  and	  BVerfG,	  NJW	  2008,	  822.	  
52	  BVerfG,	  NJW	  2008,	  822	  (826).	  
53	  See	  Leipold,	  note	  48.	  
54	  See	  Hansen/Pfitzman,	  note	  48.	  
55	  U	  Buermeyer,	  “Die	  ‘Online-­‐Durchsuchung’	  –	  Technischer	  Hintergrund	  des	  verdeckten	  
hoheitlichen	  Zugriffs	  auf	  Computersysteme”,	  (2007)	  4	  Höchstrichterliche	  Rechtsprechung	  im	  
Strafrecht	  154.	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criminal	  counterparts,	  police	  Trojans	  require	  the	  unwitting	  cooperation	  of	  the	  target.56	  
Such	  an	  act	  of	  cooperation	  can,	  for	  example,	  simply	  be	  the	  opening	  of	  an	  email,	  for	  
instance	  an	  email	  that	  purports	  to	  come	  from	  a	  bona	  fide	  state	  agency	  such	  as	  the	  local	  
council	  or	  the	  Department	  for	  Pensions.	  However,	  while	  the	  above	  method	  is	  a	  likely	  
possibility,	  LEAs	  or	  the	  government	  have	  provided	  no	  specific	  indications	  of	  how	  the	  
infiltration	  is	  to	  occur.	  The	  unwitting	  cooperation	  of	  the	  suspect	  in	  the	  investigative	  
process	  should	  raise	  immediate	  legal	  questions.	  It	  sets	  the	  online	  search	  apart	  from	  
traditional	  search	  methods	  –	  where	  the	  suspect	  either	  gives	  consent	  to	  the	  police	  
officers	  entering	  his	  premises,	  or	  is	  compelled	  to	  suffer	  that	  intrusion	  through	  a	  
warrant,	  or	  officers	  may	  clandestinely,	  but	  without	  his	  help	  enter	  his	  flat	  to	  place	  e.g.	  a	  
listening	  device.	  Remote	  online	  searches	  combine	  aspects	  of	  both	  approaches,	  
requiring	  a	  degree	  of	  cooperation	  while	  aiming	  at	  an	  unobserved	  intrusion.	  This	  should	  
raise	  the	  question	  how	  this	  cooperation	  should	  be	  legally	  evaluated.	  If	  the	  software	  is	  
thought	  of	  as	  a	  proxy	  of	  a	  police	  officer,	  is	  “permitting”	  it	  on	  your	  computer	  the	  
equivalent	  of	  permitting	  an	  officer	  (an	  undercover	  officer?)	  into	  your	  house?	  Does	  this	  
alone	  change	  your	  legal	  status?	  	  
Some	  of	  the	  cooperation	  could	  be	  designed	  to	  be	  quite	  elaborate	  and	  with	  the	  legal	  
issues	  in	  mind.	  For	  example,	  a	  suspect	  accessing	  the	  council	  website	  to	  register	  his	  car.	  
A	  pop-­‐up	  window	  appears	  with	  a	  long	  scroll	  down	  text	  that	  requires	  to	  “tick”	  an	  
acceptance	  of	  the	  cookie	  policies	  –	  but	  unlike	  normal	  cookie	  policies,	  this	  one	  has	  
buried	  in	  the	  text	  a	  notification	  that	  the	  data	  “may”	  be	  used	  by	  police.	  Upon	  clicking	  the	  
box,	  the	  software	  installs	  itself	  on	  the	  suspect’s	  computer.	  	  
Maybe	  surprisingly,	  the	  issue	  of	  cooperation	  and	  consent	  has	  not	  been	  discussed	  by	  
either	  courts	  or	  academic	  literature.	  It	  is	  however	  not	  as	  far	  fetched,	  as	  it	  may	  seem.	  
The	  results	  of	  a	  survey	  conducted	  in	  the	  context	  of	  this	  thesis	  within	  a	  European	  Union	  
project57	  indicated	  that	  lawyers	  are	  willing	  to	  reframe	  many	  traditionally	  legal	  aspects	  
as	  issues	  of	  technology.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  they	  indicated	  a	  strong	  willingness	  to	  use	  for	  
the	  reminder	  analogical	  reasoning,	  forcing	  the	  new	  technologies	  into	  old	  conceptual	  
ideas.	  This	  notion	  was	  particularly	  strong	  in	  civilian	  jurisdictions	  -­‐	  unsurprisingly,	  as	  in	  
the	  ideology	  of	  the	  civil	  law,	  the	  Codes	  must	  have	  an	  answer,	  which	  makes	  even	  a	  far	  
fetched	  analogy	  permissible	  if	  the	  alternative	  is	  the	  recognition	  that	  the	  law	  does	  not	  
yet	  answer	  the	  question.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56	  Buermeyer,	  note	  48.	  
57	  See	  for	  a	  more	  detailed	  account	  of	  this	  chapter	  3,	  p.	  77.	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If	  the	  infiltration	  is	  successful,	  this	  method	  offers	  considerable	  advantages	  for	  the	  
investigating	  authority	  in	  comparison	  to	  traditional	  investigative	  methods.	  Because	  the	  
method	  is	  undertaken	  without	  the	  knowledge	  of	  the	  suspect,	  this	  person	  is	  not	  alerted	  
to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  police	  consider	  him	  a	  target,	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  traditional	  house	  
search.	  Hence	  the	  suspect	  will	  not	  change	  his	  behaviour	  or	  remove	  data	  from	  his	  ICT	  
devices.	  	  
Furthermore,	  this	  measure	  allows	  collecting	  encrypted	  data	  in	  an	  unencrypted	  form	  as	  
the	  investigating	  authority	  can	  access	  the	  data	  while	  the	  user	  is	  typing	  it.	  Moreover,	  
passwords	  and	  further	  information	  about	  the	  Internet	  usage	  pattern	  of	  the	  suspect	  can	  
be	  collected.	  In	  addition,	  communication	  data	  can	  be	  identified,	  which	  enables	  the	  
exposure	  of	  the	  new	  terrorism	  structures.58	  
This	  kind	  of	  information	  would	  hardly	  ever	  be	  possible	  to	  obtain	  using	  traditional	  
investigative	  methods.59	  
2.2 Background and Initial Judgements 
As	  transpired	  later	  on,	  German	  Federal	  Secret	  Services	  (Bundesamt	  für	  
Verfassungsschutz)	  and	  the	  Federal	  Criminal	  Agency	  (Bundeskriminalamt	  -­‐	  BKA)	  have	  
deployed	  the	  new	  investigative	  measure	  and	  conducted	  online	  searches	  of	  computers	  
and	  other	  ICT	  devices	  of	  suspects	  since	  2005.60	  These	  agencies	  were	  granted	  this	  new	  
investigative	  power	  based	  on	  an	  internal	  regulation	  by	  the	  then	  Home	  Secretary	  
Schily.61	  This	  internal	  approval	  approach	  meant	  that	  the	  introduction	  of	  this	  new	  
investigative	  measure	  remained	  confidential	  and	  secret	  at	  the	  time.	  	  
The	  judicial	  review	  and	  public	  debate	  was	  triggered	  by	  the	  application	  of	  a	  state	  
attorney	  to	  the	  BGH	  to	  remotely	  search	  a	  suspect’s	  computer	  in	  a	  terrorism	  
investigation	  on	  25	  November	  2006.	  62	  The	  investigating	  judge	  declined	  the	  application	  
based	  on	  the	  reasoning	  that	  such	  an	  action	  would	  constitute	  a	  severe	  encroachment	  on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58	  See	  p.	  20	  above.	  
59	  BVerfG,	  NJW	  2008,	  822	  (826).	  
60	  Tagesschau,	  “Schily	  erlaubte	  Online-­‐Durchsuchungen”	  (2005),	  available	  online	  at:	  
http://www.tagesschau.de/inland/meldung21410.html.	  
61	  S	  Krempl,	  “Polit-­‐Posse	  um	  heimliche	  Online-­‐Durchsuchungen	  unter	  Schily”	  (2007)	  heise,	  
available	  online	  at:	  http://heise.de/-­‐195563;	  C	  Rath,	  “Die	  Polizei	  als	  Hacker”,	  (2006)	  die	  
tageszeitung,	  available	  online	  at:	  
http://www.taz.de/index.php?id=archivseite&dig=2006/12/11/a0060.	  
62	  BGH,	  Beschluss	  vom	  25.11.2006	  -­‐	  Az.	  1	  BGs	  184/2006,	  http://medien-­‐internet-­‐und-­‐
recht.de/volltext.php?mir_dok_id=486.	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the	  basic	  right	  to	  informational	  self-­‐determination	  (Article	  2.1	  in	  connection	  with	  1.1	  of	  
the	  German	  constitution	  –	  Grundgesetz	  [GG])	  and	  no	  legal	  basis	  allowing	  such	  an	  
encroachment	  exists	  under	  German	  procedural	  criminal	  law.	  He	  further	  found	  that	  
existing	  legislation	  could	  not	  be	  applied	  analogously	  because	  the	  new	  investigative	  
measure	  is	  fundamentally	  different	  from	  existing	  investigative	  measures	  defined	  by	  
German	  criminal	  law	  and	  hence,	  in	  common	  law	  parlance,	  ultra	  vires.63	  Coming	  to	  that	  
conclusion	  he	  established	  that	  a	  search	  according	  to	  German	  procedural	  criminal	  law	  is	  
a	  physical	  and	  not	  an	  electronic	  process,	  and	  meant	  to	  be	  undertaken	  openly	  and	  with	  
the	  owner	  of	  the	  premise	  or	  thing	  to	  be	  searched	  present.	  He	  therefore	  reasoned	  that	  
the	  analogous	  application	  of	  existing	  law	  regulating	  the	  search	  of	  premises	  to	  the	  
clandestine	  online	  search	  of	  a	  computer	  would	  be	  comparable	  to	  a	  circumvention	  of	  the	  
constitutionally	  determined	  reservation	  of	  legislative	  authority.64	  	  
An	  appeal	  of	  the	  state	  attorney	  to	  the	  BGH	  against	  this	  initial	  ruling	  created	  further	  case	  
law	  on	  this	  topic.	  The	  appeal	  was	  based	  on	  the	  central	  argument	  that	  a	  remote	  search	  
of	  a	  suspect’s	  computer	  could	  be	  based	  on	  the	  Articles	  10265,	  11066,	  and	  9467	  of	  the	  
German	  Criminal	  Code	  (Strafprozessordnung-­‐	  StPO),	  assuming	  a	  substantial	  similarity	  
between	  the	  physical	  search	  of	  premises,	  regulated	  in	  these	  articles,	  and	  the	  remote	  
access	  of	  a	  suspect’s	  computer.	  	  
The	  BGH	  rejected	  in	  its	  judgement	  the	  analogy	  between	  a	  traditional	  search	  of	  physical	  
premises	  and	  clandestine	  searches	  of	  a	  computer.68	  The	  court	  agreed	  with	  the	  
investigating	  judge	  that	  existing	  legislation	  regulating	  the	  search	  of	  premises	  does	  not	  
offer	  a	  legal	  basis	  allowing	  for	  such	  a	  measure	  to	  be	  undertaken.	  The	  court	  reasoned	  
further	  that	  generally,	  the	  search	  and	  confiscation	  of	  computers	  during	  investigations	  is	  
permissible	  under	  Article	  102	  StPO	  in	  conjunction	  with	  Articles	  110	  and	  94	  ff	  StPO.	  
However,	  these	  articles	  require	  that	  a	  search	  is	  undertaken	  openly,	  with	  a	  police	  officer	  
and	  the	  person	  affected	  by	  the	  measure	  present,	  and	  the	  search	  has	  to	  be	  transparent,	  
hence	  the	  reasons	  for	  and	  findings	  of	  the	  search	  have	  to	  be	  disclosed	  to	  the	  suspect.69	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63	  Ibid.	  The	  analogous	  application	  of	  laws	  in	  public	  law	  is	  a	  common	  procedure.	  It	  means	  that	  
laws	  can	  be	  applied	  analogously	  to	  a	  situation	  similar	  to	  the	  one	  explicitly	  regulated	  by	  the	  law.	  
64	  Ibid.	  
65	  Regulates	  the	  search	  of	  premises.	  
66	  Regulates	  the	  seizure	  and	  search	  of	  documents	  and	  digital	  storage	  devices.	  
67	  Regulates	  the	  securing	  and	  seizure	  of	  evidence.	  
68	  BGH,	  NJW	  2007,	  930.	  
69	  Ibid.	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An	  order	  to	  undertake	  a	  search	  secretly	  can	  therefore	  not	  be	  based	  on	  Articles	  102	  
StPO	  in	  conjunction	  with	  Articles	  110	  and	  94	  ff	  StPO.	  The	  court	  explicitly	  stated	  that	  
this	  is	  the	  case	  for	  both,	  the	  search	  of	  a	  computer	  with	  the	  aim	  to	  find	  data,	  and	  the	  
search	  of	  a	  premise	  to	  find	  physical	  items.70	  The	  court	  especially	  dismissed	  the	  
argument	  that	  a	  secret	  search	  could	  be	  considered	  less	  incriminating	  for	  the	  person	  
affected,	  than	  an	  openly	  undertaken	  search	  where	  the	  place	  to	  be	  searched	  is	  entered	  
by	  police	  officers.71	  It	  found	  that	  a	  secret	  search,	  as	  compared	  to	  an	  open	  search	  
regulated	  in	  Articles	  102	  StPO	  ff,	  establishes	  a	  sanction	  due	  to	  the	  high	  interference	  
intensity	  of	  such	  a	  measure.72	  During	  an	  open	  search	  the	  suspect	  has	  the	  opportunity	  to	  
influence	  the	  length	  of	  the	  measure,	  or	  end	  it	  through	  cooperation	  (e.g.	  by	  handing	  out	  
the	  items	  or	  documents	  in	  question),	  or	  to	  start	  counteractions	  with	  the	  help	  of	  a	  
lawyer.	  This	  was	  not	  envisaged	  in	  a	  secret	  online	  search,	  indeed,	  it	  would	  have	  defied	  
its	  very	  reason	  to	  be.	  Therefore	  such	  a	  measure	  cannot	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  less	  
incriminating	  measure,	  which	  would	  have	  allowed	  basing	  it	  on	  articles	  of	  the	  StPO.	  	  
At	  this	  point,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  point	  out	  that	  while	  the	  specific	  way	  the	  police	  wanted	  
to	  use	  online	  search	  tools	  was	  clandestine,	  this	  is	  not	  a	  necessary	  feature	  of	  the	  
technology.	  	  It	  could	  as	  well	  be	  imagined	  a	  remote	  online	  search	  that	  informs	  the	  
suspect	  of	  what	  is	  going	  on-­‐	  the	  experience	  would	  then	  be	  very	  similar	  to	  the	  (eerie)	  
experience	  when	  one’s	  computer	  support	  person	  “takes	  over”	  a	  networked	  computer	  
to	  remedy	  an	  issue.	  As	  described	  above,	  a	  pop-­‐up	  could	  formally	  ask	  for	  “permission	  to	  
enter”,	  and	  it	  could	  even	  be	  envisaged	  a	  situation	  where	  the	  computer	  negotiates	  
autonomously	  on	  the	  user’s	  behalf	  access	  rights	  with	  the	  forensic	  software.	  This	  is	  less	  
far	  fetched	  than	  it	  sounds,	  a	  very	  similar	  process	  happens	  constantly	  on	  the	  Internet.	  
Google	  uses	  web	  crawlers,	  pieces	  of	  software	  that	  visit	  autonomously	  websites,	  to	  
extract	  terms	  for	  indexing.	  To	  be	  permitted	  on	  a	  site,	  the	  software	  has	  to	  “negotiate”	  
permission,	  and	  it	  is	  easy	  for	  the	  user	  to	  include	  an	  “agent	  exclusion	  clause	  that	  
prevents	  such	  a	  search	  taking	  place,	  or	  limits	  the	  search	  to	  parts	  of	  the	  site.73	  The	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70	  Ibid.	  
71	  See	  e.g.	  M	  Hofmann,	  “Die	  Online-­‐Durchsuchung	  –	  staatliches	  „Hacken“	  oder	  zulässige	  
Ermittlungsmaßnahme?”	  (2005)	  25:3	  Neue	  Zeitschrift	  für	  Strafrecht	  121,	  124	  supporting	  this.	  
72	  BGH,	  NJW	  2007,	  930.	  
73	  For	  the	  technical	  aspects,	  see	  e.g.	  M	  D	  Dikaiakos,	  A	  Stassopoulou,	  L	  Papageorgiou,	  “An	  
investigation	  of	  web	  crawler	  behavior:	  characterization	  and	  metrics”,	  (2005)	  28:8	  Computer	  
Communications,	  880–897;	  for	  the	  legal	  issues	  of	  this	  negotiation	  process,	  see	  e.g.	  M	  L	  Boonk,	  D	  
R	  A	  de	  Groot,	  F	  M	  T	  Brazier,	  A	  Oskamp,	  “Agent	  exclusion	  on	  websites”	  (2005)	  in	  A	  Oskamp,	  C	  
Cevenini	  (eds)	  The	  Law	  and	  Electronic	  Agents:	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  LEA	  04	  workshop	  (Nijmegen:	  
Wolf	  Legal	  Publishers,	  2005),	  13-­‐20.	  For	  a	  different	  opinion	  see	  J	  Groom,	  “Are	  ‘Agent’	  Exclusion	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reason	  to	  highlight	  this	  already	  here	  is	  that	  it	  exemplifies	  one	  of	  the	  perennial	  problems	  
of	  legal	  regulation,	  especially	  but	  not	  exclusively	  through	  courts.	  Even	  though,	  as	  will	  
be	  shown	  below,	  the	  German	  Federal	  Constitutional	  Court	  in	  particular	  went	  out	  of	  its	  
way	  to	  develop	  a	  generic,	  conceptual	  answer,	  it	  was	  nonetheless	  tied	  to	  a	  degree	  by	  the	  
very	  specific	  features	  of	  the	  case	  before	  it.	  The	  consequence	  is	  that	  what	  the	  courts	  had	  
to	  focus	  on,	  on	  procedural	  grounds	  alone,	  was	  the	  clandestine	  nature	  of	  the	  approach,	  
which	  in	  this	  analysis	  is	  accidental,	  not	  decisive	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  software	  enabled	  
evidence	  collection.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  the	  legal	  response	  faces	  the	  danger	  of	  either	  
being	  too	  wide	  and	  prohibiting	  an	  entire	  class	  of	  technologies	  simply	  because	  its	  first	  
use	  before	  the	  courts	  involved	  a	  highly	  problematic	  usage,	  or	  being	  too	  narrow	  and	  
addressing	  only	  the	  issue	  of	  clandestine	  searches	  while	  leaving	  other,	  equally	  
problematic,	  issues	  unaddressed.	  This	  in	  turn	  could	  give	  police	  and	  prosecution	  
services	  an	  opportunity	  to	  avoid	  the	  restrictions	  simply	  by	  plugging	  one	  hole,	  while	  
leaving	  the	  other	  issues	  wide	  open	  for	  abuse.	  	  
These	  initial	  judgments	  mainly	  addressed	  formal	  procedural	  questions,	  ruling	  that	  
without	  explicit	  legislation,	  granting	  such	  a	  warrant	  request	  would	  be	  ultra	  vires.	  At	  
this	  stage	  there	  were	  only	  little	  technological	  facts	  known	  about	  the	  tool	  and	  the	  court	  
undertook	  no	  efforts	  to	  investigate	  further	  technical	  details	  and	  fully	  understand	  the	  
concept	  of	  this	  new	  investigative	  method.	  The	  reasoning	  of	  the	  judiciary	  was	  based	  on	  a	  
description	  of	  what	  should	  be	  achieved	  by	  using	  the	  tool,	  but	  with	  little	  attention	  to	  the	  
“how”.	  As	  argued	  above,	  this	  is	  in	  the	  author’s	  opinion	  underestimating	  the	  legal	  and	  
jurisprudential	  issues	  that	  are	  raised	  by	  the	  method,	  rather	  than	  the	  outcome	  of	  
technology	  mediated	  evidence	  collection.	  
	  Nevertheless,	  two	  key	  findings	  can	  be	  extracted	  from	  this	  judgment.	  Firstly,	  this	  new	  
investigative	  method	  cannot	  be	  subsumed	  under	  the	  existing	  regulatory	  framework	  
because	  it	  fundamentally	  differs	  from	  traditional	  investigative	  methods	  and	  from	  a	  
legal-­‐conceptual	  point	  of	  view	  cannot	  be	  compared	  to	  either	  the	  traditional	  search	  by	  a	  
human	  officer	  or	  the	  use	  of	  technical	  equipment	  facilitating	  the	  work	  of	  an	  officer.	  
Secondly,	  as	  a	  result	  a	  new	  legal	  basis	  allowing	  the	  use	  of	  this	  measure	  is	  required.	  This	  
also	  means	  that	  internal	  regulations	  are	  not	  sufficient	  as	  legal	  bases	  for	  these	  new	  
investigative	  measures.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Clauses	  a	  Legitimate	  Application	  of	  the	  EU	  Database	  Directive?”	  (2004)	  1:1	  SCRIPTed,	  83-­‐118,	  
available	  online	  at	  http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-­‐ed/docs/agents.asp.	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This	  is	  a	  first	  indication	  confirming	  the	  research	  hypothesis	  of	  this	  thesis	  that	  the	  new	  
software-­‐based	  policing	  technologies	  challenge	  existing	  legal	  frameworks	  that	  are	  
premised	  on	  the	  parameters	  of	  the	  offline	  world.	  
2.3 The German Federal Constitutional Court Judgment 
On	  27th	  February	  2008,	  the	  German	  Federal	  Constitutional	  Court	  created	  in	  a	  
landmark	  ruling	  a	  new	  constitutional	  right	  in	  confidentiality	  and	  integrity	  of	  
information	  technology	  systems	  and	  therewith	  recognised	  for	  the	  first	  time	  the	  
constitutional	  relevance	  of	  the	  virtual	  living	  space	  and	  data	  online.	  74	  	  
	  
The	  judgement	  concerns	  the	  North	  Rhine-­Westphalia	  Constitution	  Protection	  Act	  
(Verfassungsschutzgesetz)75	  that	  authorised	  the	  Office	  of	  the	  Constitution	  of	  the	  State	  
(nordrhein-­‐westfälischer	  Verfassungsschutz)	  to,	  inter	  alia,	  secretly	  access	  information	  
technology	  systems	  through	  the	  use	  of	  technical	  means.76	  	  Thus,	  the	  state	  of	  North	  
Rhine-­‐Westphalia	  created	  a	  legal	  basis	  for	  the	  online	  searching	  of	  computers,	  and	  in	  
that	  way	  fulfilled	  the	  central	  requirement	  that	  the	  BGH	  had	  established	  as	  a	  necessary	  
precondition	  to	  lawfully	  undertake	  online	  searches	  of	  computers	  using	  remote	  forensic	  
software	  tools.77	  	  
	  
Article	  5.2(11)	  NRW-­‐CPA	  was	  added	  to	  empower	  the	  constitution	  protection	  agency	  to	  
carry	  out	  two	  types	  of	  investigative	  measures:	  	  
	  
• Firstly,	  secret	  monitoring	  and	  other	  reconnaissance	  of	  the	  Internet	  (alternative	  
1),	  and	  	  
• Secondly,	  secret	  access	  to	  information	  technology	  systems,	  using	  technical	  aids	  
if	  necessary	  (alternative	  2).78	  	  
	  
The	  second	  alternative,	  Article	  5.2(11)	  NRW-­‐CPA,	  establishes	  the	  legal	  basis	  for	  an	  
online	  search	  of	  computers	  and	  other	  ICT	  devices.	  The	  secret	  access	  of	  an	  information	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74	  BVerfG,	  NJW	  2008,	  822.	  
75	  Hereafter	  “NRW-­‐CPA”.	  
76	  Most	  policing	  functions,	  including	  some	  antiterrorism	  functions,	  are	  a	  devolved	  matter	  under	  
the	  German	  constitution.	  
77	  See	  above	  2.2,	  p.	  32.	  
78	  GVBl.	  NRW	  2006,	  S.620.	  
	   37	  
technology	  system	  according	  to	  Article	  5.2(11)	  NRW-­‐CPA	  is	  understood	  to	  be	  its	  
technical	  infiltration	  by	  a	  piece	  of	  specifically	  designed	  software.79	  	  
Article	  5.2	  (11)	  NRW-­‐CPA	  empowers	  the	  constitution	  protection	  authority	  to	  
undertake	  these	  measures	  under	  the	  general	  preconditions	  for	  data	  collection	  of	  
intelligence	  services	  arising	  from	  Article	  5.2	  in	  conjunction	  with	  Article	  7.1	  and	  
Article	  3.1	  NRW-­‐CPA.	  According	  to	  these	  provisions,	  the	  use	  of	  such	  investigative	  
measures	  is	  only	  permissible	  if	  information	  on	  efforts	  or	  activities	  that	  are	  relevant	  to	  
the	  protection	  of	  the	  constitution	  can	  be	  obtained,	  or	  the	  sources	  of	  such	  information	  
(i.e.	  key	  figures	  in	  a	  terrorism	  network)	  are	  detected.	  	  
This	  law	  was	  heavily	  criticized	  and	  it	  was	  widely	  suggested	  that	  it	  was	  in	  violation	  of	  
the	  constitution.80	  	  
In	  every	  investigation	  exists	  a	  conflict	  between	  the	  need	  to	  gain	  information	  and	  data	  
about	  a	  suspect	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	  protection	  of	  privacy	  rights	  of	  this	  person	  on	  
the	  other.81	  Law	  enforcement	  agencies	  need	  to	  infringe	  citizens’	  privacy	  rights	  in	  order	  
to	  investigate	  crimes.82	  However,	  a	  balance	  has	  to	  be	  retained	  and	  infringements	  have	  
to	  be	  necessary	  and	  proportionate.	  It	  was	  argued	  by	  several	  academics	  that	  in	  this	  
particular	  case,	  this	  balance	  was	  not	  retained	  and	  Article	  5.2	  (11)	  NRW-­‐CPA	  is	  an	  
unconstitutional	  infringement	  of	  the	  privacy	  rights	  of	  affected	  persons.83	  	  
The	  main	  problem	  that	  has	  been	  identified	  by	  these	  authors	  is	  the	  relatively	  task-­‐
oriented	  and	  simple	  nature	  of	  the	  technology.	  German	  law	  distinguishes	  different	  types	  
of	  data,	  some	  of	  it	  so	  important	  for	  privacy	  that	  no	  access	  is	  ever	  permitted;	  other	  data	  
is	  of	  a	  much	  less	  important	  nature.	  While	  a	  Trojan	  could	  be	  programmed	  to	  copy	  only	  
image	  files	  (in	  a	  child	  pornography	  case)	  or	  only	  text	  files	  with	  the	  word	  “bomb”,	  the	  
legal	  classification	  of	  data	  types	  is	  too	  subtle	  and	  requires	  too	  much	  world	  knowledge	  
about	  the	  way	  we	  think	  about	  privacy	  to	  allow	  for	  a	  simple	  solution	  that	  ensures	  that	  
the	  Trojan	  only	  copies	  permissible	  data.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79	  Landtagsdrucksache	  –	  LTDrucks	  14/2211,	  p.	  17.	  
80	  See	  e.g.	  Hornung,	  note	  48,	  at	  577;	  Fox,	  note	  48,	  at	  840;	  C	  Wegener,	  “Hintergründe	  zum	  
Vorhaben	  ‘Online-­‐Durchsuchung’”	  15.	  Workshop	  “Sicherheit	  in	  vernetzten	  Systemen”,	  3	  
available	  online	  at:	  http://www.wecon.net/files/14/DFN2008-­‐HzVOD-­‐ARTIKEL.pdf.	  
81	  See	  the	  privacy	  and	  data	  protection	  regulations	  (e.g.	  Articles	  2.1	  in	  connection	  with	  1.1;	  5;	  8;	  
10	  GG)	  of	  the	  German	  Constitution	  that	  establish	  the	  boundaries	  for	  investigative	  actions.	  See	  
also	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment	  to	  the	  United	  States	  Constitution	  protecting	  privacy	  and	  data	  
protection	  rights	  of	  suspects	  during	  investigative	  measures	  of	  police	  and	  secret	  services.	  See	  
also	  the	  UK	  Regulation	  of	  Investigatory	  Powers	  Act	  2000,	  regulating	  the	  powers	  of	  public	  bodies	  
to	  carry	  out	  surveillance	  and	  investigation.	  
82	  B	  J	  Koops,	  A	  Vedder,	  “Criminal	  Investigation	  and	  Privacy:	  Opinions	  of	  Citizens”	  (2002)	  18:5	  
Computer	  Law	  &	  Security	  Report	  322-­‐326	  (322).	  
83	  See	  e.g.	  Hornung,	  note	  48,	  at	  577;	  Fox,	  note	  48,	  at	  840.	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The	  BVerfG	  in	  its	  judgement	  agreed	  with	  this	  view	  and	  ruled	  that	  Article	  5.2	  (11)	  NRW-­‐
CPA	  was	  not	  in	  compliance	  with	  the	  constitution	  and	  therefore	  null	  and	  void.	  While	  the	  
result	  itself	  was	  no	  surprise	  because	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  substantial	  and	  procedural	  privacy	  
safeguards,84	  the	  expectation	  had	  been	  that	  the	  court	  would	  only	  need	  to	  apply	  the	  
explicitly	  enumerated	  basic	  rights	  and	  existing	  constitutional	  principles	  to	  reach	  this	  
conclusion.	  The	  court	  however	  found	  that	  for	  several	  reasons	  the	  existing	  rights	  canon	  
was	  not	  sufficient	  to	  protect	  the	  constitutional	  rights	  of	  citizens	  from	  the	  potential	  loss	  
of	  liberty	  that	  the	  remote	  searching	  of	  computers	  with	  remote	  forensic	  software	  tools	  
could	  cause,	  and	  thus	  created	  –	  or	  maybe	  inferred	  from	  first	  principles	  –	  a	  new	  basic	  
right	  in	  the	  confidentiality	  and	  integrity	  of	  information	  technology	  systems.85	  
This	  surprise	  move	  was	  partly	  due	  to	  the	  welcome	  fact	  that	  the	  court	  engaged	  in	  
considerable	  depth	  with	  the	  specific	  technological	  issues	  that	  the	  legislation	  raised.	  
Three	  of	  the	  countries	  leading	  academics	  in	  the	  field,	  Prof	  Felix	  Freiling,	  Prof.	  Dr.	  
Andreas	  Pfitzmann,86	  and	  Prof.	  Dr.	  Dr.	  hc	  Ulrich	  Sieber	  were	  appointed	  by	  the	  court	  as	  
technical	  experts.	  Maybe	  more	  unusual	  was	  the	  background	  of	  a	  fourth	  expert	  advising	  
the	  court.	  Andreas	  Bogk	  is	  a	  freelance	  Hacker	  at	  Clozure	  Inc	  and	  CEO	  at	  Chaos	  
Computer	  Club	  Events,	  one	  of	  the	  biggest	  and	  most	  influential	  hacker	  organisations.	  
Thus,	  compared	  to	  the	  BGH	  judgment	  and	  the	  decision	  by	  the	  BGH	  investigation	  judge	  
the	  reasoning	  of	  the	  BVerfG	  was	  unusually	  well	  informed	  about	  the	  technological	  
aspects.	  This	  is	  important	  to	  note	  as	  often,	  shortcomings	  in	  the	  regulation	  of	  technology	  
are	  blamed	  on	  ignorance	  by	  lawyers,	  something	  that	  could	  in	  principle	  be	  easily	  
remedied.	  The	  author	  of	  this	  thesis	  for	  instance	  was	  involved,	  as	  part	  of	  the	  research,	  in	  
developing	  a	  certificate	  in	  forensic	  computing	  for	  lawyers	  that	  is	  accredited	  by	  the	  EU,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84	  See	  e.g.	  G	  Hornung,	  “	  Ein	  neues	  Grundrecht.	  Der	  verfassungsrechtliche	  Schutz	  der	  
"Vertraulichkeit	  und	  Integrität	  informationstechnischer	  Systeme"”,	  (2008)	  5	  Computer	  und	  
Recht,	  299.	  
85	  Strictly	  speaking	  this	  new	  basic	  right	  is	  not	  a	  new	  constitutional	  right,	  but	  a	  new	  sub-­‐group	  of	  
the	  general	  personality	  right	  (W	  Hoffmann-­‐Riem,	  “Der	  grundrechtliche	  Schutz	  der	  
Vertraulichkeit	  und	  Integrität	  eigengenutzter	  informationstechnischer	  Systeme”	  (2008)	  
Juristenzeitung	  1009-­‐1022,	  1018	  f.).	  Arguably,	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  new	  right	  by	  the	  court	  would	  
have	  given	  rise	  to	  issues	  of	  the	  separation	  of	  powers.	  In	  practice	  however,	  the	  future	  approach	  
of	  the	  court	  may	  outweigh	  the	  difference	  between	  a	  specific	  right	  and	  a	  sub-­‐group	  of	  the	  general	  
personality	  right.	  As	  apparent	  from	  the	  development	  and	  impact	  of	  the	  right	  to	  informational	  
self-­‐determination	  (another	  sub-­‐group	  of	  the	  general	  personality	  right),	  the	  German	  Federal	  
Constitutional	  Court	  does	  not	  hesitate	  to	  use	  a	  non-­‐written	  fundamental	  right	  to	  severely	  
restrict	  surveillance	  activities	  by	  state	  agencies	  (G	  Hornung,	  R	  Bendrath,	  A	  Pfitzman,	  
“Surveillance	  in	  Germany:	  Strategies	  and	  Counterstrategies“	  in	  S	  Gutwirth	  et	  al	  (eds.)	  Data	  
Protection	  in	  a	  Profiled	  World	  (Berlin	  Heidelberg:	  Springer,	  2010)	  139-­‐156,	  142).	  
86	  Prof	  Pfitzmann	  died	  on	  23	  September	  2010.	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and	  has	  by	  now	  taught	  more	  than	  400	  judges	  and	  prosecutors.87	  For	  any	  problems	  
identified	  with	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  BVerfG	  though,	  this	  simple	  explanation	  can	  be	  ruled	  
out,	  and	  more	  intractable	  structural	  issues	  of	  the	  legal	  regulation	  of	  technology	  need	  to	  
be	  looked	  at.	  
The	  court	  placed	  much	  emphasis	  on	  the	  importance	  and	  influence	  of	  ICTs	  for	  people’s	  
lives	  and	  their	  societies.	  The	  user	  experience	  and	  the	  user	  understanding	  of	  ICTs	  is	  
critically	  assessed	  and	  conceptualised.	  The	  court	  acknowledged	  that	  the	  use	  of	  ICTs	  and	  
the	  Internet	  is	  no	  longer	  a	  trivial	  activity	  rooted	  in	  the	  physical	  world,	  but	  has	  created	  
its	  own,	  digital	  world	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  taken	  serious.88	  Our	  “home”	  is	  partly	  online	  and	  
therefore	  rules	  protecting	  our	  physical	  homes	  should	  also	  apply	  to	  our	  digital	  habitats.	  	  
As	  a	  result	  of	  this	  reasoning,	  the	  court	  found	  that	  the	  existing	  German	  fundamental	  
rights	  canon	  is	  insufficient	  to	  guarantee	  the	  protection	  of	  this	  digital	  habitat	  and	  
consequently,	  developed	  a	  new	  basic	  right.	  
2.4 The Right in Confidentiality and Integrity of Information Technology 
Systems 
ICTs	  depend	  heavily	  on	  the	  processing	  of	  (private)	  data.	  In	  an	  important	  sense,	  
everything	  that	  happens	  online	  is	  ultimately	  about	  information	  exchange,	  even	  though	  
we	  may	  experience	  this	  in	  a	  different	  way,	  e.g.	  as	  “moving	  a	  player	  in	  an	  online	  game”.	  	  
Therefore,	  one	  could	  say	  with	  only	  a	  small	  degree	  of	  hyperbole	  that	  ultimately	  all	  
Internet	  law	  is	  data	  protection	  law.	  This	  recognition	  led	  the	  court	  to	  recognise	  the	  
fundamental	  importance	  of	  solidifying	  constitutional	  guaranties	  in	  online	  settings.	  	  
	  
In	  this	  case,	  the	  court	  decided	  that	  a	  new	  basic	  right	  was	  required	  to	  ensure	  that	  
citizens	  are	  sufficiently	  protected	  from	  violations	  of	  their	  rights.	  
	  
Although	  it	  does	  not	  happen	  very	  often	  in	  Germany	  that	  a	  new	  basic	  right	  is	  established	  
through	  judicial	  activism,	  the	  right	  of	  the	  court	  to	  creatively	  fill	  identified	  gaps	  in	  the	  
constitution’s	  civil	  rights	  framework	  is	  widely	  recognised	  and,	  unlike	  in	  the	  US,	  
originalism	  has	  never	  been	  a	  prominent	  position	  in	  post-­‐war	  Germany.89	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87	  For	  more	  information	  on	  this	  see	  chapter	  3,	  p.77.	  
88	  BVerfG,	  NJW	  2008,	  822,	  841.	  
89	  R	  Alexy,	  R	  Dreier,	  “Statutory	  Interpretation	  in	  the	  Federal	  Republic	  of	  Germany”,	  in	  N	  
MacCormick	  and	  R	  Summers	  (eds)	  Interpreting	  Statutes:	  A	  Comparative	  Study	  (Darthmouth:	  
Aldershot,	  1991)	  72-­‐121.	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Like	  the	  right	  to	  information	  self-­‐determination,	  this	  new	  fundamental	  right	  is	  based	  on	  
Article	  2.1	  German	  basic	  law	  (Grundgesetz	  –	  GG)	  in	  conjunction	  with	  Article	  1.1	  GG,	  and	  
is	  derived	  from	  a	  general	  personality	  right.	  Article	  1	  GG,	  which	  states	  that	  “human	  
dignity	  is	  inviolable,	  and	  all	  organs	  of	  the	  state	  have	  the	  ultimate	  aim	  to	  protect	  it”	  
establishes	  a	  general	  overriding	  principle	  in	  the	  German	  legal	  system,	  and	  is	  designed	  
explicitly	  as	  a	  stop-­‐gap	  solution	  if	  legislative	  solutions	  fall	  behind	  social	  change.	  The	  
new	  constitutional	  IT	  right	  protects,	  so	  the	  court,	  the	  personal	  and	  private	  life	  of	  rights	  
holders	  from	  state	  accesses	  of	  ICTs,	  and	  in	  particular	  against	  state	  access	  of	  the	  
information	  technology	  system	  as	  a	  whole,	  and	  not	  only	  of	  individual	  communication	  
events	  or	  stored	  data.90	  	  
2.4.1 What is protected? 
The	  court	  applies	  the	  guarantees	  of	  this	  right	  to	  information	  technology	  systems,	  but	  
interestingly	  does	  not	  deliver	  a	  definition	  of	  such	  a	  system.	  Instead,	  it	  lists	  systems	  that	  
are	  not	  protected	  by	  this	  right,	  and	  provides	  a	  description	  of	  minimum	  abilities	  
information	  technology	  systems	  must	  possess	  to	  fall	  into	  the	  protection	  scope	  of	  this	  
fundamental	  right.	  By	  doing	  so,	  it	  keeps	  the	  protective	  scope	  of	  this	  basic	  right	  very	  
broad	  and	  at	  least	  regarding	  this	  aspect	  “future-­‐proof”	  and	  technology	  neutral.91	  
	  
Protected	  are	  information	  technology	  systems	  which	  alone,	  or	  in	  their	  technical	  
interconnectedness,	  can	  contain	  personal	  data	  of	  the	  person	  concerned	  to	  such	  a	  
degree	  and	  in	  such	  a	  diversity	  that	  access	  to	  the	  system	  facilitates	  insight	  into	  
significant	  parts	  of	  the	  life	  of	  a	  person	  or	  indeed	  provides	  a	  revealing	  picture	  of	  their	  
personality.92	  Such	  systems	  are	  for	  example	  personal	  computers	  and	  laptops	  (used	  for	  
both,	  private	  and	  business	  purposes),	  and	  mobile	  phones	  and	  electronic	  calendars,	  
which	  have	  a	  large	  number	  of	  functions	  and	  can	  collect	  and	  store	  many	  kinds	  of	  
personal	  data.	  	  
Significantly,	  the	  court	  decided	  that	  the	  mere	  ability	  of	  the	  system	  to	  store	  personal	  
data	  is	  sufficient.	  Whether	  this	  capacity	  was	  actually	  utilised	  by	  the	  user	  in	  question	  
need	  not	  be	  determined	  in	  the	  individual	  case.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90	  BVerfG,	  NJW	  2008,	  822	  (846).	  
91	  See	  for	  a	  discussion	  on	  technology	  neutrality	  for	  example,	  C	  Reed,	  “Taking	  Sides	  on	  
Technology	  Neutrality”	  (2007)	  4:3	  SCRIPTed	  263-­‐284.	  
92	  BVerfG,	  NJW	  2008,	  822	  (846).	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Furthermore,	  it	  acknowledges	  that	  systems	  that	  are	  part	  of	  a	  network	  (such	  as	  the	  
Internet)	  do	  not	  always	  contain	  personal	  data	  themselves,	  but	  data	  about	  the	  person	  
concerned	  can	  be	  stored	  on	  another	  system	  within	  the	  network,	  which	  however	  can	  be	  
accessible	  if	  the	  system	  is	  infiltrated.	  The	  new	  IT	  basic	  right	  thus	  also	  protects	  data	  that	  
is	  outsourced,	  for	  example	  using	  cloud	  computing	  technology.93	  	  
	  
The	  new	  IT	  basic	  law	  identifies	  two	  properties	  worthy	  of	  constitutional	  protection:	  the	  
confidentiality	  and	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  system.	  	  
Confidentiality	  refers	  to	  the	  interest	  of	  a	  user	  of	  an	  information	  technology	  system	  in	  
ensuring	  that	  the	  data	  created,	  processed	  and	  stored	  by	  the	  system	  remains	  
confidential.94	  Thus	  this	  aspect	  is	  largely	  congruent	  with	  the	  right	  to	  informational	  self-­‐
determination.	  Integrity	  refers	  to	  the	  protection	  against	  the	  unauthorised	  access	  of	  the	  
system	  to	  use	  its	  performance,	  functions	  and	  storage	  contents.	  As	  the	  experience	  with	  
the	  British	  Computer	  Misuse	  Act	  1990	  and	  its	  very	  similar	  provision	  (though	  targeted	  
at	  criminals)	  shows,	  it	  is	  virtually	  impossible	  to	  spy	  on	  a	  computer	  system	  without	  
making	  some	  unauthorised	  changes	  to	  it95	  	  -­‐	  an	  issue	  that	  will	  be	  of	  concern	  for	  this	  
thesis	  later	  when	  the	  evidential	  value	  of	  evidence	  thus	  obtained	  is	  discussed.96	  It	  can	  
therefore	  be	  assumed	  that	  all	  present,	  and	  probably	  most	  future,	  systems	  that	  allow	  
information	  gathering	  without	  explicit	  consent	  will	  fall	  foul	  of	  this	  provision.	  
	  
Additionally,	  systems	  are	  only	  protected	  if	  the	  person	  concerned	  considers	  the	  system	  
his	  own,	  and	  thus	  may	  presume	  that	  he	  alone	  or	  others	  authorised	  by	  him,	  such	  as	  close	  
family	  members,	  use	  it	  in	  a	  self-­‐determined	  manner.97	  It	  could	  be	  added	  that	  
increasingly,	  we	  grant	  access	  to	  our	  computer	  automatically,	  e.g.	  to	  update	  agents	  that	  
install	  automatically	  the	  latest	  version	  of	  a	  program.	  Trusted	  Computing	  will	  make	  it	  a	  
matter	  of	  course	  to	  grant	  access	  to	  certain	  software	  providers	  who	  will	  be	  charged	  with	  
maintaining	  the	  systems	  safety.	  Even	  though	  in	  this	  case,	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  people	  not	  
known	  to	  the	  owner	  will	  be	  given	  routine	  access,	  this	  should	  not	  be	  constructed	  as	  a	  
“waiver”	  of	  protected	  rights	  –even	  though	  his	  consent	  to	  these	  measures	  will	  in	  reality	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  Cloud	  Computing	  see:	  M	  Mowbray,	  “The	  Fog	  over	  the	  Grimpen	  Mire:	  Cloud	  
Computing	  and	  the	  Law”,	  6:1	  SCRIPTed	  132-­‐146.	  
94	  BVerfG,	  NJW	  2008,	  822	  (847).	  
95	  See	  O	  Kerr,	  “Cybercrime's	  Scope:	  Interpreting	  Access	  and	  Authorization	  in	  Computer	  Misuse	  
Statutes”	  (2003)	  78:5	  New	  York	  University	  Law	  Review	  1596-­‐1668.	  
96	  See	  chapter	  7.	  
97	  BVerfGE,	  NJW	  2008,	  822	  (849).	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be	  very	  superficial	  and	  formal,	  hidden	  in	  the	  terms	  and	  conditions	  when	  buying	  a	  new	  
computer.98	  	  
However,	  the	  use	  of	  one’s	  own	  system	  via	  the	  use	  of	  information	  technology	  systems	  
that	  are	  at	  the	  disposal	  of	  others	  is	  covered.	  This	  could,	  for	  example,	  be	  the	  remote	  
access	  of	  one’s	  system	  or	  external	  storage	  device	  via	  a	  computer	  in	  a	  cyber	  café.	  	  
2.4.2 Restrictions 
As	  determined	  above	  (2.1),	  citizens’	  privacy	  rights	  necessarily	  need	  to	  be	  infringed	  by	  
law	  enforcement	  agencies	  to	  investigate	  crimes.	  Hence,	  the	  right	  in	  confidentiality	  and	  
integrity	  of	  information	  technology	  systems	  is	  not	  absolute.	  It	  can	  be	  restricted	  for	  both	  
preventive	  purposes	  and	  to	  prosecute	  crimes.	  Yet,	  as	  explained	  above,	  any	  measure	  
that	  restricts	  this	  fundamental	  right	  has	  to	  be	  proportionate	  to	  the	  violation,	  especially	  
if	  the	  measure	  is	  carried	  out	  without	  the	  knowledge	  of	  the	  suspect.	  	  
Thus,	  the	  court	  has	  found	  that	  a	  measure	  restricting	  this	  right	  is	  only	  proportionate	  
where	  sufficient	  evidence	  exists,	  that	  significant	  higher-­‐ranking	  fundamental	  values	  
need	  to	  be	  protected.99	  	  
The	  court	  considers	  higher-­‐ranking	  fundamental	  values	  to	  be	  the	  life	  and	  integrity	  of	  
other	  citizens,	  the	  foundations	  of	  the	  state,	  and	  essential	  values	  of	  humanity.100	  
However,	  the	  court	  then	  softens	  this	  requirement,	  ruling	  that	  a	  high	  level	  of	  probability	  
that	  the	  danger	  will	  materialise	  in	  the	  near	  future	  is	  not	  required.101	  
Furthermore,	  any	  such	  measure	  has	  to	  be	  scrutinised	  and	  confirmed	  by	  a	  judge	  on	  a	  
case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis	  to	  guarantee	  an	  objective	  and	  independent	  control	  prior	  to	  the	  
execution,	  and	  it	  has	  to	  be	  based	  on	  a	  constitutional	  legal	  basis.102	  	  
A	  further	  requirement	  is	  that	  any	  measure	  restricting	  the	  IT	  basic	  right	  does	  not	  violate	  
the	  core	  area	  of	  the	  private	  conduct	  of	  life,	  which	  includes	  among	  other	  things	  
communication	  and	  information	  about	  inner	  feelings	  or	  deeply	  personal	  relationships.	  
The	  private	  conduct	  of	  life	  is	  an	  absolute	  fundamental	  right,	  which	  cannot	  be	  restricted	  
(Article	  1.1	  GG	  –	  right	  to	  human	  dignity).	  Since	  it	  will	  often	  be	  very	  difficult	  to	  
differentiate	  between	  core	  area	  and	  non-­‐core	  area	  data	  during	  the	  investigation	  
process,	  the	  court	  determines	  that	  adequate	  procedures	  have	  to	  be	  in	  place	  for	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98	  B	  Schafer,	  Y	  Danidou,	  “Trusted	  computing	  and	  the	  digital	  crime	  scene”	  (2011)	  8	  Digital	  
Evidence	  and	  Electronic	  Signature	  Law	  Review	  111-­‐123.	  
99	  BVerfG,	  NJW	  2008,	  822	  (849).	  
100	  BVerfG,	  NJW	  2008,	  822	  (849).	  
101	  BVerfG,	  NJW	  2008,	  822	  (853).	  
102	  BVerfG,	  NJW	  2008,	  822	  (854).	  
	   43	  
examination	  stage	  of	  the	  data.	  In	  particular,	  if	  core	  area	  data	  is	  detected,	  this	  data	  has	  to	  
be	  deleted	  immediately	  and	  the	  use	  of	  this	  data	  by	  the	  state	  is	  prohibited.103	  However,	  
this	  raises	  the	  dilemma	  that	  the	  requirement	  to	  delete	  the	  collected	  core	  area	  data	  
cannot	  undo	  the	  violation	  of	  the	  absolute	  right	  to	  human	  dignity.	  Furthermore,	  as	  
Kutscha	  points	  out,	  although	  the	  measure	  itself	  has	  to	  be	  permitted	  by	  a	  judge,	  the	  
court	  did	  not	  establish	  a	  requirement	  for	  a	  judge	  to	  control	  the	  analysis	  process.104	  	  
At	  this	  point,	  one	  might	  discuss	  if	  by	  ignoring	  the	  specific	  abilities	  of	  investigative	  
software,	  an	  opportunity	  was	  missed	  here.	  However,	  as	  long	  as	  only	  the	  software	  
makes	  a	  copy,	  and	  deletes	  irrelevant	  data	  before	  the	  police	  as	  “owner”	  accesses	  it,	  any	  
infringement	  of	  privacy	  would	  be	  minimal	  or	  nonexistent.	  	  	  
2.5 Reasoning 
Coming	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  a	  new	  basic	  right	  is	  necessary	  to	  guarantee	  the	  
safeguarding	  of	  data	  protection	  and	  privacy	  rights,	  the	  court	  had	  considered	  and	  
rejected	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  existing	  basic	  rights	  canon	  is	  sufficient	  to	  ensure	  this.	  
This	  reasoning	  has	  been	  discussed	  controversially,	  with	  some	  authors	  arguing	  that	  
existing	  basic	  rights	  are	  sufficient	  to	  protect	  citizens	  from	  such	  investigative	  activities	  
by	  state	  agencies.105	  The	  arguments	  of	  the	  court	  against	  the	  applicability	  of	  existing	  
basic	  rights,	  and	  the	  criticism	  thereof,	  are	  thus	  important	  to	  assess	  the	  relevance	  of	  the	  
new	  IT	  basic	  right.106	  	  
	  
The	  court	  considered	  and	  rejected	  the	  right	  to	  secrecy	  of	  telecommunications	  (Article	  
10.1	  GG),	  the	  right	  to	  inviolability	  of	  the	  home	  (Article	  13.1	  GG),	  and	  the	  right	  to	  
informational	  self-­‐determination	  (Article	  2.1	  in	  conjunction	  with	  Article	  1.1	  GG)	  as	  
possibilities.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103	  Ibid.	  
104	  M	  Kutscha,	  “Mehr	  Schutz	  von	  Computerdaten	  durch	  ein	  neues	  Grundrecht?”,	  (2008)	  15	  Neue	  
Juristische	  Wochenschrift,	  1042,	  1043.	  
105	  See	  e.g.	  Hornung/Bendrath/Pfitzman,	  note	  85,	  at	  142.	  
106	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  thesis	  only	  the	  central	  arguments	  are	  depicted	  here.	  For	  a	  discussion	  
of	  the	  full	  reasoning	  see	  W	  Abel,	  B	  Schafer,	  "The	  German	  Constitutional	  Court	  on	  the	  Right	  in	  
Confidentiality	  and	  Integrity	  of	  Information	  Technology	  Systems	  –	  a	  case	  report	  on	  BVerfG,	  NJW	  
2008,	  822",	  (2009)	  6:1	  SCRIPTed	  106	  –	  123.	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2.5.1 The Secrecy of Telecommunications 
Secrecy	  of	  telecommunications	  according	  to	  Article	  10.1	  GG	  protects	  the	  non-­‐physical	  
transmission	  of	  information	  to	  individual	  recipients	  with	  the	  aid	  of	  telecommunications	  
devices.107	  Protected	  by	  this	  basic	  right	  is	  any	  type	  of	  telecommunication	  regardless	  of	  
the	  transmission	  type	  used	  (cable	  or	  broadcast,	  analogue	  or	  digital	  transmission),	  and	  
the	  data	  transmitted	  (speech,	  picture,	  sound,	  or	  other	  data),	  thus	  also	  any	  
communication	  via	  the	  Internet.108	  Moreover,	  protected	  by	  this	  right	  are	  not	  only	  the	  
contents	  of	  the	  communication,	  but	  also	  details	  about	  their	  general	  circumstances,	  such	  
as	  details	  about	  the	  communication	  partners,	  and	  the	  transmission	  type	  (by	  email,	  chat,	  
VoIP).109	  	  
Thus	  any	  ongoing	  communication	  via	  the	  Internet,	  and	  the	  data	  generated	  by	  such	  
communication	  falls	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  protection	  of	  Article	  10.1	  GG,	  regardless	  of	  
whether	  the	  measure	  targets	  the	  transmission	  channel	  or	  the	  terminal	  used	  for	  
telecommunication.110	  	  
 
	  The	  court	  however	  found	  that	  Article	  10.1	  GG	  does	  not	  cover	  an	  online	  search	  of	  data	  
stored	  on	  the	  storage	  media	  of	  an	  ICT	  device,	  especially	  if	  the	  data	  is	  not	  in	  the	  public	  
domain	  and	  the	  affected	  person	  has	  undertaken	  steps	  to	  protect	  the	  data	  from	  
unauthorised	  access.111	  	  
	  
Hence,	  the	  court	  considered	  that	  the	  right	  to	  secrecy	  of	  telecommunications	  is	  only	  
applicable	  if	  the	  surveillance	  is	  technically	  restricted	  exclusively	  to	  data	  emanating	  
from	  an	  ongoing	  telecommunication	  process,	  i.e.	  searching	  of	  the	  system	  is	  
impossible.112	  
	  
This	  reasoning	  of	  the	  court	  is	  conclusive.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  software	  tool	  requires	  the	  
suspect	  to	  be	  online	  at	  some	  point	  and	  engaged	  in	  communication	  does	  not	  make	  the	  
search	  a	  wiretapping	  operation	  any	  more	  than	  a	  police	  officer	  who	  seizes	  a	  suspects	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  See	  e.g.	  BVerfGE	  NJW	  1985,	  121	  (136);	  NJW	  2002,	  3619	  (3626).	  
108	  See	  BVerfGE,	  NJW	  2005,	  2603	  (2638)	  for	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  2003,	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phone	  during	  a	  physical	  search	  of	  his	  premises	  changes	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  operation	  
from	  a	  search	  into	  an	  interception	  of	  telecommunication.	  	  	  	  
The	  secret	  infiltration	  of	  a	  complex	  ICT	  system	  offers	  the	  opportunity	  to	  spy	  on	  the	  
system	  as	  a	  whole,	  and	  is	  not	  just	  an	  intercept	  of	  an	  isolated	  exchange	  of	  
communication	  as	  in	  a	  traditional	  wiretapping	  operation.113	  In	  particular,	  there	  is	  a	  
chance	  that	  personal	  data	  stored	  on	  the	  computer,	  which	  is	  unrelated	  to	  and	  goes	  over	  
and	  above	  the	  contents	  and	  circumstances	  of	  the	  ongoing	  telecommunication,	  is	  
collected	  (even	  if	  this	  is	  unintended).	  Thus,	  the	  potential	  threat	  to	  civil	  liberties	  goes	  far	  
beyond	  the	  mere	  surveillance	  of	  telecommunication,	  and	  also	  beyond	  the	  protective	  
scope	  of	  Article	  10.1	  GG.	  
	  
In	  practice,	  this	  means	  that	  hardly	  any	  search	  will	  be	  a	  “pure”	  communications	  
intercept.	  The	  main	  aim	  of	  the	  software	  tool	  as	  discussed	  above	  is	  to	  collect	  data	  stored	  
on	  a	  computer,	  and	  the	  conceptual	  gap	  to	  communication	  interception	  is	  too	  wide	  to	  be	  
bridged	  by	  analogous	  interpretation	  of	  Article	  10.1	  GG.	  This	  also	  means	  that	  several	  
aspects	  of	  the	  remote	  searching	  of	  computers	  are	  not	  covered	  by	  the	  guarantee	  of	  
secrecy	  in	  telecommunications	  as	  provided	  by	  Article	  10.1	  GG.	  	  	  
2.5.2 The Inviolability of the Home 
The	  guarantee	  of	  the	  inviolability	  of	  the	  home	  granted	  by	  Article	  13.1	  GG	  protects	  the	  
private	  living	  space	  from	  intrusion	  by	  the	  state.	  	  
The	  spatial	  sphere	  in	  which	  private	  life	  takes	  place	  constitutes	  the	  interests	  protected	  
by	  this	  basic	  right.114	  The	  private	  living	  space	  is,	  however,	  not	  limited	  to	  the	  private	  flat	  
or	  house	  of	  the	  rights	  holder,	  but	  also	  includes	  business	  and	  office	  space.115	  It	  protects	  
this	  space	  from	  physical	  intrusion,	  as	  well	  as	  from	  the	  use	  of	  technical	  measures	  that	  
provide	  an	  insight	  into	  the	  otherwise	  protected	  happenings	  within	  the	  private	  living	  
space.	  This	  is,	  for	  example,	  the	  acoustic	  and	  optical	  surveillance	  of	  a	  living	  space,116	  but	  
also	  the	  measurement	  of	  electromagnetic	  radiation	  to	  monitor	  the	  use	  of	  information	  
technology	  systems	  inside	  the	  dwelling.	  	  
The	  court	  found	  that	  Article	  13.1	  GG	  only	  provides	  protection	  of	  the	  private	  living	  space	  
against	  the	  secret	  intrusion	  by	  police	  or	  secret	  service	  to	  physically	  manipulate	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  BVerG,	  NJW	  2008,	  822	  (842).	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  See	  BVerfGE,	  NJW	  1993,	  2035	  (2047);	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  2001,	  1121	  (1129-­‐1130).	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information	  technology	  systems,	  and	  against	  the	  infiltration	  of	  such	  systems	  to	  monitor	  
the	  events	  in	  a	  flat	  using	  peripherals	  connected	  to	  the	  system	  (such	  as	  the	  use	  of	  inbuilt	  
microphones	  for	  eavesdropping).117	  	  
It	  stated	  that	  such	  actions	  would	  be	  comparable	  in	  its	  nature	  to	  the	  traditional	  search	  of	  
a	  house	  and	  would	  therefore	  be	  covered	  by	  Article	  13	  GG.	  However,	  even	  this	  
protection	  did	  not	  go	  far	  enough,	  and	  it	  underestimates	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  digital	  
world	  for	  today’s	  citizens.	  The	  court	  argued	  that	  Article	  13	  GG	  is	  insufficient	  to	  protect	  
rights	  holders	  against	  the	  general	  infiltration	  of	  ICT	  systems	  using	  a	  software	  tool	  to	  
access	  the	  stored	  data	  and	  monitor	  the	  communication,	  even	  if	  the	  system	  is	  located	  in	  
a	  dwelling.118	  	  
	  
Hornung	  disagrees	  with	  this	  reasoning.119	  He	  argues	  that	  Article	  13	  GG	  is	  not	  merely	  
aimed	  at	  protecting	  the	  physical	  space	  as	  such,	  but	  rather	  at	  protecting	  the	  privacy	  of	  
the	  rights	  owner	  within	  this	  physical	  space	  and	  his	  freedom	  to	  behave	  as	  he	  wishes.120	  
Accordingly,	  he	  comes	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  Article	  13	  GG	  covers	  all	  online	  activities	  
undertaken	  from	  the	  private	  living	  space.	  
	  
However,	  one	  specific	  problem	  created	  by	  remote	  online	  searches	  is	  that	  infiltration	  
and	  monitoring	  can	  be	  performed	  regardless	  of	  the	  location	  of	  the	  information	  
technology	  system.	  The	  introduction	  introduced	  the	  notion	  of	  porous	  borders	  of	  the	  
Internet	  world,	  and	  here	  this	  problem	  can	  be	  observed.	  
A	  location-­‐dependent	  protection	  is	  of	  no	  use	  if	  the	  system	  is	  located	  outside	  the	  private	  
space,	  or	  on	  the	  move	  between	  “protected”	  areas.	  Especially	  small	  ICTs	  such	  as	  laptops,	  
PDAs	  and	  mobile	  phones	  are	  designed	  to	  be	  carried	  around.	  The	  precise	  location	  of	  the	  
system	  will	  often	  be	  unknown,	  and	  is	  also	  irrelevant	  for	  investigators	  when	  infiltrating	  
the	  device	  to	  access	  stored	  data.	  This	  would	  have	  had	  the	  counterintuitive	  consequence	  
that	  a	  citizen	  who	  starts	  writing	  an	  email	  on	  his	  laptop	  at	  home,	  reviews	  it	  on	  a	  park	  
bench	  and	  completes	  and	  sends	  it	  back	  at	  home	  moves	  between	  protected	  and	  
unprotected	  environments,	  loosing	  and	  gaining	  apparently	  arbitrarily	  constitutional	  
protection	  and	  thus	  creating	  artificial	  distinctions	  in	  an	  activity	  that	  is	  experienced	  as	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  2008,	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  Gercke,	  note	  48,	  at	  250.	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uniform	  by	  the	  citizen.	  Hornung	  acknowledges	  this	  problem,	  stating	  that	  Article	  13	  GG	  
could	  be	  applied	  analogously	  to	  these	  cases.121	  	  
	  
However,	  while	  it	  is	  acknowledged	  that	  this	  is	  a	  possible	  outcome,	  there	  is	  nothing	  that	  
would	  force	  the	  courts	  to	  take	  this	  route.	  Therefore,	  this	  approach	  does	  not	  sufficiently	  
recognise	  the	  importance	  of	  ICT	  devices	  and	  the	  significance	  the	  online	  space	  has	  
gained	  for	  citizens.	  The	  concept	  of	  cloud	  computing122	  already	  challenges	  this	  approach	  
since	  the	  data	  is	  no	  longer	  stored	  on	  a	  device	  controlled	  by	  the	  owner	  of	  the	  data	  at	  all,	  
but	  a	  third	  party.	  Thus	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  “quasi-­‐living	  space”	  applicable	  to	  mobile	  
devices	  fails	  here.	  Analogies	  are	  always	  difficult	  as	  long-­‐term	  solutions	  when	  applied	  to	  
fast-­‐developing	  technologies	  such	  as	  ICTs.	  
2.5.3 The Right to Informational Self-determination 
The	  right	  to	  informational	  self-­‐determination,	  which	  is	  not	  explicitly	  mentioned	  in	  the	  
constitution,	  was	  derived	  from	  Article	  2.1	  in	  conjunction	  with	  Article	  1.1	  GG,	  which	  
guarantee	  the	  right	  to	  free	  development	  of	  one’s	  personality	  and	  a	  general	  	  “right	  to	  
dignity”,	  respectively.	  	  
	  
This	  right	  constitutes	  the	  core	  of	  Germany’s	  data	  protection	  law	  and	  was	  created	  by	  the	  
BVerfG	  in	  a	  landmark	  ruling	  unrelated	  to	  ICTs.123	  	  
	  
Ruling	  on	  the	  constitutionality	  of	  the	  national	  census,	  the	  court	  established	  a	  legal	  
entitlement	  to	  the	  capacity	  of	  the	  individual	  to	  determine	  in	  principle	  the	  disclosure	  
and	  use	  of	  one’s	  personal	  data.124	  This	  right	  resulted	  from	  the	  court’s	  recognition	  that	  
the	  state	  had	  multiple	  possibilities	  to	  collect,	  process,	  and	  use	  private	  data,	  and	  that	  the	  
evolution	  of	  electronic	  data	  processing	  techniques	  had	  simplified	  these	  to	  such	  an	  
extent	  that	  a	  detailed	  image	  of	  the	  personality	  of	  the	  individual	  becomes	  feasible.	  This	  
had	  the	  potential	  to	  impair	  confidentiality	  interests	  of	  the	  affected	  person,	  which	  are	  
protected	  by	  fundamental	  rights.	  Moreover,	  the	  mere	  anticipation	  that	  one’s	  data	  could	  
be	  collected	  entailed	  an	  unacceptable	  encroachment	  on	  one’s	  freedom	  of	  conduct,	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  P	  Mell,	  T	  Grance,	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  Cloud	  
Computing”	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  Computer	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  419.	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encouraging	  people	  to	  forgo	  valid,	  and	  perfectly	  legal,	  lifestyle	  choices	  in	  the	  mere	  
anticipation	  that	  information	  about	  them	  could	  be	  collected	  and	  leaked	  to	  third	  parties.	  
This	  means	  in	  particular	  that	  no	  concrete	  threat	  has	  to	  be	  evident.	  The	  court	  stated	  that	  
this	  is	  in	  particular	  the	  case	  if	  personal	  data	  can	  be	  used	  and	  linked	  in	  a	  manner,	  which	  
the	  person	  concerned	  can	  neither	  detect	  nor	  prevent.125	  Fear	  of	  surveillance	  is	  just	  as	  
limiting	  to	  the	  free	  development	  of	  a	  social	  personality	  as	  the	  surveillance	  itself.	  	  
	  
Given	  the	  historical	  and	  teleological	  background	  of	  this	  basic	  right,	  the	  assumption	  of	  
many	  scholars	  was	  that	  the	  right	  to	  informational	  self-­‐determination	  could	  be	  applied	  
to	  the	  data	  processing	  online	  and	  would	  be	  sufficient	  to	  regulate	  the	  online	  searching	  of	  
ICTs.126	  
	  
However,	  the	  court	  found	  that	  the	  right	  to	  informational	  self-­‐determination	  does	  not	  
sufficiently	  appreciate	  the	  fact	  that	  individuals	  rely	  on	  information	  technology	  systems	  
to	  develop	  their	  personality	  and	  hence	  entrust	  the	  system	  with	  sensitive	  data,	  or	  
inevitably	  provide	  such	  data	  by	  merely	  using	  the	  system.127	  A	  third	  party	  accessing	  
such	  a	  system	  can	  obtain	  potentially	  large	  amounts	  of	  sensible	  information	  about	  an	  
individual,	  without	  having	  to	  rely	  on	  further	  data	  collection	  and	  processing	  measures.	  	  
	  
As	  with	  Article	  13	  GG,	  arguing	  that	  the	  right	  to	  informational	  self-­‐determination	  would	  
be	  sufficient	  is	  short	  sighted.	  Extending	  the	  protection	  scope	  of	  the	  right	  to	  ICTs	  and	  
their	  use	  might	  be	  feasible	  at	  the	  current	  stage;	  however,	  the	  fast	  development	  of	  ICTs	  
and	  their	  integration	  into	  people’s	  life	  means	  that	  an	  ever-­‐increasing	  amount	  of	  private	  
data	  is	  stored	  online	  and	  ICTs	  become	  ever	  more	  important	  for	  the	  private	  and	  
business	  life	  of	  people.	  In	  a	  way,	  one	  could	  say	  that	  the	  Internet	  and	  ICTs	  cut	  out	  the	  
“man	  in	  the	  middle”.	  The	  data	  comes	  already	  pre-­‐processed	  and	  arranged	  by	  the	  data	  
subject’s	  computer.	  	  
Since	  the	  older	  data	  protection	  decision	  focused	  on	  the	  process	  of	  data	  handling	  and	  
organisation,	  there	  is	  the	  danger	  that	  the	  new	  surveillance	  technologies	  circumvent	  this	  
right.	  The	  active,	  if	  unwitting,	  participation	  of	  the	  suspect	  that	  is	  crucial	  for	  the	  
functioning	  of	  the	  software	  tool	  has	  therefore	  also	  the	  potential	  to	  deprive	  the	  suspect	  
of	  protection	  otherwise	  taken	  for	  granted.	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  BVerfG,	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  2008,	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  (844).	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  See	  e.g.	  Hornung/Bendrath/Pfitzman,	  note	  85,	  at	  142.	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  Ibid.	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Another	  crucial	  aspect	  that	  is	  overlooked	  by	  scholars	  arguing	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  
applicability	  of	  the	  right	  to	  informational	  self-­‐determination	  is	  the	  automation	  of	  the	  
policing	  activities	  and	  the	  resulting	  modification	  of	  the	  existing	  policing	  system,	  which	  
is	  traditionally	  rooted	  in	  the	  reasonable	  exercise	  of	  human	  judgment.	  We	  expect	  for	  
instance	  from	  prosecution	  agencies	  to	  issue	  warrants	  only	  if	  there	  is	  a	  reasonable	  
suspicion	  against	  a	  suspect,	  the	  search	  must	  have	  a	  (subjective)	  likelihood	  to	  produce	  
relevant	  evidence	  (that	  is,	  is	  a	  goal	  directed,	  intentional	  process)	  and	  the	  gains	  must	  on	  
balance	  justify	  the	  infringement	  of	  certain	  rights	  and	  liberties.	  Law	  enforcement	  is	  
therefore	  always	  also	  an	  exercise	  in	  practical	  reason	  and	  practical	  reasonableness.	  We	  
control	  the	  exercise	  of	  this	  discretionary	  reasoning	  through	  various	  means,	  some	  of	  
them	  procedural,	  others	  more	  substantive.	  Procedurally,	  we	  often	  link	  the	  right	  to	  
make	  such	  a	  decision	  to	  a	  certain	  degree	  of	  proven	  experience,	  expressed	  in	  
hierarchical	  organisations	  such	  as	  the	  police	  typically	  through	  a	  rank.	  	  Only	  officers	  of	  a	  
certain	  rank,	  and	  with	  that,	  a	  certain	  degree	  of	  track	  record	  of	  getting	  it	  right	  and	  the	  
relevant	  life	  experience	  that	  this	  carries	  will	  be	  permitted	  to	  make	  certain	  decisions.	  
Laws	  on	  police	  procedure	  will	  typically	  prescribe	  and	  in	  varying	  degrees	  regiment	  the	  
exercise	  of	  this	  discretionary	  reasoning,	  by	  linking	  legal	  consequences	  directly	  to	  the	  
internal	  mental	  state	  of	  police	  officers,	  “reasonable	  suspicion“	  as	  a	  trigger	  condition	  for	  
search	  rights	  again	  being	  the	  paradigmatic	  example.	  Finally,	  courts	  will	  be	  able	  to	  
scrutinise	  if	  this	  discretion	  was	  wielded	  appropriately,	  engaging	  in	  their	  own	  practical	  
reasoning	  in	  the	  process.	  All	  this	  is	  necessary	  for	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  –	  police	  officers	  
exercise	  their	  power	  with	  their	  subjective	  knowledge	  and	  understanding	  of	  the	  laws	  
that	  confer	  them	  to	  them,	  and	  the	  courts	  can	  if	  required	  validate	  or	  invalidate	  post	  
factum	  this	  reasoning	  process.	  By	  replacing	  officers	  through	  an	  automated	  process,	  or	  
even	  by	  shifting	  the	  emphasis	  away	  from	  the	  human	  controller	  of	  the	  software	  (if	  there	  
is	  still	  such	  a	  person)	  to	  the	  program	  carries	  with	  it	  the	  potential	  to	  shortcut	  these	  
safeguards,	  transforming	  what	  ought	  to	  be	  a	  normative-­‐evaluative	  process	  of	  practical	  
reasoning	  into	  a	  purely	  factual	  question	  of	  technology	  performing	  according	  to	  its	  
design	  parameters.	  Empirical	  research	  that	  the	  author	  carried	  out	  in	  the	  context	  of	  this	  
thesis	  within	  the	  European	  project	  mentioned	  above	  on	  Admissibility	  of	  Electronic	  
Evidence	  in	  court	  bears	  out	  this	  concern.128	  A	  substantial	  number	  of	  the	  respondents	  to	  
the	  questionnaire	  acknowledged	  that	  they	  had	  little	  or	  no	  understanding	  of	  computer	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technology,	  and	  were	  therefore	  happy	  to	  “black	  box”	  large	  parts	  of	  the	  investigative	  
process,	  putting	  their	  trust	  in	  computer	  forensics	  experts	  who	  could	  testify	  to	  the	  
correct	  functioning	  of	  their	  diagnostic	  tools.	  But	  by	  changing	  the	  conceptual	  framing	  of	  
the	  question	  from	  one	  of	  practical	  reasonableness	  and	  law	  conformant	  exercise	  of	  
power	  by	  a	  human	  being	  to	  one	  of	  software	  technology,	  many	  of	  the	  probing	  questions	  
a	  judge	  or	  defence	  solicitor	  may	  have	  asked	  of	  a	  police	  officer	  (“did	  you	  really	  hear	  a	  
scream	  before	  you	  entered	  the	  flat?”)	  fell	  by	  the	  wayside,	  and	  computer	  experts	  who	  
were	  perceived	  as	  neutral	  and	  objective	  scientists	  were	  given	  a	  much	  less	  rigorous	  
level	  of	  scrutiny.	  	  
	  
Online	  searching	  of	  a	  computer	  is	  of	  a	  severity	  for	  the	  personality	  of	  the	  affected	  person	  
that	  goes	  beyond	  mere	  individual	  data	  collection,	  against	  which	  the	  right	  to	  
information	  self-­‐determination	  provides	  protection,	  and	  it	  is	  therefore	  correct	  to	  
reason	  that	  it	  is	  not	  covered	  by	  the	  fundamental	  right	  to	  informational	  self-­‐
determination.	  
2.6 Evaluation 
The	  academic	  discussion	  of	  the	  judgment	  has	  mainly	  focused	  on	  the	  new	  basic	  right	  
and	  the	  court’s	  dismissal	  of	  the	  applicability	  of	  the	  existing	  rights	  canon.	  	  
The	  court,	  however,	  delivered	  a	  forward-­‐looking	  piece	  of	  regulation	  that	  is	  more	  
complex	  than	  it	  appears	  at	  first	  glance.	  Hidden	  in	  the	  court’s	  reasoning	  on	  the	  
applicability	  of	  the	  existing	  rights	  canon	  to	  novel	  software-­‐based	  investigative	  
measures	  are	  important	  new	  approaches	  to	  the	  future	  policing	  of	  the	  Internet	  and	  data	  
online.	  
What	  has	  slipped	  the	  attention	  of	  most	  scholars	  is	  the	  court’s	  recognition	  of	  the	  
existence	  of	  a	  virtual	  living	  space	  and	  the	  acknowledgment	  of	  its	  constitutional	  
relevance.129	  	  
2.6.1 Virtual Living Space 
Little	  attention	  has	  so	  far	  been	  paid	  in	  the	  legal	  discussion	  of	  this	  judgment	  to	  the	  
court’s	  recognition	  of	  a	  virtual	  living	  space	  as	  a	  concept	  of	  constitutional	  relevance.	  The	  
reason	  for	  this	  could	  be	  that	  the	  court	  fails	  to	  explicitly	  refer	  to	  this	  new	  concept	  in	  the	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judgment.	  The	  court’s	  recognition	  of	  this	  concept	  can	  however	  be	  derived	  from	  the	  
court’s	  reasoning	  on	  the	  use	  of	  ICTs	  and	  the	  Internet.	  
	  
The	  court	  establishes	  in	  its	  judgment	  that	  the	  use	  of	  ICTs	  has	  gained	  an	  importance	  and	  
significance	  for	  the	  personality	  and	  the	  development	  of	  individuals	  that	  could	  not	  have	  
been	  foreseen.130	  It	  states	  that	  modern	  ICTs	  provide	  the	  individual	  with	  new	  
possibilities	  and	  are	  now	  omnipresent	  and	  that	  their	  use	  is	  central	  to	  the	  lives	  of	  many	  
citizens.	  It	  goes	  on	  to	  find	  that	  the	  performance	  of	  ICT	  systems	  and	  their	  significance	  
for	  the	  development	  of	  the	  personality	  increase	  further	  if	  such	  systems	  are	  networked	  
with	  one	  another,	  which	  is	  more	  and	  more	  becoming	  the	  norm,	  in	  particular	  because	  of	  
the	  increased	  use	  of	  the	  Internet	  by	  large	  groups	  of	  the	  population.131	  	  
Hence,	  the	  court	  acknowledges	  that	  ICT	  systems	  are	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  citizens’	  lives	  
and	  are	  shaping	  the	  way	  people	  live	  and	  work,	  and	  societies	  function.	  	  It	  furthermore	  
recognises	  that	  citizens	  are	  entrusting	  ICT	  systems	  with	  increasingly	  more	  sensible	  
information,	  which	  leads	  to	  new	  types	  of	  endangerment	  for	  the	  personality	  of	  citizens.	  	  
	  
These	  endangerments	  can	  in	  particular	  materialise	  if	  LEAs	  monitor	  the	  usage	  of	  ICT	  
devices	  and	  their	  applications,	  and	  collect	  data	  stored	  on	  those	  devices	  and	  generated	  
during	  communications.	  This	  data	  can	  be	  of	  sensitive	  nature	  and	  provide	  LEAs	  with	  a	  
detailed	  image	  of	  the	  personality	  of	  the	  suspect,	  as	  well	  as	  details	  about	  his	  habits	  and	  
activities	  in	  the	  virtual	  living	  space.	  Accessing	  this	  data	  can	  therefore	  lead	  to	  violations	  
of	  privacy	  and	  data	  protection	  rights.	  With	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  new	  IT	  basic	  right	  
the	  court	  acknowledges	  the	  constitutional	  relevance	  of	  the	  virtual	  living	  space,	  and	  the	  
need	  to	  protect	  citizens	  from	  violations	  thereof.	  	  
	  
The	  acknowledgment	  of	  the	  virtual	  living	  space	  as	  a	  legal	  concept	  of	  constitutional	  
relevance	  and	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  new	  IT	  basic	  right	  is	  a	  logical	  consequence	  of	  
the	  analysis	  of	  the	  state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	  of	  ICTs	  and	  their	  likely	  future	  development.	  	  
	  
The	  growing	  significance	  of	  the	  virtual	  living	  space	  means	  that	  the	  borders	  between	  the	  
digital	  and	  analogue	  realm	  are	  increasingly	  blurred.	  The	  importance	  of	  the	  virtual	  
living	  space	  has	  its	  roots	  in	  the	  development	  and	  advancement	  of	  ICTs.	  We	  no	  longer	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  BVerfG,	  NJW	  2008,	  822	  (827).	  
131	  BVerfG,	  NJW	  2008,	  822	  (827).	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provide	  machines	  with	  commands;	  we	  enter	  into	  dialogues,	  navigate	  simulated	  worlds,	  
and	  create	  virtual	  realities.	  Further,	  these	  dialogues	  are	  no	  longer	  limited	  to	  one-­‐on-­‐
one	  person/machine	  interactions.	  Millions	  of	  people	  now	  interact	  with	  one	  another	  via	  
computers	  on	  networks,	  where	  they	  have	  the	  opportunity	  to	  talk,	  to	  exchange	  ideas	  
and	  feelings,	  and	  to	  assume	  personae	  of	  their	  own	  creation.132	  This	  leads	  to	  the	  
development	  of	  a	  “second	  self”	  or	  “digital	  identity”	  in	  the	  virtual	  living	  space,	  and	  these	  
two	  identities	  –	  the	  virtual	  and	  the	  analogue	  –	  increasingly	  fuse.	  Actions	  in	  the	  virtual	  
living	  space	  have	  consequences	  upon	  the	  analogue	  self	  and	  vice	  versa.	  	  
	  
As	  this	  case	  study	  shows,	  this	  leads	  to	  questions	  regarding	  the	  policing	  of	  this	  virtual	  
living	  space.	  The	  more	  people	  entrust	  the	  virtual	  living	  space	  with	  information	  and	  live	  
online,	  the	  greater	  is	  the	  interest	  of	  LEAs	  to	  monitor	  and	  police	  this	  space.	  The	  
significance	  of	  the	  development	  of	  the	  new	  IT	  basic	  law	  and	  the	  acknowledgment	  of	  the	  
virtual	  living	  space	  as	  a	  concept	  of	  fundamental	  value	  becomes	  evident	  here.	  The	  
growing	  importance	  of	  the	  virtual	  living	  space	  triggers	  the	  introduction	  of	  novel,	  
software-­‐based	  investigative	  tools.	  	  As	  shown,	  their	  unique	  abilities,	  however,	  threaten	  
fundamental	  values	  and	  rights.	  With	  its	  judgment,	  the	  court	  has	  established	  that	  the	  
policing	  of	  the	  virtual	  living	  space	  can	  only	  occur	  within	  the	  parameters	  of	  the	  
constitution.	  It	  recognises	  however	  also	  the	  essential	  difference	  between	  virtual	  and	  
offline	  lifes,	  a	  difference	  prominent	  enough	  to	  force	  the	  court	  to	  develop	  a	  new	  
constitutional	  right.	  
2.6.2 The New Investigative Tools 
The	  judgment	  of	  the	  German	  Federal	  Constitutional	  Court	  (necessarily)	  has	  its	  
shortcomings.	  In	  particular,	  it	  lacks	  a	  deeper	  technical	  analysis	  of	  the	  proposed	  
software	  tool	  envisaged	  to	  deploy	  during	  online	  searches.	  The	  focus	  of	  the	  court	  was	  on	  
the	  target	  of	  an	  invasive	  investigative	  act,	  and	  the	  rights	  violated	  in	  the	  process.	  This	  is	  
of	  course	  typical	  for	  court	  based	  reasoning,	  which	  occurs	  only	  after	  a	  right	  was	  
potentially	  violated.	  Precluded,	  partly	  for	  procedural	  reasons,	  was	  therefore	  an	  analysis	  
of	  the	  details	  of	  the	  process,	  and	  how	  in	  the	  future	  law	  compliant	  software-­‐based	  
investigative	  tools	  should	  be	  structured.	  Or	  with	  other	  words,	  while	  the	  court	  discussed	  
the	  virtual	  living	  space	  as	  a	  sui	  generis	  regulatory	  space,	  it	  did	  not	  yet	  discuss	  the	  
virtual	  police	  officer.	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  Turkle	  (2005),	  note	  6.	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 2.7 Relevance 
Despite	  the	  national	  (German)	  focus	  of	  this	  case	  study,	  the	  online	  searching	  of	  
computers	  is	  an	  international	  phenomenon.	  The	  reason	  for	  focusing	  on	  the	  German	  
case	  instead	  of	  choosing	  a	  more	  general	  European	  approach	  is	  the	  important	  and	  
detailed	  case	  law	  generated	  by	  the	  BVerfG.	  While	  this	  judgment	  only	  has	  a	  direct	  legal	  
impact	  in	  Germany,	  the	  findings	  are	  of	  great	  significance	  for	  other	  countries	  given	  the	  
transnational	  nature	  of	  the	  Internet	  and	  the	  data	  stored	  online.	  
	  
This	  is	  particularly	  relevant,	  since	  the	  Council	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  (EU)	  
recommended	  in	  2008	  that	  member	  states	  should	  undertake	  clandestine	  remote	  
searches	  of	  computers	  of	  suspects,	  if	  provided	  for	  under	  national	  law,	  and	  thus	  
encouraged	  the	  EU	  members	  to	  introduce	  this	  new	  investigative	  method.133	  This	  
recommendation	  is	  part	  of	  a	  framework	  strategy	  developed	  to	  more	  effectively	  combat	  
cybercrime	  and	  the	  increase	  in	  crimes	  committed	  using	  computer	  technology.	  	  
Following	  this	  recommendation,	  several	  member	  states	  discussed	  the	  general	  legality	  
of	  this	  measure,	  and	  the	  need	  to	  implement	  legislation	  allowing	  for	  the	  online	  searching	  
of	  computers.	  In	  addition,	  the	  German	  government	  initiated	  the	  foundation	  of	  a	  
working	  group	  –	  the	  so-­‐called	  Remote	  Forensic	  Software	  User	  Group	  –	  to	  exchange	  
information	  about	  the	  technical	  details	  of	  the	  online	  searching	  of	  computers.134	  The	  
core	  participants	  of	  this	  group	  are	  Germany,	  the	  Netherlands,	  Belgium	  and	  Switzerland.	  	  
	  
In	  the	  UK,	  according	  to	  the	  Association	  of	  Chief	  Police	  Officers	  (Acpo),	  194	  clandestine	  
searches	  had	  been	  undertaken	  within	  one	  year	  of	  people’s	  homes,	  offices	  and	  hotel	  
rooms.135	  
Here,	  the	  remote	  searching	  of	  computers	  is	  currently	  based	  on	  existing	  legislation.	  
Since	  1994,	  an	  amendment	  to	  the	  Computer	  Misuse	  Act	  1990	  made	  state	  hacking	  
possible.	  Section	  162	  of	  the	  Criminal	  Justice	  and	  Public	  Order	  Act	  1994	  amended	  section	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133	  Council	  of	  the	  European	  Union,	  ‘Council	  Conclusions	  on	  a	  Concerted	  Work	  Strategy	  and	  
Practical	  Measures	  Against	  Cybercrime’,	  2987th	  Justice	  and	  Home	  Affairs	  Council	  meeting,	  27	  –	  
28	  November	  2008,	  available	  at	  http://www.ue2008.fr/webdav/site/PFUE/shared/import/	  
1127_JAI/Conclusions/JHA_Council_conclusions_Cybercrime_EN.pdf	  
134	  A	  Wilkens,	  “BKA	  initiierte	  internationale	  Staatstrojaner-­‐Arbeitsgruppe”	  (2011)	  heise,	  
available	  online	  at	  http://heise.de/-­‐1378367	  
135	  D	  Leppard,	  “Police	  set	  to	  step	  up	  hacking	  of	  home	  PCs”	  (2009)	  The	  Sunday	  Times,	  available	  
online	  at	  http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article5439604.ece.	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10	  of	  the	  Computer	  Misuse	  Act	  1990	  (saving	  for	  certain	  law	  enforcement	  powers)	  to	  
allow	  access	  to	  computer	  material	  by	  constables	  and	  other	  enforcement	  officers.	  	  
However,	  such	  intrusive	  surveillance	  is	  closely	  regulated	  under	  the	  Regulation	  of	  
Investigatory	  Powers	  Act	  2000	  (RIPA).	  
RIPA	  allows	  in	  Section	  II	  for	  covert	  directed	  surveillance	  of	  persons.	  Directed	  
surveillance	  is	  defined	  as	  covert	  surveillance,	  which	  is	  undertaken	  for	  a	  specific	  
investigation	  or	  operation	  that	  is	  likely	  to	  obtain	  private	  information	  about	  a	  person,	  
and	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  preventing	  or	  detecting	  a	  serious	  crime.	  Furthermore,	  the	  action	  
needs	  to	  be	  authorised.	  This	  is	  the	  case,	  if	  the	  officer	  undertaking	  the	  measure	  believes,	  
at	  the	  time	  of	  executing	  it,	  that	  the	  action	  is	  necessary	  to	  prevent	  or	  detect	  serious	  
crime,	  and	  is	  proportionate	  to	  what	  it	  seeks	  to	  achieve.	  
The	  author	  notes	  that	  the	  wording	  of	  RIPA	  refers	  directly	  to	  the	  beliefs	  of	  relevant	  
officers	  of	  the	  right	  rank,	  opening	  up	  the	  possibility	  to	  either	  circumvent	  RIPA	  through	  
autonomous	  tools,	  or	  to	  prohibit	  them	  altogether	  because	  of	  the	  absence	  of	  such	  mental	  
states.	  This	  thesis	  will	  argue	  that	  a	  better	  solution	  is	  to	  be	  open	  about	  both	  the	  dangers	  
and	  possibilities	  of	  remote	  forensic	  software	  tools,	  which	  however	  need	  to	  be	  able	  to	  
perfom	  the	  functional	  equivalents	  of	  the	  deliberative	  steps	  (“necessary	  to	  detect”)	  and	  
to	  recognise	  this	  ability,	  not	  by	  ascribing	  to	  them	  legal	  personality,	  but	  the	  equivalent	  of	  
a	  “police	  rank”,	  a	  solution	  which	  this	  thesis	  argues	  is	  less	  philosophically	  loaded	  as	  
speculation	  about	  “robot	  consciousness”	  inevitably	  are.	  
	  
Other	  European	  countries	  have	  also	  discussed	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  online	  searching	  
of	  ICTs	  as	  an	  investigative	  measure.136	  Most	  recently,	  Finland	  has	  published	  in	  February	  
2011	  a	  draft	  amendment	  of	  the	  Coercive	  Measures	  Act,	  which	  would	  grant	  police	  the	  
power	  to	  undertake	  online	  searches	  of	  computers.137	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136	  Both	  Switzerland	  and	  Austria	  had	  public	  discussions	  about	  the	  introduction	  of	  this	  measure.	  
Similarly	  to	  the	  UK,	  Switzerland	  does	  not	  have	  a	  specific	  legal	  basis	  allowing	  this	  investigative	  
measure.	  However,	  a	  law	  regulating	  the	  surveillance	  of	  the	  post-­‐	  and	  telecommunications	  traffic	  
enables	  police	  to	  undertake	  this	  measure	  (see	  e.g.	  E	  Platz,	  “Rechtliche	  Zulässigkeit	  von	  Remote	  
Forensic	  Software	  in	  der	  Schweiz”	  (2008)	  sic-­online,	  available	  online	  at	  http://www.sic-­‐
online.ch/2008/documents/838.pdf	  ).	  In	  Austria,	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  legal	  basis	  allowing	  the	  
online	  searching	  of	  computers	  is	  still	  being	  debated	  (see	  e.g.	  D	  AJ	  Sokolov,	  “Österreich:	  
Arbeitsgruppe	  Online-­‐Durchsuchung	  legt	  Bericht	  vor,	  (2008)	  heise,	  available	  online	  at:	  
http://heise.de/-­‐198121).	  
137	  Helsinki	  Times,	  “Finnish	  government	  wants	  police	  to	  have	  spyware	  powers”	  (2011)	  Helsinki	  
Times,	  available	  online	  at:	  http://www.helsinkitimes.fi/htimes/domestic-­‐news/politics/14409-­‐
finnish-­‐government-­‐wants-­‐police-­‐to-­‐have-­‐spyware-­‐powers.html.	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In	  Germany,	  following	  the	  BVerfG	  judgment	  and	  the	  conditions	  set	  out	  therein,	  several	  
legal	  bases	  for	  the	  online	  searching	  of	  computers	  have	  been	  introduced.	  
	  
On	  federal	  level,	  the	  law	  defining	  the	  powers	  of	  the	  Federal	  Criminal	  Agency	  (Gesetz	  
über	  das	  Bundeskriminalamt	  und	  die	  Zusammenarbeit	  des	  Bundes	  und	  der	  Länder	  in	  
kriminalpolizeilichen	  Angelegenheiten	  –	  BKA	  Gesetz)	  has	  been	  amended	  to	  include	  the	  
power	  to	  undertake	  an	  online	  search	  of	  computers.138	  Article	  20k	  was	  added	  to	  the	  list	  
of	  powers	  to	  allow	  the	  German	  Federal	  Criminal	  Agency	  (Bundeskriminalamt	  -­‐BKA)	  to	  
secretly	  access,	  without	  the	  knowledge	  of	  the	  affected	  person,	  information	  technology	  
systems	  under	  certain	  conditions.139	  	  
	  
On	  federal	  state	  level,	  two	  federal	  states,	  Bavaria	  and	  Rhineland-­‐Palatinate,	  have	  
introduced	  legislation	  allowing	  the	  online	  searching	  of	  ICT	  devices.	  
Bavaria	  amended	  its	  Police	  Power	  Code	  (Polizeiaufgabengesetz	  -­‐	  PAG)	  on	  3rd	  July	  2008	  
to	  include	  the	  power	  to	  search	  computers	  remotely.140	  	  
However,	  this	  amendment	  was	  altered	  to	  ensure	  its	  constitutionality	  after	  the	  
opposition	  party	  filed	  a	  constitutional	  complaint	  against	  the	  regulation.141	  	  The	  
currently	  valid	  version	  came	  into	  effect	  on	  14th	  July	  2009.142	  	  
Rhineland-­‐Palatinate	  amended	  its	  Police	  Code	  (Polizei-­	  und	  Ordnungsbehördengesetz	  -­‐	  
POG)	  to	  include	  the	  power	  to	  remotely	  and	  clandestinely	  search	  the	  computer	  of	  
suspects	  on	  27th	  January	  2011.143	  	  
Article	  31c	  (1)	  POG	  grants	  police	  the	  power	  to	  access	  information	  technology	  systems	  
to	  prevent	  a	  danger	  for	  the	  life	  and	  integrity	  of	  another	  person,	  the	  foundations	  of	  the	  
state,	  and	  essential	  values	  of	  humanity.144	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138	  BKAGes.	  i.	  d.	  F.	  v.	  25.	  12.	  2008,	  BGBl.	  I	  3083	  ff;	  S	  Krempl,	  “Bundestag	  verabschiedet	  BKA-­‐
Gesetz	  mit	  heimlichen	  Online-­‐Durchsuchungen”	  (2008)	  heise,	  available	  online	  at	  
http://heise.de/-­‐216645.	  	  
139	  Article	  20k	  Bundeskriminalamt	  Gesetz,	  available	  at	  http://www.gesetze-­‐im-­‐
internet.de/bkag_1997/__20k.html.	  
140	  S	  Krempl,	  “Bayrischer	  Landtag	  setzt	  den	  ‘Bayerntrojaner’	  frei”	  (2008)	  heise,	  available	  online	  
at	  http://heise.de/-­‐183633.	  
141	  S	  Krempl,	  “SPD	  legt	  Verfassungsbeschwerde	  gegen	  den	  ‘Bayerntrojaner’	  ein”	  (2008)	  heise,	  
available	  online	  at	  http://heise.de/-­‐207807.	  
142	  http://by.juris.de/by/PolAufgG_BY_1990_Art34d.htm;	  M	  Emert,	  “Münchener	  Koalition	  
beschließt	  Änderungen	  beim	  ‘Bayerntrojaner’”	  (2009)	  heise,	  available	  online	  at	  
http://heise.de/-­‐5939.	  
143	  S	  Krempl,	  “Rheinland-­‐Pfalz	  lässt	  den	  Landestrojaner	  von	  der	  Leine”	  (2011)	  heise,	  available	  
online	  at	  http://heise.de/-­‐1178650.	  
144	  http://rlp.juris.de/rlp/PolG_RP_P31c.htm	  .	  
	   56	  
All	  new	  legal	  bases	  have	  been	  drafted	  to	  adhere	  to	  the	  requirements	  developed	  by	  the	  
BVerfG	  in	  its	  judgment.	  Thus	  all	  require	  that	  a	  danger	  for	  the	  foundations	  of	  the	  state	  or	  
a	  federal	  state,	  essential	  values	  of	  humanity,	  or	  the	  life	  and	  integrity	  of	  another	  person	  
exists	  for	  the	  measure	  to	  be	  permissible.	  	  
	  
However,	  the	  new	  BKA	  law	  has	  already	  been	  challenged	  before	  the	  BVerfG.145	  The	  
complaint	  is	  still	  pending	  but	  it	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	  whether	  the	  court	  will	  find	  this	  law	  
constitutional,	  and	  provide	  further	  general	  guidance	  on	  the	  topic,	  and	  interpretation	  of	  
the	  IT	  basic	  right	  in	  its	  judgment.	  	  
2.8 Conclusion 
The	  growing	  significance	  of	  ICTs	  and	  the	  Internet	  for	  people’s	  lives	  leads	  to	  a	  fusion	  of	  
the	  online	  and	  offline	  world.	  More	  and	  more,	  people	  develop	  a	  life	  online	  and	  entrust	  
ICTs	  with	  core	  private	  data.	  	  
	  
As	  a	  result,	  LEAs	  are	  increasingly	  interested	  in	  monitoring	  online	  activities	  and	  
accessing	  the	  data	  stored	  there.	  The	  policing	  of	  the	  online	  living	  space,	  however,	  
requires	  novel,	  software-­‐based	  investigative	  methods.	  These	  novel	  methods,	  like	  the	  
online	  searching	  of	  computers,	  rely	  on	  technologies	  that	  gradually	  replace	  human	  
officers	  for	  core	  policing	  tasks.	  They	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  cyber-­‐cops,	  operating	  
autonomously,	  without	  the	  direct	  intervention	  of	  human	  operators.	  	  
	  
These	  tools	  are	  executing	  potentially	  infringing	  tasks,	  like	  the	  search	  of	  private	  data	  
and	  monitoring	  of	  conversations.	  The	  BVerfG	  therefore	  established	  in	  its	  judgment	  that	  
the	  online	  living	  sphere	  is	  of	  constitutional	  value	  and	  any	  executive	  acts	  potentially	  
infringing	  this	  need	  to	  be	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  constitutional	  right	  to	  confidentiality	  
and	  integrity	  of	  information	  technology	  systems.	  	  	  
	  
This	  means	  that	  the	  new	  investigative	  technologies	  need	  to	  operate	  in	  compliance	  with	  
existing	  legislation	  regulating	  police	  investigations.	  This,	  however,	  poses	  the	  problem	  
of	  adjusting	  the	  legal	  framework	  that	  relies	  so	  prominently	  on	  human	  agency	  and	  
intent,	  like	  suspicion,	  to	  autonomous	  software	  tools.	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  S	  Lüders,	  “Verfassungsbeschwerde	  gegen	  BKA-­‐Gesetz”	  (2009)	  Humanistischer	  
Presseverband,	  available	  online	  at	  http://hpd.de/node/6228.	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3 EMPIRICAL STUDY RESULTS 
	  
The	  previous	  chapter	  (2)	  has	  raised	  a	  number	  of	  questions	  about	  the	  technical	  
feasibility	  and	  legality	  of	  the	  use	  of	  new	  software-­‐based	  investigative	  methods	  –	  such	  as	  
the	  online	  searching	  of	  ICTs.	  In	  particular,	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  case	  law	  has	  highlighted	  
that	  legal	  practitioners	  disagree	  about	  the	  legality	  of	  these	  new	  investigative	  
technologies.	  The	  judgment	  of	  the	  BVerfG,146	  while	  important	  in	  itself,	  did	  not	  provide	  
sufficiently	  detailed	  reasoning	  about	  the	  precise	  legal	  requirements	  for	  the	  lawful	  use	  
of	  this	  new	  investigative	  technology.	  It	  is	  a	  High	  Court	  ruling,	  which	  is	  focused	  on	  the	  
definition	  of	  general	  new	  concepts,	  instead	  of	  developing	  detailed	  requirements	  for	  the	  
lawful	  use	  of	  new	  new	  software-­‐based	  investigative	  tools.	  	  	  
As	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  these	  new	  legal	  concepts,	  in	  particular	  the	  
acknowledgment	  of	  the	  virtual	  living	  space,	  are	  of	  great	  importance	  for	  future	  law-­‐
making	  and	  policing	  of	  the	  digital	  sphere.	  However,	  the	  judgment	  did	  not	  fully	  resolve	  
the	  debate	  surrounding	  the	  online	  searching	  of	  ICTs	  in	  particular,	  and	  of	  new	  software-­‐
based	  investigative	  tools	  in	  general.	  This	  leaves	  lawmakers	  and	  legal	  practitioners	  with	  
a	  legal	  uncertainty	  about	  the	  usability	  of	  this	  method,	  as	  well	  as	  citizens	  insecure	  about	  
the	  limits	  and	  restrictions	  of	  the	  policing	  of	  the	  virtual	  living	  space.	  This	  is	  particularly	  
significant	  because,	  as	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  several	  European	  
governments	  are	  already	  deploying	  this	  investigative	  method,	  or	  planning	  to	  introduce	  
it	  in	  due	  course.147	  	  
	  
Therefore,	  an	  urgent	  need	  exists	  to	  determine	  the	  most	  pressing	  problems	  for	  legal	  
practitioners	  and	  other	  stakeholders	  concerned	  with	  the	  implementation	  and	  use	  of	  
these	  new	  investigative	  technologies,	  and	  those	  stakeholders	  necessarily	  involved	  in	  
this	  process,	  such	  as	  Internet	  Service	  Providers	  (ISPs).	  This	  ensures	  that	  the	  technical	  
and	  legal	  analysis	  in	  this	  thesis	  is	  important	  and	  relevant	  for	  practitioners.	  	  
The	  analysis	  of	  the	  case	  study	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  has	  highlighted	  that	  only	  few	  
details	  about	  the	  technical	  specifics	  of	  the	  new	  investigative	  measure,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  
legal	  concerns	  of	  those	  concerned	  with	  its	  operation,	  are	  known.	  One	  reason	  for	  this	  is,	  
as	  analysed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  the	  need	  for	  a	  certain	  degree	  of	  secrecy.148	  The	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146	  BVerfG,	  NJW,	  2008,	  822.	  
147	  See	  section	  2.7,	  p.	  53.	  
148	  See	  p.	  23.	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disclosure	  of	  too	  many	  technical	  details	  can	  interfere	  with	  the	  clandestine	  use	  of	  the	  
tool.	  This	  is	  also	  the	  reason	  why	  legislation	  drafted	  after	  the	  BVerfG	  judgment	  does	  not	  
go	  beyond	  the	  requirements	  developed	  by	  the	  judges	  therein.	  A	  more	  detailed	  legal	  
basis	  could	  reveal	  details	  about	  the	  tool,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  measure	  itself.	  In	  addition,	  more	  
specific	  legislation	  would	  be	  more	  liable	  to	  constitutional	  challenges	  and	  scrutiny.	  	  
However,	  despite	  this	  need	  for	  secrecy,	  thorough	  research	  into	  the	  technical	  specifics	  of	  
these	  investigative	  tools	  is	  required	  to	  conduct	  informed	  legal	  evaluation	  and	  analysis	  
about	  these	  tools.	  Particularly	  relevant	  is	  information	  about	  the	  problems	  these	  tools	  
cause	  for	  practitioners	  involved	  in	  and	  affected	  by	  their	  use.	  Such	  information	  enables	  
focusing	  on	  relevant	  topics	  and	  problems,	  and	  undertaking	  informed	  reasoning,	  which	  
increases	  the	  practical	  relevance	  of	  the	  work.	  
Due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  relevant	  publications	  and	  more	  detailed	  case	  law,	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  
determine	  these	  factors	  based	  on	  doctrinal,	  text-­‐based	  research	  alone.	  Thus	  a	  different	  
method	  is	  required	  to	  gain	  relevant	  insights	  and	  information.	  	  
To	  gain	  a	  better	  understanding,	  one	  part	  of	  the	  research	  for	  this	  thesis	  has	  therefore	  
consisted	  of	  interviews	  with	  relevant	  stakeholders	  and	  experts	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  
(UK)	  and	  Germany.	  The	  results	  from	  these	  interviews	  have	  considerably	  influenced	  the	  
structure	  and	  focus	  of	  the	  technical	  and	  legal	  analysis	  of	  this	  work.	  
3.1 Interviewees – The Different Stakeholders 
The	  selection	  of	  the	  interviewees	  was	  to	  some	  extent	  influenced	  by	  the	  availability	  of	  
relevant	  stakeholders.	  	  
Generally,	  the	  aim	  was	  to	  interview	  representatives	  from	  relevant	  governmental	  
departments,	  law	  enforcement	  agencies,	  ISPs,	  and	  regulatory	  authorities	  from	  both	  the	  
UK	  and	  Germany.	  In	  addition,	  to	  gain	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  technical	  aspects	  of	  
this	  investigative	  measure,	  a	  neutral	  technical	  expert	  with	  a	  relevant	  background	  and	  
understanding	  of	  the	  specific	  topic	  was	  selected.	  
As	  indicated,	  the	  relevant	  topic	  is	  of	  sensitive	  nature,	  and	  no	  detailed	  information	  is	  
available	  in	  the	  public	  domain.	  The	  condition	  for	  the	  interviews	  was	  therefore	  that	  no	  
statements	  can	  directly	  be	  quoted.	  The	  interviewed	  stakeholders	  can	  be	  named,	  and	  the	  
information	  can	  be	  worked	  into	  the	  thesis,	  but	  no	  statement	  can	  directly	  be	  linked	  to	  
one	  stakeholder.	  While	  this	  to	  some	  extend	  restricts	  the	  use	  of	  the	  empirical	  data,	  its	  
value	  and	  importance	  for	  this	  work	  outweighs	  these	  limitations.	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3.1.1 Interviewees Germany 
The	  following	  stakeholders	  and	  experts	  were	  interviewed	  in	  Germany:	  	  
	  
Organisation	   Name	   Function	  
Bundesministerium	  für	  
Wirtschaft	  und	  Technologie	  
(Federal	  Ministry	  for	  
Economics	  and	  
Technology)	  
Rolf	  Bender	   Senior	  Officer	  for	  Media	  
Law	  and	  New	  Services	  
Bundesministerium	  für	  
Justiz	  (Federal	  Ministry	  of	  
Justice)	  
Marcus	  Schladebach	   Senior	  Officer	  for	  Media	  
Law	  
BITKOM	  
(Federal	  Association	  for	  
Information	  Technology)	  
Guido	  Brinkel	   Head	  of	  Media	  Policy	  
FSM	  
(Association	  for	  the	  
voluntary	  self-­‐control	  of	  
the	  Internet)	  
Sabine	  Frank	   Managing	  Director	  
eco	  
(Association	  of	  German	  
Internet	  Industry)	  
Frank	  Ackermann	   Director	  Self-­‐Regulation	  	  
Deutsche	  Telekom	  AG	   Veronica	  Frey,	  Andreas	  
Goeckel	  
Senior	  Officers	  Multimedia	  
and	  Internet	  Law	  
Chaos	  Computer	  Club	   Volker	  Birk	   Member	  
	  
In	  Germany,	  the	  attempt	  to	  interview	  a	  relevant	  law	  enforcement	  agency	  was	  
unsuccessful.	  No	  agency	  was	  willed	  (or	  cleared)	  to	  discuss	  this	  investigative	  method.	  
However,	  the	  representatives	  of	  the	  federal	  ministries	  were	  able	  to	  answer	  all	  
questions,	  because	  they	  closely	  collaborate	  with	  the	  German	  Federal	  Criminal	  Agency	  
(Bundeskriminalamt).	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As	  technical	  expert	  a	  member	  of	  the	  German	  Chaos	  Computer	  Club	  (CCC)	  was	  chosen,	  
because	  the	  CCC	  was	  technical	  advisor	  to	  the	  BVerfG.	  This	  means	  that	  members	  are	  
well	  informed	  about	  the	  technical	  details	  and	  capabilities	  of	  the	  tools	  deployed.	  
The	  BITKOM,	  FSM	  and	  eco	  are	  regulatory	  authorities,	  which	  collaborate	  with	  both	  the	  
government	  and	  stakeholders	  from	  the	  so-­‐called	  Internet	  value	  chain,	  most	  
prominently	  ISPs.149	  These	  regulatory	  authorities	  are	  important	  for	  ensuring	  that	  a	  
balance	  is	  kept	  between	  the	  regulatory	  requests	  of	  the	  government,	  and	  the	  protection	  
of	  the	  citizens	  and	  the	  stakeholders	  of	  the	  value	  chain.	  
3.1.2 Interviewees UK 
Organisation	   Name	   Function	  
Ministry	  for	  Business,	  
Innovation,	  and	  Skills	  
Nigel	  Hickson	   Head	  of	  Global	  ICT	  Policy	  
SOCA	  e-­‐crime	  unit	   Jonathan	  Flaherty,	  Richard	  
Hyams	  
Technical	  Senior	  Officers	  
OFCOM	   Jeremy	  Olivier	   Head	  of	  Multimedia	  
ISPA	  UK	   Andrew	  Kernahan	   Policy	  Officer	  






Executive	  Solicitor	  and	  
Vodafone’s	  Group	  Privacy	  
Officer	  
Public	  Policy	  Director	  
HM	  Revenue	  and	  Customs	   Simon	  Bird	   Data	  Analytics	  Team	  –	  Web	  
Robot	  
	  
OFCOM	  and	  ISPA	  UK	  are	  both	  regulatory	  authorities	  concerned	  with	  the	  balancing	  of	  
interests	  of	  governments	  and	  industry	  stakeholders.	  The	  interviewees	  of	  the	  SOCA	  e-­‐
crime	  unit	  and	  the	  HM	  Revenue	  and	  Customs	  department	  were	  of	  particular	  relevance,	  
because	  both	  are	  involved	  in	  the	  development	  and	  deployment	  of	  software-­‐based	  
investigative	  technologies.	  The	  interviews	  therefore	  provided	  crucial	  insights	  into	  the	  
problems	  and	  challenges	  faced	  by	  investigators	  during	  the	  development	  and	  
deployment	  of	  these	  new	  investigative	  technologies.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149	  For	  more	  information	  on	  the	  Internet	  value	  chain,	  see	  e.g.	  S	  J	  Barnes,	  “The	  Mobile	  Commerce	  
Value	  Chain:	  Anlysis	  and	  Future	  Developments”	  (2002)	  22:2	  International	  Journal	  of	  Information	  
Management,	  91-­‐108.	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3.2 Methodology 
For	  this	  thesis,	  the	  chosen	  methodology	  to	  collect	  the	  empirical	  data	  was	  to	  conduct	  
qualitative	  research	  interviews.	  The	  reason	  for	  choosing	  this	  methodology,	  over	  for	  
example	  quantitative	  interviews	  in	  form	  of	  questionnaires,	  is	  that	  this	  is	  an	  exploratory	  
study	  that	  aims	  to	  establish	  the	  general	  problems	  and	  challenges	  faced	  by	  the	  different	  
stakeholders	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  new	  investigative	  technologies.	  	  
A	  qualitative	  research	  approach	  is	  particularly	  well	  suited	  for	  collecting	  empirical	  data	  
about	  a	  vague	  and	  complex	  topic.	  As	  Field	  and	  Morse	  put	  it,	  qualitative	  research	  is	  
particularly	  useful	  for	  studying	  “phenomenon	  or	  events	  about	  which	  little	  is	  known.”150	  	  
Principally,	  qualitative	  research	  methods	  should	  be	  used	  when	  there	  is	  little	  known	  
about	  a	  subject.	  Quantitative	  research	  methods	  are	  particularly	  useful	  when	  the	  
phenomenon	  or	  topic	  is	  already	  well	  researched,	  and	  the	  aim	  of	  the	  study	  is	  to	  confirm	  
a	  new	  theory.	  Or	  to	  put	  it	  differently	  “quantitative	  research	  seeks	  causes	  and	  facts	  from	  
the	  epic	  or	  ‘world	  view’	  perspective.151	  	  
As	  stated	  above,	  only	  very	  little	  is	  known	  about	  the	  technical	  details	  of	  the	  new	  
software-­‐based	  investigative	  tools,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  legal	  and	  practical	  problems	  caused	  
by	  their	  usage	  for	  the	  stakeholders	  involved	  in	  the	  process.	  Qualitative	  research	  is	  
therefore	  the	  adequate	  methodology	  to	  collect	  relevant	  data	  and	  information	  about	  
these	  issues.	  
Qualitative	  research	  interviews	  try	  to	  establish	  something	  from	  the	  subject’s	  point	  of	  
view,	  and	  uncover	  the	  meaning	  of	  their	  experiences.152	  Hence	  this	  approach	  focuses	  on	  
individuals’	  experiences	  and	  perspectives	  and	  can	  therefore	  provide	  a	  detailed	  
description	  and	  insight	  into	  previously	  unexplored	  topics.	  
Interviews	  in	  particular	  allow	  people	  to	  convey	  to	  others	  a	  situation	  from	  their	  own	  
perspective	  and	  in	  their	  own	  words.153	  	  
Collecting	  data	  through	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  interviews	  has	  many	  advantages,	  and	  was	  
therefore	  the	  preferred	  method	  over,	  for	  example,	  telephone	  interviews.	  Among	  other	  
things,	  a	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  communication	  enables	  a	  better	  control	  over	  the	  interview	  
process.	  The	  interviewee	  can	  be	  put	  at	  ease	  by	  the	  use	  of	  effective	  interpersonal	  skills,	  
and	  questions	  can	  be	  reworded	  if	  necessary.	  Hence	  the	  interviewer	  can	  clarify	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150	  J	  M	  Morse,	  P	  A	  Field,	  Nursing	  Research:	  The	  Application	  of	  Qualitative	  Approaches	  
(Cheltenham:	  Nelson	  Thornes,	  2002,	  3rd	  ed)	  8.	  
151	  Morse/Field,	  ibid,	  at	  9.	  
152	  S	  Kvale,	  Interviews:	  An	  Introduction	  to	  Qualitative	  Research	  Interviewing	  (Thousand	  Oaks	  
California:	  Sage	  Publications,	  1996)	  30.	  
153	  Kvale,	  ibid,	  at	  35.	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ambiguous	  or	  unclear	  questions,	  as	  well	  as	  misunderstandings	  and	  misinterpretations	  
by	  the	  interviewee.	  This	  contributes	  to	  the	  reliability	  and	  validity	  of	  the	  collected	  data.	  	  
According	  to	  Gillham,	  quantitative	  research	  questions	  can	  generally	  be	  defined	  
according	  to	  the	  following	  criteria:154	  	  
	  
1. Questions	  asked,	  or	  topics	  raised,	  are	  ‘open’	  with	  the	  interviewee	  determining	  
their	  own	  answer.	  This	  is	  a	  key	  distinction	  from	  questionnaires	  where	  normally	  
the	  researcher	  not	  only	  asks	  the	  questions	  but	  also	  provides	  the	  answers	  in	  
some	  sort	  of	  choice	  format,	  for	  example,	  ranking	  preferences	  in	  order,	  circling	  
one	  item	  on	  a	  ‘very	  satisfactory’	  to	  ‘very	  unsatisfactory’	  scale,	  and	  so	  on.	  
	  
2. The	  relationship	  between	  interviewer	  and	  interviewee	  is	  responsive	  or	  
interactive,	  allowing	  for	  a	  degree	  of	  ‘adjustment’:	  clarification,	  exploration,	  for	  
example:	  Tell	  me	  more	  about	  that,	  or	  I	  don’t	  think	  I	  quite	  understand.	  
	  
3. There	  is	  structure	  and	  purpose	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  interviewer	  even	  when	  the	  
context,	  like	  informal	  questioning	  in	  real-­‐life	  settings,	  is	  ‘natural’	  or	  at	  least	  
naturalistic	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  taking	  advantage	  of	  opportunities	  that	  arise.	  
	  
Throughout	  the	  interviews	  in	  this	  research	  study,	  the	  open	  question	  methodology	  was	  
applied.	  By	  using	  general	  and	  open-­‐ended	  questions	  the	  interviewees	  are	  encouraged	  
to	  provide	  their	  own	  views,	  and	  explain	  their	  own	  experiences.	  This	  means	  that	  more	  
detailed	  and	  relevant	  information	  can	  be	  obtained	  deploying	  this	  methodology	  instead	  
of	  a	  more	  stringent	  and	  structured	  methodology	  approach.	  	  
Nevertheless,	  a	  framework	  of	  questions	  was	  developed,	  which	  was	  the	  basis	  for	  all	  
interviews,	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  general	  structure	  of	  the	  interviews	  was	  identical,	  and	  
thus	  the	  collected	  data	  comparable.155	  These	  questions	  were	  emailed	  to	  the	  
interviewees	  before	  the	  interviews,	  so	  that	  they	  had	  a	  chance	  to	  prepare	  themselves	  
adequately,	  and	  thus	  feel	  more	  at	  ease	  during	  the	  interviews.	  
The	  interviews	  in	  this	  study	  lasted	  between	  approximately	  60	  to	  120	  minutes.	  All	  
interviews	  were	  conducted	  at	  the	  premises	  of	  the	  interviewees.	  Hence	  the	  settings	  
varied.	  Because	  most	  of	  the	  interviewees	  objected	  to	  the	  recording	  of	  the	  interview	  due	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154	  B	  Gillham,	  Research	  Interviewing:	  The	  Range	  of	  Techniques	  (Berkshire:	  Open	  University	  
Press,	  2005)	  3.	  
155	  See	  Appendix	  I	  for	  a	  list	  of	  these	  questions.	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to	  confidentiality	  regulations,	  notes	  were	  taken	  during	  the	  interviews.	  These	  
transcripts	  were	  turned	  into	  field	  notes	  after	  every	  interview	  highlighting	  the	  areas	  of	  
key	  significance.	  
This	  type	  of	  qualitative	  research	  produces	  vast	  amounts	  of	  rich	  data,	  which	  need	  to	  be	  
systematically	  analysed	  in	  a	  logical	  fashion.156	  This	  is	  particularly	  important	  for	  this	  
study,	  because	  the	  interviews	  were	  conducted	  with	  different	  stakeholders,	  looking	  at	  
the	  issue	  from	  different	  perspectives	  and	  with	  different	  motivations.	  This	  means	  that	  
there	  was	  only	  very	  limited	  consensus	  among	  the	  interviewees.	  This	  was	  further	  
complicated	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  interviews	  were	  undertaken	  in	  two	  different	  countries,	  
which	  means	  that	  different	  jurisdictions,	  and	  different	  (legal)	  backgrounds	  with	  
regards	  to	  the	  new	  software-­‐based	  investigative	  tools	  influenced	  the	  statements	  of	  the	  
interviewees.	  	  
To	  enable	  the	  subtraction	  of	  key	  statements	  and	  determine	  whether	  common	  concerns	  
among	  all	  stakeholders	  existed,	  the	  data	  was	  subjected	  to	  the	  three-­‐stage	  qualitative	  
data	  analysis	  method	  described	  by	  Miles	  and	  Huberman:	  data	  reduction,	  data	  display	  
and	  data	  conclusion	  drawing.157	  
Data	  reduction	  refers	  to	  the	  process	  of	  “selecting,	  focusing,	  simplifying,	  abstracting	  and	  
transforming”	  the	  data.158	  This	  process	  ensures	  that	  data	  is	  presented	  in	  such	  a	  way	  
that	  final	  conclusions	  can	  be	  drawn.	  
For	  this	  study,	  the	  interview	  transcripts	  were	  re-­‐written	  after	  the	  interviews	  and	  then	  
checked	  for	  overlapping	  data	  in	  response	  to	  the	  different	  questions.	  These	  overlaps	  
were	  highlighted.	  This	  was	  followed	  by	  a	  selection	  of	  the	  key	  statements	  of	  each	  
interview,	  which	  were	  collided	  into	  a	  new	  document.	  This	  list	  of	  key	  statements	  for	  
each	  of	  the	  questions	  highlighted	  the	  different	  views	  of	  the	  interviewees	  on	  the	  topic.	  It	  
also	  highlighted	  where	  problems	  and	  challenges	  arising	  from	  the	  use	  of	  the	  new	  tools	  
for	  the	  stakeholders	  differed,	  and	  where	  these	  were	  the	  same.	  This	  was	  particularly	  
important	  for	  the	  integration	  of	  the	  interview	  results	  into	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  thesis.	  
Data	  display	  refers	  to	  the	  representation	  and	  visualisation	  of	  the	  relevant	  data.	  In	  this	  
case,	  the	  data	  were	  presented	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  narrative	  text,	  supported	  by	  excerpts	  
from	  the	  data	  results.	  This	  form	  of	  data	  display	  was	  chosen	  in	  particular	  because,	  as	  
discussed	  above,	  the	  individual	  statements	  could	  not	  be	  directly	  linked	  to	  the	  relevant	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156	  M	  B	  Miles,	  A	  M	  Huberman,	  Qualitative	  Data	  Analysis:	  An	  Expanded	  Sourcebook	  (Thousand	  
Oaks,	  California:	  Sage	  Publications,	  1994,	  2nd	  ed)	  34.	  
157	  M	  B	  Miles,	  A	  M	  Huberman,	  Qualitative	  Data	  Analysis:	  A	  Sourcebook	  of	  New	  Methods	  
(Thousand	  Oaks,	  California:	  Sage	  Publications,	  1984)	  20ff.	  
158	  Ibid,	  at	  21.	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stakeholder	  for	  confidentially	  reasons.	  A	  narrative	  text	  was	  therefore	  the	  best-­‐suited	  
approach.	  	  
Data	  conclusion	  drawing	  refers	  to	  the	  subtraction	  of	  conclusions	  from	  the	  collected	  
data,	  and	  their	  verification.	  The	  conclusions	  relevant	  for	  this	  thesis	  were	  drawn	  from	  
the	  key	  statement	  document,	  and	  verified	  during	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  data	  and	  where	  
necessary,	  confirmed	  by	  the	  relevant	  stakeholder.	  
3.3 Interview Settings 
As	  indicated	  above,	  the	  interview	  topic	  is	  highly	  sensible	  and	  interviews	  were	  difficult	  
to	  arrange.	  Generally,	  all	  interviews	  had	  to	  be	  conducted	  at	  the	  sites	  of	  the	  
interviewees.	  Particularly	  for	  the	  interviews	  with	  the	  governmental	  bodies,	  extensive	  
clearance	  processes	  were	  required	  before	  the	  interviews	  were	  approved.	  In	  some	  
cases,	  the	  interview	  questions	  also	  had	  to	  be	  cleared	  before	  the	  interviews	  were	  
approved.	  	  
As	  stated	  above,	  the	  overarching	  condition	  of	  most	  interviewees	  for	  participating	  in	  the	  
interviews	  was	  that	  no	  direct	  quotes	  were	  to	  be	  made	  in	  the	  writing	  up	  of	  the	  results.	  
Additionally,	  some	  of	  the	  interviewees	  required	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  write-­‐up	  to	  check	  that	  no	  
direct	  quotes	  were	  made,	  and	  only	  approved	  information	  was	  used.	  
In	  addition	  to	  these	  prior	  checks,	  some	  of	  the	  interviews	  were	  strictly	  monitored.	  On	  
one	  occasion,	  the	  interviewees	  were	  not	  physically	  present	  in	  the	  same	  room.	  The	  
interview	  was	  conducted	  via	  video	  link.	  Present	  with	  the	  interviewees	  was	  a	  legal	  
advisor.	  The	  reason	  for	  conducting	  the	  interview	  via	  video	  link	  was	  that	  the	  sound	  
could	  be	  muted	  whenever	  the	  interviewees	  were	  uncertain	  whether	  they	  were	  allowed	  
to	  answer	  a	  question,	  and	  if	  so,	  how	  and	  were	  able	  to	  consult	  with	  the	  legal	  advisor	  in	  
private.	  This	  interview	  was	  the	  shortest	  of	  all,	  and	  was	  suspended	  by	  the	  legal	  advisor	  
when	  he	  had	  the	  impression	  that	  all	  authorised	  information	  had	  been	  provided.	  This	  
was	  the	  interview	  with	  the	  strictest	  security	  measures	  in	  place	  and	  the	  least	  
possibilities	  to	  influence	  the	  course	  of	  events.	  	  
Security	  measures	  during	  other	  interviews	  included	  the	  recording	  of	  the	  interview,	  the	  
search	  of	  bags	  for	  recording	  devices,	  and	  frequently	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  legal	  advisor.	  
However,	  while	  these	  security	  measures	  meant	  that	  some	  restrictions	  about	  the	  type	  of	  
questions	  that	  could	  be	  asked	  and	  the	  amount	  of	  information	  given	  existed,	  these	  
measure	  in	  itself	  also	  highlight	  the	  sensitive	  nature	  of	  this	  topic,	  and	  the	  confusion	  and	  
insecurity	  surrounding	  it.	  Even	  those	  directly	  involved	  in	  the	  implementation	  (whether	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pertaining	  to	  the	  legal	  or	  technical	  aspects)	  are	  still	  highly	  insecure	  about	  the	  measure	  
and	  its	  legality	  and	  technical	  feasibility.	  
3.4 Interview Results 
The	  interview	  results	  are	  depicted	  here	  in	  one	  narrative	  text,	  highlighting	  the	  key	  
findings	  and	  conclusions.	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  chapter,	  these	  are	  divided	  into	  
technical,	  and	  legal/regulatory	  findings.	  This	  is	  in	  line	  with	  the	  structure	  of	  this	  thesis.	  
While	  the	  first	  necessarily	  impacts	  on	  the	  latter,	  the	  basic	  structure	  of	  these	  two	  areas	  
differs	  significantly	  and	  thus	  a	  separation	  of	  these	  areas	  leads	  to	  more	  clarity	  and	  
accuracy.	  	  
3.4.1 Technical Results 
The	  overarching	  goal	  of	  the	  interviews	  with	  the	  technical	  experts,	  and	  those	  involved	  in	  
the	  development	  of	  new	  investigative	  technologies	  was	  to	  establish	  whether	  the	  
proposed	  investigative	  measures	  are	  technically	  feasible,	  and	  to	  determine	  the	  
technological	  foundations	  of	  the	  new	  investigative	  technologies.	  Only	  very	  limited	  
information	  about	  these	  matters	  is	  publicly	  available,	  however,	  more	  details	  are	  of	  
great	  importance	  for	  the	  technical	  analysis	  in	  the	  following	  chapters,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  
discussion	  of	  the	  legal	  challenges	  and	  the	  development	  of	  a	  regulatory	  approach	  in	  
chapters	  6	  –	  9.	  	  
The	  analysis	  of	  the	  case	  law	  produced	  by	  German	  courts,	  and	  the	  discussion	  of	  the	  
online	  searching	  of	  computers	  by	  technical	  and	  legal	  experts	  in	  Germany	  in	  the	  
previous	  chapter	  has	  sketched	  out	  a	  framework	  of	  desirable	  features	  these	  new	  
investigative	  tools	  should	  possess.	  However,	  the	  source	  and	  validity	  of	  this	  information	  
is	  mostly	  unknown,	  and	  thus	  the	  data	  is	  less	  reliable.	  	  
The	  interviews	  were	  broadly	  divided	  into	  two	  parts.	  The	  first	  part	  was	  concerned	  with	  
questions	  about	  the	  feasibility	  of	  the	  specific	  investigative	  measure,	  the	  second	  with	  
questions	  about	  the	  underlying	  software	  of	  this	  new	  generation	  of	  cyber-­‐cops.	  	  
	  
The	  concept	  of	  remote	  online	  searches	  of	  ICT	  devices	  by	  a	  piece	  of	  software	  can	  appear	  
challenging	  or	  unrealistic	  to	  a	  technical	  layman.	  The	  technical	  feasibility	  of	  this	  
investigative	  method,	  and	  the	  development	  of	  such	  a	  complex	  tool	  seem	  unlikely.	  This	  
view	  was	  confirmed	  by	  the	  few	  technical	  details	  publicly	  available	  about	  the	  proposed	  
online	  search,	  and	  contradictory	  statements	  from	  various	  technical	  and	  non-­‐technical	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experts.159	  This	  scepticism	  and	  lack	  of	  knowledge	  about	  the	  technical	  feasibility	  of	  the	  
method	  is	  problematic	  and	  contra-­‐productive	  for	  an	  informed	  discussion	  about	  the	  
legal	  problems	  of	  these	  new	  investigative	  technologies.	  	  
	  
The	  interviews	  with	  the	  technical	  experts	  have	  yielded	  that	  principally	  software-­‐based	  
investigative	  tools	  have	  been	  developed	  and	  used	  for	  investigative	  purposes	  for	  the	  
past	  10	  years.	  	  
	  
However,	  all	  stakeholders	  confirmed	  that	  thus	  far,	  the	  general	  approach	  to	  software-­‐
based	  investigative	  technologies	  was	  to	  acquire	  and	  utilise	  existing	  technologies.	  
Hence,	  the	  capabilities	  of	  these	  technologies	  were	  limited	  by	  their	  pre-­‐determined	  
design,	  which	  was	  defined	  by	  developers	  not	  linked	  to	  law	  enforcement	  agencies.	  In	  
most	  cases,	  the	  technologies	  used	  were	  developed	  with	  fundamentally	  different	  
applications	  in	  mind	  (such	  as	  web-­‐crawlers	  designed	  for	  e-­‐commerce	  applications	  or	  
search	  engines).	  This	  caused	  several	  problems,	  but	  the	  most	  significant	  are	  the	  limited	  
benefits	  to	  investigations,	  the	  unreliability	  of	  the	  tools,	  and	  the	  reliance	  on	  external	  
developers.	  In	  addition,	  another	  significant	  problem	  of	  this	  approach	  is	  that	  the	  
software	  products	  used	  are	  not	  exclusively	  designed	  for	  law	  enforcement	  authorities.	  
This	  means	  that	  these	  products	  are	  also	  used	  commercially,	  as	  well	  as	  by	  private	  
persons,	  and	  among	  other	  things	  for	  criminal	  purposes.	  	  
One	  example	  of	  such	  a	  technology	  are	  so-­‐called	  web	  crawlers,160	  which	  have	  been	  used	  
since	  2003	  by	  authorities	  in	  the	  UK	  to	  stroll	  the	  Internet	  and	  collect	  suspicious	  material	  
from	  websites.	  This	  software	  operates	  based	  on	  information	  retrieval	  techniques	  that	  
select	  data	  based	  on	  key	  words	  that	  are	  pre-­‐defined	  by	  the	  operators.	  The	  problem	  
with	  this	  approach	  is	  that	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  update	  or	  modify	  the	  software	  because	  it	  
was	  developed	  externally.	  As	  a	  result,	  while	  the	  Internet	  and	  ICT	  technologies	  advance	  
and	  develop	  further,	  the	  technology	  becomes	  outdated	  and	  results	  are	  therefore	  less	  
meaningful	  and	  valuable.	  Another	  problem	  is	  that	  because	  the	  technology	  is	  also	  
commercially	  available,	  protection	  measures	  against	  it	  are	  easy	  to	  develop.	  Hence,	  the	  
value	  of	  this	  technology	  for	  investigations	  is	  limited.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159	  See	  chapter	  4	  p.	  86	  for	  more	  details	  on	  this.	  
160	  A	  web	  crawler	  is	  a	  computer	  program	  that	  browses	  the	  Internet	  in	  an	  automated	  and	  
predetermined	  manner.	  See:	  S	  Brin,	  L	  Page,	  “The	  Anatomy	  of	  a	  Large-­‐Scale	  Hypertextual	  Web	  
Search	  Engine”,	  (1998)	  30(1)	  Computer	  Networks	  and	  ISDN	  Systems,	  107.	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Thus	  more	  recently,	  a	  different	  approach	  has	  been	  pursued	  by	  law	  enforcement	  
agencies.	  All	  stakeholders	  stated	  that	  the	  widespread	  of	  and	  heavy	  reliance	  on	  ICT	  
devices	  and	  the	  Internet	  has	  led	  to	  a	  need	  for	  more	  adequate	  investigative	  tools.	  To	  
avoid	  the	  above	  problems,	  software	  developers	  have	  been	  recruited	  to	  develop	  in-­‐
house	  technologies	  for	  investigative	  purposes.	  The	  advantage	  is	  that	  these	  technologies	  
can	  be	  tailored	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  relevant	  authority,	  and	  details	  are	  kept	  confidential	  
in-­‐house.	  	  
Two	  major	  concerns	  with	  this	  approach	  exist.	  Firstly,	  the	  costs	  of	  developing	  these	  
tools	  are	  comparatively	  high,	  and	  this	  is	  the	  main	  reason	  why	  this	  task	  has	  been	  
outsourced	  so	  far.	  Thus,	  the	  development	  heavily	  relies	  on	  the	  available	  budget.	  In	  
addition,	  some	  of	  the	  technical	  experts	  have	  indicated	  in	  the	  interviews	  that	  payment	  
for	  excellent	  software	  developers	  is	  much	  better	  in	  industry	  compared	  to	  what	  the	  
government	  pays.	  In	  addition,	  skilled	  software	  developers	  (and	  in	  particular	  hackers,	  
who	  often	  develop	  the	  most	  advanced	  software	  tools)	  oftentimes	  have	  a	  work	  ethic	  that	  
contradicts	  with	  working	  for	  the	  government	  and,	  in	  particular,	  for	  law	  enforcement	  
agencies.	  This	  work	  ethic	  has	  its	  roots	  in	  the	  principle	  that	  the	  Internet	  should	  be	  an	  
unregulated	  space.	  This	  means	  that	  skilled	  software	  developers	  are	  often	  not	  willed	  to	  
work	  for	  the	  government.	  This	  was	  also	  confirmed	  for	  the	  specific	  case	  of	  the	  online	  
search	  software	  in	  Germany.	  The	  government	  had	  advertised	  positions	  for	  software	  
developers	  and	  directly	  approached	  the	  hacking	  community.161	  The	  general	  consent	  
there,	  as	  indicated	  by	  one	  of	  the	  interviewees	  was	  that	  these	  jobs	  were	  not	  something	  
highly	  skilled	  software	  developers	  or	  hackers	  would	  be	  interested	  in.	  Hence,	  the	  
development	  of	  these	  tools	  is	  problematic,	  because	  the	  costs	  are	  high	  and	  finding	  
skilled	  developers	  can	  be	  difficult.	  	  
	  
Secondly,	  all	  technical	  experts	  expressed	  their	  concern	  over	  the	  fact	  that	  developing	  
more	  complex	  software-­‐based	  investigative	  tools	  means	  entering	  into	  an	  “arms	  race”	  
with	  Internet	  and	  ICT	  users	  with	  criminal	  intent.	  The	  development	  of	  malicious	  
software,	  as	  well	  as	  protection	  and	  anomymisation	  software	  is	  advancing	  continuously,	  
and	  mainstream	  products	  can	  be	  purchased	  or	  downloaded	  free	  of	  charge.	  Hence,	  
protection	  measures	  against	  new	  investigative	  tools	  can	  easily	  be	  developed	  once	  
details	  about	  the	  tools	  are	  known.	  This	  means	  that	  law	  enforcement	  agencies	  in	  turn	  
have	  to	  enhance	  their	  tools	  or	  develop	  more	  sophisticated	  ones	  to	  cope	  with	  the	  newly	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161	  See	  for	  a	  recent	  example	  of	  such	  a	  job	  advertisement	  V	  Briegleb,	  “30	  Planstellen	  für	  den	  
Staatstrojaner”	  (2012)	  heise,	  available	  online	  at:	  http://heise.de/-­‐1414154.	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developed	  protection	  measures.	  This	  leads	  to	  the	  so	  called	  “arms	  race”,	  which	  refers	  to	  
the	  continuous	  need	  for	  updating	  of	  software	  and	  ICT	  tools	  by	  governments	  and	  users	  
to	  enable	  the	  investigation	  of	  the	  Internet	  and	  ICT	  devices,	  and	  the	  protection	  from	  
these	  investigative	  actions	  respectively.	  	  
Furthermore,	  investigative	  software	  is	  in	  most	  cases	  at	  least	  rudimentary	  based	  on	  
already	  existing	  software	  classes,162	  which	  means	  that	  technically	  versed	  Internet	  users	  
can	  detect	  investigative	  software	  tools	  and	  use	  these	  for	  their	  own	  purposes,	  or	  
develop	  counter	  measures.	  	  
These	  problems	  are	  unavoidable	  consequences	  of	  the	  development	  and	  use	  of	  ICT	  
investigative	  tools.	  It	  is	  hoped	  that	  the	  in-­‐house	  development	  of	  these	  tools	  and	  the	  
associated	  confidentiality	  of	  the	  developing	  process	  minimises	  them.163	  	  
Another	  problem	  discussed	  by	  some	  of	  the	  technical	  experts	  is	  the	  lack	  of	  technical	  
knowledge	  of	  the	  investigators	  using	  the	  ICT-­‐based	  investigative	  tools.	  These	  require	  a	  
certain	  amount	  of	  technical	  understanding	  and	  many	  law	  enforcement	  officers	  are	  
overstrained	  with	  the	  operation	  of	  these	  tools.	  Training,	  however,	  is	  expensive	  and	  
time-­‐consuming.	  Hence,	  mistakes	  are	  being	  made	  and	  as	  a	  result,	  seized	  data	  becomes	  
unusable.	  The	  establishment	  of	  specialist	  units	  is	  still	  a	  concept	  in	  its	  infancy,	  and	  
currently	  the	  necessary	  funding	  is	  often	  problematic.	  Only	  very	  few	  of	  these	  units	  
already	  exist	  (one	  example	  for	  such	  a	  unit	  is	  the	  SOCA	  e-­‐crime	  unit).	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  funding,	  the	  reason	  for	  this	  is	  also	  that	  governments	  have	  only	  
recently	  realised	  the	  need	  for	  these	  investigative	  tools	  and	  the	  resulting	  need	  for	  
specialists,	  both	  developers	  and	  operators.	  
	  
All	  experts	  confirmed	  that	  the	  development	  of	  a	  software-­‐based	  investigative	  tool	  to	  
remotely	  search	  ICTs,	  and	  thus	  the	  measure	  itself,	  is	  feasible	  from	  a	  technical	  point	  of	  
view.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162	  See	  chapter	  4	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  this.	  
163	  The	  problem	  of	  relying	  on	  commercial	  software	  products	  for	  investigative	  purposes	  was	  
demonstrated	  by	  the	  Chaos	  Computer	  Club	  in	  Germany	  in	  late	  2011,	  when	  members	  got	  hold	  of	  
the	  software	  deployed	  for	  online	  searches	  of	  ICT	  devices	  and	  analysed	  this	  and	  published	  the	  
results.	  While	  internally	  developed	  software	  could	  equally	  be	  leaked	  to	  the	  public	  the	  risks	  for	  
this	  happening	  are	  considerably	  smaller	  the	  fewer	  institutions	  are	  involved	  in	  the	  development.	  
See:	  Chaos	  Computer	  Club,	  Analyse	  einer	  Regierungs-­Malware,	  08.10.2011,	  available	  online	  at:	  
http://www.ccc.de/system/uploads/76/original/staatstrojaner-­‐report23.pdf;	  DJ	  Walker-­‐
Morgan,	  “CCC	  Cracks	  Government	  Trojan”	  (2011)	  The	  H	  Security,	  available	  online	  at:	  http://h-­‐
online.com/-­‐1357755.	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The	  consent	  among	  experts	  was	  that	  such	  a	  piece	  of	  software	  has	  great	  similarities	  with	  
existing	  spyware	  and	  malware,	  as	  well	  as	  autonomous	  agent	  software.	  The	  only	  
difference	  is	  that	  it	  is	  government	  designed	  and	  operated.	  	  
This	  means	  that	  even	  without	  knowing	  all	  technical	  details	  of	  the	  new	  investigative	  
tools,	  it	  can	  be	  established	  that	  these	  can	  be	  designed	  to	  be	  capable	  of	  any	  actions	  
related	  technology	  is.	  The	  general	  consent	  was,	  that	  the	  investigative	  tool	  is	  principally	  
capable	  of	  clandestinely	  infiltrating	  an	  ICT	  device,	  and	  autonomously	  searching	  and	  
seizing	  relevant	  data.	  	  
One	  of	  the	  technical	  experts	  explained	  that	  the	  degree	  of	  autonomy	  and	  other	  
capabilities	  of	  the	  software	  tools	  depend	  on	  their	  design,	  and	  thus	  of	  the	  decisions	  of	  
the	  software	  developers.	  However,	  it	  was	  stated	  that	  it	  is	  generally	  possible	  to	  
implement	  the	  required	  capabilities	  into	  software.	  
One	  significant	  problem,	  however,	  was	  identified,	  namely	  the	  infiltration	  of	  a	  specific	  
ICT	  device.	  It	  was	  explained	  by	  one	  of	  the	  experts	  that	  guaranteeing	  that	  the	  system	  of	  a	  
specific	  user	  is	  infiltrated	  requires	  the	  collaboration	  of	  another	  party.	  This	  could	  either	  
–	  unknowingly	  -­‐	  be	  the	  target	  person,164	  or	  a	  third	  party	  involved	  in	  the	  transfer	  of	  the	  
data	  (for	  example	  the	  ISP)	  or	  the	  developer	  of	  the	  hardware	  or	  software.165	  
	  
The	  involvement	  of	  third	  parties	  is	  very	  problematic.	  All	  interviewed	  stakeholders	  
discussed	  this	  aspect.	  	  
The	  interesting	  observation	  made	  here	  was	  that	  different	  stakeholders	  came	  to	  
different	  conclusions.	  While	  this	  was	  to	  be	  expected	  to	  some	  degree,	  because	  law	  
enforcement	  and	  governmental	  agencies	  have	  different	  interests	  than	  other	  
stakeholders	  in	  the	  value	  chain	  (such	  as	  ISPs,	  software	  developers	  etc),	  and	  therefore	  
perspectives	  on	  this	  aspect,	  a	  more	  unified	  opinion	  and	  approach	  had	  been	  expected.	  
	  
Government	  and	  law	  enforcement	  agencies	  stated	  that	  security	  aspects	  should	  have	  
precedence	  over	  privacy	  and	  data	  protection	  concerns,	  as	  well	  as	  economic	  concerns	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164	  See	  chapter	  2,	  p.	  31	  for	  a	  longer	  discussion	  of	  this	  possibility.	  
165	  An	  example	  in	  point	  for	  this	  is	  the	  attempt	  by	  the	  Chinese	  government	  to	  mandate	  the	  
implementation	  of	  software	  into	  new	  PCs	  by	  manufacturers,	  which	  provides	  a	  “back	  door”	  into	  
the	  PCs,	  and	  thus	  access	  to	  all	  data	  and	  processes.	  See	  for	  a	  summary	  of	  this	  e.g.	  G	  Duncan,	  
“China	  to	  Mandate	  Internet	  Filtering	  Software	  on	  PCs”	  (2009)	  Digitaltrends,	  available	  online	  at	  
http://www.digitaltrends.com/international/china-­‐to-­‐mandate-­‐internet-­‐filtering-­‐software-­‐on-­‐
pcs/.	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the	  relevant	  stakeholders.166	  Some	  of	  the	  interviewees	  from	  law	  enforcement	  
expressed	  that	  they	  regard	  their	  work	  to	  be	  hindered	  by	  what	  they	  referred	  to	  as	  
“uncooperative	  behaviour”	  of	  other	  relevant	  stakeholders.	  They	  also	  stated	  that	  
ultimately	  they	  would	  not	  see	  any	  other	  option	  but	  the	  full	  cooperation	  of	  third	  parties	  
on	  these	  matters.	  	  
Governmental	  departments	  regard	  compulsory	  cooperation	  of	  third	  parties	  as	  an	  
option,	  but	  are	  currently	  exploring	  all	  possibilities	  without	  further	  formulating	  
demands.	  However,	  cooperation	  is	  regarded	  to	  be	  vital	  in	  the	  future	  for	  cases	  of	  serious	  
crime.	  
Third	  parties	  affected	  by	  this	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  stated	  that	  they	  regard	  themselves	  not	  
in	  a	  position	  to	  cooperate	  with	  governmental	  and	  law	  enforcement	  demands.	  
Particularly,	  because	  they	  have	  a	  contract	  with	  their	  customers,	  that	  is	  build	  on	  trust.	  If	  
customers	  become	  aware	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  these	  companies	  cooperate	  with	  law	  
enforcement	  to	  facilitate	  access	  to	  customer’s	  data,	  they	  would	  terminate	  their	  
contract,	  or	  choose	  other	  provider.	  Also,	  stakeholders	  stated	  that	  they	  consider	  having	  
a	  duty	  towards	  their	  customers	  to	  protect	  them	  from	  unjust	  acts	  if	  at	  all	  possible.	  	  
They	  discussed	  further	  that	  they	  regard	  a	  compromise	  such	  as	  cooperation	  in	  cases	  of	  
(suspected)	  serious	  crime	  as	  a	  “slippery	  slope”	  problem.	  Meaning	  that	  they	  fear	  that	  
once	  they	  agree	  to	  assist	  in,	  for	  example,	  child	  pornography	  cases,	  they	  would	  make	  
themselves	  liable	  to	  cooperate	  also	  in	  other	  cases,	  which	  are	  less	  severe.	  	  
However,	  the	  remarkable	  outcome	  was	  that	  none	  to	  very	  little	  direct	  discussion	  has	  so	  
far	  occurred	  between	  affected	  stakeholders.	  This	  means	  that	  no	  compromise	  can	  be	  
reached,	  unless	  legislation	  introducing	  a	  duty	  of	  care	  or	  duty	  to	  cooperate	  is	  
implemented.	  	  
The	  technical	  results	  of	  the	  interviews	  confirmed	  that	  theoretically,	  software	  could	  be	  
designed	  to	  execute	  an	  online	  search	  of	  ICT	  devices,167	  and	  more	  generally,	  to	  introduce	  
cyber-­‐cops	  replacing	  humans	  for	  policing	  tasks.	  These	  technical	  details	  are	  used	  as	  a	  
basis	  for	  the	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  the	  relevant	  technologies	  in	  the	  technical	  chapters	  of	  
this	  work.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166	  Identified	  as	  relevant	  stakeholders	  were	  particularly	  ISPs	  and	  software	  developer.	  
167	  This	  was	  also	  confirmed	  by	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  “Federal	  Trojan”	  software	  by	  the	  Chaos	  
Computer	  Club.	  See	  Chaos	  Computer	  Club,	  note	  171,	  F	  Rötzer,	  “CCC	  entlarvt	  Bundestrojaner	  und	  
Sicherheitspolitik”	  (2011)	  TELEPOLIS,	  available	  online	  at	  
http://www.heise.de/tp/artikel/35/35648/1.html.	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3.4.2 Legal and Regulatory Findings  
The	  goal	  of	  the	  interviews	  was	  to	  determine	  the	  legal	  and	  regulatory	  challenges	  that	  
arise	  from	  the	  use	  of	  ICT-­‐based	  investigative	  tools	  for	  online	  searches	  of	  ICTs	  
specifically,	  and	  the	  use	  of	  cyber-­‐cops	  for	  policing	  activities	  of	  the	  virtual	  living	  space	  in	  
general.	  The	  problem	  of	  the	  valid	  legal	  basis	  is	  so	  far	  the	  only	  issue	  that	  has	  been	  
analysed	  and	  discussed	  at	  length.	  Hence,	  this	  legal	  issue	  was	  not	  discussed	  further	  with	  
the	  experts.	  	  
For	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  interviews,	  it	  was	  assumed	  that	  a	  valid	  legal	  basis	  for	  such	  
actions	  exists.	  Since	  the	  BVerfG	  established	  in	  its	  judgment	  that	  these	  investigative	  
tools	  and	  measures	  are	  not	  generally	  unconstitutional,168	  and	  the	  EU	  has	  recommended	  
the	  introduction	  and	  facilitation	  of	  online	  searches,	  it	  can	  be	  assumed	  that	  the	  question	  
of	  a	  valid	  legal	  basis	  will	  not	  be	  a	  problem	  in	  the	  future.	  As	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  
chapter,	  several	  German	  federal	  states	  have	  already	  introduced	  a	  legal	  basis	  based	  on	  
the	  BVerfG	  judgment.169	  While	  the	  constitutionality	  of	  these	  laws	  has	  been	  challenged	  
again,170	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  the	  BVerfG	  will	  rule	  the	  measure	  to	  be	  generally	  
unconstitutional.	  The	  Court	  might	  take	  this	  opportunity	  to	  develop	  more	  detailed	  
conditions	  for	  the	  use	  of	  this	  new	  investigative	  measure.	  Ruling	  this	  generally	  
unconstitutional,	  however,	  would	  contradict	  the	  previous	  judgment.	  	  
It	  needs	  to	  be	  highlighted,	  however,	  that	  when	  stakeholders	  mentioned	  the	  legal	  basis	  
issue,	  those	  from	  Germany	  identified	  it	  as	  a	  more	  serious	  problem	  than	  those	  from	  the	  
UK.	  In	  the	  UK,	  stakeholders	  generally	  identified	  other	  legal	  issues	  as	  the	  more	  pressing	  
ones,	  and	  assumed	  that	  such	  investigative	  actions	  are	  covered	  by	  existing	  legislation,	  in	  
particular	  the	  Regulation	  of	  Investigatory	  Powers	  Act	  2000	  (RIPA).	  
Thus	  the	  interviews	  focused	  on	  determining	  other	  pressing	  legal	  and	  regulatory	  issues	  
arising	  from	  the	  use	  of	  these	  new	  investigative	  tools	  for	  legal	  practitioners.	  To	  the	  best	  
knowledge	  of	  the	  author,	  this	  has	  not	  been	  undertaken	  so	  far,	  and	  thus	  the	  analysis	  of	  
these	  legal	  and	  regulatory	  problems,	  and	  the	  development	  of	  a	  solution	  for	  these	  is	  an	  
important	  contribution.	  
All	  stakeholders	  pointed	  out	  that	  there	  is	  a	  dichotomy	  between	  what	  is	  technically	  
possible	  and	  legally	  allowed.	  The	  problem	  is	  oftentimes	  that	  investigative	  tools	  are	  
developed	  without	  the	  legal	  requirements	  and	  challenges	  in	  mind,	  and	  these	  only	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168	  BVerfGE,	  NJW,	  2008,	  822.	  
169	  See	  p.	  55.	  
170	  At	  the	  time	  of	  finishing	  this	  thesis	  the	  constitutional	  complaints	  were	  still	  pending.	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materialise	  once	  the	  tools	  are	  deployed.	  Because	  the	  regulation	  and	  policing	  of	  the	  
Internet	  and	  ICT	  devices	  is	  such	  a	  new	  area,	  few	  if	  any	  laws	  exist	  that	  deal	  explicitly	  
with	  the	  regulation	  of	  ICT-­‐based	  investigative	  tools.	  Hence	  legal	  practitioners	  deploying	  
these	  tools	  are	  insecure	  about	  the	  legality	  of	  certain	  investigative	  measures.	  
Generally,	  the	  legal	  and	  regulatory	  issues	  exist	  on	  two	  levels,	  the	  national	  and	  the	  
international	  level.	  	  
On	  the	  international	  level,	  stakeholders	  from	  both	  jurisdictions	  (Germany	  and	  UK)	  
pointed	  out	  that	  there	  is	  a	  lack	  of	  cooperation	  and	  harmonisation	  on	  this	  topic.	  It	  was	  
stated	  that	  the	  biggest	  problem	  is	  the	  lack	  of	  consistency	  in	  how	  countries	  approach	  
this	  matter.	  Some	  member	  states	  chose	  a	  restrictive	  approach,	  while	  others	  introduced,	  
or	  plan	  to	  introduce	  these	  software	  based	  investigative	  tools	  without	  any	  technical	  or	  
legal	  restrictions.	  Others	  have	  no	  plans	  to	  introduce	  these	  tools	  at	  all,	  and	  have	  also	  not	  
formed	  an	  opinion	  on	  this.	  While	  the	  different	  handling	  of	  criminal	  investigations	  is	  a	  
very	  common	  phenomenon	  in	  different	  jurisdictions,	  and	  does	  not	  usually	  cause	  
problems,	  the	  problem	  with	  this	  particular	  investigative	  measure	  is	  that	  the	  online	  
searching	  of	  computers	  can	  have	  extraterritorial	  consequences.	  The	  Internet	  is	  a	  space	  
where	  national	  borders	  are	  not	  represented	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  they	  are	  in	  the	  offline	  
world.	  	  
All	  interviewees	  identified	  the	  extraterritorial	  risk	  as	  one	  of	  the	  most	  pressing	  
problems	  of	  the	  use	  of	  cyber	  cops.	  The	  particular	  problem	  is	  that	  the	  infiltration	  of	  ICT	  
devices	  can	  occur	  while	  these	  are	  located	  in	  a	  different	  jurisdiction,	  or	  these	  new	  
investigative	  tools,	  given	  their	  networked	  operating	  environment,	  can	  access	  data	  that	  
is	  stored	  in	  a	  different	  jurisdiction.	  This	  can	  happen	  intentionally	  and	  unintentionally.	  	  
The	  specific	  problems	  identified	  were	  (1)	  whether	  the	  accessing	  of	  data	  and	  infiltration	  
of	  an	  ICT	  device	  constitutes	  an	  extraterritorial	  violation.	  Furthermore,	  (2)	  in	  which	  
cases,	  if	  at	  all,	  are	  such	  extraterritorial	  actions	  allowed?	  Is	  this	  only	  in	  cases	  of	  
(suspected)	  serious	  criminal	  activities	  the	  case,	  or	  also	  in	  less	  serious	  cases.	  (3)	  Are	  any	  
formal	  requests	  of	  assistance	  necessary	  in	  these	  cases,	  given	  that	  no	  human	  officer	  
enters	  foreign	  territory?	  (4)	  What	  kind	  of	  checks	  are	  necessary	  to	  determine	  whether	  
an	  ICT	  device	  or	  relevant	  digital	  data	  is	  located	  abroad.	  And	  (5)	  how	  can	  extraterritorial	  
violations	  be	  avoided.	  
	  
The	  interviewees	  indicated	  that	  this	  is	  an	  entirely	  new	  problem,	  and	  no	  solutions	  have	  
so	  far	  been	  discussed	  on	  national	  or	  international	  level	  to	  solve	  these	  issues.	  In	  
particular,	  the	  stakeholders	  concerned	  with	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  tools	  indicated	  that	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these	  are	  very	  pressing	  and	  worrying	  matters,	  and	  solutions	  need	  to	  be	  developed	  to	  
ensure	  legal	  certainty.	  
This	  also	  requires	  an	  international	  discussion	  and	  agreement	  about	  the	  use	  and	  
regulation	  of	  these	  tools	  in	  other	  jurisdictions.	  	  
It	  was	  further	  stated,	  that	  generally	  the	  problem	  of	  introducing	  legislation	  dealing	  with	  
the	  policing	  and	  regulation	  of	  the	  Internet	  is	  that	  recent	  attempts	  in	  both	  jurisdictions	  
(Germany	  and	  UK)	  to	  draft	  such	  legislation	  have	  been	  highly	  problematic	  and	  
controversial.	  	  
In	  Germany,	  the	  law	  to	  complicate	  access	  to	  child	  pornographic	  material	  (Gesetz	  zur	  
Erschwerung	  des	  Zugangs	  zu	  kinderpornographischen	  Inhalten	  in	  
Kommunikationsnetzen	  -­‐Zugangserschwerungsgesetz)171	  was	  drafted	  in	  2009,	  and	  
came	  into	  force	  in	  2010.	  The	  law	  requires	  the	  German	  Federal	  Criminal	  Police	  Office	  
(Bundeskriminalamt	  -­‐	  BKA)	  to	  compile	  a	  list	  with	  domain	  names,	  IP	  addresses	  and	  
URLs	  of	  websites	  containing	  child	  pornographic	  material	  or	  linking	  to	  websites	  
containing	  such	  material,	  which	  needs	  to	  be	  updated	  daily.	  ISPs	  with	  more	  than	  10,000	  
customers	  are	  then	  obliged	  to	  block	  access	  to	  the	  websites	  on	  this	  list,	  at	  least	  on	  the	  
DNS	  level.	  	  
The	  law	  was	  heavily	  criticised	  for	  being	  ill	  drafted	  and	  ineffective.	  The	  concept	  of	  
blocking	  content	  is	  very	  controversial,	  among	  other	  things	  because	  there	  is	  a	  risk	  of	  
Internet	  state	  censoring	  of	  content	  since	  there	  is	  no	  objective	  controller	  entity	  verifying	  
that	  the	  content	  to	  be	  blocked	  is	  indeed	  unlawful.	  	  
Due	  to	  the	  enormous	  public	  criticism	  of	  this	  law,	  the	  government	  agreed	  that	  the	  BKA	  
would	  not	  compile	  a	  blacklist,	  nor	  ask	  ISPs	  to	  block	  content,	  and	  a	  law	  was	  drafted	  
which	  annulled	  the	  Zugangserschwerungsgesetz	  in	  2011.	  	  
In	  the	  UK,	  the	  Digital	  Economy	  Act	  (DEA)	  was	  adopted	  in	  April	  2010.	  It	  includes	  eleven	  
topics,	  one	  of	  which	  introduces	  a	  graduate	  response	  system	  to	  copyright	  
infringements.172	  After	  a	  certain	  number	  of	  copyright	  infringements	  (i.e.	  the	  
downloading	  and	  uploading	  of	  copyright	  infringing	  material	  online),	  an	  ISP	  may	  be	  
required	  to	  disconnect	  a	  subscriber	  from	  the	  Internet.	  In	  addition,	  the	  Secretary	  of	  
State	  may	  impose	  technical	  obligations	  on	  ISPs,	  obliging	  them	  to	  undertake	  measures	  
against	  its	  subscribers,	  such	  as	  a	  limit	  of	  speed	  or	  capacity,	  a	  block	  or	  limit	  on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171	  http://www2.bgbl.de/Xaver/start.xav?startbk=Bundesanzeiger_BGBl.	  
172	  http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2010/pdf/ukpga_20100024_en.pdf.	  Explanatory	  
memorandum:	  
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200910/ldbills/001/2010001.pdf.	  See	  also	  for	  an	  
earlier	  consultation:	  http://www.berr.gov.uk/consultations/page51696.html.	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subscriber’s	  access	  to	  certain	  material	  or	  a	  limit	  on	  or	  suspension	  of	  the	  service	  to	  the	  
subscriber.173	  	  
The	  DEA	  was	  heavily	  criticised	  by	  consumer	  rights	  and	  privacy	  groups,	  as	  well	  as	  
academics	  working	  in	  the	  field	  of	  Internet	  regulation.174	  The	  criticism	  focused	  primarily	  
on	  the	  requirement	  to	  disconnect	  users,	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  protection	  for	  institutions	  
offering	  Internet	  access,	  such	  as	  libraries	  and	  universities.	  	  
The	  High	  Court	  of	  Justice	  granted	  a	  judicial	  review	  of	  the	  DEA	  on	  November	  10	  2010.175	  
In	  April	  2011	  the	  Court,	  in	  its	  decision	  about	  the	  judicial	  review,	  upheld	  most	  of	  the	  
criticised	  provisions.176	  However,	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  has	  granted	  on	  7	  October	  2011	  
the	  permission	  to	  appeal	  against	  the	  High	  Court	  ruling	  that	  upheld	  most	  of	  the	  
criticised	  provisions.177	  	  
Both	  controversial	  regulatory	  attempts,	  and	  the	  criticism	  and	  problems	  associated	  with	  
the	  enactment	  of	  these	  laws,	  have	  left	  governments	  and	  policy	  makers	  insecure	  and	  
reluctant	  to	  introduce	  new	  legislation	  dealing	  with	  the	  policing	  and	  regulation	  of	  the	  
Internet.	  	  
	  
Furthermore,	  as	  indicated	  in	  the	  previous	  section,178	  the	  involvement	  of	  intermediaries	  
such	  as	  ISPs	  is	  highly	  problematic.	  As	  discussed	  there,	  intermediaries	  have	  a	  trust-­‐
based	  relationship	  with	  customers,	  who	  pay	  for	  services	  and	  expect	  in	  return	  a	  certain	  
degree	  of	  confidentiality	  and	  protection	  of	  their	  data.	  In	  addition,	  particularly	  in	  
Germany	  the	  regulations	  on	  the	  secrecy	  of	  telecommunications	  restrict	  the	  possibilities	  
of	  intermediaries	  to	  carry	  out	  certain	  technical	  measures,	  and	  release,	  or	  enable	  access	  
to	  private	  data.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173	  See	  also:	  http://www.berr.gov.uk/consultations/page51696.html.	  
174	  See	  e.g.,	  C	  Doctorow,	  “Britain’s	  New	  Internet	  Law	  -­‐-­‐	  As	  Bad	  as	  Everyone’s	  Been	  Saying,	  And	  
Worse.	  Much,	  Much	  Worse”,	  (2009)	  boingboing,	  available	  at	  
http://www.boingboing.net/2009/11/20/britains-­‐new-­‐interne.html;	  L	  Edwards,	  “Mandy	  and	  
Me:	  Some	  Thoughts	  on	  the	  Digital	  Economy	  Bill”,	  (2009)	  6:3	  SCRIPTed,	  534,	  available	  at	  
http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-­‐ed/vol6-­‐3/editorial.asp.	  
175	  Out-­‐Law,	  “Digital	  Economy	  Act	  to	  be	  Reviewed	  by	  Courts	  and	  Parliament”	  (2010)	  out-­law	  
http://www.out-­‐law.com/page-­‐11538.	  
176	  P	  Bradwell,	  “Judicial	  Review	  of	  the	  Digital	  Economy	  Act”	  (2011)	  European	  Digital	  Rights,	  
available	  online	  at:	  http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number9.7/judicial-­‐review-­‐digital-­‐
economy-­‐bill.	  
177	  BBC	  News,	  “BT	  and	  TalkTalk	  to	  Appeal	  Digital	  Economy	  Act”	  (2011)	  available	  online	  at:	  	  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-­‐15212651.	  
178	  See	  p.	  71.	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On	  national	  level,	  most	  stakeholders	  identified	  the	  issue	  of	  reliability	  and	  usability	  of	  
the	  data	  seized	  by	  a	  software	  tool	  as	  one	  of	  the	  most	  pressing	  problems.	  
The	  deployment	  of	  autonomously	  operating	  software	  tools	  that	  carry	  out	  actions	  
usually	  undertaken	  by	  human	  officers,	  such	  as	  the	  search	  and	  seizure	  of	  relevant	  
evidence,	  raises	  questions	  about	  the	  reliability	  of	  this	  evidence.	  Additionally,	  the	  
problem	  is	  that	  the	  evidence	  collected	  is	  only	  available	  in	  digital	  format.	  Those	  
stakeholders	  concerned	  with	  the	  collection	  and	  use	  of	  evidentiary	  material	  pointed	  out	  
that	  digital	  evidence	  is	  still	  an	  underdeveloped	  area	  of	  law.	  There	  exists	  great	  legal	  
uncertainty	  about	  the	  general	  admissibility	  and	  reliability	  of	  this	  type	  of	  evidence.	  	  
The	  technical	  experts	  added	  that	  the	  particular	  problem	  with	  digital	  data	  seized	  during	  
an	  online	  search	  is	  that	  the	  software	  tool	  used	  to	  undertake	  the	  search	  necessarily	  
compromises	  the	  target	  system.	  This	  causes	  problems	  for	  the	  reliability	  of	  the	  data.	  	  
The	  specific	  problems	  identified	  were	  (1)	  whether	  digital	  data	  seized	  by	  software	  tools	  
can	  be	  regarded	  as	  admissible	  and	  reliable	  evidence.	  (2)	  In	  how	  far	  the	  use	  of	  an	  
autonomous	  software	  tool	  to	  seize	  the	  data	  impacts	  the	  reliability	  and	  admissibility	  of	  
the	  data	  as	  evidence.	  (3)	  How	  the	  potential	  compromise	  of	  the	  target	  system	  impacts	  
the	  reliability	  and	  admissibility	  of	  the	  evidence,	  and	  (4)	  in	  how	  far	  digital	  data	  seized	  
from	  a	  live	  system	  can	  be	  used	  as	  evidence.	  
	  
The	  interviews	  showed	  that	  the	  subject	  of	  digital	  data	  as	  evidence,	  and	  in	  particular	  
digital	  data	  seized	  by	  software	  tools	  and	  from	  live	  systems	  is	  still	  a	  grey	  area	  in	  both	  
jurisdictions.	  However,	  this	  subject	  is	  of	  particular	  relevance	  for	  the	  digital	  data	  seized	  
during	  cyber-­‐investigations	  because	  it	  is	  oftentimes	  the	  main	  evidence	  in	  contrast	  to	  
digital	  data	  that	  is	  seized	  during	  traditional	  investigations,	  which	  merely	  functions	  as	  a	  
supplement.	  In	  line	  with	  the	  judgment	  of	  the	  BVerfG,	  which	  established	  that	  the	  virtual	  
living	  space	  is	  as	  important	  as	  the	  physical	  world,	  future	  investigations	  will	  oftentimes	  
solely	  focus	  on	  the	  virtual	  living	  space,	  hence	  any	  evidence	  will	  be	  in	  digital	  format	  and	  
often	  seized	  from	  live	  systems	  using	  software	  based	  investigative	  tools.	  	  
This	  means	  that	  the	  evidentiary	  value	  of	  this	  data	  is	  extremely	  important	  for	  future	  
investigations.	  	  
However,	  it	  was	  pointed	  out	  by	  several	  stakeholders	  that	  to	  date,	  this	  is	  an	  unresolved	  
matter,	  and	  great	  legal	  uncertainty	  exists	  about	  this	  issue.	  Costly	  investigative	  
measures	  though	  are	  only	  of	  any	  real	  value	  if	  the	  results	  can	  be	  used	  further	  during	  
later	  legal	  procedures.	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In	  addition,	  particularly	  German	  stakeholders	  pointed	  out	  that	  similarly	  to	  the	  
harmonisation	  required	  on	  international	  level,	  this	  is	  also	  required	  on	  national	  level.	  All	  
matters	  of	  police	  powers	  are	  federal	  state	  law	  in	  Germany;	  hence	  the	  different	  federal	  
states	  can	  have	  different	  regulations	  on	  this	  topic.	  If	  these	  vary	  too	  much,	  the	  regulation	  
of	  the	  above-­‐discussed	  problems	  becomes	  even	  more	  difficult.	  	  
	  
Another	  primary	  concern	  that	  most	  stakeholders	  from	  both	  jurisdictions	  shared	  
concerned	  the	  adequate	  regulation	  of	  these	  investigative	  tools.	  As	  shown	  in	  the	  
previous	  chapter,	  these	  new	  investigative	  tools	  carry	  out	  core	  policing	  tasks	  
autonomously.	  Ensuring	  that	  these	  autonomously	  operating	  tools	  obey	  relevant	  laws	  
and	  regulations	  during	  the	  investigative	  actions	  is	  a	  new	  challenge.	  All	  stakeholders	  
pointed	  out	  that	  no	  existing	  regulatory	  methods	  exist	  at	  the	  moment	  that	  could	  deal	  
with	  this	  challenge.	  	  
	  
Other	  legal	  and	  regulatory	  problems	  were	  raised	  during	  the	  interviews.	  Some	  
stakeholders	  mentioned	  the	  problem	  of	  software	  executing	  tasks	  normally	  carried	  out	  
by	  a	  human	  officer.	  It	  was	  briefly	  discussed	  that	  depending	  on	  the	  degree	  of	  autonomy	  
this	  could	  prompt	  problems	  for	  existing	  legal	  concepts	  tailored	  to	  human	  officers.	  	  
Another	  concern	  that	  was	  raised	  by	  some	  of	  the	  stakeholders	  was	  the	  issue	  of	  liability	  
for	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  software	  tool.	  In	  case	  damage	  or	  harm	  occurs,	  the	  question	  of	  
liability	  needs	  to	  be	  established.	  Given	  that	  the	  tools	  operate	  autonomously,	  and	  solely	  
the	  tools	  and	  not	  the	  human	  operator	  will	  undertake	  some	  decisions	  and	  legal	  
reasoning,	  this	  becomes	  a	  pertinent	  issue.	  
3.5 Complementary Research Results 
The	  sensitivity	  of	  the	  topic	  has,	  as	  explained	  above,	  shaped	  and	  restricted	  to	  some	  
extend	  the	  interviews.	  To	  minimise	  the	  problems	  arising	  from	  the	  strict	  security	  
protocols,	  anonymous	  interview	  statements,	  and	  qualitative	  interview	  approach	  for	  the	  
results,	  the	  above	  outcomes	  are	  correlated	  with	  those	  of	  another	  survey	  that	  was	  
carried	  out.	  This	  survey	  consisted	  of	  questionnaire-­‐based	  interviews,	  combined	  with	  
reports	  from	  experts.	  While	  the	  main	  aim	  of	  the	  survey	  had	  a	  different	  focus,	  the	  
involvement	  of	  the	  author	  in	  designing	  the	  questionnaire,	  conducting	  the	  research	  and	  
evaluating	  the	  outcome	  allowed	  aligning	  some	  of	  the	  issues	  with	  the	  problems	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discussed	  here.	  In	  particular,	  it	  tried	  to	  give	  empirical	  backing	  to	  the	  theories	  on	  how	  
lawyers	  cope	  with	  technology.	  	  
The	  survey	  was	  part	  of	  a	  project,	  which	  was	  partially	  funded	  by	  the	  European	  Union	  
under	  the	  AGIS	  Programme,	  and	  focused	  on	  determining	  how	  legal	  practitioners	  deal	  
with	  ICTs	  and	  their	  outputs,	  and	  in	  particular	  digital	  evidence	  and	  its	  admissibility	  to	  
court	  proceedings,	  and	  whether	  specific	  regulations	  dealing	  with	  this	  type	  of	  evidence	  
exist	  in	  their	  respective	  jurisdiction.179	  The	  methodological	  approach	  chosen	  for	  this	  
study	  is	  indebted	  to	  the	  socio-­‐legal	  tradition	  in	  comparative	  law.180	  Rather	  than	  asking	  
simply	  what	  rules	  and	  regulations	  in	  different	  countries	  say,	  it	  tried	  to	  get	  a	  feel	  for	  the	  
way	  in	  which	  lawyers	  make	  sense	  of	  these	  regulations	  in	  their	  practice.	  To	  achieve	  this	  
goal,	  a	  two-­‐pronged	  strategy	  was	  followed.	  Country	  reports	  were	  commissioned	  for	  16	  
jurisdictions,	  where	  experts	  in	  academia	  gave	  an	  account	  of	  the	  legal	  situation,	  which	  
was	  (admittedly	  to	  a	  limited	  degree)	  reviewed	  by	  the	  consortium	  members	  including	  
this	  author.	  We	  took	  the	  resulting	  accounts	  as	  a	  good	  proxy	  for	  the	  “real”	  legal	  situation	  
in	  these	  countries	  –	  and	  without	  analysing	  too	  deeply	  what	  “real”	  in	  this	  context	  means.	  	  
In	  the	  second	  stage,	  questionnaires	  involving	  free	  text	  answers	  to	  problem	  questions	  
together	  with	  simple	  tick	  box	  sections	  were	  send	  to	  practitioners	  in	  these	  countries	  –	  
judges,	  prosecutors,	  forensic	  experts	  and	  defence	  lawyers.	  The	  return	  rate	  did	  not	  
allow	  a	  statistically	  valid	  evaluation,	  therefore	  they	  were	  followed	  up	  with	  data	  coming	  
from	  in-­depth	  interviews:	  at	  the	  very	  least	  one	  representative	  from	  every	  professional	  
group	  in	  each	  of	  the	  sixteen	  countries	  studied	  was	  interviewed,	  with	  questions	  based	  
on	  those	  issues	  highlighted	  in	  the	  questionnaires	  from	  that	  country.	  	  The	  objective	  was	  
to	  combine	  for	  each	  country	  a	  diverse	  and	  heterogeneous	  range	  of	  participants	  who	  
can	  express	  different	  opinions	  with	  respect	  to	  how	  they	  are	  working	  in	  practice,	  
advantages,	  inconveniences	  and	  future	  perspectives	  when	  dealing	  with	  electronic	  
evidence.	  For	  this	  part	  of	  the	  fieldwork,	  we	  used	  three	  different	  protocols:	  one	  for	  
lawyers,	  one	  for	  computer	  forensic	  experts,	  and	  a	  third	  for	  commercial	  actors.	  The	  total	  
sample	  of	  field	  observations	  is	  made	  up	  of	  one	  hundred	  twenty-­‐five	  questionnaires,	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  Admissibility	  of	  Electronic	  Evidence	  (A.E.E.C.):	  Fighting	  against	  High-­‐Tech	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  For	  details	  
on	  the	  project	  see	  F	  Insa,	  “The	  Admissibility	  of	  Electronic	  Evidence	  in	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  (A.E.E.C.):	  Fighting	  
against	  High-­‐Tech	  Crime	  –	  Results	  of	  a	  European	  Study”	  (2007)	  1:4	  Journal	  of	  Digital	  Forensic	  
Practice,	  285-­‐289.	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  Markesinis,	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  Mentality:	  Mental	  Disposition	  or	  Outlook	  as	  a	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  Impeding	  
Recourse	  to	  Foreign	  Law”	  (2006)	  80	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  Review	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This	  approach	  allowed	  us	  to	  identify	  if	  there	  were	  particular	  concerns	  and	  anxieties	  
amongst	  lawyers	  about	  digital	  evidence,	  and	  whether	  their	  confidence,	  or	  lack	  thereof,	  
matched	  their	  true	  understanding	  of	  the	  field	  (hence	  the	  prior	  evaluation	  of	  the	  laws	  by	  
experts).	  	  
The	  aim	  was	  to	  get	  an	  idea	  of	  the	  “sense	  making”	  activities	  that	  lawyers	  perform	  when	  
challenged	  by	  technological	  developments.	  We	  tried	  to	  visualise	  the	  data	  using	  
“semantic	  networks”,	  a	  method	  often	  employed	  in	  comparative	  and	  applied	  
linguistics.181	  	  
The	  idea	  is	  to	  see	  how	  central	  concepts	  are	  for	  cognition	  by	  analysing	  how	  they	  are	  
connected	  to	  other	  concepts.	  One	  graph	  that	  was	  derived	  from	  this	  project	  shall	  be	  




Figure	  1:	  Visualisation	  of	  source	  texts	  
	  
In	  this	  case,	  it	  tries	  to	  depict	  the	  source	  texts	  lawyers	  used	  to	  build	  analogies	  in	  
response	  to	  the	  problem	  question	  given	  to	  them	  in	  the	  questionnaire.	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  Carley,	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  Kaufer,	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  An	  Approach	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Even	  though	  the	  response	  rate	  precludes	  a	  rigorous	  mathematical	  analysis,	  certain	  
trends	  emerged	  from	  the	  responses	  that	  are	  relevant	  for	  this	  thesis.	  
Generally,	  most	  interviewees	  from	  all	  countries	  stated	  that	  uncertainty	  exists	  about	  the	  
regulation	  of	  ICTs	  and	  handling	  of	  digital	  data,	  which	  they	  identified	  as	  a	  source	  of	  
concern.	  There	  seemed	  to	  be	  little	  connection	  between	  the	  correctness	  of	  their	  
understanding	  of	  the	  technological	  issues	  and	  the	  confidence	  they	  expressed	  in	  
handling	  them	  should	  the	  issue	  arise	  in	  court.	  Broadly	  speaking,	  the	  majority	  expressed	  
their	  worries	  about	  their	  ignorance	  of	  the	  technological	  side,	  while	  affirming	  their	  
belief	  that	  their	  legal	  skill	  sets	  would	  nonetheless	  allow	  them	  to	  come	  to	  a	  legally	  
correct	  solution	  of	  any	  problem.	  As	  a	  preferred	  method	  to	  address	  these	  problems,	  two	  
strategies	  emerged.	  One	  was	  to	  “black	  box”	  the	  entire	  question:	  this	  is	  a	  question	  of	  fact	  
best	  left	  to	  the	  properly	  trained	  forensic	  experts,	  and	  we	  can	  implicitly	  trust	  their	  
analysis.	  No	  further	  scrutiny,	  by	  a	  judge	  or	  under	  cross-­‐examination,	  is	  necessary	  
provided	  the	  proper	  procedure	  in	  determining	  the	  expert’s	  expertise	  were	  followed.	  	  
The	  second	  strategy	  is	  the	  analogous	  application	  of	  existing	  legislation	  to	  the	  new	  
issues.	  However,	  most	  interviewees	  stated	  that	  for	  this	  approach,	  knowledge	  about	  and	  
understanding	  of	  the	  technical	  details	  of	  the	  respective	  technologies	  is	  required	  to	  
develop	  successful	  analogies.	  They	  indicated	  that	  thus	  far,	  legal	  practitioners	  are	  not	  
suitably	  educated	  in	  this	  area	  and	  expressed	  the	  concern	  that	  this	  will	  remain	  an	  issue	  
in	  the	  future.	  	  
Paradoxically,	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  less	  they	  knew	  about	  the	  actual	  ability	  and	  limitations	  
of	  (any	  type	  of)	  computer	  forensic	  technology,	  the	  more	  willing	  they	  were	  to	  make	  far	  
reaching	  analogies	  to	  comprehend	  it.	  The	  introduction	  of	  new	  legislation	  however,	  was	  
not	  a	  primary	  desiderata	  of	  legal	  practitioners	  to	  address	  this	  situation,	  with	  one	  
notable	  exception:	  The	  international	  nature	  of	  cybercrime	  and	  digital	  evidence	  was	  
recognised	  by	  all	  respondents,	  and	  to	  the	  extend	  that	  regulation	  and	  harmonisation	  
was	  requested,	  it	  was	  to	  address	  perceived	  problems	  with	  the	  procedure	  in	  countries	  
other	  than	  the	  respondents,	  to	  ensure	  that	  evidence	  obtained	  abroad	  could	  if	  necessary	  
be	  used	  in	  the	  domestic	  court.	  This	  fits	  to	  the	  observation	  about	  the	  role	  of	  “trust”	  made	  
above	  –	  lawyers	  are	  willing	  to	  trust	  in	  their	  compatriots,	  but	  are	  much	  less	  certain	  
about	  “foreigners”.	  
	  
The	  results	  of	  these	  quantitative	  interviews	  are	  remarkably	  similar	  to	  those	  of	  the	  
qualitative	  interviews	  depicted	  above.	  	  Particularly	  the	  points	  that	  legal	  practitioners	  
recognise	  that	  they	  often	  lack	  the	  necessary	  knowledge	  about	  ICTs	  and	  their	  outputs,	  
	   80	  
but	  nevertheless	  use	  confidently	  and	  willingly	  often	  far	  reaching	  analogous	  
applications	  of	  existing	  legislation	  to	  new	  settings.	  What	  they	  would	  like	  the	  most	  is	  for	  
some	  authoritative	  source	  to	  confirm	  that	  their	  analogies	  are	  valid,	  rather	  than	  
legislative	  intervention.	  
	  
These	  results	  mean	  for	  this	  work	  that	  successful	  and	  correct	  analogies	  that	  achieve	  the	  
equivalent	  to	  the	  analogue	  regulatory	  regime	  have	  to	  be	  facilitated,	  which	  requires	  that	  
software-­‐based	  investigative	  tools	  have	  to	  be	  developed	  with	  the	  cognitive	  coping	  
mechanisms	  of	  legal	  pracititoners	  in	  mind.	  The	  question	  is	  how	  this	  problem	  is	  best	  
addressed	  for	  the	  software-­‐based	  investigative	  tools	  discussed	  in	  this	  work.	  Given	  the	  
lack	  of	  technical	  knowledge	  of	  legal	  practitioners,	  the	  focus	  needs	  to	  be	  on	  designing	  
the	  software	  tools	  to	  enable	  successful	  analogies.	  An	  analogy	  can	  be	  called	  “successful”	  
in	  this	  sense	  if	  it	  achieves	  the	  equivalent	  regulatory	  effect.	  So	  in	  the	  example	  of	  the	  
“Federal	  Trojan”,	  to	  think	  of	  the	  software	  as	  the	  equivalent	  of	  a	  police	  officer	  is	  a	  legally	  
valid	  analogy	  if	  it	  succeeds	  to	  protect	  the	  citizen	  from	  state	  intrusion	  just	  as	  much	  as	  if	  
a	  real	  officer	  had	  tried	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  information	  about	  them,	  and	  gives	  the	  police	  
access	  to	  the	  same	  data	  that	  they	  would	  have	  been	  able	  to	  acquire	  in	  the	  traditional	  
form.	  With	  other	  words,	  the	  mere	  use	  of	  technology	  should	  not	  place	  either	  police	  or	  
citizen	  in	  a	  better	  or	  worse	  position.	  	  
	  
I	  hypothesise	  that	  analogies	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  valid	  in	  this	  sense	  if	  it	  is	  realistic,	  that	  
is	  if	  the	  lawyer	  does	  not	  attribute	  too	  much,	  or	  indeed	  too	  little,	  capacity	  to	  the	  
autonomous	  forensic	  tool	  because	  he	  thinks	  of	  it	  as	  a	  “digital	  police	  officer”.	  This	  can	  be	  
achieved	  in	  two	  ways,	  both	  of	  which	  are	  discussed	  in	  this	  thesis:	  by	  better	  
understanding	  the	  legally	  relevant	  features	  and	  limitations	  of	  the	  software	  tools,	  and	  by	  
“forcing”	  the	  metaphor	  onto	  real	  life,	  that	  is,	  by	  ensuring	  computationally	  that	  the	  
software	  does	  indeed	  exhibit	  facilities	  and	  capacities	  that	  are	  of	  the	  kind	  that	  in	  human	  
police	  officers	  are	  attached	  to	  legal	  consequences	  That	  is	  they	  should	  have	  the	  
computational	  equivalent	  to	  “having	  a	  reasonable	  suspicion”,	  but	  need	  not	  have	  the	  
equivalent	  of	  “liking	  donuts	  a	  lot”.	  
	  
How	  this	  can	  be	  accomplished	  to	  avoid	  reliability	  issues	  of	  for	  example	  a	  “black	  box”	  
solution,	  where	  legal	  practitioners	  provide	  the	  input	  commands	  and	  the	  technology	  
executes	  the	  reasoning	  and	  provides	  the	  outcome,	  which	  means	  that	  the	  responsibility	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for	  the	  correct	  reasoning	  lies	  solely	  with	  the	  software	  engineers,	  and	  legal	  scrutiny	  of	  
the	  reasoning	  process	  is	  impossible,	  is	  discussed	  in	  chapters	  8	  and	  9	  of	  this	  thesis.	  
	  
This	  outcome	  however,	  supports	  the	  key	  argument	  of	  this	  thesis	  that	  software-­‐based	  
investigative	  tools	  are	  increasingly	  operating	  as	  “autonomous	  cyber-­‐cops”	  assisting	  or	  
replacing	  human	  officers	  for	  policing	  tasks.	  	  
3.6 Conclusion 
The	  interviews	  provided	  some	  very	  important	  results	  for	  this	  thesis.	  The	  technical	  
experts	  contributed	  that	  the	  use	  of	  complex	  software	  tools	  during	  investigative	  
measures	  is	  not	  per	  se	  a	  new	  concept.	  However,	  the	  degree	  of	  autonomy	  of	  currently	  
developed	  cyber-­‐cops	  developed	  to	  undertake,	  for	  example,	  online	  searches	  of	  
computers	  is	  novel.	  It	  was	  confirmed	  that	  the	  development	  of	  tools	  featuring	  the	  
desired	  capabilities	  and	  necessary	  degree	  of	  autonomy	  is	  possible,	  albeit	  expensive.	  
Technical	  experts	  also	  identified	  related	  software	  tools,	  which	  will	  likely	  serve	  as	  the	  
basis	  for	  these	  new	  investigative	  tools.	  This	  is	  extremely	  important	  for	  the	  technical	  
analysis	  in	  the	  following	  chapters,	  where	  this	  information,	  together	  with	  information	  
publicly	  released	  by	  various	  governmental	  bodies,	  courts	  and	  other	  experts	  forms	  the	  
basis	  for	  the	  analysis	  about	  the	  technical	  nature	  of	  the	  envisaged	  software	  based	  
investigative	  tools.	  
	  
Legal	  experts	  identified	  the	  most	  pressing	  issues	  that	  legal	  practitioners	  currently	  face	  
during	  the	  introduction	  phase	  of	  these	  software	  tools	  and	  the	  new	  investigative	  
measure.	  	  
These	  are	  (1)	  the	  extraterritorial	  impact,	  (2)	  the	  evidential	  value	  of	  the	  seized	  data,	  and	  
(3)	  the	  regulation	  of	  the	  tools.	  	  
While	  other	  matters	  were	  mentioned	  and	  discussed,	  all	  stakeholders	  highlighted	  these	  
issues	  as	  the	  most	  pressing	  problems.	  The	  reason	  why	  these	  issues	  were	  identified	  as	  
such	  important	  matters,	  is	  that	  these	  challenge	  existing	  core	  concepts	  that	  have	  been	  
tailored	  to	  human	  officers	  and	  investigations	  of	  the	  offline	  world.	  In	  addition,	  these	  are	  
fundamental	  problems,	  which,	  if	  not	  solved,	  could	  potentially	  jeopardise	  the	  use	  of	  
these	  tools	  and	  violate	  rights	  of	  suspects.	  	  
This	  evaluation	  of	  legal	  and	  regulatory	  problems	  by	  stakeholders	  directly	  concerned	  
with	  the	  development	  and	  use	  of	  these	  new	  investigative	  tools	  is	  profoundly	  important	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for	  this	  thesis.	  Analysing	  problems	  that	  are	  of	  high	  relevance	  to	  practitioners	  means	  
that	  the	  work	  of	  this	  thesis	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  directly	  impact	  on	  policy	  making.	  Some	  
of	  the	  stakeholders	  asked	  to	  receive	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  completed	  work	  and	  discuss	  the	  
results	  further,	  hoping	  that	  some	  of	  the	  analysis	  of	  this	  thesis	  could	  be	  significant	  for	  
their	  work.	  	  
	  
More	  generally,	  these	  interviews	  have	  highlighted	  that	  the	  current	  approach	  to	  
technology	  regulation,	  dealing	  with	  problems	  when	  they	  are	  pressing,	  is	  problematic.	  
All	  stakeholders	  have	  highlighted	  that	  foresight	  is	  necessary	  for	  the	  regulation	  of	  these	  
new	  investigative	  tools,	  and	  more	  generally	  the	  policing	  and	  regulation	  of	  the	  virtual	  
living	  space.	  Recent	  examples,	  such	  as	  the	  rushed	  DEA	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  the	  
Zugangserschwerungsgesetz	  in	  Germany,	  highlight	  that	  it	  is	  important	  to	  foresee	  legal	  
and	  regulatory	  problems,	  and	  draft	  legislation	  carefully.	  	  
	  
Another	  problem	  that	  has	  become	  evident	  is	  that	  several	  stakeholders	  are	  involved	  in	  
the	  policing	  of	  the	  virtual	  living	  space,	  and	  the	  development	  and	  use	  of	  new	  ICT-­‐based	  
investigative	  measures.	  Among	  others,	  private	  bodies,	  usually	  intermediaries	  are	  
affected.	  However,	  when	  the	  boundaries	  between	  public	  and	  private	  bodies	  are	  
blurred,	  problems	  arise	  because	  fundamentally	  different	  perspectives	  clash.	  However,	  
no	  cooperation	  or	  discussion	  between	  these	  different	  stakeholders	  occurs.	  This	  needs	  
to	  be	  changed	  to	  enable	  the	  development	  of	  a	  legally	  sound	  compromise.	  	  
	  
In	  addition,	  the	  policing	  and	  investigation	  of	  the	  virtual	  living	  space	  requires	  more	  
international	  cooperation	  and	  harmonisation	  because	  national	  borders,	  which	  
traditionally	  served	  as	  sovereignty	  indicators	  and	  boundaries,	  do	  not	  exist	  in	  the	  virtual	  
living	  space.	  It	  is	  therefore	  crucial	  that	  sufficient	  agreements	  are	  in	  place,	  to	  avoid	  
violations	  of	  international	  laws,	  and	  enable	  the	  proper	  and	  lawful	  use	  of	  new	  
investigative	  technologies.	  	  
It	  was	  stated	  that	  one	  of	  the	  German	  regulatory	  authorities	  organised	  a	  meeting	  of	  
international	  e-­‐crime	  units,	  which	  was	  the	  first	  of	  its	  kind	  and	  well	  received.	  The	  aim	  of	  
the	  meeting	  was	  to	  establish	  contacts	  and	  networks	  for	  future	  collaboration.	  However,	  
it	  would	  be	  important	  to	  have	  policy	  makers	  present,	  so	  that	  they	  become	  more	  aware	  
of	  the	  practical	  problems	  these	  new	  investigative	  measures	  cause,	  and	  can	  discuss	  and	  
develop	  national	  and	  international	  legislation	  to	  solve	  these.	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The	  partially	  very	  strict	  clearance	  procedures	  prior	  to	  the	  interviews	  and	  the	  settings	  
of	  some	  of	  the	  interviews	  highlight	  the	  sensitivity	  of	  this	  topic,	  but	  also	  the	  great	  
insecurity	  of	  all	  involved	  stakeholders.	  Specific	  questions	  about	  the	  technical	  details	  of	  
the	  tools,	  as	  well	  as	  questions	  about	  the	  past	  and	  current	  conduction	  of	  online	  searches	  
were	  often	  not	  answered	  (where	  a	  legal	  advisor	  was	  present,	  these	  questions	  were	  
always	  discussed	  with	  him).	  This	  silence	  is	  telling	  in	  itself.	  It	  highlights	  again	  not	  only	  
the	  need	  for	  confidentiality	  on	  this	  matter,	  but	  also	  the	  lack	  of	  knowledge	  and	  
insecurity	  surrounding	  the	  use	  of	  software	  based	  investigative	  tools	  and	  the	  policing	  of	  
the	  virtual	  living	  space.	  
The	  consequences	  of	  this	  insecurity,	  as	  well	  as	  lack	  of	  harmonisation	  on	  national	  and	  
international	  level	  mean	  that	  legal	  practitioners	  directly	  involved	  in	  the	  use	  of	  these	  
new	  investigative	  tools	  face	  a	  great	  legal	  uncertainty.	  Lawyers,	  for	  example,	  are	  faced	  
with	  the	  problem	  of	  not	  knowing	  in	  how	  far	  evidence	  presented	  by	  state	  attorneys	  is	  
authentic.	  Judges	  face	  the	  same	  problem	  of	  not	  knowing	  whether	  the	  evidence	  is	  or	  
should	  be	  admitted.	  	  
	  
The	  consensus	  of	  all	  interviewees	  was	  therefore	  that	  more	  legal	  and	  technical	  analysis	  
of	  the	  most	  pressing	  issues	  is	  required	  to	  establish	  legal	  certainty	  for	  the	  future	  use	  of	  
these	  tools.	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4 SOFTWARE-BASED INVESTIGATIVE TOOLS  
	  
One	  central	  problem	  identified	  in	  the	  previous	  chapters	  is	  the	  lack	  of	  detailed	  technical	  
knowledge	  about	  the	  new	  software-­‐based	  investigative	  tools.	  This	  is	  partly	  due	  to	  
confidentiality	  reasons	  as	  chapter	  3	  indicated,	  but	  also	  highlights	  that	  legal	  
practitioners	  often	  have	  little	  or	  no	  understanding	  of	  computer	  technology	  and	  try	  to	  
avoid	  (commissioning)	  deeper	  technical	  analysis	  of	  such	  new	  software-­‐based	  tools.	  
Instead,	  the	  focus	  is	  often	  on	  the	  rights	  violations	  of	  such	  investigative	  acts	  (the	  BVerfG	  
judgment	  is	  an	  example	  in	  point)	  and	  legal	  procedural	  topics,	  such	  as	  a	  valid	  legal	  basis.	  
The	  preferred	  methodology	  is	  the	  application	  of	  legal	  analogies	  to	  the	  new	  situation.	  
	  
However,	  the	  lack	  of	  technical	  details	  constraints	  a	  deeper	  legal	  conceptual	  analysis	  of	  
such	  software-­‐based	  investigative	  tools	  and	  their	  actions.	  This	  is	  particularly	  
problematic	  if	  the	  tools	  significantly	  impact	  existing	  policing	  structures,	  such	  as	  the	  
introduction	  of	  virtual	  police	  officers,	  which	  can	  fully	  replace	  human	  officers	  for	  some	  
policing	  functions.	  The	  successful	  application	  of	  analogies	  to	  such	  new	  circumstances	  
becomes	  problematic,	  if	  not	  impossible.	  	  
	  
Given	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  virtual	  living	  space	  for	  people’s	  lives	  it	  is	  important	  to	  
develop	  a	  successful	  regulatory	  approach	  for	  software-­‐based	  investigative	  tools.	  
	  
This	  chapter	  analyses	  the	  technical	  details	  of	  software-­‐based	  investigative	  tools,	  
focusing	  primarily	  on	  the	  software	  tools	  deployed	  for	  online	  searches	  of	  ICTs.	  As	  
discussed,	  this	  is	  currently	  still	  a	  comparatively	  task-­‐oriented	  and	  simple	  technology	  
but	  already	  triggers	  all	  problematic	  aspects	  that	  future,	  more	  autonomous,	  advanced,	  
and	  intelligent	  software	  tools	  also	  feature.	  In	  a	  second	  step,	  an	  already	  more	  
sophisticated	  technology	  is	  analysed	  that	  shares	  crucial	  features	  with	  the	  online	  search	  
software	  and	  is	  already	  used	  by	  LEAs.	  
	  
In	  the	  first	  part	  of	  this	  chapter,	  the	  specific	  technology	  underlying	  the	  remote	  online	  
searching	  of	  computers	  is	  presented	  in	  section	  4.1.	  As	  starting	  points	  for	  this	  analysis	  
serve	  both	  the	  public	  debate	  about	  the	  specifics	  of	  the	  technology,	  and	  the	  interview	  
results.	  This	  is	  followed	  by	  a	  classification	  of	  this	  technology	  in	  section	  4.2.	  Section	  4.3	  
evaluates	  the	  legal	  status	  of	  this	  technology.	  In	  section	  4.4	  a	  related	  technology,	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autonomous	  software	  agents,	  which	  shares	  some	  attributes	  with	  the	  software	  used	  to	  
remotely	  search	  computers,	  and	  is	  equally	  used	  by	  authorities	  already,	  is	  discussed.	  
One	  example	  of	  the	  application	  of	  this	  technology	  in	  law	  enforcement	  activities	  is	  
introduced	  in	  section	  4.5.	  Provisional	  conclusions	  are	  drawn	  in	  section	  4.6.	  
4.1 Technical Details of the Online Searching of Computers – The Public 
Discussion 
The	  discussion	  about	  the	  specific	  type	  of	  software	  used	  to	  undertake	  the	  online	  
searching	  of	  computers	  and	  its	  potential	  capabilities	  was	  manifold	  in	  several	  European	  
countries,	  but	  particularly	  in	  Germany.	  This	  discussion	  was	  accompanied	  by	  debates	  
about	  the	  feasibility	  of	  the	  proposed	  activities.	  This	  section	  provides	  an	  account	  of	  
these	  debates	  and	  summarises	  the	  main	  arguments,	  before	  analysing	  the	  state	  of	  the	  
art	  of	  the	  relevant	  technologies	  in	  section	  4.2	  to	  draw	  a	  realistic	  conclusion	  about	  
abilities	  and	  feasibility	  at	  the	  end	  of	  that	  section.	  	  
4.1.1 Proposed Type of Software and its Abilities 
Technical	  details	  about	  the	  type	  of	  software	  to	  be	  used	  to	  undertake	  online	  searches	  of	  
computers,	  or	  its	  abilities,	  have	  not	  officially	  been	  disclosed	  by	  the	  governments	  in	  any	  
of	  the	  countries	  discussed	  in	  this	  thesis.182	  As	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  the	  
reason	  for	  this	  is	  that	  information	  about	  such	  measures	  is	  classified	  as	  highly	  sensitive,	  
to	  complicate	  the	  detection	  of	  the	  software	  on	  a	  system	  and	  the	  development	  of	  
potential	  countermeasures.	  	  
The	  German	  government,	  in	  an	  official	  request	  for	  information	  about	  the	  topic	  of	  online	  
searches	  by	  the	  then	  oppositional	  German	  liberal	  party	  FDP,	  confirmed	  this	  need	  for	  
secrecy	  about	  the	  particulars	  of	  the	  software,	  stating	  that	  information	  about	  the	  
technology	  can	  only	  be	  disclosed	  to	  involved	  authorities.183	  An	  investigating	  judge	  of	  
the	  German	  Federal	  Court	  of	  Justice	  (BGH),	  when	  approving	  a	  request	  to	  undertake	  an	  
online	  search	  of	  an	  ICT	  device	  prior	  to	  the	  BGH	  ruling,184	  was	  the	  first	  member	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182	  During	  the	  research	  for	  this	  thesis,	  the	  author	  has	  also	  not	  come	  across	  information	  released	  
about	  technical	  details	  of	  similar	  measures	  by	  governments	  of	  countries	  other	  than	  those	  
discussed	  here.	  	  
183	  BT-­‐Drucksache	  16/4997,	  “Antwort	  der	  Bundesregierung	  auf	  die	  Kleine	  Anfrage	  der	  
Abgeordneten	  Gisela	  Piltz,	  Sabine	  Leutheusser-­‐Schnarrenberger,	  Jörg	  van	  Essen,	  weiterer	  
Abgeordneter	  und	  der	  Fraktion	  der	  FDP”	  10.04.2007,	  p.2,	  available	  online	  at	  
http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/049/1604997.pdf.	  
184	  See	  e.g	  BGH,	  Beschluss	  vom	  21.02.2006	  –	  Az.	  3	  BGs	  31/2006,	  http://www.hrr-­‐
strafrecht.de/hrr/3/06/3-­‐bgs-­‐31-­‐06.php;	  Leipold,	  note	  48,	  at	  315.	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judiciary	  to	  comment	  on	  the	  desirable	  technical	  abilities	  of	  the	  proposed	  software.	  He	  
stated	  that	  a	  specifically	  designed	  piece	  of	  software	  would	  infiltrate	  the	  computer	  of	  the	  
suspect	  “from	  outside”	  to	  copy	  the	  stored	  data	  and	  subsequently	  transport	  it	  back	  to	  
the	  investigating	  authority.185	  
This	  was	  followed	  by	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  BGH	  on	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  online	  searches,	  
which	  was	  the	  first	  judicial	  authority	  to	  officially	  publish	  details	  on	  the	  proposed	  
software.	  However,	  the	  court	  remained	  very	  vague	  and	  merely	  stated	  that	  “a	  
specifically	  designed	  computer	  program	  would	  be	  passed	  on	  to	  the	  suspect	  for	  
installation	  on	  his	  computer	  to	  allow	  authorities	  to	  access	  the	  data	  stored	  on	  its	  storage	  
media”.	  186	  	  It	  did	  not	  provide	  any	  details	  about	  the	  type	  of	  software	  and	  what	  its	  
precise	  abilities	  are.	  	  
The	  North	  Rhine-­‐Westphalian	  government,	  as	  described	  above	  in	  chapter	  2,	  was	  the	  
first	  legislative	  authority	  specifying	  in	  its	  amendment	  of	  Article	  5.2(11)	  NRW-­‐CPA	  the	  
online	  search	  as	  an	  investigative	  method.	  However,	  the	  North	  Rhine-­‐Westphalian	  
government	  remained	  even	  less	  specific	  about	  the	  technical	  details	  of	  the	  described	  
measure.	  It	  merely	  stated	  that	  the	  online	  search	  of	  a	  computer	  may	  be	  accomplished	  by	  
“technical	  means”.187	  The	  term	  “technical	  means”	  does	  not	  allow	  drawing	  conclusions	  
about	  the	  specifics	  of	  these	  means,	  and	  whether	  this	  will	  be	  a	  software	  or	  hardware	  
solution.	  	  
The	  situation	  is	  identical	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  other	  European	  countries,	  where	  no	  
information	  has	  been	  released	  about	  the	  particulars	  of	  the	  software	  used	  to	  undertake	  
remote	  searches.	  Equally	  on	  EU	  level,	  no	  technical	  details	  were	  released	  in	  the	  Council	  
Conclusions	  about	  how	  the	  remote	  searches	  should	  be	  undertaken.	  	  
However,	  a	  fairly	  clear	  picture	  about	  the	  technical	  details	  of	  remote	  searches	  of	  ICT	  
devices	  has	  evolved	  in	  the	  literature.	  The	  technical	  feasibility	  of	  these	  proposed	  
technical	  details	  is,	  however,	  controversially	  discussed.	  An	  overview	  of	  these	  opinions	  
is	  provided	  in	  this	  section,	  before	  evaluating	  in	  the	  following	  section	  (4.1.2)	  whether	  
the	  discussed	  methods	  are	  technically	  grounded	  and	  feasible.	  	  
Böckenförde	  established	  that	  generally,	  thus	  also	  for	  law	  enforcement	  agencies,	  the	  
way	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  the	  data	  stored	  on	  private	  computers	  varies.188	  It	  can	  be	  similar	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185	  BGH	  Beschluss,	  ibid.	  
186	  BGH,	  NJW	  2007,	  930.	  
187	  Article	  5.2(11)	  NRW-­‐CPA,	  available	  online	  at	  
http://www.im.nrw.de/sch/doks/vs/vsg_nrw_2007.pdf.	  
188	  T	  Böckenförde,	  Die	  Ermittlung	  im	  Netz	  (2003,	  Tübingen:	  Mohr	  Siebeck)	  at	  209.	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predominantly	  malicious	  activities	  such	  as	  “hacking”	  and	  “cracking”189,	  or	  by	  making	  
use	  of	  channels	  specifically	  designed	  for	  accessing	  the	  data.	  According	  to	  Böckenförde,	  
which	  method	  to	  choose	  depends	  on	  the	  type	  of	  target	  system.190	  He	  establishes	  that	  
the	  most	  promising	  method	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  a	  private	  computer	  in	  its	  singularity,191	  is	  
by	  infiltrating	  the	  specific	  system	  with	  a	  software	  specifically	  designed	  to	  spy	  on	  the	  
data	  stored	  on	  the	  target	  machine,	  which	  he	  specifies	  to	  be	  Trojan	  software.192	  
Although,	  these	  conclusions	  were	  drawn	  for	  generic	  online	  investigations	  in	  general,	  
and	  not	  the	  online	  search	  of	  an	  ICT	  device	  in	  particular,	  he	  has	  been	  among	  the	  first	  
authors	  to	  specify	  the	  type	  of	  software	  required	  by	  law	  enforcement	  agencies	  to	  
infiltrate	  computers	  of	  suspects.	  Authors	  reasoning	  about	  the	  technical	  feasibility	  of	  the	  
online	  search	  picked	  up	  these	  findings	  and	  discussed	  them	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  recent	  
developments.	  	  
Gercke	  was	  one	  of	  the	  first	  authors	  to	  embark	  on	  defining	  the	  technological	  details	  of	  
the	  online	  search	  of	  computers.	  He	  states	  that	  remote	  access	  to	  suspects’	  computers	  is	  
accomplished	  through	  the	  use	  of	  very	  specific	  software.	  He	  specifies	  further	  that	  this	  
software	  is	  similar	  to	  hacking	  tools,	  particularly	  to	  Trojan	  software,	  thereby	  confirming	  
the	  findings	  of	  Böckenförde	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  online	  search.193	  He	  states	  that	  this	  
software	  can	  be	  either	  installed	  on	  the	  target	  computer	  through	  legitimate	  software	  
updates	  that	  include,	  unknown	  to	  the	  suspect,	  the	  specific	  code,	  or	  through	  backdoors,	  
which	  additionally	  also	  provide	  access	  to	  the	  ICT	  device	  as	  a	  whole	  and	  not	  only	  the	  
data	  stored	  on	  it.194	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189	  These	  terms	  are	  sometimes	  used	  interchangeably,	  without	  making	  a	  clear	  differentiation	  
between	  them.	  The	  following	  definition	  of	  “Hacker”	  and	  “Cracker”	  serves	  to	  better	  distinguish	  
between	  these	  terms.	  “A	  hacker	  is	  a	  person	  intensely	  interested	  in	  the	  arcane	  and	  recondite	  
workings	  of	  any	  computer	  operating	  system.	  Most	  often,	  hackers	  are	  programmers.	  As	  such,	  
hackers	  obtain	  advanced	  knowledge	  of	  operating	  systems	  and	  programming	  languages.	  They	  
may	  know	  of	  holes	  within	  systems	  and	  the	  reasons	  for	  such	  holes.	  Hackers	  constantly	  seek	  
further	  knowledge,	  freely	  share	  what	  they	  have	  discovered,	  and	  never,	  ever	  intentionally	  
damage	  data	  (Anonymous,	  Maximum	  Security:	  A	  Hacker’s	  Guide	  to	  Protecting	  Your	  Internet	  Site	  
and	  Network	  [Canada:	  SAMS,	  2002],	  p.	  47).”	  “A	  cracker	  is	  a	  person	  who	  breaks	  into	  or	  otherwise	  
violates	  the	  system	  integrity	  of	  remote	  machines,	  with	  malicious	  intent.	  Crackers,	  having	  gained	  
unauthorized	  access,	  destroy	  vital	  data,	  deny	  legitimate	  users	  service,	  or	  basically	  cause	  
problems	  for	  their	  targets.	  Crackers	  can	  easily	  be	  identified	  because	  their	  actions	  are	  malicious	  
(Ibid).”	  
190	  Böckenförde,	  note	  188,	  at	  210.	  
191	  Thus	  a	  machine	  that	  is	  not	  part	  of	  a	  network	  and	  hence	  not	  designed	  to	  be	  accessed	  from	  
outside.	  
192	  Böckenförde,	  note	  188,	  at	  211.	  
193	  M	  Gercke,	  “Telekommunikationsüberwachung”	  in	  F	  Roggan,	  M	  Kutscha	  (eds.)	  Handbuch	  zum	  
Recht	  der	  inneren	  Sicherheit	  (Berlin:	  Berliner	  Wissenschafts-­‐Verlag,	  2006)	  146-­‐182,	  at	  168.	  
194	  Ibid,	  at	  169.	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Many	  authors	  writing	  on	  the	  topic	  of	  online	  search,	  both	  from	  a	  legal	  and	  technical	  
perspective	  confirmed	  these	  initial	  findings.195	  	  
However,	  this	  initial	  reasoning	  remained	  rather	  unspecific	  and	  no	  technical	  details	  
about	  the	  software	  or	  its	  abilities	  were	  provided	  at	  this	  early	  stage.	  As	  stated	  above,	  
this	  was	  in	  line	  with	  the	  information	  policy	  of	  the	  German	  government,	  which	  equally	  
did	  not	  release	  any	  detailed	  information	  about	  the	  software	  and	  only	  confirmed	  that	  it	  
was	  testing	  the	  technical	  feasibility	  of	  such	  a	  measure.196	  It	  did	  specify	  that	  an	  initial	  
amount	  of	  	  €	  200.000	  would	  be	  required	  to	  design	  this	  tool	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  payment	  
of	  two	  programmers,	  however,	  this	  information	  does	  not	  give	  an	  indication	  about	  the	  
specifics	  of	  the	  technology.197	  	  
This	  initial	  general	  debate	  was	  followed	  by	  more	  in-­‐depth	  studies	  about	  the	  type	  of	  
software	  required	  and	  its	  abilities,	  and	  the	  general	  feasibility	  of	  an	  online	  search.	  These	  
studies	  established	  that	  the	  software	  to	  be	  used	  for	  this	  measure	  would	  not	  be	  a	  
completely	  novel	  product,	  but	  rather	  rely	  on	  existing	  malware	  tools	  and	  previous	  
research	  undertaken	  in	  this	  field,	  and	  in	  particular	  research	  on	  Trojan	  software.198	  It	  
was	  argued	  that	  this	  type	  of	  software	  already	  possesses	  attributes	  that	  make	  it	  ideal	  for	  
use	  by	  law	  enforcement	  agencies	  to	  remotely	  search	  ICT	  devices	  of	  suspects.	  
Particularly,	  because	  Trojan	  software	  is	  designed	  to	  operate	  hidden	  from	  the	  view	  of	  
the	  user	  of	  the	  computer.	  Furthermore,	  because	  such	  software	  is	  able	  to	  receive	  
commands	  through	  a	  hidden	  input	  port,	  collect	  data	  on	  the	  infiltrated	  system,	  and	  send	  
this	  data	  back	  to	  the	  operators	  through	  a	  hidden	  output	  port.199	  Apart	  from	  
ascertaining	  the	  type	  of	  technology	  most	  likely	  to	  be	  used,	  these	  studies	  also	  focus	  on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195	  See	  e.g.	  Leipold,	  note	  48;	  Hornung,	  note	  48;	  Kutscha,	  note	  48;	  Rux,	  note	  48;	  M	  Kemper,	  
“Anforderungen	  und	  Inhalt	  der	  Online-­‐Durchsuchung	  bei	  der	  Verfolgung	  von	  Straftaten”	  (2007)	  
40:4	  Zeitschrift	  für	  Rechtspolitik,	  105-­‐109,	  105;	  P	  Schaar,	  “Anmerkung	  zum	  Beschluss	  des	  BGH	  
vom	  31.1.2007	  -­‐	  StB	  18/06	  -­‐	  zur	  verdeckten	  Online-­‐Durchsuchung”,	  (2007)	  10:4	  
Kommunikation	  und	  Recht	  202-­‐205,	  202;	  K	  Cornelius,	  “Anmerkung	  zum	  Beschluss	  des	  BGH	  zur	  
verdeckten	  Online-­‐Durchsuchung”,	  (2007)	  62:15/16	  Juristenzeitung	  285-­‐295,	  286;	  Gercke,	  note	  
48,	  at	  226.	  	  
196	  BT-­‐Drucksache	  16/4997,	  note	  181,	  at	  2.	  
197	  BT-­‐Drucksache	  16/3973,	  “Antwort	  	  der	  Bundesregierung	  auf	  die	  Kleine	  Anfrage	  der	  
Abgeordneten	  Jan	  Korte,	  Petra	  Pau,	  	  Kersten	  Naumann	  und	  der	  Fraktion	  DIE	  LINKE”,	  
28.12.2006,	  p.	  4,	  available	  online	  at	  
http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/039/1603973.pdf.	  
198	  U	  Buermeyer,	  note	  48,	  at	  154;	  Hansen/Pfitzmann,	  note	  48,	  at	  225;	  F	  C	  Freiling,	  “Schriftliche	  
Stellungnahme	  zum	  Fragenkatalog	  Verfassungsbeschwerden	  1	  BvR	  370/07	  und	  1	  BvR	  595/07”,	  
29.09.2007,	  1-­‐7,	  at	  4,	  available	  online	  at	  http://pi1.informatik.uni-­‐
mannheim.de/filepool/publications/stellungnahme-­‐online-­‐durchsuchung.pdf.	  
199	  Hansen/Pfitzmann,	  note	  48,	  at	  225.	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the	  abilities	  of	  the	  software,	  specifying	  that	  the	  scope	  of	  abilities	  of	  this	  type	  of	  software	  
can	  be	  potentially	  large.200	  According	  to	  these	  authors,	  these	  tools	  are	  able	  to:	  	  
• Undertake	  a	  system	  analysis	  of	  the	  target	  device,	  including	  gaining	  information	  
about	  the	  installed	  operating	  system,	  programs	  and	  user	  accounts;	  	  
• Compile	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  directories;	  search	  these	  directories	  for	  certain	  file	  
names	  and	  undertake	  full-­‐text	  search	  for	  key	  words;	  
• Undertake	  a	  search	  of	  attached	  internal	  and	  external	  data	  storage	  devices	  (such	  
as	  USB	  sticks,	  CDs/DVDs,	  flash-­‐memory,	  external	  hard	  drives);	  
• Download	  specific	  documents	  (text,	  pictures);	  
• Use	  a	  key	  logger;	  
• Deactivate	  software;	  
• Log	  the	  user’s	  Internet	  access;	  
• Log	  the	  user’s	  passwords;	  
• Generate	  messages	  on	  the	  target	  computer	  (to	  influence	  the	  user	  behaviour);	  
• Scan	  the	  network;	  
• Generate	  and	  transmit	  screen	  shots;	  
• Monitor	  the	  ICT	  devices’	  surrroundings	  (by	  activating	  an	  in-­‐built	  camera	  
and/or	  microphone).201	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  remember	  that	  the	  software	  will	  not	  necessarily	  possess	  all	  of	  the	  
above-­‐described	  abilities,	  but	  could	  only	  possess	  some	  of	  them	  or	  even	  more,	  if	  
programmed	  accordingly.	  	  
Having	  discussed	  the	  likely	  type	  of	  software	  to	  be	  used	  and	  its	  potential	  abilities,	  these	  
studies	  further	  explore	  how	  the	  online	  search	  will	  be	  conducted.	  Here,	  the	  crucial	  (and	  
technically	  most	  demanding)202	  phase	  is	  the	  infiltration	  of	  the	  target	  machine	  and	  
installation	  of	  the	  software.	  Without	  the	  ability	  to	  infiltrate	  a	  specific	  system,	  an	  online	  
search	  cannot	  be	  conducted,	  unless,	  as	  Hansen	  and	  Pfitzmann	  point	  out,	  the	  measure	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200	  Bundesministerium	  des	  Inneren,	  “Fragenkatalog	  der	  SPD-­‐Bundestagsfraktion,	  AG	  Kultur	  
und	  Medien,	  AG	  Neue	  Medien”,	  22.08.2007,	  available	  online	  at	  http://netzpolitik.org/wp-­‐
upload/fragen-­‐onlinedurchsuchung-­‐SPD.pdf;	  Bundesministerium	  des	  Inneren,	  “Fragenkatalog	  
des	  Bundesministeriums	  der	  Justiz“,	  22.08.2007,	  available	  online	  at	  http://netzpolitik.org/wp-­‐
upload/fragen-­‐onlinedurchsuchung-­‐BMJ.pdf;	  D	  Fox,	  Secorvo	  Security	  Consulting	  GmbH,	  
“Stellungnahme	  zur	  ‚Online-­‐Durchsuchung’	  Verfassungsbeschwerden	  1	  BvR	  370/07	  und	  1	  BvR	  
595/07”,	  29.09.2007,	  1-­‐17,	  at	  7,	  available	  online	  at	  
http://www.secorvo.de/publikationen/stellungnahme-­‐secorvo-­‐bverfg-­‐online-­‐
durchsuchung.pdf.	  
201	  This	  list	  is	  not	  necessarily	  complete.	  It	  only	  represents	  the	  abilities	  that	  have	  officially	  been	  
named	  in	  the	  literature.	  
202	  Fox,	  note	  200,	  at	  6.	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undertaken	  without	  infiltrating	  the	  ICT	  device.203	  This,	  however,	  significantly	  limits	  the	  
extent	  and	  type	  of	  data	  that	  can	  be	  collected.	  	  
It	  is	  possible	  to	  analyse	  the	  electromagnetic	  radiation	  of	  the	  target	  system	  and	  thereby	  
collecting	  information	  about	  optical	  signals,	  such	  as	  an	  image	  of	  the	  monitor,	  received	  
(directly	  or	  indirectly	  through	  a	  window)204	  acoustical	  signals	  (every	  key	  on	  a	  
keyboard	  makes	  a	  different	  noise	  when	  used),205	  and	  electromagnetic	  signals	  of	  the	  
different	  components	  build	  into	  the	  IT	  systems	  (such	  as	  graphic	  cards,	  sound	  cards,	  
keyboards	  and	  CPUs).206	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  these	  methods	  can	  be	  technically	  very	  
advanced,	  the	  amount	  of	  data	  that	  can	  be	  accessed	  is	  limited	  (this	  dependents	  on	  the	  
suspect’s	  behaviour,	  e.g.	  the	  websites	  and	  files	  accessed,	  and	  passwords	  typed),	  and	  the	  
authority	  gains	  no	  control	  over	  the	  ICT	  device.	  The	  advantage	  of	  this	  method	  is	  that	  the	  
violation	  of	  privacy	  and	  data	  protection	  rights	  of	  the	  affected	  person	  can	  be	  smaller	  and	  
the	  risk	  that	  a	  third	  person	  is	  affected	  can	  be	  eliminated	  faster,	  thus	  the	  measure	  could	  
be	  more	  in	  line	  with	  existing	  legislation	  and	  therefore	  regarded	  to	  be	  proportionate	  
and	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  constitution	  (in	  countries	  that	  have	  one)	  or	  human	  rights	  
(such	  as	  the	  UK	  1998	  Human	  Rights	  Act,	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights).	  
However,	  due	  to	  the	  above	  mentioned	  limitations	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  an	  online	  search	  
will	  be	  undertaken	  without	  infiltrating	  the	  system.	  This	  is	  also	  confirmed	  by	  the	  above-­‐
mentioned	  statements	  by	  authorities,	  confirming	  the	  development	  of	  a	  piece	  of	  
software	  to	  be	  used	  during	  an	  online	  search,	  which	  would	  not	  be	  necessary	  if	  there	  was	  
no	  need	  to	  infiltrate	  an	  ICT	  device.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
203	  M	  Hansen,	  A	  Pfitzmann,	  “Techniken	  der	  Online-­‐Durchsuchung”	  in	  F	  Roggan	  (ed.),	  Online-­
Durchsuchungen	  –	  Rechtliche	  und	  tatsächliche	  Konsequenzen	  des	  BVerfG-­Urteils	  vom	  27.	  Februar	  
2008	  (Berlin:	  Berliner	  Wissenschafts-­‐Verlag,	  2008)	  131-­‐157,	  134.	  
204	  M	  G	  Kuhn,	  “Optical	  Time-­‐Domain	  Eavesdropping	  Risks	  of	  CRT	  Displays”	  (2002)	  Proceedings	  
IEEE	  Symposium	  on	  Security	  and	  Privacy,	  3-­‐18,	  3;	  M	  Backes,	  M	  Dürmuth,	  D	  Unruh,	  
“Compromising	  Reflections	  –	  or	  –	  How	  to	  Read	  LCD	  Monitors	  Around	  the	  Corner”	  (2008)	  
Proceedings	  IEEE	  Symposium	  on	  Security	  and	  Privacy,	  158-­‐169.	  	  
205	  L	  Zhuang,	  “Security	  Inference	  from	  Noisy	  Data”,	  (2008),	  Unpublished	  PhD	  thesis,	  University	  
of	  California,	  Berkeley,	  available	  online	  at	  
http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/Pubs/TechRpts/2008/EECS-­‐2008-­‐32.pdf.	  
206	  M	  G	  Kuhn,	  R	  J	  Anderson,	  “Soft	  Tempest:	  Hidden	  Data	  Transmission	  	  
Using	  Electromagnetic	  Emanations”	  in	  D	  Aucsmith	  (ed.),	  Information	  Hiding	  (Berlin,	  Heidelberg:	  
Springer,	  1998)	  124-­‐142;	  R	  J	  Anderson,	  M	  G	  Kuhn,	  “Soft	  Tempest	  –	  An	  Opportunity	  for	  NATO”	  
(1999)	  Protecting	  NATO	  Information	  Systems	  in	  the	  21	  Century,	  IST	  Symposium,	  Washington	  DC,	  
USA,	  25–27	  Oct,	  available	  online	  at	  http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/nato-­‐tempest.pdf;	  
M	  G	  Kuhn,	  “Electromagnetic	  Eavesdropping	  Risks	  of	  Flat-­‐Panel	  Displays”	  (2004)	  Workshop	  on	  
Privacy	  Enhancing	  Technology,	  26–28	  May	  2004,	  Toronto,	  Canada,	  available	  online	  at	  
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mgk25/pet2004-­‐fpd.pdf.	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4.1.2 Infiltration Methods 
The	  possible	  infiltration	  methods	  were	  briefly	  mentioned	  in	  chapter	  2,207	  but	  the	  
findings	  of	  the	  studies	  are	  depicted	  in	  more	  detail	  here.	  Generally,	  the	  tenor	  is	  that	  
several	  potential	  approaches	  exist	  to	  infiltrate	  an	  ICT	  device	  with	  the	  above	  described	  
software	  solutions.	  	  
One	  possible	  infiltration	  method	  concerns	  the	  physical	  accessing	  of	  the	  target	  computer	  
and	  the	  manual	  installation	  of	  the	  investigative	  software.208	  This	  method	  provides	  a	  
very	  high	  certainty	  that	  the	  software	  is	  installed	  successfully	  and	  on	  the	  specific	  ICT	  
device	  of	  the	  suspect.	  However,	  it	  requires	  the	  physical	  intrusion	  of	  the	  private	  space	  of	  
the	  suspect	  and	  the	  manual	  manipulation	  of	  the	  machine	  by	  the	  authorities.	  There	  
might	  be	  no	  opportunity	  to	  do	  this	  and	  password	  protected	  machines	  can	  complicate	  
the	  access.	  Furthermore,	  if	  the	  executing	  authority	  is	  located	  in	  a	  country	  other	  than	  
the	  suspect	  physically	  accessing	  the	  space	  of	  the	  suspect	  might	  be	  impossible.209	  In	  
addition	  the	  amount	  of	  required	  human	  labour	  is	  relatively	  high	  for	  this	  method,	  and	  
therefore	  makes	  it	  expensive.	  	  This	  method	  can	  therefore	  be	  excluded	  as	  a	  likely	  means	  
of	  infiltration.	  	  
The	  alternative	  options	  discussed	  do	  not	  require	  physical	  access	  to	  the	  ICT	  devices.	  
These	  methods	  are	  similar	  to	  those	  developed	  for	  the	  infiltration	  of	  ICT	  devices	  with	  
malware,	  and	  can	  be	  divided	  into	  two	  categories:	  a)	  those	  requiring	  the	  (unknowing)	  
cooperation	  of	  the	  suspect,	  and	  b)	  those	  that	  do	  not	  rely	  on	  any	  actions	  of	  the	  suspect.	  
In	  the	  first	  category,	  the	  infiltration	  and	  installation	  of	  the	  software	  is	  hidden	  in	  a	  
different	  application	  (“host”	  application),	  which	  needs	  to	  be	  executed	  by	  the	  user	  of	  the	  
computer,	  and	  will	  then	  install	  itself	  in	  the	  background	  (hidden	  from	  the	  view	  of	  the	  
user).	  Such	  “host	  applications”	  can	  be:	  
	  
• Email	  attachments:	  The	  relevant	  software	  can	  be	  hidden	  in	  the	  attachment	  of	  an	  
email,	  which,	  once	  opened,	  is	  started	  and	  can	  install	  itself	  in	  the	  background.	  
The	  enticement	  to	  open	  the	  attachment	  can	  be	  increased	  by	  making	  it	  look	  to	  be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207	  See	  p.	  31.	  
208	  See	  e.g.	  Hansen/Pfitzmann,	  note	  203,	  at	  135;	  Hansen/Pfitzmann,	  note	  48,	  at	  227;	  Fox,	  note	  
44,	  at	  6;	  U	  Sieber,	  “Stellungnahme	  zu	  dem	  Fragenkatalog	  des	  Bundesverfassungsgerichts	  in	  dem	  
Verfahren	  1	  BvR	  370/07	  zum	  Thema	  der	  Online-­‐Durchsuchungen“,	  09.10.2007,	  1-­‐24,	  at	  12,	  
available	  online	  at	  http://www.mpicc.de/shared/data/pdf/bverfg-­‐sieber-­‐1-­‐endg.pdf;	  Freiling,	  
note	  198,	  at	  4;	  Pohl,	  note	  43,	  at	  686.	  	  
209	  See	  chapter	  6	  for	  more	  details	  about	  the	  legal	  problems	  of	  cross-­‐jurisdictional	  online	  
searches.	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sent	  from	  an	  authority,	  such	  as	  the	  tax	  office,	  and	  include	  important	  
information	  in	  the	  attachment.	  
• Software	  updates:	  The	  software	  is	  included	  in	  a	  manipulated	  software	  update,	  
which	  is	  forwarded	  to	  the	  suspect.	  The	  software	  update	  itself	  can	  be	  genuine,	  
but	  include	  the	  particular	  code,	  which	  will	  again	  be	  installed	  in	  the	  background.	  
The	  advantage	  is	  that	  the	  user	  might	  be	  prompted	  to	  install	  the	  software	  with	  
administrator	  rights.	  
• Manipulated	  Website:	  A	  website	  (ideally	  one	  often	  visited	  by	  the	  suspect	  or	  one	  
specifically	  designed	  for	  this	  purpose)	  is	  modified	  to	  include	  code,	  which	  will	  
start	  an	  installation	  program	  once	  the	  target	  has	  accessed	  the	  site.	  The	  
installation	  program	  will	  then	  be	  downloaded	  and	  install	  the	  software	  tool	  on	  
the	  suspect’s	  computer.	  
• CD/DVD:	  A	  manipulated	  CD	  or	  DVD,	  which	  is	  passed	  on	  to	  the	  suspect,	  includes	  
the	  software,	  which	  is	  installed	  by	  an	  autorun	  function	  in	  the	  background	  when	  
the	  CD/DVD	  is	  inserted.	  
• USB	  stick:	  A	  manipulated	  USB	  stick,	  which	  includes	  the	  software	  that	  is	  installed	  
by	  an	  autorun	  function	  in	  the	  background.	  
	  
In	  all	  of	  the	  above	  cases	  the	  software	  installs	  itself	  on	  the	  machine	  without	  the	  need	  for	  
further	  supervision	  by	  an	  operator.	  Once	  the	  manipulated	  “host”	  has	  been	  prepared	  
and	  distributed,	  the	  software	  will	  work	  autonomously.	  
	  
The	  second	  category	  comprises	  techniques	  that	  do	  not	  require	  the	  cooperation	  of	  the	  
suspect	  and	  are	  executed	  remotely	  by	  a	  human	  operator.	  This	  is	  the	  exploitation	  of	  so	  
called	  backdoors,	  where	  authorities	  hack	  into	  the	  system	  of	  a	  suspect	  by	  exploiting	  
security	  holes	  in	  the	  operating	  system,	  that	  are	  still	  relatively	  unknown	  and	  therefore	  
still	  “open”.	  A	  human	  operator	  then	  directly	  installs	  the	  software	  on	  the	  computer	  of	  
the	  suspect.	  Alternatively,	  authorities	  could	  collaborate	  with	  software	  producers	  to	  
have	  their	  own	  backdoors	  included	  into	  software.	  However,	  this	  would	  cause	  several	  
problems,	  starting	  with	  the	  willingness	  of	  the	  software	  producers	  due	  to	  potential	  loss	  
of	  consumer	  trust.	  Furthermore,	  there	  would	  be	  the	  very	  real	  risk	  that	  the	  backdoor	  
would	  be	  detected	  by	  criminals	  and	  used	  for	  their	  own	  purpose.	  
Another	  possibility	  is	  to	  force	  Internet	  Service	  Providers	  (ISPs)	  to	  manipulate	  genuine	  
software	  downloads	  of	  suspects	  to	  include	  the	  specific	  code.	  However,	  this	  would	  again	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bear	  the	  risk	  of	  loss	  of	  consumer	  trust	  outlined	  above.210	  The	  German	  government	  has	  
stated	  that	  it	  would	  not	  enact	  such	  an	  obligation	  to	  co-­‐operate	  for	  private	  parties.	  This	  
might	  also	  be	  the	  case	  because	  highly	  sensitive	  information	  (such	  as	  identification	  of	  
suspects)	  would	  have	  to	  be	  disclosed	  to	  third	  parties,	  and	  could	  therefore	  be	  potentially	  
exploited	  by	  internal	  employees	  of	  these	  companies.	  
	  
The	  above-­‐discussed	  infiltration	  methods	  have	  been	  discussed	  in	  the	  literature	  in	  great	  
detail,	  but	  no	  single	  method	  has	  been	  identified	  as	  the	  most	  likely	  one	  to	  be	  used.	  
Moreover,	  no	  feasibility	  study	  of	  the	  different	  approaches	  exists.	  
Hence	  concluding	  it	  can	  be	  summarised	  that	  even	  the	  more	  in-­‐depth	  studies	  have	  failed	  
to	  precisely	  identify	  the	  type	  of	  software	  to	  be	  used	  and	  determine	  its	  abilities	  and	  
more	  importantly,	  the	  feasibility	  of	  the	  measure,	  which	  has	  even	  been	  doubted	  by	  some	  
authors.211	  
	  
However,	  one	  key	  conclusion	  can	  be	  drawn	  from	  the	  above	  analysis	  of	  existing	  
literature,	  which	  is	  relevant	  for	  the	  following	  section,	  where	  the	  details	  about	  the	  
software	  are	  analysed	  further.	  Consent	  exists	  that	  the	  investigative	  software	  is	  similar	  
to	  existing	  malware,	  particularly	  Trojan	  horses	  and	  related	  software	  applications.	  As	  
illustrated	  in	  chapter	  3,	  the	  interviewed	  technical	  expert	  also	  confirmed	  this.212	  
Furthermore,	  these	  studies	  have	  succeeded	  in	  identifying	  the	  desirable	  abilities	  of	  the	  
software	  tool.	  
	  
For	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  legal	  challenges	  in	  the	  following	  chapters	  of	  this	  thesis,	  it	  is	  
essential	  to	  understand	  the	  technological	  details	  of	  the	  proposed	  tool.	  Only	  with	  a	  
detailed	  understanding	  of	  the	  technology	  is	  it	  possible	  to	  evaluate	  its	  current	  and	  
future	  abilities,	  and	  thus	  the	  impact	  on	  police	  investigations	  and	  the	  legal	  framework	  
regulating	  these	  activities.	  An	  analysis	  of	  the	  state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	  of	  relevant	  malware,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
210	  See	  also	  the	  interview	  results	  on	  this	  in	  chapter	  3	  at	  p.	  70.	  
211	  J	  Schmidt,	  “Bundestrojaner:	  Geht	  was	  –	  was	  geht.	  Technische	  Optionen	  für	  die	  Online-­‐
Durchsuchung”(2007)	  heise,	  available	  online	  at	  http://www.heise.de/security/Bundestrojaner-­‐
Geht-­‐was-­‐was-­‐geht-­‐-­‐/artikel/86415;	  Fox,	  note	  44;	  S	  Berlit,	  T	  Wegewitz,	  “Mythos	  
„Bundestrojaner“	  -­‐	  Auf	  dem	  Weg	  zur	  legalen	  Onlineüberwachung	  –	  “,	  (2008)	  1.	  Workshop	  IT-­
Sicherheitsmanagement,	  available	  online	  at	  http://wi.f4.htw-­‐
berlin.de/users/messer/LV/Globals/ISM-­‐Workshops/Workshop-­‐
WS07/Mythos%20Bundestrojaner%200.pdf.	  
212	  See	  p.	  71.	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specifically	  Trojan	  software	  is	  undertaken	  in	  the	  next	  section,	  to	  classify	  and	  define	  the	  
type	  of	  software	  and	  its	  current	  and	  future	  abilities	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  thesis.	  
4.2 Relevant Malware – A Classification  
Before	  determining	  the	  abilities	  of	  the	  software	  tool	  to	  be	  used	  to	  remotely	  search	  an	  
ICT	  device	  of	  a	  suspect,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  understand	  the	  underlying	  technology.	  What	  
precisely	  is	  a	  software	  Trojan	  horse	  and	  to	  which	  class	  of	  software	  does	  it	  belong?	  In	  
this	  section,	  the	  technology	  is	  introduced,	  its	  origins	  provided,	  and	  a	  classification	  into	  
an	  existing	  class	  of	  software	  is	  undertaken.	  This	  classification	  also	  enables	  the	  
application	  of	  existing	  research	  findings	  to	  this	  new	  software	  tool.	  
	  
As	  established	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  many	  authors	  who	  write	  about	  technology	  to	  be	  
used	  to	  search	  ICT	  devices	  online,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  technical	  expert	  interviewed,	  state	  that	  
such	  a	  tool	  shares	  crucial	  attributes	  with	  existing	  malware.213	  Thus	  in	  a	  first	  step,	  it	  
needs	  to	  be	  established	  what	  precisely	  malware	  is.	  
	  
Generally,	  the	  term	  malware	  stems	  from	  malicious	  software	  and	  describes	  intentionally	  
dysfunctional	  software.214	  It	  is	  also	  referred	  to	  as	  software	  with	  a	  malicious	  intent,215	  or	  
software	  that	  is	  developed	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  doing	  harm	  to	  computers	  or	  via	  
computers.216	  Furthermore,	  it	  is	  designed	  to	  circumvent	  security	  mechanisms	  in	  place	  
to	  prevent	  such	  harm	  doing,	  by	  coercing	  the	  user	  to	  circumvent	  it,	  or	  exploiting	  
vulnerabilities	  somewhere	  in	  the	  system	  to	  spread	  itself	  or	  act.217	  However,	  these	  are	  
very	  broad	  definitions	  from	  which	  no	  categorisation	  about	  the	  abilities	  of	  this	  type	  of	  
software	  can	  be	  drawn.	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  is	  that	  malware	  includes	  various	  types	  of	  
software,	  which	  although	  ultimately	  all	  having	  the	  same	  aim	  of	  unauthorised	  accessing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
213	  See	  e.g.	  G	  Hornung,	  C	  Schnabel,	  “Data	  protection	  in	  Germany	  II:	  Recent	  decisions	  on	  online-­‐
searching	  of	  computers,	  automatic	  number	  plate	  recognition	  and	  data	  retention“	  (2009)	  25:2	  
Computer	  Law	  &	  Security	  Review	  115-­‐122;	  Hornung/Bendrath/Pfitzman,	  note	  85.	  
214	  K	  Brunnstein,	  “From	  AntiVirus	  to	  AntiMalware	  Software	  and	  Beyond:	  Another	  Approach	  to	  
the	  Protection	  of	  Customers	  from	  Dysfunctional	  System	  Behaviour”	  in	  22nd	  National	  
Information	  Systems	  Security	  Conference	  (Virgina,USA,	  1999);	  M	  Swimmer,	  “Malicious	  Software	  
in	  Ubiquitous	  Computing”	  in	  M	  Petkovic,	  W	  Jonker	  (eds.)	  Security,	  Privacy,	  and	  Trust	  in	  Modern	  
Data	  Management	  (Berlin	  Heidelberg:	  Springer,	  2007)	  451-­‐466,	  452.	  
215	  H	  Chen	  et	  al.,	  “Back	  to	  the	  Future:	  A	  Framework	  for	  Automatic	  Malware	  Removal	  and	  System	  
Repair”,	  (2006)	  Proceedings	  22nd	  Computer	  Security	  Application	  Conference	  257-­‐268,	  257.	  
216	  The	  Linux	  Information	  Project,	  Definition	  of	  Malware,	  available	  online	  at	  
http://www.linfo.org/malware.html.	  
217	  Swimmer,	  note	  214,	  at	  451.	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computers	  with	  a	  malicious	  intent,	  can	  vary	  significantly	  in	  terms	  of	  abilities	  and	  
characteristics.	  These	  different	  types,	  the	  most	  commonly	  known	  being	  viruses,	  worms	  
and	  Trojans,	  were	  all	  designed	  with	  a	  different	  application	  in	  mind	  and	  have	  been	  
developed	  and	  further	  enhanced	  since	  the	  early	  1980s,	  when	  the	  first	  malicious	  piece	  
of	  software	  in	  form	  of	  a	  virus	  appeared.218	  However,	  as	  shown	  above,	  the	  online	  search	  
has	  very	  specific	  requirements	  for	  the	  investigative	  software	  to	  be	  successful.	  Hence	  
referring	  to	  the	  domain	  malware	  as	  a	  whole	  can	  be	  misleading,	  as	  not	  all	  of	  the	  
applications	  falling	  into	  this	  category	  fulfill	  all	  the	  necessary	  requirements.	  Computer	  
viruses,	  for	  example,	  are	  primarily	  self-­‐replicating	  programs	  that	  infect	  other	  programs	  
by	  modifying	  them	  to	  include	  a	  copy	  of	  themselves.219	  Thus,	  this	  type	  of	  malware	  does	  
not	  possess	  the	  abilities	  required	  for	  an	  online	  search	  of	  an	  ICT	  device,	  where	  the	  focus	  
is	  on	  the	  searching	  and	  copying	  of	  data	  stored	  on	  the	  target	  device	  and	  the	  monitoring	  
of	  communication.	  	  
	  
The	  class	  of	  malware	  designed	  to	  be	  surreptitiously	  installed	  on	  a	  user’s	  computer,	  and	  
to	  monitor	  the	  user’s	  behaviour	  and	  report	  this	  back	  to	  a	  third	  party	  is	  called	  
spyware.220	  	  However,	  when	  searching	  for	  a	  definition	  of	  this	  term,	  it	  becomes	  clear	  
that	  not	  one	  single	  widely	  accepted	  definition	  of	  spyware	  exists.	  Taking	  the	  term	  
literally,	  spyware	  is	  ware	  that	  spies	  on	  you.	  The	  US	  Federal	  Trade	  Commission	  has	  
defined	  spyware	  as	  “software	  that	  aids	  in	  gathering	  information	  about	  a	  person	  or	  
organisation	  without	  their	  knowledge,	  which	  may	  send	  such	  information	  to	  another	  
entity	  without	  the	  consumer’s	  consent,	  or	  asserts	  control	  over	  a	  computer	  without	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
218	  J	  Leyden,	  “Computer	  Virus	  turns	  25”,	  (2007)	  The	  Register,	  available	  online	  at	  
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/07/13/virus_silver_jubilee/,	  who	  explains	  that	  the	  first	  
malware	  ever	  released	  was	  a	  computer	  virus,	  which	  spread	  between	  Apple	  II	  computers	  via	  
infected	  floppy	  disks,	  called	  Elk	  Cloner	  in	  1982.	  
219	  M	  Karresand,	  “Seperating	  Trojan	  Horses,	  Viruses,	  and	  Worms	  –	  A	  Proposed	  Taxonomy	  of	  
Software	  Weapons”	  (2003)	  Proceedings	  of	  2003	  IEEE	  Workshop	  on	  Information	  Assurance,	  127-­‐
134,	  127;	  F	  Cohen,	  “Computer	  Viruses	  –	  Theory	  and	  Experiments”	  (1987)	  6:1	  Computer	  Security,	  
22-­‐35,	  23.	  
220	  J	  C	  Sipior,	  B	  T	  Ward,	  “Trust,	  privacy,	  and	  legal	  protection	  in	  the	  use	  of	  software	  with	  
surreptitiously	  installed	  operations:	  An	  empirical	  evaluation”	  (2008)	  10:3	  Information	  Systems	  
Frontiers,	  3-­‐18,	  3;	  E	  Doyle,“Not	  All	  Spyware	  is	  as	  Harmless	  as	  Cookies:	  Block	  it	  or	  Your	  Business	  
Could	  Pay	  Dearly”,	  (2003)	  Computer	  Weekly,	  	  available	  online	  at	  
http://www.computerweekly.com/Articles/2003/11/26/198884/not-­‐all-­‐spyware-­‐is-­‐as-­‐
harmless-­‐as-­‐cookies.htm;	  T	  F	  Stafford,	  A	  Urbaczewski,	  “Spyware:	  The	  Ghost	  in	  the	  Machine”	  
(2004)	  14	  Communications	  of	  the	  Association	  for	  the	  Information	  Systems,	  291-­‐306,	  291.	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consumer’s	  knowledge”.221	  Another	  definition	  is	  “any	  software	  that	  covertly	  gathers	  
user	  information	  through	  the	  user's	  Internet	  connection	  without	  his	  or	  her	  knowledge,	  
usually	  for	  advertising	  purposes.	  Spyware	  applications	  are	  typically	  bundled	  as	  a	  
hidden	  component	  of	  freeware	  or	  shareware	  programs	  that	  can	  be	  downloaded	  from	  
the	  Internet	  […].	  Once	  installed,	  the	  spyware	  monitors	  user	  activity	  on	  the	  Internet	  and	  
transmits	  that	  information	  in	  the	  background	  to	  someone	  else.	  Spyware	  can	  also	  gather	  
information	  about	  e-­‐mail	  addresses	  and	  even	  passwords	  and	  credit	  card	  numbers.”222	  
Furthermore,	  spyware	  is	  able	  to	  collect	  personal	  information	  stored	  or	  typed	  into	  a	  
computer	  and	  can	  also	  install	  other	  spyware	  programs.223	  It	  can	  capture	  user’s	  
keystrokes	  and	  mouse	  clicks	  during	  web	  navigation	  and	  local	  computer	  use,	  and	  scan	  
hard	  drives	  to	  obtain	  information	  from	  user’s	  files	  and	  application	  programs	  such	  as	  
email,	  word	  processors	  and	  games.224	  Spyware	  is	  essentially	  software	  that	  asserts	  
control	  over	  a	  user’s	  computer	  without	  the	  user’s	  consent	  and	  knowledge.225	  Spyware	  
usually	  arrives	  hidden	  in	  other	  software	  downloads	  without	  the	  knowledge	  of	  the	  
user.226	  	  
All	  these	  definitions	  have	  two	  general	  concepts	  in	  common:	  1)	  spyware	  is	  installed	  on	  a	  
user’s	  device	  without	  the	  user’s	  consent	  and	  2)	  spyware	  tracks	  the	  user	  behaviour	  
online	  and	  transmits	  that	  information	  to	  unknown	  parties.227	  	  
	  
These	  definitions	  and	  descriptions	  of	  the	  domain	  spyware	  show	  that	  its	  characteristics	  
are	  very	  similar	  to	  the	  specifications	  and	  requirements	  developed	  for	  the	  online	  search	  
software	  tool.	  Therefore,	  it	  can	  be	  concluded	  that	  this	  is	  the	  appropriate	  domain	  to	  
derive	  information	  about	  characteristics	  and	  abilities	  of	  this	  class	  of	  software	  and	  apply	  
these	  to	  the	  software	  underlying	  the	  online	  search.	  This,	  however,	  requires	  to	  further	  
specify	  the	  precise	  type	  of	  spyware	  relevant	  for	  this	  analysis.	  The	  general	  domain	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
221	  Federal	  Trade	  Commission,	  “Public	  workshop:	  monitoring	  software	  on	  your	  PC:	  spyware,	  
adware,	  and	  other	  software”	  2004,	  available	  online	  at:	  
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/spyware/extension.pdf	  .	  
222	  Webopedia,	  “Spyware”	  available	  online	  at	  
http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/s/spyware.html.	  
223	  Sipior/Ward,	  note	  220,	  at	  4.	  
224	  R	  R	  Urbach,	  G	  A	  Kibel,	  “Adware/Spyware:	  An	  Update	  Regarding	  Pending	  Litigation	  and	  
Legislation”,	  (2004)	  16:7	  Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Technology	  Law	  Journal,	  12-­‐16,	  12;	  
Sipior/Ward,	  note	  227,	  at	  3.	  
225	  Stafford/Urbaczewski,	  note	  220,	  at	  292.	  
226	  Sipior/Ward,	  note	  220,	  at	  4.	  
227	  K	  McDowell,	  “Now	  That	  We	  Are	  All	  So	  Well-­‐Educated	  about	  Spyware,	  Can	  We	  Put	  the	  Bad	  
Guys	  out	  of	  Business?”	  (2006)	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  34th	  annual	  ACM	  SIGUCCS	  conference	  on	  User	  
services,	  235	  –	  239,	  236.	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spyware	  includes	  the	  sub-­‐categories	  adware,228	  key	  loggers,229	  and	  Trojan	  horses.230	  
However,	  all	  these	  sub-­‐categories	  were	  developed	  for	  different	  applications	  and	  thus	  
feature	  different	  specific	  abilities.	  As	  already	  indicated	  by	  the	  literature	  review	  on	  the	  
technical	  details	  of	  the	  online	  search,231	  and	  by	  the	  technical	  expert	  interviewed	  for	  this	  
thesis,232	  Trojan	  horse	  software	  is	  a	  sub-­‐category	  featuring	  the	  most	  relevant	  
characteristics	  and	  abilities,	  and	  therefore	  a	  closer	  analysis	  of	  this	  class	  is	  performed	  in	  
the	  next	  section,	  to	  gain	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  its	  abilities	  and	  characteristics.	  	  
4.2.1 A Trojan Horse – A Conqueror of Troy? 
As	  with	  spyware,	  there	  is	  no	  one	  single	  widely	  accepted	  definition	  of	  a	  software	  Trojan	  
horse	  (Trojan).	  The	  term	  stems	  from	  the	  Trojan	  horse	  myth	  in	  Greek	  mythology.233	  
Software	  Trojans	  have	  been	  around	  since	  the	  late	  1980s.	  The	  first	  Trojan	  detected	  was	  
the	  PC-­Write	  Trojan	  in	  1986.234	  Another	  famous	  example	  of	  this	  early	  generation	  is	  the	  
Aids	  Information	  Disk	  Trojan,	  also	  referred	  to	  as	  AIDS	  Trojan.235	  These	  early	  Trojans	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
228	  Adware	  refers	  to	  software	  applications	  that	  reside	  on	  an	  individual’s	  computer	  and	  are	  not	  
related	  to,	  or	  authorized	  by,	  the	  underlying	  website	  that	  the	  user	  may	  be	  viewing	  at	  that	  time.	  
These	  advertisements	  can	  take	  the	  form	  of	  pop-­‐up	  or	  pop-­‐under	  ads,	  web	  banners,	  redirected	  
webpages,	  and	  spam	  email.	  Some	  adware	  may	  alter	  a	  homepage	  by	  hijacking	  a	  web	  browser,	  or	  
add	  URLs	  to	  bookmarks,	  to	  persistently	  present	  a	  competitor’s	  website	  or	  a	  look-­‐alike	  site,	  
disallowing	  the	  user	  web	  acces	  for	  his	  own	  purpose.	  Personal	  information	  such	  as	  financial	  data,	  
passwords,	  and	  identification-­‐tagged	  downloads	  can	  be	  transmitted,	  without	  the	  user’s	  
knowledge	  or	  consent	  to	  the	  adware	  author	  or	  a	  third	  party	  (Urbach/Kibel,	  note	  224,	  at	  12;	  
Sipior/Ward,	  note	  220,	  at	  4).	  
229	  Keyloggers	  are	  programs	  that	  run	  silently	  in	  the	  background	  and	  record	  keystrokes	  and	  
mouse	  clicks	  on	  a	  computer.	  The	  data	  can	  then	  be	  played	  back	  to	  reconstruct	  what	  a	  user	  did	  (T	  
S	  Chan,	  “Spyware”	  in	  H	  Bidgoli	  (ed.)	  Handbook	  of	  Information	  Security	  Volume	  1	  (Wiley:	  
Hoboken,	  New	  Jersey,	  2005)	  136).	  
230	  Stafford/Urbaczewski,	  note	  220,	  at	  292.	  
231	  See	  p.	  86.	  
232	  See	  p.	  66.	  
233	  According	  to	  Greek	  mythology,	  the	  Greeks	  built	  a	  huge,	  wooden	  figure	  of	  a	  horse	  in	  which	  a	  
select	  force	  of	  men	  hid.	  The	  Greeks	  pretended	  to	  sail	  away,	  and	  the	  Trojans	  pulled	  the	  Horse	  
into	  their	  city	  as	  a	  victory	  trophy.	  That	  night	  the	  Greek	  force	  crept	  out	  of	  the	  Horse	  and	  opened	  
the	  gates	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  Greek	  army,	  which	  had	  sailed	  back	  under	  cover	  of	  night.	  The	  Greek	  
army	  entered	  and	  destroyed	  the	  city,	  decisively	  ending	  the	  war	  (Wikipedia,	  “Trojan	  Horse”	  
available	  online	  at	  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trojan_Horse).	  	  	  
234	  The	  PC-­‐Write	  Trojan,	  appeared	  in	  1986,	  pretending	  to	  be	  version	  2.72	  of	  the	  shareware	  
word	  processor,	  PC-­‐Write.	  (Quicksoft,	  the	  company	  that	  made	  PC-­‐Write,	  did	  not	  release	  a	  
version	  2.72.)	  When	  a	  user	  launched	  what	  she	  believed	  to	  be	  PC-­‐Write	  2.72,	  she	  really	  started	  
the	  PC-­‐Write	  Trojan,	  which	  then	  performed	  two	  actions:	  one,	  it	  wiped	  out	  the	  FAT	  (file	  
allocation	  table;	  system	  a	  PC	  uses	  to	  organize	  contents	  on	  the	  hard	  drive);	  and	  two,	  it	  formatted	  
the	  hard	  drive,	  deleting	  all	  saved	  data	  (K	  Dickey,	  “Tales	  of	  Trojan	  Horses	  –	  Why	  You	  Should	  
Beware	  of	  Those	  Bearing	  Gifts”	  9:2	  Smart	  Computing	  12-­‐16,	  13).	  
235	  In	  late	  1989,	  20.000	  floppy	  disks	  containing	  this	  trojan	  were	  mailed	  to	  addresses	  stolen	  from	  
PC	  Business	  World	  and	  the	  World	  Health	  Organization,	  by	  a	  company	  called	  ‘PC	  Cyborg’.	  The	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had	  in	  common	  that	  they	  only	  possessed	  limited,	  pre-­‐determined	  abilities	  and	  were	  
distributed	  via	  traditional	  channels	  (such	  as	  posting	  the	  floppy	  disk	  containing	  the	  
AIDS	  Trojan	  to	  the	  victim).	  
	  
	  Initial	  definitions	  of	  Trojans	  were	  based	  on	  the	  state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	  of	  this	  generation.	  One	  
well-­‐known	  definition	  is	  included	  in	  the	  now	  obsolete	  first	  draft	  of	  the	  Site	  Security	  
Handbook	  RFC	  1244:	  
“A Trojan Horse program can be a program that does something useful, 
or merely something interesting. It always does something unexpected, 
like steal passwords or copy files without your knowledge.”236 
To	  the	  same	  generation	  of	  definitions	  also	  belongs	  the	  copybook	  definition	  given	  by	  
most	  anti-­‐virus	  vendors:	  	  
	  
“A Trojan is a non-replicating program that appears to be legitimate but 
is designed to carry out some harmful action on the victim computer”.237  
 
At	  this	  time,	  Trojans	  were	  relatively	  rare	  compared	  to	  viruses,	  because	  they	  could	  not	  
spread	  as	  easily	  due	  to	  their	  lack	  of	  self-­‐replicating	  abilities.	  As	  previously	  mentioned,	  
their	  abilities	  were	  also	  still	  relatively	  restricted	  and	  the	  execution	  of	  their	  tasks	  
dependent	  upon	  the	  behaviour	  of	  the	  user	  of	  the	  infected	  machine.	  For	  example	  in	  the	  
AIDS	  example,	  in	  which	  the	  PC	  had	  to	  be	  booted	  90	  times	  before	  the	  Trojan	  executed	  
the	  pre-­‐determined	  task.	  	  
While	  the	  above	  definitions	  reflect	  these	  limitations,	  they	  do	  provide	  a	  good	  basic	  
description	  of	  a	  software	  Trojan	  and	  some	  of	  the	  characteristics	  provided	  have	  
remained	  true	  until	  today,	  which	  will	  become	  clear	  in	  the	  definitions	  of	  the	  next	  
generation	  Trojans.	  
The	  emergence	  of	  the	  World	  Wide	  Web,	  making	  the	  spreading	  of	  Trojans	  considerably	  
easier,	  facilitated	  the	  development	  of	  a	  new	  generation	  of	  Trojans.	  Good	  examples	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
disks	  supposedly	  contained	  information	  about	  HIV.	  When	  the	  user	  ran	  the	  installation	  program,	  
the	  Trojan	  wrote	  itself	  to	  the	  hard	  disk,	  created	  its	  own	  hidden	  files	  and	  directories	  and	  
modified	  system	  files.	  After	  the	  PC	  had	  been	  booted	  90	  times,	  the	  trojan	  encrypted	  the	  contents	  
of	  the	  hard	  disk,	  making	  the	  data	  inaccessible.	  The	  only	  accessible	  file	  remaining	  on	  the	  disk	  was	  
a	  README	  file:	  this	  contained	  a	  bill	  and	  a	  PO	  Box	  address	  in	  Panama	  for	  payment	  (D	  Emm,	  
“Focus	  on	  Trojans	  –	  holding	  data	  to	  ransom”	  (2006)	  6	  Network	  Security,	  4-­‐7,	  4.).	  
236	  Site	  Security	  Policy	  Handbook	  Working	  Group,	  Site	  Security	  Policy	  Handbook	  RFC	  1244,	  
1991,	  50,	  available	  online	  at	  http://www.faqs.org/ftp/rfc/pdf/rfc1244.txt.pdf.	  
237	  Emm,	  note	  235,	  at	  4.	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this	  generation	  are	  the	  Polyglot	  Trojan238	  in	  1999	  and	  the	  Cytron	  Trojan239	  in	  2002.	  
This	  new	  generation	  was	  not	  only	  making	  use	  of	  new	  distribution	  channels	  (such	  as	  
emails)	  but	  was	  also	  more	  advanced	  in	  design.	  These	  Trojans	  did	  not	  rely	  any	  longer	  on	  
actions	  of	  the	  user	  of	  the	  infiltrated	  computer	  to	  trigger	  the	  execution	  of	  their	  tasks,	  
and	  were	  able	  to	  perform	  more	  complex	  tasks	  (such	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Polyglot	  the	  
scanning	  of	  specific	  data	  and	  the	  sending	  of	  this	  data	  to	  a	  designated	  email	  account)	  
autonomously.	  Furthermore,	  the	  focus	  of	  these	  Trojans	  was	  not	  any	  longer	  on	  generally	  
destroying	  or	  pampering	  with	  all	  data,	  but	  rather	  on	  the	  spying	  on	  selected	  data	  
(whereby	  this	  selection	  was	  undertaken	  by	  the	  software	  itself).	  
Hence	  new	  definitions	  were	  developed	  to	  honor	  these	  facts	  and	  move	  away	  from	  the	  
early	  concepts	  and	  attempts	  of	  classifying	  this	  technology.	  	  
Brunnstein	  defines	  this	  generation	  of	  Trojans	  as:	  
	  
 “A software or module that, in addition to its specified functions, has 
one or more additional hidden functions (called “Trojanic functions”) 
that are added to a given module in a contamination process 
(trojanization) usually unobservable for a user. These hidden functions 
may activate depending upon specific (trigger) conditions”.240 
 
Bontchev	  offer	  the	  following	  definition:	  
“A Trojan Horse is a program which performs (or claims to perform) 
something useful, while at the same time intentionally performs, 
unknowingly to the user, some kind of destructive function. This 
destructive function is usually called a	  payload.”241	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
238	  In	  1999,	  many	  users	  received	  an	  email	  message	  that	  included	  a	  Y2Kcount.exe	  attachment	  
and	  looked	  as	  if	  Microsoft	  sent	  it.	  Users	  believed	  double-­‐clicking	  the	  attachment	  would	  launch	  a	  
program	  that	  displayed	  a	  countdown	  to	  New	  Year's	  Day	  2000.	  Instead,	  opening	  the	  file	  
displayed	  an	  error	  message.	  Then,	  while	  users	  read	  the	  error	  message	  and	  tried	  to	  diagnose	  the	  
"problem,"	  a	  Trojan	  horse	  named	  Polyglot	  ran	  in	  the	  background,	  installing	  itself	  on	  the	  system	  
and	  editing	  configuration	  files	  to	  monitor	  user	  Internet	  activity.	  Whenever	  Polyglot	  noted	  data	  
transmission	  over	  the	  Internet,	  it	  would	  scan	  the	  data	  for	  passwords	  and	  other	  sensitive	  
information	  and	  log	  the	  information	  into	  a	  TMP	  (temporary)	  file.	  Periodically,	  the	  Trojan	  horse	  
sent	  this	  type	  of	  keystroke	  log	  to	  an	  email	  account,	  where	  a	  cracker	  could	  easily	  retrieve	  its	  
contents	  (Dickey,	  note	  233,	  at	  13).	  
239	  In	  September	  2002,	  antivirus	  software	  developers	  (and	  others)	  discovered	  the	  Cytron	  
Trojan	  horse.	  A	  user	  receives	  an	  email	  message	  that	  claims	  the	  user	  can	  pick	  up	  an	  ecard	  from	  a	  
friend	  by	  clicking	  a	  graphic	  of	  a	  hand	  holding	  an	  envelope.	  When	  the	  recipient	  clicks	  the	  graphic,	  
a	  designated	  Web	  site	  loads	  in	  the	  browser	  window.	  Then,	  if	  the	  user	  accepts	  the	  Digital	  
Certificate	  that	  appears	  on-­‐screen,	  Cytron	  begins	  sending	  full-­‐screen	  pop-­‐up	  ads	  for	  
pornographic	  Web	  sites	  to	  the	  user	  (Dickey,	  note	  233,	  at	  14).	  
240	  Brunnstein,	  note	  214.	  
241	  V	  V	  Bontchev,	  Methodology	  of	  Computer	  Anti-­Virus	  Research	  (University	  of	  Hamburg:	  
Doctoral	  Thesis,	  1998).	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What	  these	  definitions	  show	  is	  that	  there	  is	  a	  reason	  why	  not	  one	  widely	  accepted	  
definition	  of	  a	  Trojan	  but	  several	  exist.	  The	  new	  generations	  of	  Trojans,	  while	  sharing	  
some	  characteristics,	  such	  as	  the	  non-­‐replicative	  code	  and	  the	  masquerading	  as	  
something	  useful,	  are	  more	  advanced	  and	  therefore	  feature	  more	  specific	  abilities	  and	  
serve	  very	  specific	  purposes.	  These	  characteristics	  are	  difficult	  to	  generalise	  in	  one	  
definition.	  Therefore,	  the	  existing	  definitions	  of	  Trojans	  are	  weak,	  because	  they	  are	  not	  
specific	  enough	  to	  be	  applied	  to	  all	  types	  of	  Trojans	  and	  to	  enable	  the	  detection	  and	  
classification	  of	  all	  the	  different	  types	  of	  Trojans.	  Thus,	  no	  working	  definition	  of	  a	  
Trojan	  is	  developed	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  thesis,	  but	  rather	  existing	  Trojans	  are	  
classified	  according	  to	  their	  specific	  abilities.	  
Today’s	  Trojans	  have	  not	  significantly	  changed	  from	  the	  second	  generation	  of	  Trojans.	  
They	  have,	  however,	  become	  more	  sophisticated	  in	  their	  specific	  tasks,	  and	  infiltration	  
methods	  are	  now	  more	  reliable.	  
	  
As	  Emm	  points	  out:	  	  
“Things have moved on considerably since the days when most 
‘copybook’ Trojans were written. Far from appearing to be something 
benign, most Trojans don’t appear at all […]. They install silently and 
the victim has no idea the Trojan is there”.242  
 
The	  fact	  that	  Trojans	  have	  become	  invisible	  to	  the	  user	  of	  the	  targeted	  machine	  is	  
important	  for	  the	  use	  of	  this	  software	  by	  law	  enforcement	  agencies.	  The	  objective	  is	  
that	  the	  suspect	  should	  not	  under	  any	  circumstances	  detect	  the	  software	  used	  to	  
undertake	  an	  online	  search	  	  
Some	  of	  the	  general	  abilities	  of	  today’s	  Trojans	  are	  the	  starting	  and	  stopping	  of	  
computer	  processes,	  stealing	  of	  information	  (for	  example	  passwords),	  and	  the	  opening	  
of	  a	  backdoor	  that	  allows	  an	  outside	  attacker	  to	  control	  the	  compromised	  computer.243	  
However,	  Trojans	  can	  have	  many	  faces	  and	  each	  one	  is	  purpose-­‐built	  to	  carry	  out	  a	  
specific	  function	  on	  the	  victim	  machine.	  Hence	  different	  sub-­‐classes	  of	  Trojans	  have	  
evolved	  and	  those	  relevant	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  thesis	  are	  depicted	  below.244	  What	  is	  
relevant	  for	  this	  discussion	  is	  the	  awareness	  that	  all	  these	  sub-­‐categories	  feature	  the	  
above-­‐mentioned	  general	  abilities	  and	  characteristics	  of	  a	  Trojan.	  They	  possess	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
242	  Emm,	  note	  235,	  at	  5.	  
243	  L	  A	  Hughes,	  G	  J	  DeLone,	  “Viruses,	  Worms,	  and	  Trojan	  Horses:	  Serious	  Crimes,	  Nuisance,	  or	  
Both?”	  (2007)	  25	  Social	  Sciences	  Computer	  Review,	  78-­‐97,	  81.	  
244	  For	  a	  full	  list	  of	  all	  sub-­‐categories	  of	  Trojans	  see	  e.g.	  McDowell,	  note	  227;	  Anonymous,	  note	  
189,	  at	  360	  ff.	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additional	  specific	  features	  making	  them	  distinguishable	  from	  earlier	  generation	  
Trojans.	  
4.2.1.1 Backdoor Trojans 
Backdoor	  Trojans	  possess	  the	  additional	  feature	  of	  being	  able	  to	  also	  open	  a	  
backdoor245	  to	  the	  target	  system.	  They	  are	  sometimes	  referred	  to	  as	  Remote	  Access	  
Trojans	  (RAT).246	  This	  is	  the	  most	  widespread	  and	  also	  the	  most	  dangerous	  type	  of	  
Trojan.	  Backdoor	  Trojans	  are	  so	  particularly	  dangerous	  because	  they	  have	  the	  potential	  
to	  allow	  remote	  administration	  of	  the	  target	  system	  by	  the	  author	  or	  operator	  of	  the	  
Trojan.247	  This	  means	  that	  they	  allow	  the	  operator	  (i.e.	  a	  hacker	  in	  the	  case	  of	  malicious	  
Trojans,	  a	  police	  officer	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  government	  Trojan,	  like	  the	  software	  deployed	  
during	  an	  online	  search)	  to	  pretend	  that	  he	  was	  sitting	  at	  the	  keyboard	  of	  the	  target	  
machine.	  The	  capabilities	  of	  these	  Trojans	  can	  be	  extensive:	  
	  
• Use	  the	  target	  system	  and	  Internet	  connection	  to	  send	  spam;	  
• Steal	  online	  and	  offline	  passwords	  of	  the	  user,	  credit	  card	  numbers,	  address	  
details,	  phone	  numbers,	  and	  other	  information	  stored	  on	  the	  computer	  that	  
could	  be	  used	  for	  identity	  theft,	  or	  other	  financial	  fraud;	  
• Log	  user	  activity,	  read	  email,	  view	  and	  download	  contents	  of	  documents,	  
pictures,	  videos	  and	  other	  private	  data;	  
• Send,	  receive,	  execute	  and	  delete	  files;	  
• Use	  the	  computer	  and	  Internet	  connection,	  in	  conjunction	  with	  other	  
computers	  to	  launch	  Distributed	  Denial	  of	  Service	  (DDoS)	  attacks;	  
• Modify	  system	  files,	  disable	  antivirus,	  delete	  files,	  change	  system	  settings,	  to	  
cover	  tracks,	  or	  just	  to	  wreak	  havoc.248	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
245	  A	  backdoor	  in	  a	  computer	  system	  (or	  cryptosystem	  or	  algorithm)	  is	  a	  method	  of	  bypassing	  
normal	  authentication,	  securing	  remote	  access	  to	  a	  computer,	  obtaining	  access	  to	  plaintext,	  and	  
so	  on,	  while	  attempting	  to	  remain	  undetected.	  The	  backdoor	  may	  take	  the	  form	  of	  an	  installed	  
program	  (e.g.,	  Back	  Orifice),	  or	  could	  be	  a	  modification	  to	  an	  existing	  program	  or	  hardware	  
device	  (Wikipedia,	  “Backdoor	  (computing)”	  available	  online	  at	  
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backdoor_(computing)).	  
246	  These	  types	  of	  Trojans	  are	  sometimes	  classed	  into	  different	  sub-­‐categories.	  However,	  since	  
they	  are	  identical	  in	  their	  specific	  abilities	  it	  is	  not	  differentiate	  between	  them.	  	  
247	  Emm,	  note	  235,	  at	  6;	  M	  Sunner,	  “The	  Rise	  of	  the	  Targeted	  Trojans”	  (2007)	  12	  Network	  
Security	  4-­‐7,	  at	  6.	  
248	  Blair,	  “What	  is	  a	  Backdoor	  Trojan”	  (2007)	  Geeks	  to	  Go,	  available	  online	  at	  
http://www.geekstogo.com/2007/10/03/what-­‐is-­‐a-­‐backdoor-­‐trojan/.	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However,	  unlike	  legitimate	  remote	  administration	  utilities	  they	  install,	  launch	  and	  run	  
invisibly,	  without	  the	  consent	  or	  knowledge	  of	  the	  user.249	  	  
4.2.1.2 Data-Sending Trojans 
Data-­‐sending	  Trojans	  are	  used	  to	  send	  data	  back	  to	  the	  hacker	  with	  information	  such	  as	  
passwords,	  or	  confidential	  information	  such	  as	  credit	  card	  details,	  chat	  logs,	  address	  
lists,	  etc.250	  The	  Trojan	  could	  look	  for	  specific	  information	  in	  particular	  locations	  or	  it	  
could	  install	  a	  key-­‐logger	  and	  simply	  send	  all	  recorded	  keystrokes	  to	  the	  hacker	  (who	  
in	  turn	  can	  extract	  the	  passwords	  from	  that	  data).	  	  
Captured	  data	  can	  be	  sent	  back	  to	  the	  attacker’s	  email	  address,	  which	  in	  most	  cases	  is	  
located	  at	  some	  free	  web-­‐based	  email	  provider	  for	  anonymity.	  Alternatively,	  captured	  
data	  can	  be	  sent	  by	  connecting	  to	  a	  hacker’s	  website	  -­‐	  perhaps	  using	  a	  free	  web	  page	  
provider	  -­‐	  and	  submitting	  data	  via	  a	  web-­‐form.	  Both	  methods	  would	  go	  unnoticed	  and	  
can	  be	  done	  from	  any	  machine	  on	  any	  network	  with	  Internet	  and	  email	  access.	  Both	  
internal	  and	  external	  hackers	  can	  use	  data-­‐sending	  Trojans	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  
confidential	  information	  about	  a	  company.251	  	  
4.2.1.3 Trojan Spies 
Trojan	  spies	  are	  designed	  to	  track	  user	  activity	  and	  save	  the	  information	  to	  the	  user’s	  
hard	  disk	  and	  then	  forward	  it	  to	  the	  author	  or	  operator	  of	  the	  Trojan.	  The	  range	  of	  
information	  collected	  by	  these	  Trojans	  includes:	  
• Keystrokes;	  
• Screenshots;	  
• Logs	  of	  active	  applications;	  
• Other	  user	  actions.252	  
	  
 4.2.1.4 Targeted Trojans 
Targeted	  Trojans	  are	  a	  very	  recent	  development.253	  These	  Trojans	  aim	  at	  specific	  
targets	  instead	  of	  randomly	  targeting	  a	  large	  number	  of	  victims,	  and	  are	  therefore	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
249	  Emm,	  note	  235,	  at	  6.	  
250	  GFI,	  “The	  corporate	  threat	  posed	  by	  email	  trojans”	  Whitepaper,	  available	  online	  at	  
http://www.gfi.com/whitepapers/network-­‐protection-­‐against-­‐trojans.pdf.	  
251	  Ibid.	  
252	  Emm,	  note	  235,	  at	  6.	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harder	  to	  detect	  by	  antivirus	  protection	  measures.	  They	  are	  designed	  to	  collect	  
information	  about	  data	  stored	  on	  the	  hard	  drive	  of	  the	  computer	  and,	  in	  particular,	  
communication	  data,	  such	  as	  emails.	  
They	  are	  custom-­‐written	  and	  one-­‐offs,	  usually	  exploiting	  new	  or	  little-­‐known	  security	  
problems	  in	  popular	  applications,	  such	  as	  Microsoft	  Word,	  Excel	  or	  PowerPoint	  
applications,	  masquerading	  as	  business	  emails.	  These	  document	  types	  are	  more	  likely	  
not	  to	  be	  stripped	  out	  by	  a	  virus	  scanner	  and	  therefore	  reach	  the	  target	  more	  often.254	  
Furthermore,	  custom-­‐written,	  one-­‐off	  Trojans	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  circumvent	  traditional	  
anti-­‐virus	  programs.	  This	  is	  the	  case	  because	  traditional	  anti-­‐virus	  programs	  rely	  on	  
DNA-­‐like	  ‘signatures’ extracted	  from	  live	  viruses	  to	  prevent	  future	  attacks.	  In	  other	  
words,	  virus	  researchers	  wait	  for	  a	  widespread	  attack	  to	  happen	  before	  they	  can	  find	  
the	  antidote	  and	  distribute	  it.255	  Hence,	  as	  McDowell	  puts	  it,	  “the	  intent	  is	  to	  write	  
malware	  that	  bypasses	  basic	  defenses	  and	  appeals	  to	  the	  personal	  interests	  of	  users	  to	  
induce	  them	  to	  open	  documents	  or	  click	  on	  links	  that	  load	  malicious	  code”.256	  
On	  June	  26	  2007,	  MessageLabs257	  intercepted	  514	  targeted	  Trojan	  attacks	  using	  an	  
email	  with	  a	  Microsoft	  Word	  document	  attached,	  which	  contained	  embedded	  
executable	  code.258	  Among	  those	  (successfully)	  targeted	  by	  this	  type	  of	  Trojans	  were	  
leading	  companies	  in	  Israel.259	  The	  remarkable	  point	  of	  this	  case	  is	  that	  the	  attacks	  only	  
came	  to	  light	  when	  one	  of	  the	  targets	  found	  passages	  of	  a	  book	  he	  had	  written	  online,	  
despite	  the	  fact	  that	  these	  passages	  had	  only	  ever	  been	  stored	  on	  his	  PC.260	  This	  shows	  
how	  difficult	  it	  is	  for	  antivirus	  software	  to	  detect	  this	  type	  of	  Trojan	  and	  how	  
successfully	  these	  are	  being	  deployed.	  The	  514	  Trojans	  detected	  by	  MessageLabs	  were	  
thus	  only	  a	  small	  fraction	  of	  those	  actually	  in	  use.	  	  
The	  analysis	  of	  the	  different	  sub-­‐categories	  of	  Trojans	  has	  shown	  that	  this	  technology	  is	  
very	  advanced	  and	  technically	  robust.	  It	  features	  the	  abilities	  that	  are	  required	  for	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
253	  McDowell,	  note	  227,	  at	  237.	  
254	  Messagelabs,	  “Targeted	  Trojans:	  A	  New	  Online	  Threat	  to	  Businesses”,	  Whitepaper,	  available	  
online	  at	  http://whitepapers.theregister.co.uk/paper/view/330/eav-­‐whitepaper-­‐
targetedtrojans-­‐a4.pdf.	  
255	  Ibid;	  J	  Evers,	  “The	  future	  of	  malware:	  Trojan	  horses”	  (2006)	  CNETnews.com,	  available	  online	  
at	  http://www.zdnetasia.com/news/security/0,39044215,61960021,00.htm.	  
256	  McDowell,	  note	  227,	  at	  238.	  
257	  http://www.messagelabs.com/	  
258	  Sunner,	  note	  247,	  at	  5.	  
259	  J	  E	  Dunn,	  “Israeli	  Police	  Uncover	  Massive,	  Trojan	  Horse-­‐Based	  Industrial	  Spy	  Ring”,	  (2005)	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software	  deployed	  during	  online	  searches	  of	  ICT	  devices,	  and	  is	  therefore	  the	  most	  
likely	  source	  for	  information	  about	  the	  tool.	  More	  importantly,	  the	  above	  analysis	  has	  
shown	  that	  technology	  capable	  of	  the	  tasks	  required	  during	  an	  online	  search	  already	  
exists.	  Furthermore,	  this	  technology	  is	  already	  “successfully”	  used,	  which	  highlights	  
that	  the	  online	  search	  software,	  featuring	  similar	  characteristics,	  will	  be	  able	  to	  
perform	  the	  same	  tasks,	  such	  as	  infiltrating	  an	  ICT	  device	  of	  a	  suspect	  and	  search	  and	  
copy	  the	  data	  stored	  on	  it,	  and	  then	  send	  it	  back	  to	  the	  operator.	  	  
As	  presented	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  chapter	  3,261	  the	  interviewed	  technical	  expert	  confirmed	  
the	  above	  findings,	  stating	  that	  such	  software	  is	  able	  to	  do	  anything	  that	  other,	  already	  
existing	  software	  does.	  Furthermore,	  he	  confirmed	  that	  the	  software	  would	  be	  able	  to	  
circumvent	  installed	  protection	  measures,	  such	  as	  antivirus	  software	  and	  firewalls,	  
because	  already	  existing	  malware	  is	  able	  to	  do	  precisely	  this.262	  He	  also	  confirmed	  that	  
the	  online	  search	  software	  is	  able	  to	  conduct	  the	  search	  autonomously	  and	  without	  
direct	  intervention	  or	  supervision	  of	  the	  operator	  or	  designer.	  	  
	  
Hence,	  it	  can	  be	  concluded	  that	  the	  software	  required	  to	  undertake	  an	  online	  search	  
shares	  crucial	  attributes	  with	  existing	  spyware,	  and	  particularly	  backdoor,	  spy,	  and	  
targeted	  Trojans.	  	  
4.3 Trojans – A Program or a Warrior? 
The	  above	  analysis	  of	  spyware	  and	  particularly	  Trojans	  has	  shown	  that	  these	  software	  
tools	  are	  executing	  complex	  tasks	  without	  direct	  intervention	  or	  supervision	  by	  the	  
operator	  or	  designer.	  During	  an	  online	  search	  of	  an	  ICT	  device,	  this	  degree	  of	  autonomy	  
results	  in	  the	  software	  tool	  carrying	  out	  tasks	  that	  a	  human	  officer	  would	  do	  during	  a	  
normal	  search	  of	  a	  premise.	  For	  example,	  searching	  the	  data	  on	  the	  computer	  and	  
selecting	  the	  information	  relevant	  for	  the	  investigation,	  and	  monitoring	  communication	  
traffic	  for	  important	  information.	  This	  fact	  leads	  to	  the	  question	  whether	  a	  software	  
Trojan	  is	  comparable	  to	  any	  other	  program,	  such	  as	  Microsoft	  Word,	  and	  can	  thus	  be	  
classified	  as	  such,	  or	  whether	  it	  needs	  to	  be	  classified	  as	  a	  different	  entity.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
261	  See	  p.	  105.	  
262	  See	  Oxford	  Dictionaries,	  “Botnet”,	  http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/botnet.	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Generally,	  computer	  programs	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  sequences	  of	  instructions	  for	  the	  
computer.263	  Furthermore,	  every	  piece	  of	  software	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  mere	  process,	  
that	  is	  pieces	  of	  code	  with	  data	  and	  states.264	  
These	  definitions	  seem	  well	  suited	  for	  simple	  word	  processing	  programs,	  such	  as	  
Microsoft	  Word,	  which	  translate	  the	  keystrokes	  of	  users	  into	  machine-­‐readable	  code.	  
Here,	  the	  emphasis	  is	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  these	  types	  of	  software	  rely	  on	  input	  from	  a	  
human	  user	  (directly,	  for	  example,	  in	  case	  of	  a	  word	  processing	  program,	  indirectly	  in	  
case	  of	  the	  underlying	  operating	  system)	  and	  are	  depended	  on	  commands	  to	  function.	  
This	  understanding	  of	  software	  is	  predominant,	  and	  applies	  to	  most	  of	  the	  commercial	  
software	  products	  available.	  However,	  when	  examining	  the	  example	  of	  a	  word	  
processing	  program	  closer,	  it	  seems	  doubtful	  that	  all	  programs	  and	  their	  additional	  
functions	  can	  be	  subsumed	  under	  these	  definitions	  and	  notions.	  	  
A	  spell	  checker,	  for	  example,	  is	  an	  application	  that	  flags	  words,	  which	  have	  been	  
mistyped	  by	  the	  user	  and	  offers	  correctly	  spelled	  alternatives.265	  Hence,	  this	  program	  
fulfils	  a	  function	  without	  any	  direct	  input	  from	  the	  user.	  	  Such	  a	  program	  works	  by	  
comparing	  every	  written	  word	  against	  those	  found	  in	  an	  implemented	  dictionary.	  If	  it	  
cannot	  find	  a	  word,	  it	  will	  flag	  it	  and	  suggest	  similar	  alternatives.	  Here	  users	  provide	  
input,	  namely	  the	  misspelled	  word	  to	  trigger	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  application.	  
Furthermore,	  it	  is	  the	  user	  making	  the	  decision	  whether	  the	  word	  is	  indeed	  misspelled,	  
and	  if	  any	  of	  the	  suggestions	  the	  program	  provides	  are	  correct	  and	  fit	  the	  purpose.	  
Therefore,	  an	  application	  such	  as	  a	  spell	  checker	  still	  falls	  into	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  program,	  
as	  provided	  above.	  	  
	  
However,	  these	  definitions	  appear	  inadequate	  when	  thinking	  of	  a	  piece	  of	  software,	  
such	  as	  a	  Trojan.	  As	  described	  in	  the	  last	  paragraph,	  these	  applications	  can	  function	  
autonomously	  and	  execute	  highly	  complex	  tasks.	  While	  operating	  systems,	  for	  example,	  
also	  perform	  complex	  computing	  tasks,	  the	  difference	  is	  that	  a	  Trojan	  operates	  in	  an	  
unfamiliar	  environment	  and	  solves	  tasks	  and	  makes	  decisions	  beyond	  the	  control	  of	  the	  
designer	  and	  operator.	  This	  is	  of	  particular	  relevance	  if	  these	  software	  tools	  are	  used	  to	  
investigate	  crimes	  and	  collect	  evidence.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
263	  R	  M	  Stair,	  G	  W	  Reynolds,	  Principles	  of	  Information	  Systems	  (Course	  Technology	  Press:	  
Boston,	  2009),	  134.	  
264	  F	  Brazier	  et	  al.,	  “Are	  Law-­‐Abiding	  Agents	  Realistic?”	  (2002)	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  workshop	  on	  
the	  Law	  of	  Electronic	  Agents	  (LEA02),	  151-­‐155,	  152.	  
265	  Oxford	  Dictionaries,	  “Spell	  Checker”	  
http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/spellchecker?q=Spell+Checker.	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Hence	  the	  existing	  notion	  of	  a	  program	  seems	  to	  be	  less	  appropriate	  for	  this	  type	  of	  
application.	  However,	  if	  this	  is	  the	  case	  the	  questions	  arise	  how	  these	  applications	  can	  
be	  classified	  and	  what	  this	  means	  for	  their	  use	  by	  law	  enforcement	  agencies.	  	  
	  
The	  obvious	  question	  arising	  is	  whether	  the	  increase	  in	  autonomy	  and	  intelligence	  
transforms	  them	  into	  some	  type	  of	  “persona”.266	  	  
There	  have	  been	  debates	  on	  the	  legal	  status	  of	  software	  tools	  in	  the	  past;	  however,	  
these	  have	  mainly	  focused	  on	  the	  question	  whether	  software	  tools	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  
persons	  in	  the	  civil	  law	  sense,	  that	  is,	  whether	  a	  software	  tool	  is	  capable	  of	  entering	  
into	  legal	  transactions	  and	  is	  liable	  for	  its	  activities.267	  	  This	  debate	  arose	  due	  to	  the	  
frequent	  use	  of	  autonomous	  agent	  software	  for	  e-­‐commerce	  applications.	  268	  The	  
common	  concern	  was	  whether	  existing	  civil	  law	  concepts	  were	  adequate	  to	  deal	  with	  
this	  use.	  The	  main	  focus	  was	  on	  the	  question	  whether	  software	  tools	  can	  enter	  into	  
contractual	  negotiations,	  and	  if	  such	  contracts,	  solely	  concluded	  by	  software	  tools	  
without	  any	  human	  supervision	  are	  valid	  and	  binding.	  The	  problem	  debated	  here	  was	  
in	  particular	  the	  contractual	  requirement	  of	  a	  “meeting	  of	  the	  minds”	  and	  in	  how	  far	  
software	  tools	  can	  fulfil	  this.	  This	  debate	  has	  now	  reached	  a	  considerable	  maturity	  and	  
it	  has	  been	  shown	  that	  the	  above	  problems	  can	  all	  sufficiently	  be	  addressed	  by	  the	  
notion	  of	  agency	  and	  its	  associated	  liability	  regimes.269	  	  
	  
However,	  when	  such	  software	  tools	  are	  used	  by	  law	  enforcement	  agencies	  and	  are	  
replacing	  human	  officers	  for	  certain	  tasks,	  the	  question	  of	  legal	  status	  becomes	  an	  
important	  issue	  again.	  Contrary	  to	  contractual	  transactions,	  where	  the	  concept	  of	  
agenthood	  offered	  a	  suitable	  solution	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  legal	  status	  of	  intelligent	  
software	  tools,	  a	  police	  officer	  cannot	  defer	  his	  duties	  and	  rights	  to	  another	  person.270	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
266	  S	  Franklin,	  A	  Grasser,	  “Is	  it	  an	  agent,	  or	  just	  a	  program?	  A	  taxonomy	  for	  autonomous	  	  
agents”	  in	  J	  Miller,	  M	  Wooldridge,	  N	  Jennings	  (eds)	  Intelligent	  Agents	  III:	  Agent	  Theories,	  	  
Architectures,	  and	  Languages	  (Springer	  Verlag,	  Berlin:	  1997),	  21	  –	  35.	  
267	  See	  e.g.	  E	  Weitzenböck,	  “Electronic	  Agents	  and	  the	  Formation	  of	  Contracts”	  (2001)	  9:3	  
International	  Journal	  of	  Law	  and	  Information	  Technology,	  204-­‐234;	  E	  Weitzenböck,	  “Good	  faith	  
and	  fair	  dealing	  in	  contracts	  formed	  and	  performed	  by	  electronic	  agents”	  (2004)	  12:1-­‐2	  Artifical	  
Intelligence	  and	  Law,	  83-­‐110;	  S	  Wettig,	  E	  Zehedner,	  “The	  electronic	  agent:	  a	  legal	  personality	  
under	  German	  law?”	  in	  A	  Oskamp,	  E	  Weitzenbök	  The	  Law	  and	  Electronic	  Agents	  (LEA	  2003)	  
(Unipub,	  Oslo:	  2003)	  97-­‐113;	  J	  Bing,	  G	  Sartor	  (eds)	  The	  Law	  of	  Electronic	  Agents	  (Oslo:	  
Norwegian	  Research	  Center	  for	  Computers	  and	  Law,	  2003).	  	  
268	  See	  below	  section	  4.4,	  p.108	  for	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  this	  technology.	  
269	  C	  Sorge,	  “Conclusion	  of	  contracts	  by	  electronic	  agents”	  (2005)	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  10th	  
international	  conference	  on	  Artificial	  intelligence	  and	  law,	  210-­‐214,	  211.	  
270	  B	  Schafer,	  “The	  taming	  of	  the	  Sleuth—problems	  and	  potential	  of	  autonomous	  agents	  in	  crime	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Thus	  while	  the	  question	  of	  classification	  of	  intelligent	  software	  could	  be	  avoided	  for	  the	  
civil	  law	  setting,	  it	  remains	  an	  important	  issue	  for	  the	  use	  by	  law	  enforcement	  agencies.	  	  
	  
During	  investigations,	  law	  enforcement	  officers	  often	  have	  rights	  that	  are	  not	  available	  
to	  the	  normal	  citizen,	  such	  as	  the	  right	  to	  search	  the	  premises	  of	  a	  suspect.	  
Furthermore,	  they	  have	  duties,	  which	  do	  not	  apply	  to	  ordinary	  citizens,	  such	  as	  the	  
duty	  to	  investigate	  a	  crime.	  These	  rights	  and	  duties	  must	  be	  executed	  in	  accordance	  
with	  existing	  legislation,	  best	  practice	  guidelines	  and	  codes	  of	  practice.	  Furthermore,	  
some	  of	  these	  rights	  and	  duties	  may	  be	  formulated	  in	  an	  intentionalistic	  language,	  using	  
terms	  such	  as	  “reasonable	  suspicion”.	  These	  terms	  not	  only	  refer	  to	  a	  relevant	  state	  of	  
mind	  of	  the	  investigating	  officer,	  they	  also	  use	  vague	  concepts	  such	  as	  “reasonable”	  that	  
cannot	  be	  straightforwardly	  implemented	  in	  programming	  code.	  271	  	  However,	  these	  
concepts	  and	  regulations	  also	  apply	  to	  investigative	  acts	  undertaken	  by,	  or	  with	  the	  
help	  of	  the	  software	  tool	  and	  need	  to	  be	  obeyed.	  Otherwise,	  the	  privacy	  rights	  of	  
citizens	  could	  be	  at	  scrutiny	  or	  the	  evidence	  collected	  inadmissible	  in	  court.	  	  
	  
Thus	  from	  the	  above	  analysis	  it	  can	  be	  concluded	  that	  when	  and	  if	  a	  software	  tool	  
executes	  some	  of	  these	  rights	  and	  duties,	  its	  role	  goes	  beyond	  that	  of	  a	  computer	  
program,	  which	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  mere	  tool	  assisting	  an	  officer	  in	  his	  work,	  and	  
hence	  its	  status	  during	  investigations	  needs	  to	  be	  clarified.	  Therefore,	  the	  software	  tool	  
deployed	  during	  an	  online	  search	  is	  not	  a	  mere	  program,	  but	  rather	  an	  autonomous	  
“cyber-­‐cop”.	  This	  finding	  particularly	  affects	  the	  reasoning	  about	  the	  legal	  
consequences	  of	  this	  technology	  deployed	  during	  investigations.	  Chapters	  6	  and	  7	  
explore	  how	  this	  impacts	  investigations	  and	  the	  evidence	  collected	  by	  these	  tools.272	  	  
4.4 Software Agents 
As	  mentioned	  in	  the	  previous	  section	  (4.3),	  the	  discussion	  about	  the	  legal	  status	  of	  
intelligent	  software	  has	  predominantly	  focused	  on	  software	  agents,	  also	  referred	  to	  as	  
electronic	  or	  autonomous	  agents.	  This	  is	  equally	  a	  technology	  capable	  of	  acting	  
autonomously	  and	  without	  direct	  intervention	  by	  a	  human	  operator.	  Furthermore,	  law	  
enforcement	  and	  administrative	  authorities	  are	  already	  deploying	  this	  technology	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
investigation	  and	  prosecution”	  (2006)	  20:1	  International	  Review	  of	  Law,	  Computers	  &	  
Technology,	  63-­‐76,	  65.	  
271	  Ibid,	  at	  66.	  
272	  See	  also	  Schafer,	  note	  270,	  for	  a	  more	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  the	  question	  of	  classification.	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assist	  them	  with	  their	  duties	  and	  to	  perform	  previously	  impossible	  investigations.	  This	  
means	  that	  it	  is	  very	  likely	  that	  this	  technology	  significantly	  influences	  the	  development	  
of	  the	  investigative	  tool	  used	  for	  online	  searches,	  and	  generally	  the	  new	  class	  of	  
software-­‐based	  investigative	  tools.	  
For	  this	  reason,	  this	  technology	  is	  introduced	  in	  more	  depth	  in	  this	  section.	  
4.4.1 What Is A Software Agent? The Definition Disaster 
There	  does	  neither	  exist	  a	  single,	  widely	  accepted	  definition	  of	  what	  an	  autonomous	  
agent	  is,	  nor	  a	  set	  of	  attributes	  agreed	  upon	  for	  autonomous	  agents.273	  In	  fact,	  even	  
several	  terms	  referring	  to	  this	  technology	  now	  exist,	  ranging	  from	  the	  generic	  
autonomous	  agents,	  software	  agents,	  electronic	  agents	  and	  intelligent	  agents,	  to	  the	  
more	  specific	  interface	  agents.274	  	  
However,	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  universally	  accepted	  definition	  is	  now	  generally	  recognised,	  and	  
it	  is	  common	  practice	  for	  researchers	  in	  this	  area	  to	  develop	  their	  own	  definitions.	  Thus	  
in	  a	  first	  step,	  some	  of	  these	  definitions	  are	  examined	  here.	  This	  leads	  to	  a	  better	  
understanding	  of	  this	  technology	  and	  also	  explains	  why	  no	  universally	  accepted	  
definition	  of	  this	  technology	  exists.	  	  
An	  autonomous	  agent	  has	  been	  defined	  as	  a	  “persistent	  software	  entity	  dedicated	  to	  a	  
specific	  purpose”.275	  Persistent	  is	  used	  here	  to	  distinguish	  it	  from	  subroutines	  and	  
highlight	  that	  agents	  have	  their	  own	  ideas	  about	  how	  to	  accomplish	  tasks	  and	  their	  
own	  agendas.	  Special	  purpose	  differentiates	  it	  from	  entire	  multifunction	  applications,	  
highlighting	  that	  agents	  are	  typically	  much	  smaller.	  Another	  attempt	  at	  defining	  
autonomous	  agents	  is	  “computer	  programs	  that	  simulate	  a	  human	  relationship	  by	  
doing	  something	  that	  another	  person	  could	  do	  for	  you”.276	  This	  definition	  focuses	  on	  
the	  traditional	  notion	  of	  agency	  existing	  between	  biological	  agents.	  It	  is	  very	  broad	  and	  
seems	  to	  suggest	  that	  a	  software	  agent	  is	  capable	  of	  replacing	  humans	  and	  engaging	  in	  
a	  relationship	  with	  a	  human.	  The	  choice	  of	  the	  term	  relationship	  suggests	  that	  a	  
software	  agent	  possesses	  the	  relevant	  states	  of	  mind	  necessary	  for	  this.	  In	  biological	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agents,	  these	  states	  of	  mind	  are	  a	  result	  of	  needs,	  desires	  and	  urges	  that	  evolve	  over	  
generations;	  in	  artificial	  agents	  these	  drives	  have	  to	  be	  built	  in	  by	  its	  programmers.277	  
As	  opposed	  to	  this	  definition,	  Riecken	  defines	  an	  agent	  much	  more	  loosely	  as	  an	  
“integrated	  reasoning	  process”.278	  This	  definition	  is	  very	  general	  and	  does	  not	  focus	  on	  
the	  notion	  of	  agency	  at	  all.	  
Others	  take	  agents	  to	  be	  “anything	  that	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  perceiving	  its	  environment	  
through	  sensors	  and	  acting	  upon	  that	  environment	  through	  actuators”.279	  This	  
definition	  contributes	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  artificial	  agents	  require	  an	  environment	  to	  act	  
and	  need	  to	  be	  capable	  of	  understanding	  this	  environment	  and	  reacting	  to	  it	  
appropriately.	  However,	  this	  definition	  relies	  on	  the	  understanding	  of	  environment	  and	  
the	  definition	  of	  perceiving	  and	  acting.	  As	  it	  is,	  this	  definition	  is	  very	  broad	  and	  without	  
defining	  these	  terms	  in	  more	  detail,	  this	  definition	  could	  apply	  to	  almost	  every	  existing	  
program	  or	  application.	  	  Maes	  has	  attempted	  to	  provide	  more	  details	  about	  this	  by	  
defining	  agents	  as	  “computational	  systems	  that	  inhabit	  some	  complex,	  dynamic	  
environment,	  sense	  and	  act	  autonomously	  in	  this	  environment,	  and	  by	  doing	  so	  realize	  
a	  set	  of	  goals	  and	  tasks	  for	  which	  they	  are	  designed.”280	  This	  definition	  clarifies	  that	  
agents	  should	  be	  capable	  of	  acting	  autonomously.	  Furthermore,	  Maes	  restricts	  
environments	  to	  being	  complex	  and	  dynamic,	  thereby	  excluding	  simpler	  processes	  and	  
applications.	  	  
Franklin	  and	  Graesser	  take	  an	  agent	  as	  “a	  system	  situated	  within	  and	  a	  part	  of	  an	  
environment	  that	  senses	  that	  environment	  and	  acts	  on	  it,	  over	  time,	  in	  pursuit	  of	  its	  
agenda	  and	  so	  as	  to	  effect	  what	  it	  senses	  in	  the	  future”.281	  Here,	  the	  ability	  of	  foreseeing	  
the	  results	  of	  one’s	  actions	  is	  incorporated	  into	  the	  notion	  of	  artificial	  agency.	  	  
This	  richness	  in	  definitions	  and	  their	  divergence	  stems	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  is	  a	  
wide	  range	  of	  applications	  for	  which	  artificial	  agents	  are	  designed.	  These	  range	  from	  
operating	  systems	  interfaces,282	  electronic	  commerce,283	  air-­‐traffic	  control,284	  business	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  IEEE	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  (1998)	  13:2	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process	  management,285	  to	  engineering	  applications.286	  Thus,	  the	  focus	  of	  these	  
different	  streams	  of	  research	  varies	  significantly	  and	  hence	  the	  agent	  ability	  
requirements,	  and	  therefore	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  definitions	  differ	  as	  well.	  The	  lack	  of	  
consensus	  about	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  term	  autonomous	  agent	  is	  therefore	  not	  
surprising.287	  However,	  this	  leads	  to	  the	  problem	  that	  the	  term	  software	  agent	  becomes	  
almost	  meaningless,	  unless	  one	  refers	  to	  a	  particular	  concept	  of	  agent.	  	  
To	  solve	  this	  problem,	  several	  authors	  have	  undertaken	  a	  different	  approach	  at	  
specifying	  the	  term	  software	  agents.	  Instead	  of	  attempting	  to	  formulate	  a	  definition	  of	  
this	  technology,	  they	  focus	  on	  characterising	  agents	  along	  certain	  dimensions,	  and	  thus	  
determine	  what	  constitutes	  agency.	  	  
4.4.2 The Characteristics of a Software Agent 
The	  previous	  section	  has	  established,	  that	  the	  difficulty	  of	  agreeing	  on	  one	  definition	  of	  
the	  term	  software	  agent	  stems	  primarily	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  people	  tend	  to	  have	  a	  
different	  understanding	  of	  this	  technology,	  due	  to	  the	  variety	  of	  application	  areas	  and	  
their	  different	  backgrounds.	  Therefore,	  the	  term	  software	  agent	  can	  best	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  
umbrella	  term	  for	  programs	  that	  to	  some	  extent	  display	  attributes	  commonly	  
associated	  with	  agency.288	  In	  this	  section,	  it	  is	  analysed	  in	  more	  detail,	  which	  attributes	  
are	  associated	  with	  software	  agents	  and	  are	  essential	  to	  establish	  a	  basic	  type	  of	  
agency.	  The	  assumption	  is	  that	  this	  approach	  is	  more	  application	  neutral	  and	  therefore	  
applicable	  to	  the	  whole	  class	  of	  software	  agents	  instead	  of	  a	  specific	  sub-­‐class,	  only.	  
Furthermore,	  this	  will	  provide	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  this	  technology	  and	  establish	  
minimum	  abilities	  that	  constitute	  the	  notion	  of	  agency.	  	  
According	  to	  Gilbert,	  agency	  is	  the	  degree	  of	  autonomy	  and	  authority	  vested	  in	  a	  
software	  agent.289	  In	  others	  words,	  in	  order	  to	  meet	  their	  design	  objectives	  agents	  must	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be	  able	  to	  operate	  without	  the	  direct	  intervention	  of	  humans	  and	  should	  be	  in	  control	  
of	  their	  own	  actions	  and	  internal	  state.290	  
Although	  opinions	  differ	  as	  to	  what	  an	  accurate	  description	  of	  a	  software	  agent	  is,	  it	  is	  
possible	  to	  discern	  some	  common	  features	  from	  existing	  definitions	  that	  apply	  to	  all	  
types	  of	  software	  agents,	  and	  thus	  assist	  in	  determining	  what	  agency	  is.	  Classifying	  
these	  attributes	  as	  belonging	  to	  a	  weak	  and	  strong	  notion	  of	  agency	  is	  now	  a	  
universally	  accepted	  approach,	  which	  was	  first	  coined	  by	  Wooldridge	  and	  Jennings	  in	  
their	  now	  seminal	  survey	  of	  the	  agent	  field.291	  	  
According	  to	  these	  findings,	  a	  weak	  notion	  of	  agency	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  software	  
possessing	  the	  following	  attributes:292	  
• autonomy:	  agents	  operate	  	  without	  the	  direct	  intervention	  of	  humans	  or	  others,	  
and	  possesse	  some	  degree	  of	  control	  over	  their	  actions	  and	  internal	  states;	  
• social	  ability:	  agents	  interact	  with	  other	  agents	  and	  possibly	  humans	  via	  a	  
shared	  communication	  language;	  
• reactivity:	  allowing	  agents	  to	  perceive	  and	  respond	  to	  a	  changing	  environment;	  	  
• pro-­activity:	  allowing	  agents	  to	  demonstrate	  goal-­‐directed	  activity	  by	  taking	  the	  
initiative.	  
	  
These	  characteristics	  are	  to	  some	  extend	  broadly	  accepted	  by	  many	  as	  representative	  
of	  the	  key	  qualities	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  assess	  “agentness”.293	  
The	  stronger	  notion	  of	  agency	  incorporates	  all	  of	  the	  above-­‐introduced	  abilities	  but	  is	  
additionally	  associated	  with	  a	  higher	  level	  of	  intelligence.	  The	  stronger	  notion	  of	  
agency	  is	  represented	  in	  the	  ability	  to	  reason	  using	  mentalistic	  notions	  such	  as	  
knowledge,	  belief,	  desire,	  intention,	  and	  obligation.294	  The	  authors	  established	  in	  a	  later	  
paper	  that	  the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  weak	  notion	  establish	  the	  essence	  of	  agenthood,	  
hence	  are	  the	  minimum	  criteria	  an	  application	  must	  possess	  to	  be	  classified	  as	  an	  
agent.295	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Similarly,	  Etzioni	  and	  Weld	  define	  desirable	  agent	  characteristics	  as	  including	  
autonomy,	  which	  they	  further	  characterise	  as	  requiring	  that	  agents	  are	  goal-­oriented	  
and	  thus	  accept	  high-­‐level	  requests,	  collaborative	  in	  that	  they	  can	  modify	  these	  
requests	  and	  clarify	  them,	  flexible	  in	  not	  having	  scripted	  actions,	  and	  self-­starting	  in	  
that	  they	  can	  sense	  changes	  to	  their	  environment	  and	  decide	  when	  to	  take	  actions.	  
Furthermore,	  temporal	  continuity,	  by	  which	  an	  agent	  is	  not	  simply	  a	  “one-­‐shot”	  
computation,	  character	  in	  that	  an	  agent	  has	  a	  believable	  personality	  and	  emotional	  
state,	  communication	  ability	  with	  other	  agents	  or	  people,	  adaptability	  to	  user	  
preferences	  based	  on	  previous	  experiences,	  and	  mobility	  which	  allows	  an	  agent	  to	  be	  
transported	  across	  different	  machines	  and	  architectures.296	  	  
Franklin	  and	  Graesser	  have	  also	  determined	  a	  number	  of	  properties	  they	  regard	  as	  
essential	  to	  establish	  agenthood.	  These	  are	  reactivity,	  which	  means	  that	  the	  agent	  
responds	  in	  a	  timely	  fashion	  to	  changes	  in	  the	  environment,	  autonomy	  in	  that	  the	  agent	  
is	  able	  to	  exercise	  control	  over	  its	  own	  actions,	  goal-­orientation	  and	  thus	  the	  capability	  
of	  acting	  purposefully	  and	  not	  merely	  acting	  in	  response	  to	  the	  environment,	  and	  
temporal	  continuity,	  thus	  the	  agent	  is	  a	  continuously	  running	  process.297	  Furthermore,	  
they	  have	  defined	  a	  number	  of	  variable	  properties,	  which	  can	  complement	  the	  core	  
properties,	  thereby	  creating	  useful	  classes	  of	  agents,	  such	  as	  mobile,	  learning	  agents.	  
These	  properties	  are	  communicative,	  thus	  the	  ability	  to	  communicate	  with	  other	  agents	  
and	  people,	  learning	  in	  that	  an	  agent	  changes	  its	  behaviour	  based	  on	  its	  previous	  
experience,	  mobile	  and	  hence	  capable	  of	  moving	  between	  machines,	  flexible,	  which	  
means	  that	  the	  actions	  of	  an	  agent	  are	  not	  prescribed,	  and	  character,	  thus	  the	  
possession	  of	  a	  believable	  personality	  and	  emotional	  state.298	  	  
	  
From	  the	  analysis	  of	  these	  different	  attempts	  to	  determine	  the	  characteristics	  of	  
agency,	  it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  there	  is	  no	  central	  common	  denominator.	  Hence,	  the	  
problem	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  consensus	  established	  in	  section	  4.3.1	  about	  the	  terminology	  agent	  
and	  what	  establishes	  agency	  continues	  here.	  However,	  opposed	  to	  the	  problems	  with	  
defining	  the	  term	  agent,	  this	  approach	  has	  proven	  to	  be	  more	  successful	  in	  that	  it	  has	  
established	  that	  a	  certain	  degree	  of	  similarity	  exists	  between	  the	  different	  attempts	  to	  
determine	  the	  characteristics	  of	  agency.	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Autonomy,	  reactivity,	  the	  ability	  to	  communicate	  and	  goal-­orientation	  are	  common	  
denominators	  of	  the	  different	  approaches.	  Thus,	  while	  a	  universally	  accepted	  notion	  of	  
agency	  does	  not	  exist,	  these	  common	  denominators,	  along	  with	  the	  other	  
characteristics	  provided	  by	  the	  above-­‐illustrated	  approaches,	  provide	  a	  better	  
understanding	  of	  what	  a	  software	  agent	  is	  capable	  of.	  It	  becomes	  clear	  that	  this	  
technology	  is	  highly	  advanced	  and	  able	  to	  execute	  complex	  tasks	  without	  the	  
supervision	  of	  a	  human	  controller.	  Comparing	  this	  technology	  to	  Trojan	  software,	  it	  
becomes	  clear	  that	  these	  technologies	  share	  crucial	  attributes,	  namely	  the	  degree	  of	  
autonomy	  and	  intelligence	  in	  executing	  tasks,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  ability	  to	  move	  around	  
different	  platforms.	  
	  
To	  summarise,	  there	  is	  a	  distinct	  lack	  of	  precision	  and	  concensus	  about	  the	  notion	  of	  
agency.	  However,	  the	  above	  analysis	  of	  attempts	  to	  determine	  the	  essence	  of	  agency	  
has	  led	  to	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  technical	  specifics	  of	  software	  agents.	  	  
4.4.3 Multi-Agent Systems 
The	  previous	  sections	  of	  this	  chapter	  on	  Trojan	  software	  and	  software	  agents	  have	  
depicted	  the	  unique	  features	  of	  these	  technologies,	  and	  in	  particular	  the	  ability	  to	  act	  
autonomously	  without	  direct	  supervision	  of	  an	  (human)	  operator.	  	  
	  
However,	  the	  above	  discussion	  has	  thus	  far	  focused	  on	  the	  use	  of	  single	  entities	  of	  these	  
technologies.	  Hence,	  the	  results	  and	  consequences	  of	  the	  acts	  of	  these	  entities	  were	  
eventually	  analysed	  by	  human	  operators.	  	  
	  
However,	  the	  distinct	  abilities	  of	  software	  agents	  to	  act	  autonomously,	  react	  to	  a	  given	  
environment	  and	  communicate	  with	  other	  entities	  have	  prompted	  research	  into	  the	  
design	  of	  multi-­‐agent	  systems.	  Precisely	  because	  of	  these	  abilities,	  software	  agents	  in	  a	  
specific	  environment	  are	  affected	  by	  the	  acts	  of	  other	  agents	  (software	  or	  human)	  
working	  in	  the	  same	  environment.	  	  
	  
Due	  to	  these	  reasons	  a	  multi-­‐agent	  system	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  set	  of	  agents	  that	  
interact	  together	  to	  coordinate	  their	  behavior	  and	  often	  cooperate	  to	  achieve	  some	  
	   114	  
collective	  goal.299	  Typically,	  multi-­‐agent	  systems	  are	  distributed	  systems	  in	  which	  
several	  distinct	  components,	  each	  of	  which	  is	  an	  independent	  problem-­‐solving	  agent	  
come	  together	  to	  form	  some	  coherent	  whole.300	  Thus	  these	  agents	  are	  cooperating	  to	  
combine	  their	  efforts	  to	  accomplish	  as	  a	  group	  what	  the	  single	  entity	  cannot,	  or	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  competition	  several	  agents	  try	  to	  achieve	  what	  only	  some	  of	  them	  can.301	  
Importantly,	  there	  is	  not	  usually	  a	  pre-­‐established	  architecture	  or	  configuration	  
incorporating	  the	  agents,	  and	  the	  interactions	  between	  them	  are	  not	  pre-­‐defined,	  as	  is	  
usually	  the	  case	  with	  traditional	  processes	  in	  concurrent	  programs.	  More	  significantly,	  
there	  is	  no	  global	  system	  goal;	  the	  agents	  are	  heterogeneous	  with	  their	  own	  goals	  and	  
capabilities.302	  
	  
Thus	  multi-­‐agents	  systems	  provide	  several	  advantages	  over	  single-­‐entity	  systems.	  	  
They	  are	  more	  efficient	  because	  a	  system	  with	  multiple	  agents	  allows	  for	  parallel	  and	  
asynchronous	  computation.	  In	  a	  multi-­‐agent	  system,	  tasks	  can	  be	  broken	  down	  into	  
several	  independent	  tasks	  and	  computed	  simultaneously	  by	  different	  agents.303	  
Furthermore,	  these	  systems	  are	  more	  robust	  than	  single-­‐entity	  systems.	  Multi-­‐agent	  
systems	  can	  have	  built-­‐in	  redundancy.	  If	  the	  responsibility	  for	  certain	  tasks	  is	  shared	  
among	  different	  agents,	  the	  system	  can	  tolerate	  failures	  from	  individual	  agents.304	  On	  
the	  contrary,	  when	  a	  single-­‐entity	  system	  fails,	  the	  whole	  program	  or	  application	  fails.	  
Moreover,	  multi-­‐agent	  systems	  are	  more	  scalable	  and	  flexible	  than	  single-­‐entity	  
systems.	  They	  can	  operate	  effectively	  without	  any	  limits	  to	  their	  size,	  thus	  new	  agents	  
can	  be	  added	  or	  old	  one’s	  removed	  without	  affecting	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  system.305	  
Furthermore,	  they	  can	  cope	  with	  a	  growing	  application	  domain	  by	  increasing	  the	  
nubmer	  of	  agents,	  each	  agent’s	  capabilities,	  the	  computational	  resources	  available	  to	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each	  agent,	  or	  the	  infrastructure	  needed	  by	  the	  agents	  to	  make	  them	  more	  
productive.306	  Lastly,	  multi-­‐agent	  systems	  are	  capable	  of	  producing	  emergent	  
behaviour.	  By	  letting	  multiple	  (reactive)	  agents	  interact	  within	  an	  agent	  system,	  
“smartness”	  can	  arise	  out	  of	  the	  emergent	  behaviour	  of	  the	  interactions	  of	  the	  various	  
modules.307	  	  
	  
The	  above	  analysis	  of	  multi-­‐agent	  systems	  highlights	  that	  these	  systems	  posses	  unique	  
capabilities.	  These	  systems	  operate	  with	  a	  much	  higher	  degree	  of	  autonomy	  and	  the	  
actions	  of	  the	  whole	  system,	  or	  a	  single	  entity	  within	  such	  a	  system	  are	  even	  less	  
predictable	  than	  those	  of	  single-­‐entities,	  such	  as	  Trojan	  software	  or	  software	  agents.	  
Due	  to	  the	  advantages	  and	  capabilities	  depicted	  above,	  these	  systems	  are	  also	  
potentially	  capable	  of	  undertaking	  much	  more	  complex	  tasks	  than	  single-­‐entities.	  Just	  
in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  humans	  can	  often	  achieve	  better	  results	  when	  working	  in	  groups,	  as	  
opposed	  to	  working	  alone.	  
	  
However,	  the	  increase	  in	  autonomy	  and	  intelligence	  of	  multi-­‐agent	  systems	  gives	  rise	  
to	  conceptual	  and	  legal	  problems,	  particularly	  when	  used	  by	  law	  enforcement	  agencies	  
and	  secret	  services.	  The	  above	  discussion	  (section	  4.2)	  on	  the	  status	  and	  classification	  
of	  autonomously	  and	  intelligently	  operating	  software	  entities	  becomes	  even	  more	  
relevant	  for	  multi-­‐agent	  systems,	  where	  the	  human	  influence	  on	  the	  actions	  of	  these	  
entities	  is	  minimal.	  	  
	  
When	  analysing	  the	  software	  agent	  domain,	  the	  logical	  question	  arising	  is	  in	  how	  far	  
the	  above	  described	  abilities,	  both	  of	  single-­‐agent	  and	  multi-­‐agent	  systems	  have	  
already	  or	  will	  in	  the	  future	  be	  realistically	  implemented	  into	  systems.	  In	  any	  high-­‐
technology	  domain,	  the	  systems	  deployed	  in	  commercial	  and	  industrial	  settings	  often	  
tend	  to	  embody	  research	  findings	  somewhat	  behind	  the	  leading	  edge	  of	  academic	  
research.	  It	  is	  therefore	  important	  to	  gain	  a	  clear	  understanding	  of	  the	  current	  and	  
future	  state	  of	  the	  art	  of	  agent	  research	  when	  attempting	  to	  assess	  the	  impact	  of	  this	  
technology	  on	  law	  enforcement	  and	  police	  work.	  Luck	  et	  al.	  have	  created	  an	  Agent	  
Roadmap,	  which	  provides	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  current	  and	  future	  abilities	  of	  software	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
306	  M	  N	  Huhns,	  “Agent	  Societies:	  Magnitude	  and	  Duration”	  (2002)	  IEEE	  Internet	  Computing	  2-­‐4,	  
3.	  
307	  Nwana,	  note	  273,	  at	  27.	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agent	  systems.308	  The	  Agentlink	  Roadmap	  distinguishes	  four	  broad	  phases	  of	  current	  
and	  future	  development.	  These	  phases	  have	  been	  updated	  and	  adapted	  to	  the	  technical	  
progress	  by	  Schermer,	  and	  this	  updated	  and	  more	  relevant	  version	  is	  depicted	  here.309	  
	  
a. Phase I: Closed agent systems (2005-2008) 
 
The	  first	  phase	  of	  software	  agents	  and	  multi-­‐agent	  systems	  can	  best	  be	  characterised	  as	  
closed.	  This	  breed	  of	  agent	  systems	  is	  usually	  employed	  within	  a	  single	  (corporate)	  
environment	  with	  participating	  agents	  sharing	  common	  high-­‐level	  goals	  within	  this	  
domain.310	  Usually	  the	  software	  agents	  used	  in	  closed	  agent	  systems	  cannot	  be	  
considered	  intelligent.	  This	  is	  not	  only	  due	  to	  the	  limitations	  of	  agent	  technology	  during	  
this	  phase	  but	  was	  also	  an	  issue	  of	  trust:	  people	  did	  not	  feel	  comfortable	  with	  the	  idea	  
of	  intelligent,	  autonomous	  software	  applications.311	  
	  
b. Phase II: Cross-boundary systems (2008-2012) 
	  
In	  the	  second	  phase	  of	  the	  agent-­‐technology	  development,	  systems	  are	  increasingly	  
designed	  to	  operate	  on	  multi-­‐platforms	  (as	  opposed	  to	  the	  closed	  systems	  of	  the	  first	  
pahse),	  though	  typically	  it	  is	  still	  a	  single	  design	  team	  that	  develops	  an	  agent	  system.	  
While	  agents	  in	  this	  phase	  might	  have	  fewer	  goals	  in	  common	  they	  still	  operate	  within	  
a	  single	  domain	  and	  share	  common	  domain	  knowledge.312	  Standardisation	  of	  
communication	  and	  interaction	  protocols	  such	  as	  defined	  by	  the	  FIPA	  (Foundation	  for	  
Intelligent	  Physical	  Agents)	  is	  becoming	  evermore	  important.313	  
	  
c. Phase III: Open systems (2012-2015) 
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  M	  Luck,	  P	  McBurney,	  P	  Preist,	  “Agent	  Technology:	  Enabling	  Next	  Generation	  Computing.	  A	  
Roadmap	  for	  Agent-­‐Based	  Computing”	  (2003)	  AgentLink	  II,	  IST-­‐1999-­‐29003,	  available	  online	  at	  
http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/7309/.	  
309	  B	  W	  Schermer,	  Software	  agents,	  surveillance,	  and	  the	  right	  to	  privacy:	  a	  legislative	  framework	  
for	  agent-­enabled	  surveillance	  (Leiden	  University	  Press:	  Leiden,	  2007),	  30.	  
310	  Luck/McBurney/Preist,	  see	  note	  308,	  at	  34.	  
311	  B	  W	  Schermer,	  M	  Durinck,	  L	  Bijmans,	  Juridische	  Aspecten	  van	  Autonome	  Systemen	  
(Leidenschendam:	  ECP.NL,	  2005).	  
312	  Luck/McBurney/Preist,	  see	  note	  308,	  at	  34.	  
313	  Schermer,	  see	  note	  309,	  at	  31.	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In	  the	  third	  phase	  more	  multi-­‐platform	  systems	  will	  emerge.	  These	  systems	  will	  allow	  
multiple	  heterogeneous	  agents	  from	  different	  design	  teams	  to	  operate	  on	  the	  same	  
agent	  platform,	  provided	  the	  agents	  adhere	  to	  the	  publicly	  stated	  requirements	  and	  
standards	  of	  the	  agent	  platform.314	  	  
	  
d. Phase IV: Fully scalable systems (2015 and beyond) 
 
The	  final	  phase	  of	  software-­‐agent	  development	  will	  see	  fully	  scalable	  systems	  capable	  
of	  supporting	  almost	  limitless	  amounts	  of	  agents.	  It	  is	  likely	  that	  in	  this	  phase	  agents	  
will	  be	  highly	  mobile,	  pro-­‐active,	  and	  capable	  of	  learning	  new	  skills	  on	  the	  entry	  of	  a	  
system.	  The	  agents	  will	  thus	  be	  more	  intelligent	  and	  capable	  of	  performing	  more	  
difficult	  tasks.	  It	  is	  to	  be	  expected	  that	  over	  time	  people	  will	  have	  grown	  to	  be	  
accustomed	  to	  the	  use	  of	  intelligent,	  autonomous	  agents	  and	  will	  no	  longer	  have	  fears	  
when	  it	  comes	  to	  employing	  agent	  technology.315	  
This	  roadmap	  highlights	  that	  current	  deployment	  of	  software	  agents	  and	  multi-­‐agent	  
systems	  has	  already	  reached	  a	  considerable	  maturity.	  It	  depicts	  that	  current	  systems	  
are	  mostly	  closed,	  meaning	  that	  they	  are	  only	  applied	  in	  specific	  environments	  and	  do	  
not	  interact	  with	  other	  agent	  systems	  yet.	  However,	  reaching	  the	  next	  phases	  over	  the	  
coming	  years,	  the	  development	  will	  be	  away	  from	  these	  closed	  systems	  towards	  more	  
open	  and	  scalable	  multi-­‐agent	  systems	  that	  allow	  agents	  to	  travel	  from	  one	  agent	  
system	  to	  another	  and	  learn	  new	  skills	  on	  the	  way.	  	  
	  
Hence	  this	  roadmap	  shows	  that	  agent	  technology	  is	  already	  deployed	  in	  commercial	  
settings	  but	  is	  currently	  mainly	  limited	  to	  the	  use	  of	  single-­‐agents	  or	  multi-­‐agent	  
systems	  in	  specifically	  designed	  environments.	  However,	  it	  also	  highlights	  that	  
deployment	  of	  more	  advanced	  agent	  systems	  will	  happen	  in	  the	  foreseeable	  future.	  In	  
any	  case,	  the	  currently	  used	  single-­‐	  and	  multi-­‐agent	  systems	  should	  not	  be	  
underestimated.	  To	  show	  what	  current	  software	  agents	  are	  capable	  of	  and	  how	  these	  
are	  being	  used,	  one	  example	  of	  how	  law	  enforcement	  and	  administrative	  agencies	  are	  
deploying	  software	  agent	  technology	  is	  provided	  in	  the	  next	  section.	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  Luck/McBurney/Preist,	  see	  note	  308,	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  35.	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  Schermer,	  see	  note	  309,	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4.5 Current Use of Software Agents 
COPLINK316	  is	  a	  good	  example	  of	  how	  an	  agent-­‐enabled	  data-­‐mining	  application	  can	  
make	  law	  enforcement	  more	  efficient	  and	  effective.	  COPLINK	  is	  a	  system	  used	  by	  law	  
enforcement	  agencies	  in	  the	  United	  States	  to	  aid	  in	  criminal	  investigations.	  The	  
COPLINK	  system	  was	  developed	  to	  provide	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  integration	  in	  law	  
enforcement	  information	  systems.	  COPLINK	  software	  organises	  and	  analyses	  vast	  
quantities	  of	  structured	  and	  seemingly	  unrelated	  data,	  housed	  in	  various	  incompatible	  
databases	  and	  record	  management	  systems,	  over	  an	  intranet-­‐based	  platform.317	  
COPLINK	  integrates	  different	  data	  sources	  and	  facilitates	  subject-­‐based	  inquiries.	  	  
Apart	  from	  integrating	  disparate	  databases	  COPLINK	  uses	  a	  collaboration	  and	  
notification	  tool	  called	  ‘Active	  Agent’.	  This	  component	  of	  the	  COPLINK	  system	  is	  a	  tool	  
that	  can	  be	  set	  to	  watch	  for	  new	  data	  meeting	  user-­‐specified	  parameters	  and	  then	  
automatically	  notify	  the	  user(s)	  when	  such	  data	  is	  migrated	  into	  COPLINK.318	  The	  
COPLINK	  Active	  Agent	  thus	  automates	  the	  task	  of	  running	  repetitive	  or	  periodic	  
database	  queries.	  The	  Active	  Agent	  also	  allows	  an	  investigator	  to	  collaborate	  with	  
others	  who	  are	  conducting	  similar	  queries.	  If	  collaboration	  is	  set	  as	  active,	  the	  agent	  
notifies	  other	  investigators	  running	  similar	  queries.	  This	  can	  quickly	  bring	  together	  
incidents	  involving	  the	  same	  suspect	  or	  other	  database	  objects	  that	  are	  under	  
investigation	  by	  different	  investigators,	  or	  by	  different	  jurisdictions.	  
4.6 Conclusion 
This	  chapter	  has	  identified	  the	  technical	  foundations	  of	  the	  software-­‐based	  
investigative	  tools	  that	  are	  being	  developed	  for	  online	  searches	  of	  ICT	  devices.	  The	  
analysis	  has	  yielded	  that	  the	  technology	  is	  similar	  in	  nature	  to	  existing	  malware,	  and	  
more	  specifically	  Trojan	  software.	  The	  interview	  statements	  of	  the	  experts	  on	  the	  topic	  
were	  crucial	  factors	  for	  this	  analysis,	  given	  that	  governments	  and	  law	  enforcement	  
have	  released	  little	  information	  on	  the	  topic.	  This	  highlights	  again	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  
empirical	  research	  part	  for	  this	  work.	  	  
	  
However,	  these	  software-­‐based	  investigative	  tools,	  while	  featuring	  similarities,	  will	  not	  
be	  identical	  with	  existing	  malware	  products.	  Particularly,	  as	  the	  empirical	  research	  has	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  http://www.coplink.net	  .	  
317	  Knowledge	  Computing	  Corporation,	  (2004)	  The	  COPLINK	  Whitepaper,	  2004/3.	  
318	  Ibid.	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revealed,319	  there	  is	  a	  tendency	  towards	  in-­‐house	  designed	  investigative	  tools.	  The	  
above	  analysis	  has	  shown	  that	  these	  new	  investigative	  tools	  will	  likely	  be	  a	  
combination	  of	  several	  related	  technologies	  and	  in	  particular	  autonomous	  agent	  
software	  will	  also	  influence	  their	  design.	  	  
	  
The	  important	  result	  of	  the	  analysis	  is	  that	  existing	  software	  products	  can	  already	  
operate	  autonomously,	  without	  direct	  intervention	  by	  a	  human	  operator.	  Their	  actions	  
are	  goal-­‐oriented	  and	  they	  are	  capable	  of	  reacting	  to	  changing	  conditions.	  	  
	  
These	  software	  tools	  are	  therefore	  capable	  of	  executing	  the	  actions	  required	  for	  an	  
online	  search	  of	  ICT	  devices,	  and	  able	  to	  replace	  human	  officers	  for	  investigative	  tasks.	  	  
	  
Hence,	  these	  new	  investigative	  technologies	  cannot	  be	  classed	  as	  mere	  software	  tools	  
but	  rather	  are	  emerging	  as	  autonomously	  operating	  “cyber-­‐cops”	  for	  the	  new	  cyber-­‐
policing	  system.	  
	  
This	  illustrates	  why	  the	  existing	  legal	  framework	  is	  unable	  to	  cope	  with	  this	  new	  form	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  See	  p.	  69.	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5 MOBILE, INTELLIGENT AND AUTONOMOUS POLICING TOOLS 
	  
	  
The	  previous	  chapter	  (4)	  has	  focused	  on	  the	  case	  study	  and	  specified	  the	  precise	  type	  
of	  technology	  developed	  to	  undertake	  online	  searches	  of	  ICT	  devices.	  It	  has	  established	  
that	  software-­‐based	  investigative	  tools	  deployed	  for	  online	  searches	  share	  crucial	  
attributes	  with	  existing	  malware,	  and	  particularly	  with	  Trojans,	  and	  autonomous	  agent	  
software.	  The	  analysis	  of	  these	  technologies	  has	  revealed	  that	  these	  new	  investigative	  
tools	  are	  capable	  of	  operating	  autonomously	  during	  cyber-­‐investigations,	  and	  –	  
crucially	  -­‐	  the	  online	  search	  of	  ICT	  devices	  is	  technically	  feasible.	  
	  
Moving	  away	  from	  the	  current	  ex-­‐ante	  authorisation	  of	  new	  software-­‐based	  
investigative	  tools,	  however,	  requires	  a	  different	  approach.	  Instead	  of	  focusing	  on	  one	  
specific	  tool	  and	  developing	  one	  specific	  regulatory	  method	  for	  this,	  a	  broader	  and	  
therefore	  more	  future-­‐proof	  approach	  is	  needed.	  	  
	  
The	  purpose	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  identify	  a	  new	  wider	  class	  of	  software-­‐based	  
investigative	  tools	  –	  the	  new	  generation	  of	  cyber-­‐cops.	  Focusing	  on	  a	  whole	  class	  
instead	  of	  one	  specific	  technology	  means	  that	  deeper	  conceptual	  legal	  problems	  can	  be	  
identified	  and	  a	  future-­‐proof	  and	  technology-­‐neutral	  regulatory	  approach	  developed.	  
This	  is	  essential	  to	  establish	  legal	  certainty	  for	  both,	  the	  operators	  of	  these	  new	  tools	  
and	  those	  affected	  by	  the	  investigations.	  This	  also	  ensures	  that	  the	  findings	  of	  this	  
thesis	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  a	  whole	  class	  of	  new	  investigative	  tools,	  including	  future	  tools,	  
and	  are	  therefore	  of	  wider	  significance.	  
	  
In	  a	  first	  step,	  this	  chapter	  examines	  the	  general	  problems	  of	  technology	  regulation	  in	  
section	  5.1.	  Section	  5.2	  sets	  out	  the	  foundations	  for	  the	  new	  class	  of	  software-­‐based	  
investigative	  tools	  by	  identifying	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  relevant	  technologies	  and	  common	  
denominators.	  This	  is	  followed	  by	  a	  brief	  introduction	  to	  the	  source	  domain	  of	  the	  
relevant	  technologies	  in	  section	  5.3.	  Based	  on	  these	  findings,	  a	  new	  class	  of	  
investigative	  technologies	  is	  developed	  in	  section	  5.4.	  Section	  5.5	  concludes	  with	  a	  
summary	  of	  the	  main	  findings.	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5.1 Problems of Technology Regulation 
Most	  of	  the	  existing	  work	  on	  the	  use	  of	  autonomous	  agent	  software,	  Trojan	  software	  
and	  similar	  technologies	  has	  exclusively	  focused	  on	  one	  specific	  technology.320	  While	  
this	  provides	  the	  opportunity	  to	  discuss	  and	  analyse	  the	  legal	  and	  technical	  challenges	  
of	  one	  specific	  technology	  in	  detail,	  this	  approach	  is	  of	  limited	  use	  to	  policy	  makers	  and	  
legislators	  aiming	  to	  draft	  future-­‐proof	  legislation	  and	  develop	  sustainable	  regulatory	  
approaches	  for	  new	  investigative	  technologies.	  However,	  it	  mirrors	  the	  currently	  
predominant	  ex-­‐ante	  regulatory	  system	  of	  new	  technologies,	  which	  tends	  to	  focus	  on	  
either	  granting	  authority	  to	  use	  specific	  new	  tools,	  or	  preventing	  their	  use.	  Hence,	  what	  
is	  lacking	  is	  a	  more	  systematic	  analysis	  of	  related	  technologies	  to	  examine	  whether	  a	  
new	  class	  of	  investigative	  technologies	  can	  be	  identified.	  
	  
This	  is	  important,	  as	  Koops	  has	  pointed	  out,	  because	  technology-­‐specific	  regulation	  is	  
only	  acceptable	  if	  there	  is	  a	  significant	  difference	  between	  technologies.321	  Not	  only	  is	  
this	  a	  sensible	  approach	  to	  avoid	  discrimination,	  but	  also	  does	  it	  aid	  to	  guarantee	  the	  
sustainability	  of	  the	  law.	  A	  general	  principle	  of	  law	  making	  is	  that	  the	  law	  should	  be	  
sustainable.322	  While	  it	  has	  been	  pointed	  out	  by	  many	  authors,	  and	  is	  now	  a	  generally	  
accepted	  principle,	  that	  ICTs	  develop	  at	  a	  much	  faster	  rate	  than	  the	  law,323	  this	  process	  
should	  be	  countered	  by	  drafting	  laws	  as	  technology	  neutral	  as	  possible.	  If	  a	  law	  is	  too	  
technology-­‐specific,	  it	  is	  not	  likely	  to	  cover	  future	  technological	  developments,	  and	  it	  
will	  therefore	  have	  to	  be	  adapted	  sooner	  rather	  than	  later.324	  	  
	  
One	  prominent	  example	  of	  a	  law	  that	  was	  insufficient	  to	  deal	  with	  technological	  
changes	  and	  therefore	  had	  to	  be	  adapted	  soon	  after	  it	  had	  been	  enacted	  is	  the	  1998	  EC	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
320	  See	  e.g.	  Schermer,	  note	  309;	  M	  Bond,	  G	  Danezis,	  “A	  pact	  with	  the	  Devil”	  (2006)	  Technical	  
Report	  666,	  University	  of	  Cambridge,	  available	  online	  at	  
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/techreports/UCAM-­‐CL-­‐TR-­‐666.pdf;	  Weitzenböck,	  note	  267.	  
321	  B	  J	  Koops,	  “Should	  ICT	  Regulation	  Be	  Technology-­‐Neutral”	  in	  B	  J	  Koops,	  M	  Lips,	  C	  Priens,	  M	  
Schellekens	  (eds.)	  Starting	  Points	  for	  ICT	  Regulation.	  Deconstructing	  Prevalent	  Policy	  One-­Liners,	  
IT&Law	  Series	  Vol.	  9,	  (The	  Hague,	  T.C.M.	  Asser	  Press:	  2006),	  77-­‐108,	  84.	  
322	  Ibid,	  at	  86.	  
323	  See	  e.g.	  A	  H	  Easterbrook,	  “Cyberspace	  and	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  Horse”	  (1996)	  207	  University	  of	  
Chicago	  Legal	  Forum,	  209;	  T	  Dreier,	  “Law	  and	  Information	  Technology	  –	  An	  Uneasy	  Marriage,	  Or	  
Getting	  Along	  With	  Each	  Other?”	  (2005)	  14:3	  Information	  &	  Communications	  Technology	  Law,	  
207-­‐216;	  R	  v	  Fellows;	  R	  v	  Arnold	  [1997]	  1	  Cr	  App	  R	  244;	  [1997]	  2	  All	  E.R.	  548	  illustrates	  that	  
technology	  develops	  and	  progresses	  faster	  than	  the	  law	  can	  keep	  up	  with	  it.	  
324	  J	  L	  Koger,	  “You	  Sign,	  E-­‐SIGN,	  We	  All	  Fall	  Down:	  Why	  the	  United	  States	  Should	  Not	  Crown	  the	  
Marketplace	  As	  Primary	  Legislator	  Of	  Electronic	  Signatures”	  (2001)	  11	  Transnational	  Law	  and	  
Contemporary	  Problems,	  491-­‐516,	  507.	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Telecommunications	  Framework.325	  This	  law	  had	  been	  drafted	  largely	  with	  the	  
telephone	  in	  mind	  and	  covered	  the	  development	  of	  electronic	  communications	  
insufficiently,	  hence	  was	  updated	  by	  the	  new	  2003	  e-­Communications	  Framework.326	  	  
	  
The	  above	  arguments	  have	  been	  developed	  in	  the	  debate	  about	  technology-­‐neutrality	  
of	  legislation,	  which	  has	  continued	  to	  be	  a	  pervasive	  concept	  in	  the	  field	  of	  ICT	  
regulation	  influencing	  among	  others	  debates	  on	  convergence	  with	  broadcasting,	  voice	  
over	  IP,	  universal	  service,	  spectrum	  allocation	  and	  net	  neutrality.327	  The	  relevance	  and	  
effectiveness	  of	  this	  concept,	  however,	  has	  also	  been	  critically	  discussed.	  Reed	  points	  
out	  that	  one	  disadvantage	  of	  technology	  neutral	  legislation	  is	  that	  it	  cannot	  be	  very	  
specific	  about	  the	  subject	  matter	  that	  it	  regulates,	  which	  can	  produce	  the	  undesirable	  
consequence	  that	  the	  law,	  or	  its	  application	  in	  practice,	  is	  insufficiently	  clear.328	  An	  
example	  for	  this	  is	  the	  Regulation	  of	  the	  Interception	  of	  Traffic	  Data	  in	  the	  UK,329	  which	  
is	  an	  attempt	  of	  drafting	  technology	  neutral	  legislation	  that	  has	  resulted	  in	  regulation	  
whose	  meaning	  is	  so	  vague	  that	  its	  application	  to	  the	  technology	  is	  often	  a	  matter	  of	  
guesswork.330	  	  
	  
Thus	  the	  quintessence	  is	  that	  legislation	  regulating	  new	  technologies	  should	  be	  applied	  
to	  whole	  classes	  of	  related	  technologies,	  instead	  of	  one	  specific	  technology,	  only.	  This	  
should	  guarantee	  that	  the	  balancing	  act	  between	  creating	  legislation	  that	  is	  general	  
enough	  to	  be	  sustainable	  as	  well	  as	  future	  proof,	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  specific	  enough	  
to	  provide	  sufficient	  legal	  certainty,	  which	  is	  one	  primary	  requirement	  of	  regulation	  in	  
general,331	  is	  achieved.	  	  
	  





327	  Reed,	  note	  91,	  at	  264.	  
328	  Ibid,	  280.	  
329	  A	  Escudero-­‐Pascual,	  I	  Hosein,	  “The	  Hazards	  of	  Technology-­‐Neutral	  Policy:	  Questioning	  
Lawful	  Access	  to	  Traffic	  Data”	  (2004)	  47	  Communications	  of	  the	  ACM	  77-­‐82.	  
330	  In	  the	  House	  of	  Lords	  debate	  on	  the	  UK	  Regulation	  of	  Investigatory	  Powers	  Bill	  2000,	  the	  Earl	  
of	  Northesk	  was	  provoked	  to	  remark:	  “One	  of	  the	  many	  difficulties	  I	  have	  with	  the	  Bill	  is	  that,	  in	  
its	  strident	  efforts	  to	  be	  technology	  neutral,	  it	  often	  conveys	  the	  impression	  that	  either	  it	  is	  
ignorant	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which	  current	  technology	  operates,	  or	  pretends	  that	  there	  is	  no	  
technology	  at	  all.”	  Hansard,	  House	  of	  Lords	  28th	  June,	  2000	  (Committee	  Stage),	  Column	  1012.	  
331	  Koops,	  note	  321,	  at	  96.	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This	  means	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  work	  that	  it	  needs	  to	  be	  determined	  in	  how	  far	  the	  
technologies	  introduced	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  can	  be	  grouped	  into	  one,	  more	  general	  
class.	  This	  will	  not	  only	  make	  this	  work	  more	  relevant	  for	  future	  regulatory	  matters,	  
but	  the	  results	  can	  also	  be	  applied	  to	  a	  wider	  array	  of	  current	  and	  future	  technologies.	  
Moreover,	  it	  will	  be	  easier	  to	  answer	  the	  research	  questions	  developed	  in	  chapter	  1.2	  
for	  a	  group	  of	  technologies	  instead	  of	  developing	  answers	  for	  specific	  technologies,	  
which	  might	  be	  enhanced	  and	  developed	  further	  soon	  after	  this	  work	  has	  been	  finished.	  
5.2 The Common Denominators 
As	  mentioned	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  chapter,	  work	  on	  autonomous	  agent	  technology	  
and	  software	  Trojans	  has	  to	  date,	  to	  the	  best	  knowledge	  of	  the	  author,	  exclusively	  
focused	  on	  problems	  relating	  to	  one	  of	  these	  technologies.	  Thus	  no	  attempt	  has	  been	  
made	  to	  investigate	  whether	  these	  (and	  other	  current	  or	  future)	  technologies	  can	  be	  
grouped	  into	  one	  more	  general	  class.	  	  
	  
This	  thesis	  attempts	  to	  develop	  such	  a	  group	  of	  related	  technologies	  in	  the	  remainder	  
of	  this	  chapter.	  The	  methodology	  for	  doing	  so	  is	  to	  determine	  whether	  these	  
technologies	  have	  common	  denominators,	  which	  allow	  them	  to	  be	  classed	  together	  into	  
one	  group.	  This	  approach	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  successful	  and	  established	  approach	  of	  
defining	  these	  technologies	  (in	  their	  singularity)	  illustrated	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter.332	  
The	  focus	  for	  determining	  these	  common	  denominators	  is	  on	  characteristics	  that	  
constitute	  the	  core	  of	  these	  technologies	  and,	  in	  addition,	  are	  crucial	  for	  their	  tasks	  as	  
cyber-­‐cops,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  pose	  significant	  challenges	  and	  problems	  for	  the	  
law,	  and	  in	  particular	  the	  legal	  framework	  regulating	  police	  investigations.	  	  
	  
The	  previous	  chapter	  has	  already	  depicted	  that	  Trojan	  software	  and	  autonomous	  agent	  
software	  are	  similar	  in	  design.	  However,	  it	  has	  focused	  on	  the	  analysis	  of	  their	  
respective	  capabilities	  and	  characteristics.	  This	  analysis	  has	  shown	  that	  both	  
technologies	  are	  used	  for	  data	  collection	  and	  monitoring	  purposes	  by	  law	  enforcement	  
agencies	  and	  other	  governmental	  authorities.	  While	  this	  alone	  does	  not	  necessarily	  
suggest	  that	  these	  technologies	  are	  related,	  it	  is	  evidence	  that	  this	  is	  the	  case.	  Thus	  the	  
question	  is	  whether	  these	  technologies	  feature	  shared	  characteristics	  and	  capabilities,	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which	  can	  define	  them	  in	  their	  singularity,	  as	  well	  as	  serving	  as	  key	  criteria	  of	  a	  whole	  
class	  of	  technologies.	  	  
	  
	  One	  of	  the	  key	  findings	  of	  the	  last	  chapter	  was	  that	  for	  neither	  of	  the	  technologies	  a	  
universally	  agreed	  upon	  definition	  exists.333	  The	  generally	  accepted	  approach	  is	  to	  
characterise	  these	  technologies	  along	  certain	  dimensions.	  The	  last	  chapter	  has	  
discussed	  and	  analysed	  these	  dimensions	  in	  great	  detail	  and	  therefore	  serves	  as	  a	  base	  
for	  this	  chapter.	  	  
	  
The	  key	  attributes	  of	  Trojan	  software	  identified	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  were	  the	  ability	  
to	  sense	  the	  environment	  and	  react	  to	  this	  when	  selecting	  a	  target	  computer	  and	  
searching	  the	  data	  on	  this	  machine,	  autonomously	  make	  decisions	  concerning	  the	  
selection	  of	  relevant	  data,	  and	  travel	  between	  platforms	  when	  targeting	  a	  computer	  to	  
install	  itself	  on	  this	  machine.	  The	  key	  attributes	  of	  autonomous	  agent	  software	  
identified	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  are	  autonomy,	  reactivity,	  the	  ability	  to	  communicate	  
and	  goal-­orientation.334	  
These	  key	  attributes	  indicate	  a	  similarity	  between	  these	  technologies.	  They	  refer	  to	  
similar,	  if	  not	  identical	  abilities	  –	  such	  as	  the	  shared	  ability	  to	  communicate	  with	  their	  
environment	  and	  reacting	  to	  this,	  including	  to	  changes	  thereof.	  In	  addition,	  the	  key	  
abilities	  enable	  these	  technologies	  to	  execute	  similar	  actions.	  
Therefore,	  these	  technologies	  share	  crucial	  features,	  and	  thus	  appear	  to	  be	  related.	  
However,	  the	  above-­‐depicted	  attributes	  are	  too	  specific	  to	  be	  used	  as	  key	  criteria	  for	  a	  
whole	  class	  of	  technologies.	  It	  is	  thus	  necessary	  to	  define	  more	  general	  concepts,	  under	  
which	  these	  attributes	  can	  be	  subsumed.	  	  
	  
When	  defining	  such	  concepts	  it	  is	  not	  only	  necessary	  to	  look	  at	  the	  specifics	  of	  each	  
technology,	  but	  also	  to	  take	  into	  account	  their	  specific	  usage.	  Chapter	  2	  introduced	  the	  
main	  case	  study	  of	  this	  thesis,	  where	  the	  specific	  use	  of	  the	  Trojan-­‐like	  software	  tool	  is	  
explained.	  Additionally,	  chapter	  4	  discussed	  a	  short	  example	  of	  the	  use	  of	  autonomous	  
agent	  software	  by	  authorities.	  These	  examples	  have	  highlighted	  that	  the	  current	  and	  
future	  use	  of	  these	  software	  tools	  differs	  from	  the	  traditional	  use	  of	  software.	  As	  
Wooldridge	  explains	  it	  “traditionally,	  every	  action	  a	  piece	  of	  software	  does	  must	  be	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  See	  chapter	  3	  sections	  4.2.1	  and	  4.4.1.	  
334	  See	  chapter	  4	  sections	  4.2.1	  and	  4.4	  respectively	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explicitly	  anticipated,	  planned	  for,	  and	  coded	  by	  a	  programmer.	  If	  a	  piece	  of	  software	  
ever	  encounters	  a	  situation	  that	  its	  designer	  did	  not	  anticipate,	  then	  the	  result	  is	  not	  
usually	  pretty,	  a	  system	  crash	  at	  best,	  multiple	  loss	  of	  life	  at	  worst.”335	  This	  is	  the	  case	  
because	  traditionally	  software	  has	  not	  been	  very	  good	  at	  knowing	  what	  to	  do.	  The	  
underlying	  concept	  of	  software	  is	  to	  create	  obedient	  and	  unimaginative	  slaves,	  who	  
solely	  act	  on	  commands	  of	  the	  user.	  Section	  4.3	  has	  already	  elaborated	  how	  this	  
traditional	  concept	  clashes	  with	  current	  technological	  progress.	  The	  main	  case	  study,	  
as	  well	  as	  the	  example	  provided	  in	  chapter	  4,	  have	  highlighted	  that	  the	  capabilities	  of	  
Trojan	  software	  and	  autonomous	  agent	  software	  go	  beyond	  what	  has	  traditionally	  
been	  associated	  with	  software.	  These	  tools	  are	  designed	  to	  make	  decisions	  for	  
themselves.	  Their	  specific	  use	  during	  investigations	  requires	  these	  technologies	  to	  act	  
without	  direct	  intervention	  of	  an	  operator	  and	  communicate	  with	  other	  software	  
entities	  and	  humans.	  Thus	  these	  tools	  need	  to	  be	  able	  to	  act	  autonomously,	  hence	  
possess	  a	  certain	  degree	  of	  intelligence,	  and	  move	  between	  platforms.	  	  
	  
Therefore,	  the	  relevant	  key	  concepts	  defining	  these	  technologies	  could	  be	  mobility,	  
intelligence	  and	  autonomy.	  This	  would	  be	  the	  case	  if	  -­‐	  at	  least	  -­‐	  all	  the	  above-­‐mentioned	  
key	  abilities	  of	  these	  technologies	  and	  the	  demands	  of	  the	  application	  domain	  can	  be	  
subsumed	  under	  these	  concepts.	  Whether	  this	  is	  the	  case	  is	  determined	  by	  analysing	  
the	  meaning	  of	  these	  concepts	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  the	  following	  sections.	  	  
	  
When	  analysing	  these	  key	  concepts	  it	  is	  important	  to	  bear	  in	  mind	  that	  these	  concepts	  
are	  used	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  disciplines.	  For	  example,	  human	  police	  officers	  are	  also	  mobile	  
(e.g.	  are	  required	  to	  move	  within	  the	  boundaries	  of	  their	  designated	  operational	  area),	  
act	  autonomously	  (e.g.	  need	  to	  make	  decisions	  independently)	  and	  show	  intelligence	  
(e.g.	  need	  to	  apply	  legal	  concepts	  to	  new	  situations)	  as	  key	  characteristics	  of	  their	  
profession.	  At	  first	  glance,	  this	  presumed	  similarity	  appears	  to	  indicate	  a	  resemblance	  
between	  human	  officers	  investigating	  the	  offline	  world,	  and	  cyber-­‐cops	  investigating	  
the	  virtual	  living	  space.	  However,	  even	  if	  both	  human	  and	  artificial	  officers	  have	  the	  
same	  defining	  characteristics	  in	  common,	  these	  do	  not	  necessarily	  refer	  to	  identical	  
meanings	  and	  definitions	  of	  the	  terms	  (which	  in	  turn	  could	  pose	  a	  problem	  for	  the	  law).	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Depending	  on	  the	  source	  discipline,	  their	  meaning	  can	  therefore	  differ	  significantly,	  
thus	  it	  is	  important	  to	  determine	  the	  relevant	  common	  discipline	  before	  defining	  these	  
concepts	  further.	  	  
	  
Traditionally,	  both,	  software	  agents	  and	  Trojan	  software	  have	  their	  roots	  in	  the	  field	  of	  
artificial	  intelligence	  (AI).	  Hence,	  AI	  is	  the	  applicable	  discipline	  for	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  
terms.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  understand	  the	  basic	  ideas	  and	  concepts	  of	  this	  field	  of	  
research	  before	  further	  defining	  the	  key	  concepts. 
5.3 Artificial Intelligence 
AI	  is	  a	  relatively	  recently	  emerged	  field	  of	  research,	  which	  has	  been	  influenced	  by	  a	  
variety	  of	  disciplines,	  for	  example	  computer	  sciences,	  philosophy	  and	  psychology.	  The	  
arrival	  of	  modern	  computer	  technology	  prompted	  organised	  research	  in	  this	  area.	  	  
	  
Kurzweil	  has	  defined	  AI	  as	  
	  “The	   art	   of	   creating	   machines	   that	   perform	   functions	   that	   require	  
intelligence	  when	  performed	  by	  people.”336	  
	  
Thus,	  AI	  research	  often	  aims	  at	  recreating	  mental	  capabilities	  of	  humans	  in	  machines.	  
The	  Turing	  Test	  by	  Alan	  Turing	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  the	  first	  approach	  to	  measure	  
intelligence	  in	  machines.337	  Turing	  was	  the	  first	  researcher	  to	  pose	  the	  question	  
whether	  machines	  (i.e.,	  computers)	  can	  think.338	  However,	  he	  felt	  that	  to	  be	  able	  to	  
actually	  answer	  this	  question	  would	  be	  too	  difficult	  due	  to	  problems	  with	  defining	  the	  
term	  thinking.	  Turing	  avoided	  the	  philosophical	  debate	  on	  how	  to	  define	  thinking	  by	  
substituting	  the	  original	  question	  with	  a	  test	  (an	  imitation	  game)	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  
determine	  subjectively	  whether	  a	  machine	  is	  intelligent.339	  In	  the	  imitation	  game	  (now	  
known	  as	  the	  Turing	  test),	  an	  interrogator	  has	  typewritten	  conversations	  with	  two	  
actors	  he	  cannot	  see,	  one	  human,	  the	  other	  a	  machine.	  If	  after	  a	  set	  period	  of	  time	  the	  
interrogator	  is	  unable	  to	  distinguish	  between	  man	  and	  machine	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  
conversation,	  the	  machine	  can	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  intelligent.	  Since	  Turing’s	  seminal	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  R	  Kurzweil,	  The	  age	  of	  intelligent	  machines	  (MIT	  Press,	  Cambridge,	  MA:	  1990).	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  A	  Turing,	  “Computing	  Machinery	  and	  Intelligence”	  (1950)	  236	  Mind,	  433-­‐460.	  
338	  Ibid,	  at	  433.	  
339	  Ibid.	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work	  in	  1950,	  much	  progress	  has	  been	  made	  in	  areas	  such	  as	  theorem	  proving,	  game	  
playing,	  and	  decision	  making.340	  While	  it	  has	  generally	  been	  doubted	  whether	  a	  
computer	  passing	  the	  Turing	  test	  could	  really	  be	  considered	  intelligent,341	  software	  
capable	  of	  passing	  the	  test	  has	  yet	  to	  be	  developed.	  The	  strong	  AI	  envisaged	  by	  Turing	  
has	  proven	  to	  be	  more	  difficult	  to	  develop	  than	  he	  anticipated.	  Until	  this	  day,	  Turing’s	  
test	  remains	  relevant	  in	  so	  far	  as	  it	  incorporates	  most	  of	  the	  research	  streams	  that	  form	  
AI.	  A	  computer	  would	  need	  the	  following	  abilities	  to	  pass	  the	  Turing	  test:342	  
	  
• Natural	  language	  processing,	  to	  enable	  it	  to	  communicate	  successfully	  in	  
English;	  
• Knowledge	  representation	  to	  store	  what	  it	  knows	  or	  hears;	  
• Automated	  reasoning	  to	  use	  the	  stored	  knowledge	  to	  answer	  questions	  and	  to	  
draw	  new	  conclusions;	  
• Machine	  learning	  to	  adapt	  to	  new	  circumstances	  and	  to	  detect	  and	  extrapolate	  
patterns;	  
• Computer	  vision	  to	  perceive	  objects	  and,	  
• Robotics	  to	  manipulate	  objects	  and	  move	  around.	  
	  
Generally,	  two	  main	  research	  streams	  that	  constitute	  the	  AI	  research	  field	  exist,	  the	  
strong	  and	  weak	  AI	  concepts.	  Searle	  has	  provided	  an	  adequate	  description	  of	  these	  in	  
his	  work:	  343	  
“According	  to	  weak	  AI,	  the	  principal	  value	  of	  the	  computer	  in	  the	  study	  
of	   the	   mind	   is	   that	   it	   gives	   us	   a	   very	   powerful	   tool.	   For	   example,	   it	  
enables	   us	   to	   formulate	   and	   test	   hypotheses	   in	   a	   more	   rigorous	   and	  
precise	  fashion.	  But	  according	  to	  strong	  AI,	  the	  computer	  is	  not	  merely	  
a	  tool	  in	  the	  study	  of	  the	  mind;	  rather,	  the	  appropriately	  programmed	  
computer	  really	  is	  a	  mind,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  computers	  given	  the	  right	  
programs	  can	  be	  literally	  said	  to	  understand	  and	  have	  other	  cognitive	  
states.	   In	   strong	  AI,	  because	   the	  programmed	  computer	  has	  cognitive	  
states,	   the	   programs	   are	   not	   mere	   tools	   that	   enable	   us	   to	   test	  
psychological	   explanations;	   rather,	   the	   programs	   are	   themselves	   the	  
explanations.”	  	  
The	  Turing	  test	  belongs	  to	  the	  field	  of	  strong	  AI,	  attempting	  to	  model	  human	  
intelligence	  needed	  for	  a	  conversation.	  The	  inability	  to	  design	  software	  capable	  of	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  K	  A	  Delic,	  U	  Dayal,	  “AI	  Re-­‐Emerging	  as	  Research	  in	  Complex	  Systems”	  (2006)	  7:38	  Ubiquity.	  
341	  Russel/Norvig,	  note	  279,	  at	  947	  ff.	  
342	  Russel/Norvig,	  note	  279,	  at	  2.	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  J	  R	  Searle,	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  Programs”	  (1980)	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modeling	  the	  human	  intelligence	  required	  for	  the	  Turing	  test	  is	  rooted	  in	  the	  
underlying	  concept	  of	  strong	  AI:	  symbolic	  AI.	  Symbolic	  AI	  is	  the	  branch	  of	  AI	  research	  
that	  attempts	  to	  represent	  knowledge	  in	  a	  declarative	  form	  (i.e.,	  symbols	  and	  rules).344	  
The	  foundation	  upon	  which	  the	  symbolic	  AI	  paradigm	  rests	  is	  the	  physical-­symbol	  
system	  hypothesis,	  formulated	  by	  Newell	  and	  Simon,	  who	  state	  that	  symbols	  lie	  at	  the	  
root	  of	  intelligent	  actions.345	  	  
A	  physical	  symbol	  system	  takes	  a	  set	  of	  physical	  patterns	  (symbols),	  combining	  these	  to	  
form	  structures	  (expressions),	  and	  manipulating	  these	  using	  processes	  that	  operate	  on	  
those	  symbols	  according	  to	  symbolically	  coded	  sets	  of	  instructions	  to	  produce	  new	  
expressions.346	  Thus,	  a	  symbol	  is	  a	  mental	  representation	  of	  a	  real-­‐world	  object	  (for	  
example,	  a	  table,	  a	  door,	  or	  a	  horse)	  that	  is	  made	  up	  of	  patterns	  of	  active	  and	  inactive	  
neurons.	  	  
In	  a	  computer,	  these	  patterns	  of	  active	  and	  inactive	  neurons	  can	  be	  substituted	  by	  
sequences	  of	  zeroes	  and	  ones.	  Hence,	  according	  to	  Newell	  and	  Simon,	  machines	  can	  be	  
endowed	  with	  intelligence	  when	  knowledge	  is	  being	  represented	  in	  the	  form	  of	  
symbols,	  which	  these	  machines	  can	  understand.	  	  
However,	  in	  order	  for	  a	  computer	  to	  display	  intelligent	  behaviour	  it	  needs	  to	  have	  an	  
internal	  symbolic	  representation	  of	  the	  world	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  its	  actions.347	  	  
	  
Symbolic	  AI	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  top-­‐down	  approach	  to	  AI	  in	  view	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  entire	  
state	  of	  the	  world	  needs	  to	  be	  completely	  and	  explicitly	  represented.348	  While	  the	  
symbolic	  AI	  approach	  has	  yielded	  impressive	  results	  in	  specialised	  areas	  where	  the	  
environment	  can	  be	  accurately	  modelled,	  it	  falls	  short	  when	  the	  size	  and	  complexity	  of	  
an	  environment	  increases.	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  is,	  as	  Luck	  et	  al.	  explain,	  that	  it	  is	  difficult,	  
if	  not	  impossible,	  to	  represent	  a	  dynamic	  and	  complex	  environment	  -­‐or	  even	  an	  
abstraction	  thereof-­‐	  comprehensively.	  This	  also	  goes	  for	  the	  representation	  of	  some	  
symbolic	  manipulation	  tasks	  such	  as	  planning.349	  Therefore	  the	  symbolic	  AI	  approach	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  Schermer,	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  309,	  at	  18.	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  A	  Newell,	  H	  A	  Simon,	  “Computer	  Sciences	  as	  Empirical	  Inquiry:	  Symbols	  and	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  (1976)	  
19:3	  Communications	  of	  the	  ACM,	  113-­‐126,	  114.	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  Wooldridge/Jennings,	  note	  290,	  at	  139.	  
347	  M	  Luck,	  R	  Ashri	  ,	  M	  D’Inverno,	  	  Agent-­based	  Software	  Development	  (Norwoord:	  ArtechHouse	  
Inc.,	  2004),	  14.	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  R	  A	  Brooks,	  “Intelligence	  Without	  Representation”	  (1991)	  47	  Artificial	  Intelligence,	  139-­‐159,	  
140.	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  note	  347,	  at	  14.	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does	  generally	  not	  fare	  well	  within	  complex,	  real-­‐world	  environments.	  However,	  the	  
ability	  to	  deal	  effectively	  with	  the	  environment	  is	  a	  prerequisite	  for	  strong	  AI.	  
	  
A	  new	  approach	  to	  AI	  was	  needed	  to	  overcome	  the	  fundamental	  problems	  symbolic	  AI	  
faced.	  Therefore,	  opposed	  to	  the	  (somewhat	  flawed)	  notion	  of	  strong	  AI	  and	  the	  
symbolic	  paradigm,	  the	  so-­‐called	  connectionist	  paradigm	  was	  developed.	  This	  paradigm	  
addresses	  the	  problems	  and	  dissatisfactions	  of	  the	  symbolic	  paradigm,	  particularly	  the	  
inability	  to	  handle	  flexible	  and	  robust	  processing	  in	  an	  efficient	  manner.	  	  
	  
The	  connectionist	  paradigm	  refers	  to	  a	  class	  of	  models	  that	  compute	  by	  way	  of	  
connections	  among	  simple	  processing	  units.350	  Thus,	  by	  establishing	  networks	  of	  
simple,	  and	  often	  uniform	  units,	  which	  mirror	  mental	  phenomena.	  They	  are	  large	  
networks	  of	  extremely	  simple	  processors,	  massively	  interconnected	  and	  running	  in	  
parallel.351	  Bechtel	  states	  that	  the	  understanding	  of	  how	  the	  human	  brain	  works	  
inspired	  the	  development	  of	  this	  model.352	  He	  elaborates	  further	  that	  the	  units,	  like	  
neurons,	  are	  at	  any	  given	  time	  activated	  to	  some	  degree.	  Typically,	  activation	  means	  
that	  these	  units	  are	  electrically	  charged.	  These	  units	  are	  connected	  to	  other	  units	  so	  
that,	  depending	  on	  their	  own	  activation,	  they	  can	  act	  to	  increase	  or	  decrease	  the	  
activations	  of	  these	  other	  units.353	  	  
The	  most	  commonly	  known	  connectionist	  models	  are	  neural	  networks.	  A	  neural	  
network	  consists	  of	  a	  large	  number	  of	  units	  joined	  together	  in	  a	  pattern	  of	  connections.	  
Units	  in	  a	  net	  are	  usually	  segregated	  into	  three	  classes:	  input	  units,	  which	  receive	  
information	  to	  be	  processed,	  output	  units	  where	  the	  results	  of	  the	  processing	  are	  
found,	  and	  units	  in	  between	  called	  hidden	  units.	  If	  a	  neural	  net	  were	  to	  model	  the	  
whole	  human	  nervous	  system,	  the	  input	  units	  would	  be	  analogous	  to	  the	  sensory	  
neurons,	  the	  output	  units	  to	  the	  motor	  neurons,	  and	  the	  hidden	  units	  to	  all	  other	  
neurons.354	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  “Connectionism	  and	  The	  Philosophy	  of	  the	  Mind:	  An	  Overview”	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  (2007)	  Stanford	  Encyclopedia	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  available	  online	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Connectionism	  systems	  have	  been	  inspired	  by	  biological	  neural	  networks	  and	  seem	  to	  
be	  closer	  in	  form	  to	  biological	  processes.	  They	  are	  based	  on	  two	  general	  ideas:	  a)	  that	  
intelligent,	  rational	  behaviour	  is	  seen	  as	  innately	  linked	  to	  the	  environment	  an	  agent	  
occupies,	  and	  b)	  that	  intelligent	  behaviour	  emerges	  from	  the	  interaction	  of	  various	  
simpler	  behaviours.355	  	  
As	  opposed	  to	  symbolic	  systems,	  connectionism	  systems	  are	  capable	  of	  dealing	  with	  
incomplete,	  approximate	  and	  inconsistent	  information	  as	  well	  as	  generalisation,	  and	  
are	  therefore	  believed	  to	  be	  a	  step	  in	  the	  direction	  toward	  capturing	  the	  intrinsic	  
properties	  of	  the	  biological	  substrate	  of	  intelligence.356	  Brooks	  has	  argued	  that	  higher-­‐
level	  intelligence	  need	  not	  be	  programmed	  directly	  into	  a	  machine	  from	  the	  top	  down,	  
but	  can	  emerge	  from	  the	  interaction	  of	  multiple	  simple	  modules	  situated	  within	  a	  real	  
environment.357	  Thus	  through	  the	  interaction	  of	  individually	  limited	  nodes	  complex	  
behaviour	  can	  emerge.	  
	  
The	  connectionism	  approach	  has	  a	  clear	  advantage	  over	  the	  symbolic	  approach	  in	  that	  
it	  is	  more	  flexible	  and	  adaptable.	  The	  exact	  details	  of	  the	  use	  (such	  as	  the	  exact	  topic	  
and	  course	  of	  the	  conversation	  in	  a	  Turing	  test)	  do	  not	  need	  to	  be	  known	  in	  advance.	  
Furthermore,	  due	  to	  the	  distribution	  of	  tasks,358	  these	  systems	  are	  more	  robust	  
towards	  external	  influences	  and	  unexpected	  changes.	  These	  days,	  most	  of	  the	  AI	  
research	  is	  undertaken	  in	  weak	  AI,	  applying	  the	  connectionism	  approach.	  This	  is	  
particularly	  the	  case	  for	  agent-­‐based	  applications	  and	  similar	  software,	  such	  as	  the	  
Trojan-­‐like	  software	  tool	  in	  the	  case	  study.	  
	  
The	  purpose	  of	  this	  rather	  rudimentary	  description	  of	  what	  AI	  is	  and	  how	  AI	  systems	  
are	  being	  designed	  is	  to	  gain	  a	  basic	  understanding	  of	  this	  domain.	  This	  is	  highly	  
relevant	  for	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  key	  terms	  in	  the	  following	  sections	  of	  this	  chapter.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
355	  M	  Wooldridge,	  An	  Introduction	  to	  Multi-­agent	  Systems	  (West	  Sussex:	  John	  Wiley	  &	  Sons	  Ltd,	  
2002),	  89.	  
356	  R	  Sun,	  “Artificial	  Intelligence:	  Connectionist	  versus	  Symbolic	  Approaches”	  in	  N	  J	  Smelser,	  P	  B	  
Baltes	  (eds.),	  International	  Encyclopedia	  of	  the	  Social	  and	  Behavioral	  Sciences	  
(Pergamon/Elsevier,	  Oxford:	  2001),	  783-­‐789,	  787.	  
357	  R	  A	  Brooks,	  “How	  to	  build	  complete	  creatures	  rather	  than	  isolated	  cognitive	  simulators”,	  in	  K	  
VanLehn	  (ed)	  Architectures	  for	  Intelligence	  (Hillsdale,	  NJ:	  Lawrence	  Erlbaum	  Assosiates,	  1991),	  
225-­‐239.	  
358	  The	  distribution	  of	  tasks	  is	  a	  recurring	  notion	  in	  this	  thesis.	  It	  has	  first	  been	  described	  in	  
chapter	  4.4.3	  when	  introducing	  multi-­‐agent	  systems.	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5.4 Mobile, Intelligent and Autonomous Policing Tools 
As	  discussed	  above,	  it	  is	  relevant	  and	  necessary	  to	  develop	  a	  more	  general	  class	  of	  
software-­‐based	  investigative	  technologies.	  This	  group	  is	  defined	  according	  to	  shared	  
key	  denominators	  identified	  based	  on	  the	  key	  characteristics	  of	  the	  relevant	  
technologies.	  These	  have	  been	  identified	  above	  as	  potentially	  being	  mobility,	  
intelligence	  and	  autonomy.	  These	  concepts	  could	  serve	  as	  the	  key	  pillars	  of	  this	  new	  
class	  of	  technologies,	  if	  the	  relevant	  characteristics	  of	  the	  technologies	  can	  be	  
subsumed	  under	  these	  concepts.	  Hence,	  in	  the	  following	  sections	  the	  meaning	  of	  these	  
three	  concepts	  is	  analysed.	  
The	  analysis	  is	  undertaken	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  source	  domain	  of	  the	  relevant	  
technologies:	  AI.	  Thus	  the	  understanding	  of	  these	  terms	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  work	  is	  
significantly	  influenced	  by	  the	  understanding	  of	  these	  terms	  developed	  in	  the	  AI	  
domain.	  	  
5.4.1 Mobility 
Generally,	  the	  term	  mobility	  refers	  to	  the	  state	  of	  being	  in	  motion.	  However,	  as	  stated	  in	  
the	  previous	  section,	  of	  relevance	  is	  the	  meaning	  of	  this	  term	  in	  AI	  and	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  
use	  of	  AI	  tools	  by	  police	  and	  law	  enforcement	  agencies	  as	  depicted	  in	  chapters	  2	  and	  4.	  	  
This	  section	  therefore	  analyses	  the	  meaning	  of	  mobility	  in	  AI	  and	  determines	  whether	  
this	  concept	  sufficiently	  incorporates	  some	  of	  the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  technologies	  
defined	  in	  chapter	  4,	  and	  summarised	  in	  section	  5.1	  of	  this	  chapter,	  and	  is	  thus	  
adequate	  to	  serve	  as	  one	  of	  the	  key	  concepts	  for	  the	  new	  class	  of	  investigative	  
technologies.	  This	  section	  also	  establishes	  if	  and	  how	  this	  particular	  concept	  of	  mobility	  
creates	  problems	  for	  the	  law	  regulating	  police	  investigations	  and	  the	  gathering	  of	  
evidence.	  
The	  rise	  of	  the	  commercial	  Internet	  and	  its	  many	  applications	  has	  led	  to	  a	  wealth	  of	  
information	  that	  is	  freely	  available,	  and	  the	  transformation,	  and	  partly	  reinvention,	  of	  
communication.	  Berners-­‐Lee	  has	  stated	  that	  the	  main	  reason	  for	  designing	  the	  Internet	  
was	  to	  create	  a	  “universe	  of	  network	  accessible	  information”.359	  However,	  the	  idea	  of	  
the	  Internet	  is	  also	  very	  much	  based	  on	  the	  mobility	  of	  this	  information	  and	  
communication	  data,	  as	  well	  as	  on	  the	  distribution	  of	  computing	  powers	  and	  the	  
remote	  connection	  of	  users	  with	  systems.	  The	  Internet	  itself	  is	  a	  rather	  simple	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  T	  Berners-­‐Lee,	  “The	  World	  Wide	  Web	  –	  Past,	  Present	  and	  Future”	  (1997)	  1:1	  Journal	  of	  
Digital	  Information,	  available	  online	  at:	  https://journals.tdl.org/jodi/article/viewArticle/3/3.	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application	  that	  primarily	  serves	  the	  purpose	  to	  transport	  digital	  information	  from	  one	  
computer	  to	  the	  other.	  Thus	  the	  Internet	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  distributed	  
environment.360	  
Prior	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  commercialised	  Internet,	  the	  term	  distributed	  system	  or	  
environment	  was	  mainly	  used	  to	  describe	  a	  network	  of	  several	  computer	  systems	  with	  
separated	  memory	  that	  are	  connected	  to	  each	  other	  by	  a	  dedicated	  network.361	  The	  
computers	  in	  such	  networks	  are	  almost	  always	  homogeneous,	  which	  means	  that	  they	  
have	  the	  same	  type	  of	  processor	  and	  operating	  system.	  Furthermore,	  the	  network	  is	  
more	  or	  less	  static:	  Computers	  are	  only	  rarely	  switched	  off;	  network	  connections	  
between	  hosts	  are	  always	  reliable	  and	  provide	  a	  constant	  bandwidth.362	  These	  systems	  
are	  based	  on	  the	  client	  and	  server	  paradigm,	  where	  computers	  in	  a	  network	  that	  offer	  
services	  to	  others	  are	  called	  servers,	  and	  computers	  that	  request	  and	  enjoy	  these	  
services	  are	  called	  clients.363	  The	  concept	  of	  mobility	  in	  AI	  has	  its	  roots	  in	  these	  
distributed	  systems.	  Connections	  between	  different	  computers	  or	  nodes	  are	  necessary	  
for	  the	  transportation	  of	  data.	  However,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  pre-­‐internet	  networks,	  the	  
Internet	  as	  a	  “network	  of	  networks”	  mainly	  consists	  of	  heterogeneous	  computers.364	  
This	  means	  that	  data	  transfer	  and	  information	  exchange	  is	  much	  more	  difficult,	  and	  less	  
reliable	  and	  robust	  than	  in	  a	  network	  of	  homogeneous	  computers.	  However,	  the	  
widespread	  client-­‐server	  infrastructure	  was	  not	  adequate	  to	  deal	  with	  these	  
requirements.	  Hence,	  new	  technologies	  were	  developed	  to	  cope	  with	  these	  problems.	  
These	  technologies	  fundamentally	  influenced	  the	  concept	  of	  mobility	  in	  AI	  as	  it	  exists	  
today.	  Hence,	  to	  fully	  understand	  the	  current	  concept	  of	  mobility	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  
analyse	  these	  technologies	  in	  more	  detail.	  	  
5.4.1.1 Process Migration 
Process	  migration365	  is	  one	  of	  the	  earliest	  technologies	  that	  shaped	  the	  concept	  of	  
mobility,	  as	  it	  exists	  today.	  It	  introduced	  the	  idea	  of	  load	  balancing	  between	  computers	  
in	  one	  network.	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  C	  Reed,	  Internet	  Law:	  Texts	  and	  Materials	  (Cambridge,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press:	  2004),	  7.	  
361	  P	  Braun,	  W	  Rossak,	  Mobile	  Agents:	  Basic	  Concepts,	  Mobility	  Models,	  and	  the	  Tracy	  Toolkit	  
(Morgan	  Kaufman	  Publishers	  Inc.,	  San	  Francisco,	  CA:	  2004),	  3.	  
362	  Braun/Rossak,	  ibid.	  
363	  See	  e.g.	  JJ	  Labrosse,	  et	  al.,	  Embedded	  Software	  (Oxford:	  Elsevier,	  2008)	  293.	  
364	  Braun/Rossak,	  note	  361,	  at	  3.	  
365	  A	  process	  in	  computing	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  an	  instance	  of	  a	  computer	  program,	  consisting	  of	  
one	  or	  more	  threads,	  that	  is	  being	  sequentially	  executed	  (i.e.,	  a	  list	  of	  instructions	  indexed	  by	  a	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Process	  migration	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  “the	  transfer	  of	  a	  sufficient	  amount	  of	  a	  process's	  
state	  from	  one	  machine	  to	  another	  for	  the	  process	  to	  execute	  on	  the	  target	  machine.”366	  In	  
addition	  to	  load	  balancing,	  process	  migration	  allows	  for	  small	  processes	  to	  be	  migrated	  
to	  the	  site	  of	  very	  large	  data	  files,	  and	  also	  offers	  improved	  reliability.	  If	  it	  is	  known	  that	  
a	  particular	  machine	  will	  shortly	  be	  unavailable,	  active	  processes	  may	  be	  migrated	  so	  
as	  to	  continue	  execution	  elsewhere.367	  This	  technology	  requires	  a	  network	  for	  a	  process	  
to	  be	  able	  to	  migrate	  from	  one	  machine	  to	  another	  machine	  to	  continue	  its	  execution	  
there.	  Powell	  and	  Miller	  specify	  further	  that	  these	  networks	  are	  part	  of	  a	  distributed	  
(loosely	  coupled)	  system.368	  A	  loosely	  coupled	  system	  is	  one	  in	  which	  the	  same	  copy	  of	  
a	  process	  state	  cannot	  directly	  be	  executed	  by	  both	  processors.	  Rather,	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  
state	  must	  be	  moved	  to	  a	  processor	  before	  it	  can	  run	  the	  process.369	  Process	  migration	  
is	  normally	  an	  involuntary	  operation	  that	  may	  be	  initiated	  without	  the	  knowledge	  of	  
the	  running	  process	  or	  any	  processes	  interacting	  with	  it.	  Ideally,	  all	  processes	  continue	  
execution	  with	  no	  apparent	  changes	  in	  their	  computation	  or	  communications.	  Process	  
migration	  provides	  the	  ability	  to	  stop	  a	  process,	  transport	  its	  state	  to	  another	  
processor,	  and	  restart	  the	  process,	  transparently.370	  However,	  while	  process	  migration	  
allows	  an	  entire	  process	  to	  be	  transferred	  to	  a	  remote	  host,	  this	  mechanism	  does	  not	  
allow	  an	  easy	  way	  to	  return	  data	  back	  to	  the	  source	  node	  without	  the	  entire	  process	  
returning	  as	  well.371	  Moreover,	  it	  takes	  up	  huge	  amounts	  of	  bandwidth	  and	  due	  to	  
inherent	  complexity,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  introduce	  process	  migration	  without	  impacting	  the	  
stability	  and	  robustness	  of	  the	  underlying	  operating	  system.372	  Thus	  mobility	  in	  
process	  migration	  technology	  refers	  to	  the	  movement	  of	  a	  process	  from	  one	  machine	  in	  
a	  loosely	  coupled	  system	  to	  another.	  The	  degree	  of	  mobility	  is	  therefore	  rather	  limited	  
and	  pre-­‐defined,	  and	  the	  flexibility	  of	  this	  procedure	  is	  very	  low	  since	  the	  whole	  
process	  needs	  to	  be	  shifted.	  Thus	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  transfer	  specific	  data,	  only.	  The	  aim	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
process-­‐specific	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  Knott,	  “A	  proposal	  for	  certain	  process	  management	  and	  
intercommunication	  primitives”	  (1974)	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  J	  M	  Smith,	  “A	  Survey	  of	  Process	  Migration	  Mechanisms”	  (1988)	  22:3	  ACM	  SIGOPS	  Operating	  
Systems	  Review,	  28-­‐40,	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  Nuttall,	  “A	  brief	  survey	  of	  systems	  providing	  process	  or	  object	  migration	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  (1994)	  
28:4	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  Operating	  Systems	  Review,	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  Powell,	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  Miller,	  “Process	  Migration	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  DEMOS/MO”	  (1983)	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  Ninth	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Symposium	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  Systems	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of	  this	  technology	  is	  to	  balance	  load	  between	  machines	  in	  one	  network.	  However,	  the	  
credentials	  of	  this	  network	  and	  machines	  connected	  to	  it	  are	  previously	  known,	  thus	  
this	  technology	  is	  not	  well	  suited	  for	  heterogeneous	  networks.	  
5.4.1.2 Remote Evaluation 
Remote	  evaluation	  programming	  is	  another	  technology	  that	  facilitates	  the	  movement	  of	  
data	  and	  code	  between	  different	  machines	  in	  a	  network,	  and	  has	  equally	  shaped	  the	  
notion	  of	  mobility,	  as	  it	  exists	  today.	  
Remote	  evaluation	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  the	  ability	  to	  evaluate	  a	  program	  expression	  at	  a	  
remote	  computer.373	  A	  computer	  supporting	  remote	  evaluation	  exports	  a	  set	  of	  
procedures	  by	  making	  them	  available	  to	  other	  computers.	  A	  remote	  evaluation	  request	  
occurs	  when	  one	  computer,	  which	  can	  be	  called	  the	  client,	  sends	  a	  program	  expression	  
to	  another	  computer,	  which	  can	  be	  called	  the	  server.	  The	  server	  evaluates	  the	  program	  
expression	  and	  returns	  the	  results	  (if	  any)	  to	  the	  client.	  The	  server’s	  interface	  specifies	  
the	  set	  of	  procedures	  it	  exports.374	  Thus,	  the	  remote	  computer	  receiving	  the	  request	  
executes	  the	  program	  referenced	  in	  the	  request	  within	  its	  own	  local	  address	  space	  
before	  returning	  the	  results	  to	  the	  sending	  computer.375	  	  
Remote	  evaluation	  systems	  are	  an	  improvement	  to	  process	  migration	  systems	  insofar	  
as	  the	  remote	  programming	  can	  occur	  without	  having	  to	  transfer	  the	  process	  control	  
data	  from	  the	  source	  to	  the	  destination	  host.	  This	  means	  that	  these	  processes	  are	  not	  
taking	  up	  as	  much	  bandwidth	  as	  process	  migration	  systems.	  Furthermore,	  it	  is	  possible	  
to	  transfer	  data	  back	  to	  the	  source	  machine	  much	  more	  easily.	  However,	  despite	  these	  
advantages	  remote	  evaluation	  systems	  lack	  the	  ability	  to	  encapsulate	  more	  state	  
information	  into	  the	  executable	  program	  at	  the	  remote	  host.	  	  
Thus	  mobility	  in	  remote	  evaluation	  refers	  to	  the	  movement	  of	  an	  operation	  (e.g.	  a	  
procedure	  plus	  parameters)	  to	  a	  remote	  side	  (where	  it	  is	  performed	  entirely),	  and	  the	  
movement	  of	  the	  results	  of	  this	  operation	  to	  the	  source.	  While	  the	  speed	  of	  the	  
transmission	  has	  improved,	  the	  choice	  of	  the	  data	  to	  be	  moved	  is	  still	  pre-­‐determined,	  
thus	  the	  flexibility	  has	  not	  increased.	  The	  aim	  of	  this	  technology	  is	  to	  reduce	  the	  
amount	  of	  communication	  within	  a	  network	  that	  is	  required	  to	  accomplish	  a	  given	  task.	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5.4.1.3 Mobile Objects 
Mobile	  object	  systems	  (based	  on	  formal	  object-­‐oriented	  programming	  techniques)	  
extended	  the	  remote	  evaluation	  by	  capturing	  more	  program	  behaviour	  within	  the	  
mobile	  object.376	  A	  mobile	  object	  system	  architecture	  is	  composed	  of	  four	  components:	  
(a)	  the	  host—a	  computer	  and	  operating	  system,	  (b)	  the	  computational	  environment	  
(CE)—the	  run-­‐time	  system,	  (c)	  mobile	  object	  systems—the	  computations	  currently	  
running	  on	  the	  CE,	  and	  (d)	  a	  network	  or	  communication	  subsystem	  that	  interconnects	  
CEs	  located	  on	  different	  hosts.377	  	  
	  
The	  underlying	  idea	  of	  mobile	  objects	  is	  to	  create	  active	  messages,	  that	  is,	  messages	  
that	  are	  able	  to	  migrate	  to	  a	  remote	  host.378	  The	  unit	  of	  distribution	  and	  mobility	  in	  
such	  systems	  is	  the	  object.	  Although	  some	  objects	  contain	  processes,	  others	  contain	  
only	  data:	  arrays,	  records,	  and	  single	  integers	  are	  all	  objects.	  379	  Thus,	  the	  unit	  of	  
mobility	  can	  be	  much	  smaller	  than	  in	  process	  migration	  and	  remote	  evaluation	  
systems,	  and	  therefore	  further	  reduce	  network	  traffic.	  Object	  mobility	  subsumes	  both	  
process	  migration	  and	  data	  transfer.	  	  
However,	  the	  data	  portion	  is	  still	  dominant	  in	  this	  concept,	  whereas	  the	  active	  portion	  
(i.e.	  the	  code)	  is	  more	  or	  less	  an	  add-­‐on.380	  This	  means	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  mobility	  in	  
mobile	  object	  systems	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  one	  in	  process	  migration	  and	  remote	  evaluation	  
systems.	  It	  refers	  to	  the	  transportation	  of	  data	  to	  another	  specific	  machine	  in	  a	  
network.	  The	  advancement	  here	  lies	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  data	  that	  is	  transported	  is	  more	  
specified,	  and	  it	  is	  not	  necessary	  to	  move	  entire	  processes	  or	  applications	  for	  the	  
relevant	  data	  to	  arrive	  at	  the	  target	  machine.	  Thus,	  the	  concept	  of	  mobility	  in	  mobile	  
object	  systems	  refers	  to	  the	  movement	  of	  objects	  carrying	  specified	  data	  from	  one	  
machine	  in	  a	  network	  to	  another.	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The	  three	  presented	  technologies	  have	  fundamentally	  shaped	  the	  concept	  of	  mobility	  in	  
AI.	  To	  better	  understand	  the	  concept	  of	  mobility,	  as	  it	  exists	  today,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  
look	  at	  the	  changes	  it	  has	  undergone	  due	  to	  technological	  progress.	  	  
The	  earliest	  concept	  of	  mobility	  merely	  referred	  to	  the	  movement	  of	  code	  in	  a	  specified	  
network.	  The	  focus	  was	  on	  achieving	  a	  general	  transfer	  of	  data,	  not	  on	  the	  
specifications	  of	  the	  code	  executing	  this	  movement.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  transfer	  of	  data	  
from	  one	  machine	  to	  another	  machine	  was	  possible,	  but	  to	  achieve	  this,	  a	  whole	  
process	  had	  to	  be	  moved.	  Furthermore,	  the	  transfer	  was	  a	  one-­‐way	  process	  only,	  as	  the	  
return	  of	  results	  was	  very	  difficult.	  However,	  the	  successful	  movement	  of	  data	  was	  a	  
very	  important	  step	  for	  the	  concept	  of	  mobility,	  as	  it	  exists	  today.	  	  
This	  concept	  was	  further	  extended	  by	  technological	  progress,	  which	  aimed	  at	  
improving	  the	  executing	  code.	  Thus	  remote	  evaluation	  systems	  enabled	  the	  transfer	  of	  
more	  specific	  data	  (programs	  instead	  of	  processes)	  and	  more	  importantly,	  enabled	  the	  
return	  of	  results	  to	  the	  requesting	  computer.	  Hence,	  the	  focus	  for	  improving	  the	  
concept	  of	  mobility	  was	  on	  enhancing	  the	  executing	  code.	  This	  was	  confirmed	  by	  the	  
development	  of	  mobile	  objects,	  which	  enabled	  the	  transfer	  of	  specified	  data	  and	  eased	  
the	  movement	  of	  this	  data	  by	  working	  on	  the	  underlying	  code.	  	  
	  
This	  trend	  is	  crucial	  for	  the	  use	  of	  mobility	  as	  a	  key	  concept	  in	  this	  thesis.	  The	  concept	  
of	  mobility	  underlying	  mobile	  objects	  is	  not	  sufficient	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  thesis.	  
Section	  5.1	  has	  presented	  the	  key	  characteristics	  of	  the	  technologies	  discussed	  in	  this	  
thesis,	  which	  are,	  among	  others,	  goal-­‐orientation,	  reactivity,	  and	  travelling	  between	  
platforms	  and	  target	  computers.	  These	  require	  a	  much	  more	  advanced	  executing	  code	  
than	  the	  one	  present	  in	  mobile	  code	  systems.	  Required	  is,	  for	  example,	  the	  ability	  to	  
transport	  specific	  code	  to	  computers	  selected	  and	  targeted	  by	  the	  executing	  code.	  
Furthermore,	  in	  mobile	  object	  systems	  the	  transportation	  of	  data	  occurs	  on	  explicit	  
request	  by	  the	  client	  machine	  to	  the	  server	  machine.	  This	  means	  that	  both	  machines	  
are	  aware	  of	  the	  movement	  and	  have	  to	  actively	  collaborate	  in	  it.	  Thus,	  the	  movement	  
is	  a	  transparent	  process.	  However,	  the	  technologies	  discussed	  in	  this	  thesis	  execute	  the	  
movement	  of	  data	  clandestinely	  and	  without	  explicit	  approval	  of	  the	  target	  machines.	  	  
	  
Thus	  in	  a	  next	  step	  the	  current	  concept	  of	  mobility	  in	  AI	  is	  examined	  to	  determine	  
whether	  it	  has	  transformed	  sufficiently	  to	  be	  adequate	  to	  be	  used	  as	  a	  key	  concept	  for	  
this	  thesis.	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5.4.1.4 Mobile Agents 
The	  concept	  of	  mobility	  has	  most	  recently	  been	  advanced	  in	  the	  area	  of	  software	  agent	  
research.	  In	  fact,	  the	  above-­‐depicted	  technologies	  are	  sometimes	  regarded	  as	  ancestors	  
of	  mobile	  software	  agent	  research.381	  	  
Generally,	  mobility	  in	  agent	  research	  equally	  refers	  to	  code	  being	  dispatched	  from	  a	  
client	  computer	  and	  transported	  to	  a	  remote	  server	  computer	  for	  execution.382	  
However,	  the	  notion	  of	  mobility	  has	  improved	  and	  changed	  considerably	  in	  mobile	  
agents	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  other	  technologies	  introduced	  above.	  	  Most	  importantly,	  
mobile	  agents	  support	  heterogeneous	  architectures,	  operating	  systems,	  and	  even	  
heterogeneous	  administrative	  domains,	  such	  as	  the	  Internet,	  while	  previous	  
technologies	  tend	  to	  be	  much	  more	  homogenous.383	  Hence,	  data	  can	  be	  moved	  between	  
machines	  independent	  of	  the	  platform	  of	  the	  machine	  (thus	  independent	  of	  the	  
operating	  system	  environment,	  such	  as	  Microsoft	  Windows,	  Mac	  OS,	  Linux).	  	  
Furthermore,	  the	  migration	  of	  the	  code	  is	  self-­‐initiated.384	  This	  means	  that	  the	  agent	  
determines	  dynamically	  where	  and	  when	  to	  travel	  to	  a	  particular	  destination	  node	  
based	  on	  some	  embedded	  mobility	  metadata	  to	  perform	  some	  required	  work.385	  The	  
migration	  of	  the	  code	  is	  furthermore	  not	  restricted	  to	  one	  machine	  only,	  but	  the	  code	  
can	  be	  moved	  to	  many	  different	  machines	  in	  the	  network.386	  Moreover,	  mobile	  agents	  
execute	  asynchronously,	  thus	  do	  not	  rely	  on	  the	  host	  computer	  being	  connected	  to	  the	  
network	  while	  moving	  the	  data	  and	  executing	  the	  tasks.	  Mobility	  of	  data	  often	  relied	  on	  
expensive	  or	  fragile	  network	  connections.	  However,	  mobile	  agents,	  after	  being	  
dispatched,	  become	  independent	  of	  the	  process	  that	  created	  them	  and	  can	  operate	  
asynchronously.	  The	  mobile	  device	  can	  reconnect	  at	  a	  later	  time	  to	  collect	  the	  agent	  
and	  the	  results	  of	  the	  agent’s	  work.387	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  Braun/Rossak,	  note	  361,	  at	  17;	  D	  S	  Milojicic,	  “Trend	  Wars	  -­‐	  Mobile	  agent	  applications”	  
(1999)	  7:3	  EEE	  Concurrency	  [see	  also	  IEEE	  Parallel	  &	  Distributed	  Technology]	  80-­‐90,	  81.	  
382	  D	  Chess,	  C	  Harrison,	  A	  Kershenbaum,	  “Mobile	  agents:	  Are	  they	  a	  good	  idea?”	  in	  J	  Vitek,	  C	  
Tschudin	  (eds),	  Mobile	  Object	  Systems	  -­	  Towards	  the	  Programmable	  Internet,	  Lecture	  Notes	  in	  
Computer	  Science	  (Springer-­‐Verlag,	  Berlin	  Germany:	  1997),	  25–47,	  25.	  
383	  Milojicic,	  note	  372,	  at	  83.	  
384	  P	  Braun,	  D	  Trinh,	  R	  Kowalczyk,	  “Integrating	  a	  New	  Mobility	  Service	  into	  the	  Jade	  Agent	  
Toolkit”	  in	  T	  Magedanz	  et	  al.(eds.)	  Mobility	  aware	  technologies	  and	  applications:	  second	  
international	  workshop,	  Lecture	  Notes	  in	  Computer	  Science	  (Berlin:	  Springer-­‐Verlag,	  2005),	  
354–363,	  354.	  
385	  Wong/Paciorek/Moore,	  note	  371,	  at	  93.	  
386	  D	  B	  Lange,	  M	  Oshima,	  “Seven	  Good	  Reasons	  for	  Mobile	  Agents”	  (1999)	  42:3	  Communications	  
of	  the	  ACM,	  88-­‐89,	  88.	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  Lange/Oshima,	  ibid,	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Additionally,	  mobile	  agents	  adapt	  dynamically	  to	  their	  environment.	  While	  previous	  
technologies	  relied	  on	  a	  specific	  and	  static	  environment	  for	  the	  migration	  of	  data,	  
mobile	  agents	  readily	  adapt	  to	  changes	  in	  both	  the	  program	  state	  and	  the	  network	  
environment	  (such	  as	  network	  partitioning	  and	  disconnected	  hosts)	  to	  modify	  their	  
routing	  behaviour.388	  	  
Lastly,	  mobile	  agents	  reduce	  network	  load	  further	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  previously	  
discussed	  technologies.	  Distributed	  systems	  often	  rely	  on	  communication	  protocols	  
involving	  multiple	  interactions	  to	  accomplish	  a	  given	  task.	  The	  result	  is	  a	  lot	  of	  network	  
traffic.	  Mobile	  agents	  allow	  users	  to	  package	  a	  conversation	  and	  dispatch	  it	  to	  a	  
destination	  host	  where	  interactions	  take	  place	  locally.	  Mobile	  agents	  are	  also	  useful	  
when	  reducing	  the	  flow	  of	  raw	  data	  in	  the	  network.	  When	  very	  large	  volumes	  of	  data	  
are	  stored	  at	  remote	  hosts,	  that	  data	  should	  be	  processed	  in	  its	  locality	  rather	  than	  
transferred	  over	  the	  network.389	  	  
	  
As	  has	  been	  established,	  the	  notion	  of	  mobility	  has	  been	  expanded	  and	  shaped	  by	  
research	  into	  software	  agents.	  The	  analysis	  of	  these	  advancements	  indicates	  that	  
research	  has	  indeed	  focused	  on	  improving	  the	  executing	  code	  underlying	  the	  
movement	  of	  data.	  While	  all	  of	  the	  research	  findings	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  
mobility	  presented	  in	  this	  section	  are	  technology	  specific,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  these	  
findings	  cannot	  be	  generalised.	  The	  concept	  of	  mobility	  as	  developed	  for	  software	  
agents	  can	  equally	  be	  applied	  to	  technologies	  that	  are	  architecturally	  similar	  to	  this	  
technology.	  Generally,	  if	  specific	  capabilities	  have	  been	  developed	  for	  one	  technology,	  
these	  can	  be	  adapted	  for	  other	  technologies	  as	  well.	  Thus	  it	  is	  legitimate	  to	  derive	  a	  
general	  concept	  of	  mobility	  from	  these	  findings.	  
	  
Hence,	  the	  concept	  of	  mobility	  (at	  the	  time	  of	  finishing	  this	  thesis)	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  the	  
dynamical	  and	  asynchronous	  movement	  of	  data	  between	  one	  or	  more	  machines	  in	  a	  
heterogeneous	  network,	  which	  can	  be	  initiated	  by	  the	  executing	  code.	  	  
	  
Having	  determined	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  mobility	  in	  this	  context	  it	  needs	  to	  be	  
analysed	  whether	  this	  notion	  could	  serve	  as	  a	  key	  concept	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  thesis.	  
This	  would	  be	  the	  case	  if	  the	  relevant	  key	  characteristics	  of	  the	  technologies	  discussed	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in	  this	  thesis	  can	  be	  subsumed	  under	  the	  concept	  of	  mobility.	  The	  relevant	  key	  
characteristics	  are	  goal-­‐orientation,	  reactivity,	  and	  travelling	  between	  platforms	  and	  
target	  computers.	  As	  shown	  above,	  mobility	  refers	  to	  code,	  that	  is	  capable	  of	  moving	  
between	  platforms	  and	  machines	  in	  a	  heterogeneous	  network,	  thus	  capable	  of	  
travelling	  between	  platforms.	  Furthermore,	  it	  refers	  to	  code	  that	  is	  dynamical,	  thus	  
capable	  of	  reacting	  to	  a	  changing	  environment	  and	  making	  decisions	  based	  on	  these	  
changes,	  hence	  featuring	  reactivity	  and	  goal-­‐orientation.	  The	  executing	  code	  is	  capable	  
of	  moving	  data	  on	  the	  Internet,	  which	  is	  required	  for	  the	  specific	  use	  of	  the	  new	  
software-­‐based	  investigative	  technologies,	  the	  online	  search	  of	  ICT	  devices.	  
Furthermore,	  due	  to	  the	  decrease	  in	  bandwidth	  required	  for	  the	  movement	  and	  
execution	  of	  the	  tasks,	  the	  target	  computer	  will	  not	  slow	  down	  to	  an	  extend	  
recognisable	  by	  the	  user.	  The	  move	  away	  from	  a	  strict	  client-­‐server	  model	  towards	  an	  
asynchronous	  and	  dynamical	  self-­‐executing	  model	  means	  that	  the	  migration	  of	  data	  
can	  occur	  without	  explicit	  request	  and	  permission	  by	  the	  involved	  machines,	  thus	  the	  
migration	  can	  occur	  clandestinely.	  	  
	  
This	  analysis	  has	  shown	  that	  the	  relevant	  key	  concepts	  can	  be	  subsumed	  under	  the	  
concept	  of	  mobility,	  and	  thus	  this	  notion	  is	  adequate	  to	  serve	  as	  one	  of	  the	  key	  concepts	  
defining	  a	  new	  class	  of	  software-­‐based	  investigative	  tools.	  	  
	  
The	  concept	  of	  mobility	  raises	  several	  legal	  issues,	  which	  are	  only	  briefly	  mentioned	  at	  
this	  stage	  and	  analysed	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  the	  following	  chapters.	  The	  ability	  to	  collect	  
data	  from	  any	  machine	  connected	  to	  the	  Internet	  potentially	  poses	  a	  jurisdiction	  
problem,	  as	  the	  target	  machine	  can	  be	  located	  outside	  of	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  
investigating	  authority.	  Furthermore,	  the	  execution	  of	  the	  designated	  task	  (e.g.	  search	  
for	  relevant	  data	  and	  monitoring	  of	  communication)	  is	  carried	  out	  on	  the	  target	  
machine	  and	  the	  results	  are	  moved	  via	  the	  network	  to	  the	  requesting	  machine.	  This	  
raises	  a	  problem	  of	  reliability	  of	  evidence,	  challenging	  the	  chain	  of	  evidence.	  
5.4.2 Intelligence 
Having	  determined	  that	  mobility	  is	  suitable	  to	  serve	  as	  one	  of	  the	  key	  concepts	  for	  the	  
new	  class	  of	  investigative	  technologies,	  this	  section	  analyses	  whether	  the	  concept	  of	  
intelligence	  in	  AI	  is	  equally	  suited.	  
	   140	  
Intelligence	  stems	  from	  the	  Latin	  verb	  intelligere,	  which	  means	  “to	  understand”.	  
Intelligence	  is	  natural	  to	  every	  human	  being.	  Humankind	  is	  able	  to	  undertake	  all	  kinds	  
of	  activities	  such	  as	  walking,	  driving	  a	  car	  or	  bike,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  listening	  to	  
music	  or	  engage	  in	  a	  conversation	  with	  another	  person.	  We	  can	  watch	  a	  movie	  and	  
order	  books	  on	  the	  Internet	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  as	  well	  as	  undertake	  heart	  surgery	  or	  
play	  a	  game	  of	  chess.	  How	  is	  this	  possible	  and	  how	  does	  the	  brain	  enable	  this?	  What	  are	  
minds	  and	  what	  is	  thinking?	  What	  is	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  mind	  and	  the	  brain?	  	  
The	  fundamental	  nature	  of	  intelligence	  is	  only	  dimly	  understood	  and	  much	  will	  remain	  
beyond	  human	  understanding	  for	  a	  long	  time	  to	  come.	  Philosophers	  and	  psychologists	  
have	  attempted	  to	  answer	  these	  questions	  for	  many	  centuries	  with	  mixed	  results,	  and	  
there	  is	  little	  agreement	  on	  what	  does	  and	  does	  not	  constitute	  intelligence	  and	  how	  this	  
term	  can	  be	  defined.	  	  
This	  is	  reflected	  by	  the	  introductory	  comments	  on	  intelligence	  in	  the	  Penguin	  
Dictionary	  of	  Psychology:	  “Few	  concepts	  in	  psychology	  have	  received	  more	  devoted	  
attention	  and	  few	  have	  resisted	  clarification	  so	  thoroughly.”390	  However,	  while	  the	  term	  
has	  been	  defined	  anew	  by	  many	  researchers	  working	  in	  this	  field,	  looking	  at	  some	  of	  
these	  definitions	  can	  be	  an	  important	  source	  for	  gaining	  a	  basic	  understanding	  of	  this	  
debate	  and	  the	  concept	  of	  intelligence.	  Human	  intelligence	  has	  been	  defined	  as:	  	  
	  
“A	  very	  general	  mental	  capability	  that,	  among	  other	  things,	  
involves	  the	  ability	  to	  reason,	  plan,	  solve	  problems,	  think	  
abstractly,	  comprehend	  complex	  ideas,	  learn	  quickly	  and	  learn	  
from	  experience.	  It	  is	  not	  merely	  book	  learning,	  a	  narrow	  
academic	  skill,	  or	  test-­taking	  smarts.	  Rather,	  it	  reflects	  a	  
broader	  and	  deeper	  capability	  for	  comprehending	  our	  
surroundings—"catching	  on",	  "making	  sense"	  of	  things,	  or	  
"figuring	  out"	  what	  to	  do.”391	  	  
	  
Furthermore,	  it	  has	  been	  defined	  as:	  	  
“the	  ability	  of	  a	  system	  to	  act	  appropriately	  in	  an	  uncertain	  
environment,	  where	  appropriate	  action	  is	  that	  which	  increases	  
the	  probability	  of	  success,	  and	  success	  is	  the	  achievement	  of	  
behavioral	  subgoals	  that	  support	  the	  system’s	  ultimate	  
goal.”392	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  Reber,	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These	  definitions	  highlight	  that	  certain	  capabilities	  that	  are	  connected	  with	  intelligent	  
behaviour	  play	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  defining	  the	  concept	  of	  intelligence.	  While	  research	  into	  
human	  intelligence	  has	  focused	  on	  what	  constitutes	  intelligence	  and	  how	  it	  can	  be	  
defined	  and	  classified,	  the	  existence	  of	  human	  intelligence	  per	  se	  is	  not	  an	  issue.	  
Humans	  are,	  one	  can	  say,	  by	  default	  endowed	  with	  at	  least	  a	  minimum	  degree	  of	  
intelligence.	  	  
	  
However,	  the	  problem	  of	  defining	  the	  concept	  of	  intelligence	  in	  AI	  is	  that	  computers	  (or	  
more	  accurately	  the	  underlying	  software)	  do	  not	  naturally	  possess	  intelligence	  on	  a	  
human	  level.	  Intelligence	  is	  embedded	  into	  software	  through	  the	  engineer	  and	  software	  
designer.	  The	  focus	  in	  AI	  is	  on	  how	  to	  replicate	  and	  create	  intelligence	  on	  a	  human	  level	  
in	  machines.	  	  
This	  requires	  an	  understanding	  of	  what	  constitutes	  human	  intelligence,	  and	  what	  the	  
underlying	  principles	  of	  this	  concept	  are.	  
When	  the	  digital	  computer	  was	  invented	  more	  than	  half	  a	  century	  ago,	  many	  felt	  that	  
the	  essence	  of	  thinking,	  the	  core	  of	  intelligence,	  had	  been	  found.393	  This	  was	  the	  case	  
because	  computers	  were	  capable	  of	  simulating	  natural	  language	  and	  problem	  solving	  
on	  a	  human-­‐like	  level,	  or	  even	  excelled	  humans	  at	  this.	  A	  famous	  example	  for	  this	  is	  the	  
victory	  by	  the	  IBM	  Deep	  Blue	  chess	  computer	  over	  Garry	  Kasparov,	  the	  world	  chess	  
champion	  at	  the	  time,	  in	  a	  match	  in	  1997.394	  However,	  this	  victory	  was	  based	  on	  the	  
computer	  being	  capable	  of	  undertaking	  millions	  of	  calculations	  (of	  the	  various	  possible	  
manoeuvres	  in	  the	  game	  and	  their	  consequences)	  in	  a	  very	  short	  time,	  and	  not	  on	  the	  
fact	  that	  the	  computer	  was	  particularly	  intelligent.	  	  
	  
However,	  if	  a	  computer	  capable	  of	  beating	  the	  world	  chess	  champion	  is	  not	  intelligent,	  
the	  question	  remaining	  is	  what	  constitutes	  artificial	  intelligence?	  Section	  5.1.1,	  
introducing	  the	  basics	  of	  AI,	  states	  that	  one	  way	  of	  defining	  this	  domain	  is	  the	  art	  of	  
creating	  machines	  doing	  tasks	  requiring	  intelligence.395	  While	  this	  definition	  highlights	  
that	  human	  intelligence	  is	  a	  crucial	  benchmark	  for	  determining	  artificial	  intelligence,	  it	  
does	  not	  provide	  more	  helpful	  information	  beyond	  this.	  Another	  definition	  introduced	  
in	  the	  same	  section	  further	  specifies	  that	  creating	  such	  machines	  capable	  of	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undertaking	  tasks	  requiring	  intelligence,	  means	  recreating	  human	  mental	  
capabilities.396	  Thus	  this	  definition	  explains	  in	  more	  detail	  what	  human	  intelligence	  
means,	  namely	  that	  it	  refers	  to	  mental	  capabilities.	  	  
	  
While	  this	  information	  is	  not	  specific	  enough	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  general	  explanation	  of	  what	  
the	  concept	  of	  intelligence	  refers	  to	  in	  AI,	  it	  can	  serve	  as	  a	  starting	  point	  for	  the	  analysis	  
in	  this	  section.	  The	  important	  aspect	  that	  can	  be	  drawn	  from	  this	  is	  that	  knowledge	  of	  
what	  constitutes	  human	  intelligence	  is	  required	  before	  being	  able	  to	  determine	  what	  
precisely	  constitutes	  the	  concept	  of	  intelligence	  in	  AI.	  
5.4.2.1 Human Intelligence 
As	  depicted	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  human	  intelligence	  is	  still	  a	  rather	  unexplored	  and	  
largely	  unknown	  concept.	  
As	  Albus	  puts	  it,	  “the	  definition	  of	  human	  intelligence	  remains	  a	  subject	  of	  much	  
controversy,	  and	  so	  must	  any	  theory	  that	  attempts	  to	  explain	  what	  intelligence	  is,	  how	  
it	  originated,	  or	  what	  are	  the	  fundamental	  processes	  by	  which	  it	  functions.”397	  	  
One	  of	  the	  first	  attempts	  at	  creating	  a	  scientific	  test	  to	  determine	  what	  constitutes	  
human	  intelligence	  was	  the	  introduction	  of	  intelligence	  (IQ)	  tests.	  The	  general	  idea	  of	  
an	  IQ	  test	  is	  to	  measure	  a	  capacity	  that	  is	  not	  dependent	  on	  particular	  knowledge	  but	  is,	  
in	  a	  sense,	  a	  “general	  intelligence	  capacity”,	  or	  “factor	  g”,	  as	  it	  is	  sometimes	  called.398	  
The	  heritage	  of	  the	  IQ	  test	  is	  grounded	  in	  the	  work	  of	  Galton,	  the	  “father”	  of	  the	  study	  of	  
individual	  differences.399	  	  
It	  was	  Binet,	  who	  wanted	  to	  predict	  the	  school	  success	  of	  Paris	  children	  with	  this	  test,	  
who	  invented	  the	  IQ	  test	  as	  is	  known	  today	  in	  1905.400	  	  
	  
There	  has	  been	  a	  huge	  controversy	  about	  the	  validity	  and	  usefulness	  of	  the	  IQ	  test	  and	  
the	  general	  consensus	  is	  that	  this	  test	  measures	  general	  abilities	  that	  are	  of	  particular	  
importance	  for	  learning	  abilities	  at	  school,	  but	  that	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  reduce	  a	  highly	  
complex	  phenomenon	  like	  human	  intelligence	  to	  a	  single	  number,	  and	  that	  these	  tests	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fail	  to	  predict	  well	  the	  life	  outcomes	  for	  many	  people.401	  Thus	  the	  major	  controversy	  is	  
rooted	  in	  the	  criticism	  that	  IQ	  tests	  are	  not	  a	  fair	  sample	  of	  a	  person’s	  entire	  repertoire	  
of	  adaptive	  behaviour,	  and	  are	  not	  adequate	  indicators	  of	  the	  quality	  and	  character	  of	  
human	  functioning.	  Hence,	  intelligence	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  what	  IQ	  tests	  measure.	  	  
This	  was	  confirmed	  by	  many,	  but	  particularly	  Gardner	  in	  his	  research	  has	  found	  that	  
intelligence	  consists	  of	  “multiple	  intelligences”	  or	  “multiple	  competences”	  as	  he	  has	  
coined	  it.402	  According	  to	  Gardner	  intelligence	  consists	  not	  of	  one	  single	  factor	  but	  of	  
multiple	  ones:	  linguistic	  intelligence,	  musical	  intelligence,	  logical-­‐mathematical	  
intelligence,	  spatial	  intelligence,	  bodily-­‐kinesthetic	  intelligence,	  and	  personal	  
intelligences	  (inter-­‐	  and	  intrapersonal).403	  Thus	  human	  intelligence	  is	  more	  difficult	  to	  
determine	  and	  understand	  than	  imagined	  by	  the	  founders	  of	  the	  IQ	  test.	  	  
These	  attempts	  to	  test	  intelligence	  have	  raised	  the	  issue	  of	  where	  intelligence	  and	  
knowledge	  stems	  from:	  the	  so-­‐called	  nature-­‐nurture	  debate.404	  This	  debate	  is	  of	  
relevance	  for	  the	  determination	  of	  artificial	  intelligence,	  as	  it	  could	  provide	  essential	  
information	  on	  where	  intelligence	  stems	  from	  and	  how	  it	  can	  be	  developed,	  and	  
therefore	  replicated.	  However,	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  recite	  the	  whole	  debate	  here	  and	  the	  
focus	  will	  therefore	  be	  on	  the	  main	  arguments.	  
	  
The	  major	  points	  of	  view	  –	  Locke	  versus	  Descartes,	  empiricism	  versus	  rationalism,	  a	  
“blank	  slate”	  versus	  a	  “prepared	  mind”,	  and	  behaviorism	  versus	  ethology-­‐	  represent	  
two	  essentially	  different	  approaches	  to	  understanding	  how	  individuals	  gain	  
knowledge.405	  Hence,	  those	  following	  the	  “nature”	  view	  argue	  that	  development	  is	  
largely	  the	  expression	  of	  genetically	  predetermined	  factors,	  whereas	  those	  following	  
the	  “nurture”	  view	  argue	  that	  most	  abilities	  are	  acquired	  during	  development	  and	  can	  
be	  learned.	  	  The	  debate	  around	  these	  issues	  is	  long	  standing	  but	  no	  sufficient	  evidence	  
proofing	  one	  view	  has	  been	  generated	  to	  date.	  However,	  results	  from	  scientific	  studies	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suggest	  that	  the	  claim	  that	  intelligence	  and	  knowledge	  is	  solely	  “hard-­‐wired	  into	  the	  
genes”	  and	  cannot	  be	  acquired	  and	  influenced	  by	  the	  environment	  is	  problematic.	  	  
	  
Scarr	  and	  Weinberg	  conducted	  a	  study	  among	  cross-­‐racial	  adopted	  children	  in	  1976.406	  
In	  this	  study,	  the	  IQ	  of	  black	  children	  adopted	  by	  white	  upper-­‐middle-­‐class	  families	  was	  
compared	  to	  that	  of	  black	  or	  interracial	  children	  not	  raised	  in	  the	  specific	  culture	  of	  the	  
tests	  and	  schools.	  The	  adopted	  children	  scored	  well	  above	  average	  on	  IQ	  tests	  and	  on	  
school	  achievement	  measures,	  and	  much	  better	  than	  the	  black	  and	  interracial	  children	  
with	  similar	  genetic	  background,	  who	  grew	  up	  in	  a	  different	  environment.	  This	  study	  
showed	  that	  the	  environment	  does	  indeed	  play	  a	  role	  in	  the	  development	  of	  
intelligence	  and	  the	  acquiring	  of	  knowledge.	  Therefore,	  it	  can	  be	  concluded	  that	  genes	  
are	  not	  the	  sole	  determinator	  for	  behavior.	  Rather,	  they	  establish	  a	  range	  of	  possible	  
reactions	  to	  the	  range	  of	  possible	  experiences	  that	  environments	  can	  provide.	  
Environments	  can	  also	  affect	  whether	  the	  full	  range	  of	  gene	  reactivity	  is	  expressed.	  
Thus,	  how	  people	  behave	  or	  what	  their	  measured	  IQs	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  or	  how	  quickly	  
they	  learn	  depends	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  their	  environments	  and	  on	  their	  genetic	  
endowments	  bestowed	  at	  conception.407	  	  
	  
Having	  reached	  this	  conclusion,	  the	  problem	  then	  is	  to	  determine	  how	  this	  
development	  works,	  thus	  how	  environmental	  and	  genetic	  factors	  interact	  in	  the	  
organism	  to	  create	  intelligence.	  Understanding	  this	  is	  a	  vital	  step	  towards	  replicating	  
human	  intelligence	  in	  machines	  and	  therefore	  understanding	  the	  concept	  of	  artificial	  
intelligence.	  Much	  research	  has	  been	  undertaken	  in	  the	  fields	  of	  neuroscience	  and	  
neuroinformatics	  to	  understand	  and	  recreate	  this	  process.408	  Neural	  networks	  
introduced	  in	  section	  5.3	  are	  one	  of	  the	  research	  outputs	  of	  this	  field,	  attempting	  to	  
replicate	  the	  human	  brain	  and	  creating	  intelligence	  on	  a	  human	  level.	  Thus,	  although	  
much	  is	  known	  about	  the	  mechanisms	  and	  functions	  of	  human	  intelligence	  it	  is	  still	  a	  
difficult	  task	  to	  understand	  the	  fundamental	  nature	  of	  human	  intelligence	  and	  define	  
this.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
406	  S	  Scarr,	  R	  A	  Weinberg	  “IQ	  test	  performance	  of	  black	  children	  adopted	  by	  white	  families”,	  
(1976)	  31:10	  American	  Psychologist,	  726-­‐739.	  
407	  Weinberg,	  note	  399,	  at	  101.	  
408	  See	  e.g.	  D	  Gardner,	  G	  M	  Shepherd	  "A	  gateway	  to	  the	  future	  of	  Neuroinformatics"	  (2004)	  2:3	  
Neuroinformatics	  271–274;	  M	  A	  Arbib,	  J	  S	  Grethe,	  Computing	  the	  Brain:	  A	  Guide	  to	  
Neuroinformatics	  (San	  Diego:	  Academic	  Press,	  2001).	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Albus	  states	  that	  at	  a	  minimum	  level,	  intelligence	  requires	  the	  ability	  to	  sense	  the	  
environment,	  to	  make	  decisions,	  and	  to	  control	  action.	  Higher	  levels	  of	  intelligence	  may	  
include	  the	  ability	  to	  recognise	  objects	  and	  events,	  to	  represent	  knowledge	  in	  a	  world	  
model,	  and	  to	  reason	  about	  and	  plan	  for	  the	  future.	  In	  advanced	  forms,	  intelligence	  
provides	  the	  capacity	  to	  perceive	  and	  understand,	  to	  choose	  wisely,	  and	  to	  act	  
successfully	  under	  a	  large	  variety	  of	  circumstances	  so	  as	  to	  survive,	  prosper,	  and	  
reproduce	  in	  a	  complex	  and	  often	  hostile	  environment.409	  	  
	  
It	  can	  be	  concluded	  that	  human	  intelligence	  is	  a	  profoundly	  complicated	  concept	  that	  is	  
not	  fully	  understood.	  Research	  has	  evidenced	  that	  human	  intelligence	  cannot	  be	  
measured	  in	  one	  number,	  but	  consists	  of	  multiple	  types	  of	  intelligences.	  Human	  
intelligence	  develops	  through	  the	  interaction	  of	  genes	  and	  environmental	  influences	  
and	  exists	  on	  different	  levels.	  Hence,	  machines	  that	  act	  intelligently	  need	  to	  be	  capable	  
of	  achieving	  at	  least	  the	  minimum	  level	  of	  human	  intelligence.	  Considering	  the	  specific	  
use	  of	  the	  new	  software-­‐based	  investigative	  technologies,	  it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  the	  
ability	  to	  sense	  the	  environment,	  make	  decisions,	  and	  control	  actions	  are	  key	  attributes	  
of	  these	  technologies.	  Thus	  in	  a	  next	  step,	  it	  needs	  to	  be	  established	  whether	  the	  
concept	  of	  intelligence	  in	  AI	  refers	  to	  such	  abilities.	  
5.4.2.2 Computational Intelligence 
The	  introduction	  to	  AI	  as	  a	  research	  field	  above,410	  has	  already	  highlighted	  that	  the	  idea	  
of	  intelligent	  software	  is	  old,	  but	  the	  realisation	  of	  this	  a	  difficult	  task.	  This	  section	  
focuses	  solely	  on	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  artificial	  or	  computational	  intelligence,	  
not	  the	  research	  field	  Artificial	  Intelligence	  in	  its	  entirety.411	  However,	  the	  above-­‐
discussed	  basic	  notions	  of	  AI	  are	  highly	  relevant	  for	  the	  analysis	  of	  what	  constitutes	  
computational	  intelligence	  in	  this	  section.	  
	  
The	  original	  aim	  of	  Turing	  to	  replicate	  human	  intelligence	  in	  its	  entirety	  (strong	  AI)	  
has,	  for	  the	  time	  being,	  proven	  to	  be	  impossible.	  The	  aim	  is	  rather	  to	  replicate	  certain	  
notions	  of	  human	  intelligence.	  The	  methodology	  for	  this	  is	  to	  design,	  build,	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
409	  Albus,	  note	  392,	  at	  474.	  
410	  See	  p.	  127.	  
411	  Insofar	  as	  these	  two	  can	  be	  researched	  in	  isolation.	  Artificial	  Intelligence	  as	  a	  research	  field	  
by	  necessity	  includes	  the	  discussion	  of	  machine	  or	  artificial	  intelligence.	  However,	  AI	  as	  a	  
research	  field	  encompasses	  a	  diversity	  of	  research	  areas	  as	  depicted	  above.	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experiment	  with	  computational	  systems	  that	  perform	  tasks	  commonly	  viewed	  as	  
intelligent.412	  The	  focus	  is	  therefore	  not	  on	  defining	  the	  concept	  computational	  
intelligence	  (this	  would	  prove	  equally	  difficult	  as	  defining	  human	  intelligence)	  but	  
rather	  analyse	  whether	  software	  possesses	  capabilities	  that	  can	  be	  classified	  as	  
comparable	  to	  human	  intelligence.	  
	  
As	  discussed	  above,	  human	  intelligence	  exists	  on	  different	  levels.413	  Relevant	  and	  
necessary	  for	  this	  thesis	  are	  particularly	  the	  capabilities	  to	  sense	  the	  environment,	  
make	  decisions,	  and	  control	  actions.	  
	  
McCarthy	  and	  Hayes	  argue	  that	  a	  computer	  program	  capable	  of	  acting	  intelligently	  in	  
the	  world	  must	  have	  a	  general	  representation	  of	  the	  world	  implemented,	  in	  light	  of	  
which	  its	  inputs	  are	  interpreted.414	  The	  above-­‐discussed	  symbolism	  approach	  to	  AI	  
facilitates	  this	  approach.415	  Similar	  to	  symbolic	  AI,	  where	  concepts	  for	  certain	  objects	  
are	  formalised,	  McCarthy	  and	  Hayes	  explain	  that	  concepts	  of	  causality,	  ability,	  and	  
knowledge	  need	  to	  be	  formalised	  to	  enable	  a	  computer	  program	  to	  decide	  what	  to	  
do.416	  	  
Their	  understanding	  of	  computational	  intelligence	  is	  that	  an	  entity	  that	  has	  an	  
adequate	  model	  of	  the	  world	  (including	  the	  intellectual	  world	  of	  mathematics,	  
understanding	  its	  own	  goals	  and	  other	  mental	  processes),	  is	  smart	  enough	  to	  answer	  a	  
wide	  variety	  of	  questions	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  this	  model,	  can	  obtain	  additional	  information	  
from	  the	  external	  world	  when	  required,	  and	  can	  perform	  such	  tasks	  in	  the	  external	  
world	  as	  its	  goals	  demand	  and	  its	  phys	  ical	  abilities	  permit.417	  	  
Albus	  has	  confirmed	  this	  understanding	  of	  computational	  intelligence,	  stating	  that	  the	  
functional	  elements	  of	  an	  intelligent	  system	  are	  behaviour	  generation,	  sensory	  
perception,	  world	  modelling,	  and	  value	  judgment.418	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
412	  D	  Poole,	  A	  Mackworth,	  R	  Goebel,	  Computational	  Intelligence:	  A	  Logical	  Approach	  (New	  York:	  
Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1998)	  2.	  
413	  See	  p.	  144.	  
414	  J	  McCarthy,	  P	  J	  Hayes,	  “Some	  Philosophical	  Problems	  from	  the	  Standpoint	  of	  Artificial	  
Intelligence”	  (1969)	  4	  Machine	  Intelligence,	  464.	  
415	  See	  p.	  129.	  
416	  McCarthy/Hayes,	  note	  414,	  at	  463.	  
417	  McCarthy/Hayes,	  note	  414,	  at	  466.	  
418	  J	  S	  Albus,	  “The	  Engineering	  of	  Mind”	  (1999)	  117	  Information	  Science,	  3.	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Russel	  and	  Norvig	  contribute	  to	  this	  that	  central	  to	  the	  approach	  to	  computational	  
intelligence	  is	  the	  concept	  of	  rationality.419	  	  
	  
Nilsson	  adds	  that	  computational	  intelligent	  behaviour	  involves	  perception,	  reasoning,	  
learning,	  communicating,	  and	  acting	  in	  complex	  environments.420	  	  
	  
Eberhart	  and	  Shi	  understand	  computational	  intelligence	  as	  computing	  that	  provides	  
systems	  with	  an	  ability	  to	  learn	  and/or	  deal	  with	  new	  situations,	  such	  that	  the	  system	  
is	  perceived	  to	  possess	  one	  or	  more	  attributes	  of	  reason,	  such	  as	  generalisation,	  
discovery,	  association,	  and	  abstraction.421	  
	  
These	  definitions	  of	  computational	  intelligence	  confirm	  the	  argument	  that	  the	  
replication	  of	  intelligence	  in	  its	  entirety	  is	  impossible	  and	  indeed	  undesirable,	  but	  that	  
the	  replication	  of	  certain	  human	  behaviour	  and	  capabilities	  considered	  to	  be	  intelligent	  
is	  sufficient	  and	  constitutes	  computational	  intelligence.	  These	  definitions	  also	  confirm	  
that	  the	  capabilities	  relevant	  and	  required	  for	  the	  software	  tools	  discussed	  in	  this	  thesis	  
are	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  what	  constitutes	  computational	  intelligence.	  Thus	  the	  concept	  of	  
(computational)	  intelligence	  as	  such	  seems	  well	  suited	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  key	  concept	  for	  this	  
work.	  
	  
However,	  as	  Poole	  et	  al.	  point	  out,	  there	  is	  a	  tension	  between	  the	  theoretical	  principles	  
of	  computational	  intelligence,	  and	  the	  engineering	  of	  computational	  intelligence.422	  
Thus	  the	  question	  is	  whether	  the	  theoretical	  principles	  developed	  by	  McCarthy	  and	  
Hayes	  and	  others	  can	  technically	  be	  realised.	  	  
	  
The	  engineering	  of	  computational	  intelligence	  requires	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  relevant	  
human	  behaviour.	  Steels	  explains	  that	  “for	  a	  long	  time,	  the	  natural	  sciences	  have	  made	  
progress	  by	  reducing	  the	  complexity	  at	  one	  level	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  underlying	  
components.	  Behaviour	  at	  a	  particular	  level	  is	  explained	  by	  clarifying	  the	  behaviour	  of	  
the	  components	  at	  the	  next	  level	  down.	  For	  example,	  properties	  of	  chemical	  reactions	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
419	  Russell/Norvig,	  note	  279,	  at	  32.	  
420	  N	  J	  Nilsson,	  Artificial	  Intelligence:	  A	  New	  Synthesis	  (Burlington:	  Morgan	  Kaufmann	  
Publishers,	  1998)	  1.	  
421	  R	  C	  Eberhart,	  Y	  Shi,	  Computational	  Intelligence:	  Concepts	  to	  Implementation	  (Burlington:	  
Morgan	  Kaufmann	  Publishers,	  2007)	  3.	  
422	  Poole/Mackworth/Goebel,	  note	  412,	  at	  5.	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are	  explained	  (and	  predicted)	  by	  the	  properties	  of	  the	  molecules	  engaged	  in	  the	  
reactions.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  intelligence,	  researchers	  hope	  that	  an	  understanding	  of	  
intelligence	  will	  come	  from	  understanding	  the	  behaviour	  underlying	  components.	  For	  
example,	  most	  neurophysiologists	  believe	  that	  a	  theory	  of	  intelligence	  will	  result	  from	  
understanding	  the	  behaviour	  of	  neural	  networks	  in	  the	  brain.”423	  
Thus	  replicating	  intelligent	  behaviour	  requires	  identifying	  and	  analysing	  the	  scientific	  
foundations	  of	  the	  equivalent	  human	  behaviour,	  and	  developing	  methods	  to	  engineer	  
these.	  	  
However,	  cognitive	  tasks	  humans	  perform	  every	  day	  without	  consciously	  thinking	  
about	  them	  are	  facilitated	  by	  the	  complex	  adaptive	  biological	  structure	  of	  human	  
brains.424	  Research	  in	  fields	  such	  as	  biology	  and	  biophysics	  has	  shed	  some	  light	  on	  the	  
construction	  and	  operation	  of	  the	  human	  brain	  and	  nervous	  system,	  which	  helps	  to	  
understand	  how	  these	  tasks	  are	  performed.425	  
This	  research	  linked	  with	  the	  requirements	  in	  AI	  has	  led	  to	  the	  development	  of	  
research	  areas	  that	  are	  concerned	  with	  the	  replication	  of	  these	  human	  brain	  functions,	  
and	  thus	  enable	  the	  replication	  of	  intelligent	  behaviour.	  Hence,	  these	  research	  areas	  are	  
essentially	  concerned	  with	  reverse	  engineering	  the	  human	  brain.	  
Albus	  has	  long	  assumed	  that	  brains	  must	  have	  very	  complex,	  explicit,	  hard-­‐wired	  
hierarchies	  of	  systems	  to	  handle	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  complexity	  in	  space	  and	  in	  time.426	  
This	  finding	  was	  confirmed	  by	  research	  into	  the	  reverse	  engineering	  of	  the	  human	  
brain,	  and	  has	  been	  a	  fundamental	  pillar	  for	  the	  development	  of	  research	  areas	  
concerned	  with	  the	  replication	  of	  intelligent	  behaviour.427	  	  
Discussing	  these	  research	  areas	  and	  their	  findings	  in	  great	  detail	  would	  go	  beyond	  the	  
scope	  of	  this	  work.	  However,	  the	  most	  relevant	  findings	  are	  introduced	  below,	  to	  
establish	  in	  how	  far	  the	  replication	  of	  intelligent	  behaviour	  is	  feasible.	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  L	  Steels,	  “When	  Are	  Robots	  Intellligent	  Autonomous	  Agents?”	  (1995)	  15	  Robotics	  and	  
Systems,	  4.	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  Eberhart/Shi,	  note	  421,	  at	  4.	  
425	  Ibid.	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  Albus,	  note	  392,	  at	  473.	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  See	  e.g.	  P	  J	  Werbos,	  “ADP	  Design	  to	  Replicate/Understand	  Brain	  Intelligence”	  in	  L	  I	  
Perlovsky,	  R	  Kozma,	  Understanding	  Complex	  Systems	  (Berlin,	  Heidelberg:	  Springer	  Verlag,	  2007)	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5.4.2.2.1 Artificial Neural Networks 
Human-­‐level	  intelligence	  entails	  the	  capacity	  to	  handle	  a	  broad	  array	  of	  challenges,	  
including	  logical	  reasoning,	  understanding	  the	  semantic	  content	  of	  language,	  learning,	  
navigating	  around	  obstacles	  in	  a	  room,	  discerning	  the	  intent	  of	  other	  agents,	  and	  
planning	  and	  decision	  making	  in	  situations	  where	  information	  is	  incomplete.428	  In	  
humans,	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  brain	  enables	  these	  capacities.	  Artificial	  neural	  
networks,	  a	  technique	  to	  replicate	  this	  brain	  functioning,	  are	  one	  approach	  to	  creating	  
software	  capable	  of	  intelligent	  behaviour.	  
Artificial	  neural	  networks	  are	  based	  on	  the	  biological	  neural	  networks	  model,	  which	  is	  
a	  network	  or	  circuit	  of	  biological	  neurons.429	  To	  facilitate	  the	  replication	  of	  intelligent	  
behaviour,	  and	  in	  particular	  the	  abilities	  to	  sense	  the	  environment,	  make	  decisions	  
based	  on	  visual	  stimuli,	  and	  control	  one’s	  actions,	  simplified	  models	  of	  artificial	  neural	  
networks	  mimicking	  the	  neural	  processing	  in	  the	  brain	  have	  been	  developed.	  The	  
replication	  of	  biological	  neural	  networks	  is	  particularly	  interesting,	  because	  the	  brain	  
and	  its	  functions	  are	  so	  remarkably	  robust;	  it	  does	  not	  stop	  working	  just	  because	  a	  few	  
cells	  die.430	  	  	  
Krogh	  states	  that	  “the	  computations	  of	  the	  brain	  are	  done	  by	  a	  highly	  interconnected	  
network	  of	  neurons,	  which	  communicate	  by	  sending	  electric	  pulses	  through	  the	  neural	  
wiring	  consisting	  of	  axons,	  synapses	  and	  dendrites.”431	  This	  biological	  process	  of	  
sensory	  processing	  by	  the	  brain	  inspired	  the	  creation	  of	  artificial	  neural	  networks.	  
Simulating	  a	  network	  of	  model	  neurons	  in	  a	  computer	  can	  create	  an	  artificial	  neural	  
network.432	  By	  applying	  algorithms	  that	  mimic	  the	  processes	  of	  real	  neurons,	  the	  
artificial	  network	  can	  ‘learn’	  to	  solve	  many	  types	  of	  problems.433	  	  Most	  current	  versions	  
of	  artificial	  neural	  networks,	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  self-­‐organising	  networks,	  learn	  to	  
classify	  information	  without	  being	  taught.	  This	  is	  called	  unsupervised	  adaption	  and	  can	  
frequently	  be	  used	  to	  categorise	  information	  when	  no	  known	  categories	  exist	  yet.434	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  W	  Wallach,	  S	  Franklin,	  C	  Allen,	  “A	  Conceptual	  and	  Computational	  Model	  of	  Moral	  Decision	  
Making	  in	  Human	  and	  Artificial	  Agents”	  (2010)	  2	  Topics	  in	  Cognitive	  Science,	  455.	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  J	  J	  Hoppfield,	  “Neural	  Networks	  and	  Physical	  Systems	  with	  Emergent	  Collective	  
Computational	  Abilities”	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  Proceedings	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  2554.	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This	  enables	  the	  integration	  of	  software	  into	  a	  real-­‐world	  environment,	  since	  the	  
system	  is	  capable	  of	  dynamically	  behaving	  in	  unknown	  situations.435	  	  
	  
Neural	  networks	  have	  highly	  desirable	  properties:	  just	  like	  natural	  brains	  they	  can	  
adapt	  and	  learn,	  they	  are	  noise	  and	  fault	  tolerant,	  i.e.	  they	  continue	  to	  function	  even	  
when	  partially	  damaged,	  and	  they	  can	  generalise,	  meaning	  they	  continue	  to	  work	  in	  
similar	  but	  different	  situations.436	  	  
Salomon	  finds	  that	  the	  field	  of	  autonomous	  agents	  is	  an	  important	  application	  domain	  
for	  neural	  networks,	  since	  they	  behave	  in	  the	  real	  world	  without	  any	  human	  control.437	  
The	  unsupervised	  adaption	  capability	  of	  neural	  network	  based	  systems	  is	  particularly	  
important	  for	  autonomous	  agents.	  This	  is	  also	  the	  case	  for	  the	  software	  tools	  deployed	  
during	  online	  searches	  of	  computers,	  which	  need	  to	  be	  capable	  of	  sensing	  and	  
understanding	  their	  environment,	  and	  making	  decisions	  based	  on	  the	  information	  
retrieved.	  
Salomon	  states	  further	  that	  the	  employment	  of	  neural	  networks	  to	  autonomous	  agent	  
software	  should	  lead	  to	  intelligent	  behaviour	  of	  these.438	  	  
Thus	  artificial	  neural	  networks	  enable	  the	  replication	  of	  intelligent	  behaviour	  
introduced	  in	  the	  previous	  section.	  
5.4.2.2.2 Fuzzy Logic 
Fuzzy	  logic	  is	  another	  technique	  that	  facilitates	  the	  replication	  of	  intelligent	  behaviour,	  
and	  implementation	  of	  this	  into	  software	  tools.	  	  
Fuzzy	  logic	  provides	  a	  general	  concept	  for	  description	  and	  measurement.	  Most	  fuzzy	  
logic	  systems	  encode	  human	  reasoning	  into	  a	  program	  to	  make	  decisions	  or	  control	  a	  
system.439	  	  
However,	  as	  opposed	  to	  neural	  networks,	  the	  biological	  motivation	  or	  basis	  for	  fuzzy	  
logic	  does	  not	  originate	  at	  the	  cellular	  level.	  Rather,	  as	  Eberhart	  and	  Shi	  state,	  it	  is	  
reflected	  at	  the	  behavioural	  level	  of	  the	  organism,	  that	  is,	  in	  the	  ways	  the	  organism	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  A	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  Evolving	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  Agents	  Navigating	  
Dynamic	  Environments	  (University	  of	  Northern	  British	  Columbia:	  Thesis,	  2008)	  1.	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  R	  Pfeifer,	  J	  Bongard,	  D	  Berry,	  Designing	  Intelligence	  –	  Why	  Brains	  Aren’t	  Enough	  
(Norderstedt:	  GRIN	  Verlag,	  2011)	  16.	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  R	  Salomon,	  “Neural	  Networks	  in	  the	  Context	  of	  Autonomous	  Agents:	  Important	  Concepts	  
Revisited”	  in	  C	  H	  Dagli	  et	  al.	  (eds)	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  Artificial	  Neural	  Networks	  in	  Engineering	  
(ANNIE’96)	  (New	  York:	  ASME	  Press,	  1996)	  109.	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  Ibid.	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  Eberhart/Shi,	  note	  421,	  at	  269.	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interacts	  with	  its	  environment.440	  They	  further	  explain,	  “while	  neural	  networks	  are	  
deeply	  rooted	  in	  biology,	  fuzzy	  logic	  deals	  mainly	  with	  uncertainty	  and	  vagueness.	  We	  
do	  not	  live	  in	  a	  world	  of	  ones	  and	  zeros,	  black	  and	  white,	  true	  and	  false,	  or	  other	  
absolutes.	  Our	  observations,	  communications,	  and	  experiences	  almost	  always	  include	  a	  
large	  measure	  of	  uncertainty.”441	  	  
Ross	  elaborates	  further	  on	  this,	  stating	  that	  “our	  understanding	  of	  most	  physical	  
processes	  is	  based	  largely	  on	  imprecise	  human	  reasoning.	  This	  imprecision	  (when	  
compared	  to	  the	  precise	  quantities	  required	  by	  computers)	  is	  nonetheless	  a	  form	  of	  
information	  that	  can	  be	  quite	  useful	  to	  humans.	  The	  ability	  to	  embed	  such	  reasoning	  in	  
hitherto	  intractable	  and	  complex	  problems	  is	  the	  criterion	  by	  which	  the	  efficacy	  of	  
fuzzy	  logic	  is	  judged.”442	  
Zadeh	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  the	  pioneer	  of	  fuzzy	  logic.443	  He	  defines	  fuzzy	  logic	  as	  “the	  
precise	  logic	  of	  imprecision.	  More	  concretely,	  fuzzy	  logic	  is	  a	  system	  of	  reasoning	  and	  
computation	  in	  which	  the	  objects	  of	  reasoning	  and	  computation	  are	  classes	  with	  
unsharp	  boundaries.”444	  He	  elaborates	  further	  that	  “fuzziness	  of	  human	  concepts	  is	  a	  
pervasive	  facet	  of	  human	  cognition.”445	  
Thus	  fuzzy	  logic	  can	  facilitate	  reasoning	  about	  fluid	  and	  approximate	  facts	  and	  
circumstances,	  instead	  of	  fixed	  and	  exact	  ones	  usually	  required	  for	  computational	  
reasoning.	  This	  enables	  software	  to	  reason	  about	  uncertain,	  unclear,	  or	  unknown	  facts	  
and	  situations,	  applying	  a	  methodology	  similar	  to	  the	  reasoning	  of	  humans,	  which	  is	  
based	  on	  past	  experiences	  and	  memories	  about	  similar	  situations.	  	  
Two	  main	  directions	  in	  fuzzy	  logic	  can	  be	  distinguished:	  a)	  Fuzzy	  logic	  in	  the	  broad	  
sense,	  and	  b)	  fuzzy	  logic	  in	  the	  narrow	  sense.446	  Fuzzy	  logic	  in	  the	  broad	  sense	  serves	  
predominantly	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  fuzzy	  control	  and	  analysis	  of	  vagueness	  in	  natural	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  T	  J	  Ross,	  Fuzzy	  Logic	  with	  Engineering	  Applications	  (Chichester:	  John	  Wiley	  &	  Sons,	  2004,	  
2nd	  ed.)	  2.	  
443	  See	  e.g.	  L	  A	  Zadeh,	  “Fuzzy	  Sets”	  (1965)	  8	  Information	  and	  Control,	  338-­‐353;	  L	  A	  Zadeh	  ,	  
“Fuzzy	  Logic	  and	  Approximate	  Reasoning”	  (1975)	  30:3-­‐4	  Synthese,	  407-­‐428;	  L	  A	  Zadeh,	  “Fuzzy	  
Sets	  as	  a	  Basis	  for	  a	  Theory	  of	  Posibility”	  (1978)	  1:1	  Fuzzy	  Sets	  and	  Systems,	  3-­‐28;	  L	  A	  Zadeh,	  
“Fuzzy	  Logic”	  (1988)	  21:4	  Computer,	  83-­‐93;	  L	  A	  Zadeh,	  “Fuzzy	  Logic,	  Neural	  Networks,	  and	  Soft	  
Computing”	  (1994)	  37:3	  Communicatioins	  of	  the	  ACM,	  77-­‐84;	  L	  A	  Zadeh,	  “A	  Summary	  and	  
Update	  of	  Fuzzy	  Logic”	  (2010)	  2010	  IEEE	  International	  Conference	  on	  Granular	  Computing,	  42-­‐
44.	  
444	  L	  A	  Zadeh,	  ibid	  (2010),	  at	  42.	  
445	  Ibid.	  
446	  L	  A	  Zadeh,	  “Preface”	  in	  R	  J	  Marks	  (ed)	  Fuzzy	  Logic	  Technology	  and	  Applications	  (New	  Jersey:	  
IEEE	  Press,	  1994)	  xvii.	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language.447	  Fuzzy	  logic	  in	  the	  narrow	  sense	  is	  symbolic	  logic	  with	  a	  comparative	  
notion	  of	  truth	  developed	  fully	  in	  the	  spirit	  of	  classical	  logic.448	  
Fuzzy	  logic	  has	  been	  applied	  to	  autonomous	  agent	  software	  to	  enable	  the	  decision-­‐
making	  and	  navigation	  in	  unknown	  virtual	  environments.449	  
Hence	  fuzzy	  logic	  is	  suitable	  to	  enable	  intelligent	  behaviour	  in	  software	  and	  situations	  
relevant	  for	  this	  thesis.	  	  
	  
Neural	  networks	  and	  fuzzy	  logic	  combined	  thus	  offer	  possibilities	  to	  enable	  the	  
replication	  of	  intelligent	  behaviour,	  and	  in	  particular	  the	  sensing	  of	  the	  environment	  
and	  the	  ability	  to	  make	  decisions	  based	  on	  information	  retrieved	  from	  the	  
environment,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  ability	  to	  control	  its	  own	  actions	  and	  adapting	  these	  to	  the	  
requirements	  of	  the	  environment.	  
	  
It	  can	  therefore	  be	  concluded	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  computational	  intelligence	  differs	  from	  
that	  of	  human	  intelligence.	  However,	  the	  notion	  of	  computational	  intelligence	  
incorporates	  some	  of	  the	  key	  characteristics	  of	  software-­‐based	  investigative	  tools,	  and	  
is	  therefore	  adequate	  and	  relevant	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  key	  concept	  for	  the	  new	  class	  of	  cyber-­‐
cops.	  In	  addition,	  the	  analysis	  of	  computational	  intelligence	  has	  indicated	  that	  this	  
notion	  is	  flexible	  and	  capable	  of	  dealing	  with	  technological	  changes,	  thus	  adequate	  to	  
deal	  with	  future	  developments	  and	  enhancements	  of	  relevant	  ICT-­‐based	  investigative	  
technologies	  and	  tools.	  
	  
However,	  the	  concept	  of	  intelligence	  raises	  several	  pertinent	  legal	  issues,	  which	  are	  
only	  mentioned	  at	  this	  stage	  and	  analysed	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  the	  following	  chapters	  of	  
this	  thesis.	  The	  abilities	  of	  software	  code	  to	  control	  its	  own	  actions,	  and	  adapt	  and	  react	  
to	  its	  environment	  without	  the	  influence	  or	  control	  of	  the	  operator	  lead	  to	  legal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
447	  See	  for	  more	  details	  on	  this	  notion	  e.g.:	  V	  Novak,	  Fuzzy	  Sets	  and	  their	  Applications	  (Bristol:	  
Adam	  Hilger,	  1989);	  H-­‐J	  Zimmermann,	  Fuzzy	  Set	  Theory	  and	  its	  Applications	  (Dordrecht:	  Kluwer,	  
1991,	  2nd	  ed);	  G	  J	  Klir,	  B	  Yuan	  (eds)	  Fuzzy	  Sets,	  Fuzzy	  Logic	  and	  Fuzzy	  Systems:	  Selected	  Papers	  
by	  Lotfi	  A	  Zadeh	  (Singapore:	  World	  Scientific,	  1996);	  H	  T	  Nguyen,	  C	  Noguera,	  First	  Course	  in	  
Fuzzy	  Logic	  (Boca	  Raton:	  Chapman	  &	  Hall/CCRC	  Press,	  1999,	  2dn	  ed).	  
448	  See	  for	  more	  details	  on	  this	  notion	  e.g:	  P	  Hajek,	  Metamathematics	  of	  Fuzzy	  Logic	  (Dordrecht:	  
Kluwer,	  1998);	  E	  Turunen,	  Mathematics	  Behind	  Fuzzy	  Logic	  (Advances	  in	  Soft	  Computing)	  
(Heidelberg:	  Physica	  Verlag,	  1999);	  V	  Novak,	  I	  Perfilieva,	  J	  Mockor,	  Mathematical	  Principles	  of	  
Fuzzy	  Logic	  (Dordrecht:	  Kluwer,	  2000);	  S	  Gottwald,	  A	  Treatise	  on	  Many-­Valued	  Logic	  (Baldock:	  
Research	  Studies	  Press,	  2001);	  R	  Cignoli,	  I	  D’Ottaviano,	  D	  Mundici,	  Algebraic	  Foundations	  of	  
Many-­Valued	  Reasoning	  (Dordrecht:	  Kluwer,	  2000).	  
449	  See	  J	  Jaafar,	  E	  McKenzie,	  “Decision	  Making	  Method	  Using	  Fuzzy	  Logic	  for	  Autonomous	  Agent	  
Navigation”	  (2011)	  3:1	  Electronic	  Journal	  of	  Computer	  Science	  and	  Information	  Technology,	  8-­‐18.	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questions	  about	  the	  regulation	  of	  these	  tools,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  reliability	  of	  the	  evidence	  
collected.	  During	  the	  interviews,	  these	  were	  the	  most	  pressing	  concerns	  in	  relation	  to	  
these	  abilities	  voiced	  by	  the	  different	  parties	  interviewed.	  	  
5.4.3 Autonomy 
In	  addition	  to	  mobility	  and	  intelligence,	  autonomy	  has	  been	  identified	  as	  a	  potential	  
third	  key	  concept	  above.450	  	  
The	  term	  autonomy	  stems	  from	  Greek:	  Auto-­‐nomos.	  Auto	  meaning	  self,	  and	  nomos	  
meaning	  law.	  It	  refers	  to	  an	  entity	  that	  gives	  itself	  its	  own	  laws.	  Generally,	  the	  term	  
autonomy	  refers	  to	  the	  quality	  or	  state	  of	  being	  self-­‐governing.451	  	  
However,	  autonomy	  is	  a	  concept	  with	  a	  long	  history,	  and	  has	  therefore	  been	  developed	  
and	  interpreted	  in	  various	  ways.	  As	  a	  result,	  autonomy	  is	  a	  concept	  bearing	  many	  
connotations	  such	  as	  rationality,	  freedom,	  independence,	  and	  self-­‐determination.452	  
Generally,	  autonomy	  in	  humans	  can	  be	  summed	  up	  to	  mean	  that	  to	  be	  autonomous	  is	  to	  
be	  a	  law	  to	  oneself.453	  
Generally,	  all	  these	  conditions	  or	  qualities	  relate	  to	  the	  freedom	  from	  control	  by	  others.	  
This	  means	  that	  autonomy	  requires	  a	  certain	  degree	  of	  intelligence.	  As	  discussed	  in	  the	  
previous	  section,	  humans	  are	  by	  nature	  endowed	  with	  a	  certain	  degree	  of	  intelligence.	  
The	  discussion	  of	  intelligence	  has	  highlighted	  that	  human	  and	  computational	  
intelligence	  are	  not	  identical	  concepts.	  	  
The	  question	  is	  therefore	  what	  the	  concept	  of	  autonomy	  in	  AI	  refers	  to,	  and	  whether	  it	  
incorporates	  the	  key	  attributes	  of	  the	  relevant	  investigative	  technologies	  identified	  
above.454	  
	  
As	  a	  first	  step,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  distinguish	  between	  autonomy	  and	  the	  concept	  of	  
automatic	  systems,	  as	  these	  appear	  to	  be	  similar.	  However,	  as	  Steels	  discusses,	  the	  
concept	  of	  automation	  has	  a	  different	  linguistic	  root.455	  It	  stems	  from	  the	  etymology	  of	  
the	  term	  cybernetic,	  which	  derives	  from	  the	  Greek	  for	  self-­steering.	  Thus	  automatic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
450	  See	  p.	  124.	  
451	  Merriam-­‐Webster	  Dictionary,	  “Autonomy”	  available	  online	  at	  http://www.merriam-­‐
webster.com/dictionary/autonomy.	  
452	  M	  Schermer,	  The	  Different	  Faces	  of	  Autonomy:	  Patient	  Autonomy	  in	  Ethical	  Theory	  and	  
Hospital	  Practice	  (Dordrecht:	  Kluwer,	  2002)	  1.	  
453	  Stanford	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Philosophy,	  “Personal	  Autonomy”	  1.	  
454	  See	  p.	  125.	  
455	  Steels,	  note	  423,	  at	  5.	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systems	  are	  self-­‐regulating,	  but	  they	  do	  not	  make	  the	  laws	  that	  their	  regulatory	  
activities	  seek	  to	  satisfy.	  These	  are	  given	  to	  them,	  or	  built	  into	  them.456	  Autonomous	  
systems	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  are	  systems	  that	  develop,	  for	  themselves,	  the	  laws	  and	  
strategies	  according	  to	  which	  they	  regulate	  their	  behaviour:	  they	  are	  self-­‐governing	  as	  
well	  as	  self-­‐regulating.457	  	  
Considering	  the	  specific	  demands	  for	  investigative	  tools	  policing	  the	  virtual	  living	  space	  
identified	  above,	  it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  automatic	  systems	  is	  not	  
sufficient.	  While	  some	  of	  the	  rules	  will	  be	  pre-­‐defined,	  the	  software	  tools	  need	  to	  be	  
capable	  of	  adjusting	  or	  amending	  these	  depending	  on	  the	  environment,	  collected	  data,	  
and	  suspect	  behaviour.	  
	  
Definitions	  of	  autonomy	  in	  the	  AI	  domain	  provide	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  
concept	  autonomy.	  
Liu	  et	  al.	  divide	  autonomy	  into	  four	  sub-­‐classes,	  for	  which	  they	  offer	  definitions:	  entity	  
autonomy,	  synthetic	  autonomy,	  emergent	  autonomy	  and	  computational	  system	  
autonomy.458	  
They	  define	  entity	  autonomy	  as	  “a	  condition	  or	  quality	  of	  being	  self-­‐governed,	  self-­‐
determined,	  and	  self-­‐directed.	  It	  guarantees	  that	  the	  primitive	  behaviour	  of	  an	  entity	  is	  
free	  from	  the	  explicit	  control	  of	  other	  entities.”459	  	  
Synthetic	  autonomy	  refers	  to	  “an	  abstracted	  equivalent	  of	  autonomy	  of	  an	  entity	  in	  a	  
natural	  complex	  system.	  An	  entity	  with	  synthetic	  autonomy	  is	  the	  fundamental	  building	  
block	  of	  an	  autonomy	  oriented	  computing	  system.”460	  
Emergent	  autonomy	  “is	  an	  observable,	  self-­‐induced	  condition	  or	  quality	  of	  an	  autonomy	  
oriented	  computing	  system	  that	  is	  composed	  of	  entities	  with	  synthetic	  autonomy.”461	  
Computational	  autonomy	  “is	  built	  from	  computational	  entities	  with	  synthetic	  
autonomy,	  refers	  to	  conditions	  or	  qualities	  of	  having	  self-­‐governed,	  self-­‐determined,	  
and	  self-­‐directed	  computational	  entities	  that	  exhibit	  emergent	  autonomy.”462	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  Ibid.	  	  
457	  Ibid.	  
458	  J	  Liu,	  X	  Jin,	  K	  C	  Tsui,	  Autonomy	  Oriented	  Computing:	  From	  Problem	  Solving	  to	  Complex	  
Systems	  Modeling	  (Dordrecht:	  Kluwer,	  2005)	  6.	  
459	  Ibid.	  
460	  Liu/Jin/Tsui,	  ibid,	  at	  7.	  
461	  Ibid.	  
462	  Ibid.	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These	  four	  different	  concepts	  of	  autonomy	  introduced	  by	  Liu	  et	  al.	  highlight	  that	  
autonomy	  is	  a	  social	  concept.	  An	  entity’s	  autonomy	  is	  characterised	  by	  the	  influence	  
and	  relations	  to	  other	  entities.	  Hence,	  autonomy	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  independence.463	  In	  
a	  society	  (natural	  or	  artificial)	  certain	  dependencies	  are	  necessary	  for	  it	  to	  function.464	  
However,	  it	  also	  highlights	  that	  autonomy	  in	  AI,	  just	  like	  mobility	  and	  intelligence,	  
refers	  to	  an	  abstract	  version	  of	  human	  autonomy.	  Thus,	  the	  question	  remains	  whether	  
autonomy	  in	  software	  is	  relevant	  and	  suitable	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  key	  concept	  for	  the	  new	  
class	  of	  investigative	  technologies.	  
Simon	  in	  his	  work	  coins	  the	  term	  quasi-­‐autonomy	  to	  distinguish	  between	  the	  natural	  
and	  the	  artificial	  worlds.465	  He	  regards	  quasi-­‐autonomy	  from	  the	  outer	  environment	  as	  
an	  essential	  characteristic	  of	  complex	  systems.466	  Thereby	  he	  confirms	  that	  certain	  
dependencies	  are	  necessary	  and	  will	  always	  exist.	  
Colman	  and	  Han	  develop	  this	  thought	  further,	  identifying	  five	  levels	  of	  autonomy	  based	  
on	  the	  constraints	  to	  which	  an	  entity	  is	  subject.467	  	  
These	  levels	  are:468	  
1.	  No	  autonomy:	  the	  entity	  is	  told	  what	  actions	  to	  execute,	  and	  always	  attempts	  to	  
execute	  them.	  
2.	  Process	  autonomy:	  the	  entity	  is	  given	  a	  task	  to	  perform	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  goal	  state	  
but	  it	  has	  some	  autonomy	  in	  what	  steps	  are	  executed	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  that	  task.	  	  
3.	  Goal-­state	  autonomy:	  the	  entity	  is	  given	  an	  external	  goal,	  which	  may	  be	  satisfied	  by	  
a	  number	  of	  states.	  
4.	  Intentional	  autonomy:	  the	  entity	  has	  the	  freedom	  to	  decide	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  
satisfy	  external	  goals	  –	  it	  has	  (or	  the	  developers	  ascribe	  to	  it)	  its	  own	  intentions.	  
5.	  Constraint	  autonomy:	  an	  entity	  that	  exhibits	  constraint	  autonomy	  is	  prepared	  to	  
violate	  norms	  or	  even	  rules	  to	  achieve	  its	  goals.	  
	  
These	  five	  levels	  highlight	  that	  the	  degree	  of	  autonomy	  is	  a	  question	  of	  design.	  It	  shows	  
that	  the	  software	  tools	  need	  to	  be	  developed	  with	  the	  application	  environment	  and	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  Dignum,	  “I	  am	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  in	  M	  Nickles,	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Weiss	  (eds)	  Autonomy	  2003,	  LNAI	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  228.	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their	  tasks	  in	  mind.	  Software	  tools	  deployed	  for	  the	  policing	  of	  the	  virtual	  living	  space	  
(such	  as	  for	  the	  online	  searching	  of	  ICTs)	  need	  to	  possess	  at	  least	  intentional	  autonomy	  
to	  accomplish	  the	  tasks	  adequately.	  	  
Thus	  the	  question	  is	  whether	  these	  software	  tools	  can	  be	  endowed	  with	  this	  level	  of	  
autonomy.	  	  
	  
The	  concept	  of	  autonomy	  has	  been	  of	  great	  importance	  for	  software	  agent	  
development,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  development	  of	  malware	  and	  malware-­‐like	  applications.	  	  
D’Inverno	  and	  Luck	  define	  autonomy	  in	  software	  agents	  as	  “not	  being	  dependent	  on	  the	  
goals	  of	  others,	  and	  the	  possession	  of	  goals	  that	  are	  generated	  from	  within	  rather	  than	  
adopted	  from	  other	  agents.	  Such	  goals	  are	  generated	  from	  motivations,	  higher-­‐level	  
non-­‐derivative	  components	  characterising	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  agent,	  but	  which	  are	  
related	  to	  the	  goals.”469	  Similarly	  Castelfranchi	  defines	  an	  autonomous	  agent	  as	  “a	  
software	  program	  able	  to	  exercise	  a	  choice	  that	  is	  relevant	  in	  the	  context	  of	  goals-­‐
directed	  behaviour.”470	  Thus	  he	  equally	  argues	  that	  autonomy	  in	  software	  agents	  is	  
characterised	  in	  terms	  of	  agents	  having	  their	  own	  goals,	  making	  decisions	  about	  these	  
goals	  and	  adopting	  the	  goals	  of	  others	  only	  when	  they	  choose	  to.	  
Jennings	  and	  Wooldridge	  state	  that	  autonomy	  reveals	  “when	  the	  system	  is	  able	  to	  act	  
without	  the	  direct	  intervention	  of	  humans	  (or	  other	  agents),	  and	  has	  control	  over	  its	  
own	  actions	  and	  internal	  state.”471	  In	  other	  words,	  autonomy	  means	  that	  the	  agent	  is	  
able	  to	  act	  continuously	  without	  interfering	  with	  its	  user	  or	  operator.	  
These	  definitions	  indicate	  that	  autonomy	  in	  software	  agents	  exists	  at	  least	  at	  the	  level	  
of	  intentional	  autonomy,	  since	  the	  agents	  are	  capable	  of	  deciding	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  
satisfy	  external	  goals.	  Arguably,	  software	  agents	  can	  possess	  constraint	  autonomy,	  
since	  ignorance	  of	  external	  rules	  implies	  the	  potential	  violation	  of	  these.	  	  
Autonomy	  in	  malware	  or	  malware-­‐like	  software	  is	  less	  well	  defined.	  However,	  Dörges	  
finds	  that	  “autonomy	  is	  important	  for	  most	  malware	  because	  it	  means	  that	  it	  is	  able	  to	  
run	  and	  execute	  without	  user	  intervention.”472	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  274,	  at	  29.	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  Castelfranchi,	  “Guarantees	  for	  Autonomy	  in	  Cognitive	  Agent	  Architecture”	  (1995)	  890	  
Intelligent	  Agents:	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  Architectures,	  and	  Language,	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  Jennings,	  M	  Wooldridge	  
(eds.)	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  (Berlin,	  Heidelberg,	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  Protection	  against	  Viruses,	  Bots,	  and	  Worms	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  so	  hard-­‐	  Malware	  seen	  as	  
Mobile	  Agents”	  (2007)	  PRESECURE	  Consulting	  GmbH,	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  available	  online	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Heiser	  discusses	  this	  in	  more	  detail,	  stating	  that	  autonomy	  is	  “the	  most	  significant	  
aspect	  of	  malware	  behaviour	  within	  any	  particular	  life	  phase,	  affecting	  most	  of	  the	  
other	  characteristics.	  Autonomy	  in	  malware	  means	  that	  the	  code	  operates	  by	  itself	  
automatically	  without	  direct	  human	  intervention.”473	  
Thus,	  while	  no	  detailed	  definitions	  and	  discussions	  about	  the	  meaning	  of	  autonomy	  in	  
malware	  exist,	  those	  academics	  find	  that	  the	  core	  meaning	  of	  the	  concept	  is	  identical	  
with	  that	  of	  software	  agents.	  Both	  refer	  to	  the	  unsupervised	  operation	  of	  software,	  and	  
the	  capability	  of	  goal-­‐oriented	  behaviour.	  	  
The	  technical	  realisation	  of	  these	  capabilities	  is	  not	  discussed	  here.	  Of	  importance	  for	  
this	  chapter	  is	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  autonomy	  in	  AI,	  and	  the	  establishment	  of	  
the	  key	  characteristics	  of	  this	  concept	  to	  determine	  whether	  it	  is	  suitable	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  
key	  concept	  for	  this	  thesis.	  Generally,	  the	  technical	  implementation	  of	  the	  capabilities	  
into	  software	  code	  is	  typically	  undertaken	  through	  formal	  logic	  programming.474	  
Hence,	  the	  concept	  of	  autonomy	  in	  software	  agents	  and	  malware	  is	  identical	  with	  the	  
general	  notion	  of	  (computational)	  autonomy.	  	  
This	  means	  that	  software-­‐based	  investigative	  tools	  policing	  the	  virtual	  living	  space	  are	  
capable	  of	  featuring	  autonomous	  behaviour.	  Hence,	  these	  tools	  are	  capable	  of	  goal-­‐
directed	  behaviour,	  and	  autonomous	  decision-­‐making.	  	  
	  
Based	  on	  this	  review,	  it	  can	  be	  concluded	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  autonomy	  in	  AI	  is	  suitable	  
to	  serve	  as	  a	  key	  concept	  for	  the	  new	  class	  of	  investigative	  software	  tools.	  
	  
Autonomy	  in	  software	  is	  linked	  to	  certain	  risks,	  which	  are	  particularly	  prevalent	  if	  used	  
during	  investigations.	  Most	  significantly,	  the	  software	  tool	  independently	  decides	  about	  
actions,	  and	  develops	  own	  goals	  during	  the	  process.	  Local	  and	  updated	  information	  is	  
taken	  into	  consideration	  during	  the	  investigative	  process,	  and	  this	  can	  require	  timely	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  See	  e.g.	  d’Inverno/Luck,	  note	  274,	  at	  30ff;	  M	  Nowostawski,	  M	  Purvis,	  “The	  Concecpt	  of	  
Autonomy	  in	  Distributed	  Computation	  and	  Multi-­‐Agent	  Systems”	  (2007)	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  Discussion	  Paper	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Proceedings	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  Rovatsos,	  G	  Weiß,	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Computational	  Autonomy”	  (2002)	  Proceedings	  of	  the	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  International	  Worksop	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Engineering	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  in	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  8	  of	  this	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  formal	  language,	  and	  the	  implementation	  of	  rules	  
into	  software	  code.	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reactions,	  which	  the	  tool	  makes	  itself.	  The	  designers	  and	  operators	  of	  the	  tools	  can	  only	  
to	  a	  certain	  degree	  influence	  these	  processes.	  	  
This	  raises	  several	  pertinent	  legal	  issues,	  which	  are	  only	  briefly	  introduced	  at	  this	  stage	  
and	  analysed	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  the	  following	  chapters	  of	  this	  thesis.	  Most	  importantly,	  
autonomy	  raises	  issues	  for	  the	  regulation	  of	  these	  tools,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  reliability	  of	  the	  
evidence	  collected.475	  	  
	  
Summarising,	  it	  can	  be	  concluded	  that	  the	  three	  concepts	  mobility,	  intelligence	  and	  
autonomy	  are	  suitable	  to	  serve	  as	  key	  concepts	  for	  current	  and	  future	  software-­‐based	  
investigative	  tools	  deployed	  for	  the	  policing	  of	  the	  virtual	  living	  space	  (such	  as	  the	  
online	  searching	  of	  ICTs).	  Taken	  together,	  as	  analysed	  above,	  the	  most	  important	  
characteristics	  of	  the	  technologies	  relevant	  for	  this	  thesis	  can	  be	  subsumed	  under	  these	  
concepts.	  In	  addition,	  all	  three	  concepts	  are	  flexible	  enough	  to	  deal	  with	  technological	  
progress	  and	  future	  technologies	  utilised	  during	  investigations.	  As	  discussed	  above,	  
this	  is	  important	  for	  the	  sustainability	  of	  regulatory	  attempts.	  
	  
This	  new	  class	  of	  ICT-­‐based	  investigative	  tools	  is	  termed	  Mobile,	  Intelligent	  and	  
Autonomous	  (MIA)	  Policing	  Tools.	  It	  is	  of	  relevance	  not	  only	  for	  the	  new	  cyber-­‐policing	  
method	  online	  search,	  but	  also	  more	  generally	  for	  the	  new	  cyber-­‐policing	  system	  as	  a	  
whole.	  	  
Results	  of	  the	  empirical	  study	  presented	  in	  chapter	  3	  have	  evidenced	  that	  future	  
software-­‐based	  investigative	  tools	  will	  increasingly	  replace	  humans	  for	  the	  policing	  of	  
the	  virtual	  living	  space.	  This	  means	  that	  these	  tools	  necessarily	  have	  to	  possess	  abilities	  
that	  enable	  them	  to	  operate	  autonomously,	  act	  intelligently	  and	  move	  around	  in	  the	  
virtual	  living	  space.	  	  
	  
This	  is	  also	  highlighted	  by	  recent	  cyber-­‐warfare	  and	  cyber-­‐espionage	  cases	  Stuxnet	  and	  
Flame,	  which	  were	  developed	  by	  governments	  to	  disrupt	  and	  spy	  on	  industrial	  
infrastructures	  of	  other	  countries,	  and	  feature	  these	  abilities.476	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
475	  Further	  legal	  issues	  are	  the	  legal	  classification	  of	  these	  tools	  (can	  these	  still	  be	  regarded	  as	  
mere	  investigative	  tools,	  or	  are	  these	  quasi-­‐officer?	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  this	  see	  Schafer,	  note	  
270),	  and	  the	  drafting	  of	  a	  legal	  basis	  allowing	  for	  the	  use	  of	  these	  tools.	  These	  issues,	  while	  
equally	  relevant,	  cannot	  be	  discussed	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  thesis.	  The	  focus	  is	  on	  issues	  that	  
have	  been	  identified	  as	  most	  pressing	  by	  the	  different	  interviewees.	  	  
476	  See	  e.g.	  K	  Zetter,	  “Researchers	  Connect	  Flame	  to	  US-­‐Israel	  Stuxnet	  Attack”	  (2012)	  Wired,	  
available	  online	  at:	  http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/06/flame-­‐tied-­‐to-­‐stuxnet/;	  for	  a	  
detailed	  analysis	  of	  the	  abilities	  of	  Stuxnet	  see	  N	  Falliere,	  L	  O	  Murchu,	  E	  Chien,	  “W32.Stuxnet	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5.5 Conclusion 
This	  chapter	  has	  made	  an	  important	  contribution	  towards	  the	  development	  of	  a	  future-­‐
proof	  regulatory	  approach	  of	  software-­‐based	  investigative	  tools.	  The	  development	  of	  a	  
new	  class	  of	  software-­‐based	  investigative	  tools	  –	  Mobile,	  Intelligent	  and	  Autonomous	  
(MIA)	  Policing	  Tools	  -­‐	  enables	  the	  regulation	  of	  a	  group	  of	  current	  and	  future	  
technologies,	  and	  a	  move	  away	  from	  the	  presently	  predominant	  ex-­‐ante	  authorisation	  
system	  of	  new	  investigative	  tools.	  	  
	  
This	  new	  class	  has	  been	  developed	  based	  on	  key	  characteristics	  of	  software-­‐based	  
investigative	  tools	  discussed	  in	  chapters	  2,	  3	  and	  4.	  The	  concepts	  mobility,	  intelligence,	  
and	  autonomy	  have	  proven	  to	  be	  suitable	  to	  serve	  as	  key	  concepts	  for	  this	  new	  class.	  
Their	  meaning	  within	  the	  source	  domain	  AI	  is	  broad	  enough	  to	  subsume	  current	  and	  
future	  tools	  under	  these	  concepts.	  In	  addition,	  these	  concepts	  refer	  to	  software	  abilities	  
that	  are	  fundamental	  for	  the	  replacement	  of	  humans	  by	  cyber-­‐cops	  for	  the	  policing	  of	  
the	  virtual	  living	  space.	  It	  is	  therefore	  of	  relevance	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  thesis.	  
	  
The	  results	  of	  this	  chapter,	  together	  with	  those	  of	  chapter	  4,	  form	  the	  technical	  
foundation	  of	  this	  thesis.	  This	  technical	  research	  is	  vital	  for	  an	  informed	  legal	  analysis	  
of	  current	  and	  future	  problems	  of	  the	  use	  of	  software-­‐based	  investigative	  tools.	  Some	  of	  
the	  current	  regulatory	  problems	  have	  arisen	  due	  to	  insufficient	  technical	  knowledge	  
and,	  as	  pointed	  out	  before	  in	  this	  work,	  a	  lack	  of	  technical	  research	  on	  this	  topic.	  The	  
research	  of	  these	  technical	  chapters	  clearly	  defines	  the	  abilities	  of	  MIA	  tools	  and	  
therefore	  enables	  both,	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  the	  most	  pressing	  legal	  problems	  and	  the	  
development	  of	  a	  future-­‐proof	  regulatory	  system	  for	  cyber-­‐cops	  policing	  the	  virtual	  
living	  space.	  	  
	  
This	  newly	  established	  class	  is	  the	  reference	  point	  for	  all	  legal	  discussion	  in	  the	  
following	  sections.	  The	  advantage	  of	  having	  identified	  this	  class	  is	  that	  all	  the	  legal	  
findings	  of	  this	  thesis	  apply	  to	  a	  broad	  group	  of	  investigative	  tools	  and	  actions	  
(although	  a	  focus	  remains	  on	  the	  online	  searching	  of	  ICTs	  as	  a	  confirmed	  investigative	  
method)	  instead	  of	  one	  specific	  technology,	  only.	  This	  also	  means	  that	  the	  findings	  are	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of	  relevance	  for	  policy-­‐makers	  in	  the	  longer	  term,	  instead	  of	  specifically	  solving	  one	  
problem,	  only.	  This	  justifies	  more	  complex	  technical	  and	  legal	  regulatory	  suggestions	  








The	  previous	  chapters	  have	  set	  the	  grounds	  for	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  legal	  problems	  of	  
MIA	  policing	  tools.	  The	  focus	  is	  on	  those	  legal	  problems	  identified	  as	  most	  pressing	  by	  
the	  experts	  interviewed	  for	  this	  work	  in	  chapter	  3.	  These	  legal	  issues	  result	  from	  the	  
technical	  abilities	  of	  MIA	  tools	  discussed	  in	  chapters	  4	  and	  5,	  and	  their	  use	  as	  cyber-­‐
cops	  during	  investigations	  (see	  chapter	  2	  for	  more	  details	  on	  this).	  The	  specific	  
problem	  analysed	  in	  this	  chapter	  is	  the	  cross-­‐jurisdictional	  policing	  of	  the	  virtual	  living	  
space	  by	  MIA	  tools.	  
	  
The	  most	  basic	  function	  of	  the	  Internet,	  to	  connect	  computers	  and	  other	  ICT	  devices	  all	  
over	  the	  world	  and	  enable	  the	  exchange	  and	  storage	  of	  data,	  causes	  profound	  problems	  
for	  questions	  of	  jurisdiction.	  Country	  borders	  that	  for	  centuries	  restricted	  and	  
influenced	  transactions	  between	  people	  and	  acts	  of	  the	  judiciary,	  legislative	  and	  
executive	  state	  powers	  have	  been	  blurred	  by	  ICTs	  and	  the	  Internet.	  
This	  undermines	  traditional	  legal	  concepts,	  like	  the	  sovereignty	  and	  territoriality	  
principles,	  which	  have	  been	  of	  fundamental	  importance	  for	  legislators	  and	  judges.	  
Johnson	  and	  Post,	  among	  the	  first	  scholars	  highlighting	  this	  problem,	  argue	  that	  “global	  
computer-­‐based	  communications	  cut	  across	  territorial	  borders,	  are	  creating	  a	  new	  
realm	  of	  human	  activity	  and	  undermining	  the	  feasibility-­‐and	  legitimacy-­‐of	  laws	  based	  
on	  geographic	  boundaries.”477	  However,	  thus	  far	  the	  scholarly	  debate	  of	  this	  problem	  
has	  predominantly	  focused	  on	  the	  question	  whether	  states	  can	  and	  should	  prescribe	  
legislation	  governing	  online	  activities	  causing	  harm	  inside	  their	  territory	  but	  
originating	  from	  outside	  the	  state	  borders,	  or	  originating	  within	  their	  state	  territory	  
but	  causing	  harm	  in	  other	  jurisdictions.478	  This	  scholarly	  debate	  has	  been	  accompanied	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
477	  D	  Johnson,	  D	  Post,	  “Law	  and	  Borders	  –	  The	  Rise	  of	  Law	  in	  Cyberspace”	  (1996)	  48	  Stanford	  
Law	  Review	  1367.	  
478	  See	  for	  the	  beginnings	  of	  this	  debate	  e.g.	  Johnson	  and	  Post,	  ibid,	  arguing	  that	  states	  generally	  
should	  not	  attempt	  to	  apply	  geographically	  based	  regulations	  to	  Internet	  transactions.	  J	  L	  
Goldsmith,	  “The	  Internet	  and	  the	  Abiding	  Significance	  of	  Territorial	  Sovereignty”	  (1998)	  5	  
Indiana	  Journal	  of	  Global	  Legal	  Studies	  475,	  and	  J	  L	  Goldsmith,	  “Against	  Cyberanarchy”	  (1998)	  
65	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Law	  Review	  1199,	  who	  challenges	  Johnson	  and	  Post’s	  conclusions,	  
arguing	  that	  online	  activities	  cutting	  across	  international	  borders	  are,	  from	  jurisdictional	  and	  
choice-­‐of-­‐law	  perspectives,	  similar	  to	  other	  transnational	  transactions	  that	  states	  have	  
successfully	  regulated	  for	  many	  years.	  Furthermore,	  see	  H	  H	  Perritt,	  “Cyberspace	  and	  State	  
Sovereignty”	  (1997)	  3	  Journal	  of	  International	  Legal	  Studies	  155;	  D	  L	  Burk,	  “Jurisdiction	  in	  a	  
World	  Without	  Borders”	  (1997)	  1:3	  Virginia	  Journal	  of	  Law	  and	  Technology	  1522;	  J	  R	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by	  judgments	  addressing	  the	  same	  problem	  of	  jurisdiction	  and	  the	  Internet.	  Most	  
notably	  and	  probably	  best	  known	  is	  the	  case	  of	  Yahoo!	  Inc.	  being	  sued	  in	  France	  over	  
content	  stored	  on	  US	  servers.479	  Here,	  the	  Tribunal	  de	  Grande	  Instance	  in	  Paris	  handed	  
down	  a	  judgment	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  plaintiffs	  LICRA	  and	  UEJF	  (two	  French	  anti-­‐racist	  
organisations),	  which	  had	  sued	  Yahoo!	  Inc.,	  a	  US	  cooperation,	  and	  its	  French	  
subsidiaries	  for	  allowing	  Internet	  users	  from	  France	  to	  buy	  Nazi	  memorabilia	  via	  Yahoo	  
websites.480	  The	  court	  found	  that	  Yahoo!	  Inc.	  had	  committed	  “a	  manifestly	  illegal	  
disturbance”	  (comparable	  to	  a	  nuisance)	  under	  the	  French	  New	  Code	  of	  Civil	  Procedure,	  
which	  in	  turn	  was	  based	  on	  the	  French	  Criminal	  Code	  and	  the	  offence	  of	  distributing	  
Nazi	  memorabilia.	  The	  court	  rejected	  all	  Yahoo!	  Inc.’s	  arguments	  against	  the	  court’s	  
competence	  (among	  others,	  that	  the	  content	  was	  located	  on	  a	  server	  in	  California).	  The	  
court	  found	  that	  harm	  was	  suffered	  on	  French	  territory,	  and	  therefore	  ordered	  Yahoo!	  
Inc.	  to	  prevent	  access	  from	  French	  territory	  to	  the	  Nazi	  memorabilia,	  which	  was	  backed	  
by	  a	  penalty	  of	  1000,000	  francs	  per	  day	  for	  non-­‐compliance.	  This	  judgment	  was	  
unsuccessfully	  challenged	  by	  Yahoo!	  Inc.	  in	  US	  courts.	  481	  	  While	  the	  details	  of	  the	  
Yahoo!	  case	  are	  not	  relevant	  to	  this	  chapter,	  it	  serves	  to	  illustrate	  the	  focus	  of	  
jurisprudence	  with	  regard	  to	  jurisdiction	  problems	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  Internet	  and	  other	  
ICT	  technologies,	  and	  highlights	  the	  insecurities	  of	  the	  legislative	  and	  judicative	  about	  
this	  matter.	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  U	  Kohl,	  note	  14,	  for	  an	  extensive	  overview	  of	  
the	  discussion;	  J	  Hörnle,	  “The	  Jurisdictional	  Challenge	  of	  the	  Internet”	  in	  L	  Edwards,	  C	  Waelde	  
(eds)	  Law	  and	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  Internet	  (	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  Hart	  publishing,	  2009)	  121.	  	  	  
479	  LICRA	  v	  Yahoo!	  Inc	  and	  Yahoo	  France	  (Tribunal	  de	  Grande	  Instance	  de	  Paris,	  22	  May	  200),	  
affirmed	  in	  LICRA	  and	  UEJF	  v	  Yahoo!	  Inc	  and	  Yahoo	  France	  (Tribunal	  de	  Grande	  Instance	  de	  
Paris,	  20	  November	  2000).	  
480	  See	  e.g.	  M	  Reiman,	  “Introduction:	  The	  Yahoo!	  Case	  and	  Conflict	  of	  Laws	  in	  the	  Cyberage”	  
(2003)	  24	  Michigan	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  663;	  H	  M	  Watt,	  “Yahoo!	  Cyber-­‐Collision	  of	  
Cultures:	  Who	  Regulates?”	  (2003)	  24	  Michigan	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  673;	  U	  Kohl,	  “Yahoo!	  
–	  But	  No	  Hooray!	  for	  the	  International	  Online	  Community”	  (2001)	  75	  Australian	  Law	  Journal	  
401,	  for	  a	  debate	  of	  this	  judgment.	  
481	  Yahoo!	  Inc.	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  LICRA	  and	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  F	  3d	  1199	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  Cir.	  2006);	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  Yahoo!	  Inc.	  v	  LICRA	  
and	  UEJF,	  145	  F	  Supp	  2d	  1168	  (ND	  Cal.	  2001)	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  Yahoo!	  
Inc.	  v	  LICRA	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  Supp	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  1181	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  Cir.	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  The	  US	  
Supreme	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  declined	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  hear	  an	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  30	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  2006:	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  Yahoo!	  Inc.,	  126	  S.Ct	  2332	  
(Mem)	  (2006).	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Relevant	  for	  this	  thesis,	  however,	  is	  a	  different	  jurisdictional	  problem	  that	  arises	  from	  
the	  use	  of	  MIA	  tools	  by	  police	  and	  other	  authorities.	  It	  is	  not	  the	  issue	  of	  a	  state	  seeking	  
to	  regulate	  extraterritorial	  conduct	  having	  effect	  within	  its	  borders,	  but	  a	  state	  seeking	  
to	  investigate	  that	  conduct.	  This	  issue	  has	  thus	  far	  received	  little	  attention	  by	  scholars	  
and	  lawmakers.	  However,	  new	  investigation	  technologies	  and	  powers	  make	  this	  a	  
pressing	  issue.	  	  
This	  problem	  is	  mainly	  rooted	  in	  the	  different	  concepts	  of	  mobility,	  as	  analysed	  above	  
in	  chapter	  5.482	  To	  illustrate	  this	  problem	  better,	  a	  short	  case	  scenario	  is	  introduced.	  
This	  scenario	  highlights	  the	  differences	  between	  traditional	  police	  work	  and	  
investigations	  conducted	  deploying	  MIA	  technologies,	  and	  shows	  how	  this	  difference	  
can	  raise	  jurisdictional	  problems.	  
	  
Traditionally,	  the	  investigation	  of	  a	  suspect	  can	  involve	  the	  physical	  observation	  of	  the	  
suspect	  to	  monitor	  his	  movements	  and	  investigate	  his	  network	  of	  people.	  Furthermore,	  
it	  can	  involve	  the	  monitoring	  and	  interception	  of	  his	  telephone	  calls,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  
communication	  in	  his	  living	  space,	  car	  and,	  under	  certain	  circumstances,	  working	  
space.	  In	  addition,	  investigators	  can	  obtain	  background	  information	  about	  the	  suspect	  
from	  government	  databases	  and	  records.	  	  
This	  can	  be	  followed,	  if	  certain	  legal	  pre-­‐requisites	  are	  fulfilled,	  by	  a	  physical	  search	  of	  
the	  living	  space	  and	  working	  space	  of	  the	  suspect.	  At	  this	  stage,	  investigators	  can	  seize	  
documents	  and	  ICTs	  to	  access	  data	  and	  information	  relevant	  to	  the	  investigation.	  Such	  
a	  traditional	  investigation	  is	  bound	  to	  the	  parameters	  of	  the	  offline	  world.	  Investigators	  
can	  only	  follow	  suspects	  as	  long	  as	  they	  remain	  within	  the	  boundaries	  of	  their	  
sovereign	  territory.	  These	  boundaries	  are	  clearly	  marked	  (most	  obviously	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
country	  borders,	  within	  one	  country,	  for	  example,	  by	  signs	  announcing	  the	  beginning	  of	  
a	  new	  district	  or	  city),	  and	  an	  unlawful	  crossing	  of	  these	  would	  be	  obvious	  (for	  
example,	  police	  officers	  wearing	  a	  wrong	  uniform	  or	  featuring	  the	  wrong	  identity	  card).	  
Furthermore,	  the	  infrastructure	  necessary	  to	  undertake	  investigations	  (access	  to	  
workspace,	  ability	  to	  obtain	  warrants	  etc)	  does	  not	  exist	  outside	  an	  investigator’s	  
territory	  and	  physical	  distance	  is	  a	  constraint.	  Thus,	  traditionally	  investigations	  are	  
shaped	  and	  restricted	  by	  the	  boundaries	  of	  territory	  and	  country	  borders.	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Legislation	  regulating	  investigations	  has	  equally	  been	  shaped	  by	  these	  factors.	  
Multilateral	  and	  bilateral	  treaties,	  and	  letters	  rogatory	  are	  products	  of	  the	  need	  to	  seek	  
and	  provide	  assistance	  to	  investigators	  of	  other	  territories.	  	  
	  
The	  use	  of	  MIA	  tools	  changes	  the	  nature	  of	  investigations.	  Cyber-­‐cops	  policing	  the	  
virtual	  living	  space	  are	  limited	  by	  other	  factors	  than	  their	  offline	  counterparts.	  Their	  
activities	  are	  restricted	  by	  the	  encryption	  of	  files,	  password	  protection	  of	  email	  
accounts,	  and	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  Internet	  connection	  of	  the	  target	  ICT	  device.	  Nation	  
borders,	  however,	  are	  not	  a	  restriction	  for	  the	  policing	  activities	  of	  cyber-­‐cops.	  	  
A	  suspect	  from	  Germany,	  for	  example,	  could	  use	  a	  Google	  Gmail	  email	  account,	  and	  
therefore	  have	  his	  emails	  stored	  on	  a	  server	  in	  the	  US.	  Cloud	  computing	  applications	  
enable	  users	  to	  work	  using	  software	  stored	  remotely	  on	  servers	  in	  a	  country	  different	  
to	  the	  one	  they	  reside	  in.483	  Their	  own	  computer	  is	  merely	  an	  access	  portal	  and	  all	  data	  
is	  stored	  remotely	  on	  different	  servers.	  Hence,	  investigators	  deploying	  MIA	  tools	  could	  
-­‐	  consciously	  or	  unconsciously	  -­‐investigate	  data	  of	  a	  suspect	  located	  in	  a	  different	  
sovereign	  territory.	  Factors	  that	  would	  prevent	  investigators	  from	  crossing	  national	  
borders	  in	  the	  offline	  world	  are	  obsolete	  online,	  and	  physical	  distance	  is	  not	  a	  decisive	  
factor	  any	  longer.	  Furthermore,	  the	  rise	  in	  portable	  ICT	  devices	  leads	  to	  the	  risk	  of	  
suspects	  moving	  devices	  that	  are	  infiltrated	  by	  MIA	  software	  tools	  across	  national	  
borders,	  thereby	  causing	  investigations	  to	  be	  undertaken	  in	  the	  foreign	  jurisdiction.	  	  
	  
Hence,	  the	  advances	  in	  ICT	  research	  and	  the	  introduction	  of	  new	  investigative	  powers	  
have	  led	  to	  the	  possibility	  (and	  need)	  to	  undertake	  cross-­‐border	  investigations	  of	  
digital	  data.	  
The	  question	  is	  whether	  existing	  legislation	  and	  traditional	  international	  law	  principles	  
allow	  for,	  and	  are	  sufficient	  and	  satisfactory	  to,	  regulate	  cross-­‐border	  investigations	  of	  
the	  virtual	  living	  space	  given	  that	  online	  data	  can	  be	  easily	  and	  quickly	  deleted	  and	  
amended,	  and	  rapid	  actions	  are	  therefore	  necessary.	  
	  
This	  chapter	  examines	  the	  challenges	  for	  traditional	  concepts	  of	  sovereignty	  and	  
territoriality	  that	  are	  caused	  by	  cross-­‐border	  investigations	  of	  the	  virtual	  living	  space,	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  On	  a	  most	  basic	  level,	  cloud	  computing	  is	  the	  delivery	  of	  computing	  services	  (computation,	  
data	  access,	  software	  and	  storage	  services).	  For	  an	  introduction	  to	  cloud	  computing	  see	  e.g.	  M	  
Armbrust	  et	  al.,	  “A	  View	  of	  Cloud	  Computing”	  (2010)	  53:4	  Communications	  of	  the	  ACM,	  50-­‐58.	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and	  establishes	  whether	  the	  necessary	  legal	  instruments	  exist	  to	  regulate	  these	  
adequately	  and	  sufficiently.	  	  
	  
In	  section	  6.1	  the	  foundations	  of	  the	  relevant	  international	  law	  principles	  are	  
introduced.	  Section	  6.2	  examines	  the	  traditional	  mechanisms	  of	  cross-­‐jurisdictional	  
legal	  assistance	  and	  examines	  in	  how	  far	  these	  are	  applicable	  to	  cyber-­‐investigations	  of	  
the	  virtual	  living	  space	  by	  MIA	  tools.	  Section	  6.3	  explores	  the	  legality	  of	  cross-­‐border	  
investigations	  beyond	  the	  traditional	  mechanisms	  of	  legal	  assistance.	  In	  section	  6.4	  a	  
solution	  for	  the	  cross-­‐jurisdictional	  activities	  of	  MIA	  tools	  is	  outlined.	  Section	  6.5	  
concludes	  with	  the	  main	  findings	  of	  this	  chapter.	  	  
6.1 Sovereignty and Territoriality 
The	  decisive	  question	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  whether	  cross-­‐border	  activities	  during	  
investigations	  of	  the	  virtual	  living	  space	  by	  MIA	  tools	  are	  consistent	  with	  international	  
principles	  of	  jurisdiction,	  and	  other	  international	  legislation	  and	  treaties.	  To	  answer	  
this	  question	  a	  closer	  examination	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  jurisdiction,	  and	  related	  principles	  
is	  necessary.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  establish	  certain	  background	  principles	  of	  international	  
law	  that	  highlight	  why	  the	  Internet	  and	  ICT	  technologies	  present	  difficulties	  for	  
investigators	  in	  general,	  and	  why	  cross-­‐jurisdictional	  cyber-­‐investigations	  by	  MIA	  tools	  
present	  a	  challenge	  for	  these	  principles	  in	  particular.	  	  
	  
The	  rules	  of	  jurisdiction	  in	  international	  law	  have	  always	  been	  closely	  linked	  to	  the	  
concept	  of	  territory.484	  The	  foundation	  for	  international	  law	  is	  grounded	  in	  
geographical	  considerations.	  That	  is,	  states	  occupy	  definite	  portions	  of	  the	  earth’s	  
surface,	  within	  which	  their	  governments	  exercise	  jurisdiction	  over	  persons	  and	  
property	  to	  the	  exclusion	  of	  other	  states.485	  As	  Steinberger	  finds,	  “the	  control	  over	  a	  
state’s	  territory	  is	  not	  just	  a	  consequence	  of	  statehood	  but	  also	  an	  essential	  
attribute.”486	  Thus	  the	  notion	  of	  territory	  is	  elementary	  to	  the	  understanding	  of	  
international	  law	  principles	  of	  jurisdiction.	  On	  a	  most	  basic	  level,	  the	  territoriality	  
principle	  dictates	  that	  states	  have	  jurisdiction	  over	  acts	  that	  occur	  in	  their	  territory,	  as	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  U	  Kohl,	  see	  note	  14,	  at	  8.	  	  
485	  C	  C	  Joyner,	  International	  Law	  in	  the	  21st	  Century:	  Rules	  for	  Global	  Governance	  (Lanham,	  MD:	  
Rowman	  &	  Littlefield	  Publishing,	  2005)	  43.	  
486	  H	  Steinberger,	  “Sovereignty”	  in	  R	  Bernhardt	  (ed.),	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Public	  International	  Law	  
(1987),	  Vol.10,	  397,	  413.	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a	  corollary	  of	  their	  territorial	  sovereignty.487	  In	  international	  criminal	  law,	  “the	  
territorial	  theory	  takes	  the	  position	  that	  criminal	  jurisdiction	  depends	  upon	  the	  place	  
of	  perpetration.	  That	  is,	  the	  action	  on	  whose	  territory	  the	  crime	  was	  committed	  has	  
jurisdiction	  of	  the	  offense.”488	  Thus	  the	  weight	  of	  the	  territorial	  principle	  differs,	  
depending	  on	  the	  different	  aspects	  of	  jurisdiction	  that	  are	  at	  issue.489	  	  
Jurisdiction	  is	  a	  vague	  term	  and	  has	  many	  different	  meanings,	  thus	  no	  definite	  
definition	  of	  this	  concept	  exists.	  As	  Leflar,	  among	  others	  has	  cautioned,	  “about	  all	  that	  
can	  be	  done	  about	  it	  is	  to	  try	  to	  be	  sure	  of	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  it	  is	  being	  used	  at	  any	  
given	  time.”490	  From	  a	  historical	  linguistic	  perspective	  the	  word	  jurisdiction	  stems	  from	  
the	  Latin	  term	  juris	  dictio,	  meaning	  the	  ‘administration	  of	  justice’.	  491	  This	  meaning	  is	  
still	  valid.	  However,	  it	  is	  critical	  to	  differentiate	  the	  purely	  domestic	  meaning	  of	  this	  
concept	  from	  the	  international	  one.	  In	  the	  domestic	  sense,	  it	  usually	  refers	  to	  the	  right	  
of	  one	  state	  organ	  over	  another	  one,	  or	  one	  federal	  state	  over	  another	  one,	  to	  take	  
actions	  in	  respect	  of	  a	  particular	  matter,	  as	  defined	  by	  constitutional	  law.492	  In	  the	  
international	  context,	  however,	  this	  concept	  refers	  to	  the	  regulatory	  competence	  rights	  
between	  different	  states.	  This	  chapter	  is	  only	  concerned	  with	  the	  latter	  meaning	  of	  the	  
concept:	  competence	  issues	  over	  regulatory	  questions	  between	  states.	  	  
	  
Generally,	  three	  types	  of	  jurisdiction	  can	  be	  differentiated:	  prescriptive	  jurisdiction,	  
adjudicative	  jurisdiction,	  and	  enforcement	  jurisdiction.493	  	  
Prescriptive	  jurisdiction	  refers	  to	  the	  authority	  of	  a	  state	  to	  establish	  and	  prescribe	  
criminal	  and	  regulatory	  sanctions,	  thus	  the	  authority	  to	  make	  laws.	  It	  is	  therefore	  also	  
referred	  to	  as	  legislative	  jurisdiction.494	  	  
Adjudicative	  jurisdiction	  refers	  to	  the	  authority	  of	  states	  to	  subject	  persons	  or	  things	  to	  
the	  process	  of	  its	  courts	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  state	  is	  a	  party	  to	  the	  proceedings.495	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
487	  M	  Hayashi,	  “The	  Rules	  of	  Jurisdiction	  in	  Public	  International	  Law”	  in	  M	  Dunn,	  S	  F	  Krishna-­‐
Hensel,	  V	  Mauer	  (eds)	  The	  Resurgence	  of	  the	  State:	  Trends	  and	  Processes	  in	  Cyberspace	  
Governance	  (Aldershot:	  Ashgate	  Publishing	  Ltd,	  2007)	  59	  (61).	  
488	  R	  M	  Perkins,	  “The	  Territorial	  Principle	  in	  Criminal	  Law”	  (1970)	  22	  Hastings	  Law	  Journal	  
1155.	  
489	  M	  Hayashi,	  note	  487.	  
490	  R	  Leflar,	  American	  Conflicts	  Law	  (3rd	  edition,	  Indianapolis:	  Bobbs-­‐Merrill,	  1977)	  3.	  
491	  I	  Shearer,	  “Jurisdiction”,	  in	  S	  Blay,	  R	  Piotrowicz,	  M	  Tsamenyi	  (eds.),	  Public	  International	  Law	  
–	  An	  Australian	  Perspective	  (2nd	  edition,	  Melbourne:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2005)	  154.	  
492	  Kohl,	  see	  note	  14,	  at	  14;	  K	  C	  Randall,	  “Universal	  Jurisdiction	  Under	  International	  Law”	  
(1988)	  66	  Texas	  Law	  Review,	  785.	  
493	  B	  A	  Boczek,	  International	  Law:	  A	  Dictionary	  (Lanham,	  Md.:	  Scarecrow	  Press,	  2005)	  77.	  
494	  Ibid.	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  Enforcement	  jurisdiction	  refers	  to	  the	  authority	  of	  a	  state	  to	  induce	  or	  compel	  
compliance	  with	  its	  law	  or	  to	  punish	  non-­‐compliance	  through	  courts	  (in	  which	  case	  it	  
constitutes	  an	  aspect	  of	  adjudication)	  or	  resort	  to	  executive	  action,	  including	  physical	  
interference,	  seizure	  of	  property,	  and	  similar	  actions.496	  	  
	  
Malanczuk	  highlights	  why	  it	  is	  important	  to	  differentiate	  between	  these	  three	  groups	  of	  
powers,	  and	  particularly	  between	  the	  second	  and	  third:	  “if	  a	  man	  commits	  a	  murder	  in	  
England	  and	  escapes	  to	  France,	  the	  English	  courts	  have	  jurisdiction	  to	  try	  him,	  but	  the	  
English	  police	  cannot	  enter	  French	  territory	  and	  arrest	  him	  there;	  they	  must	  request	  
the	  French	  authorities	  to	  arrest	  him	  and	  to	  surrender	  him	  for	  trial	  in	  England.”497	  	  
This	  example	  underlines	  the	  argument	  made	  above,	  that	  states	  generally	  have	  
jurisdiction	  over	  acts	  that	  occur	  in	  their	  own	  territory.	  Thus	  as	  a	  general	  rule,	  states	  
have	  a	  duty	  to	  respect	  the	  territorial	  sovereignty	  of	  other	  states.498	  	  
	  
However,	  international	  law	  permits	  in	  some	  circumstances	  the	  application	  of	  the	  forum	  
state’s	  laws	  to	  activities	  carried	  on	  elsewhere.	  Several	  doctrines	  exist	  under	  which	  a	  
state	  can	  prescribe	  laws	  governing	  extraterritorial	  conduct.499	  	  
Of	  prime	  importance	  for	  this	  chapter	  is	  the	  principle	  that	  a	  state	  is	  justified	  in	  
regulating	  conduct	  that	  has	  harmful	  effects	  within	  its	  territory	  (the	  effects	  doctrine).500	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
495	  Ibid.	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  Ibid.	  
497	  P	  Malanczuk,	  Akehurst’s	  Modern	  Introduction	  to	  International	  Law	  (London:	  Routledge,	  
1997)	  109.	  
498	  R	  Jennings,	  A	  Watts	  (eds.),	  I	  Oppenheim’s	  International	  Law	  (9th	  edition,	  Longmans,	  1992)	  
421.	  
499	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  chapter,	  it	  is	  not	  relevant	  to	  discuss	  all	  of	  these	  principles	  in	  detail.	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  “effects”	  principle	  discussed	  in	  the	  text,	  states	  can	  potentially	  assert	  
extraterritorial	  jurisdiction	  based	  on	  the	  universality	  principle	  (permitting	  states	  to	  enforce	  
sanctions	  against	  crimes	  that	  have	  an	  independent	  basis	  in	  international	  law,	  such	  as	  genocide),	  
the	  nationality	  principle	  (which	  permits	  states	  to	  regulate	  the	  conduct	  of	  its	  nationals	  wherever	  
they	  are),	  the	  protective	  principle	  (permitting	  states	  to	  regulate	  extraterritorial	  activities	  that	  
threaten	  its	  local	  security),	  and	  	  the	  passive	  personality	  principle	  (allowing	  states	  to	  exercise	  
jurisdiction	  over	  any	  person	  injuring	  one	  of	  its	  nationals).	  See	  for	  more	  details	  e.g.	  R	  Higgins,	  
Problems	  and	  Process:	  International	  Law	  and	  How	  We	  Use	  It	  (Oxford:	  Clarendon	  Press;	  New	  
York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1994)	  56;	  J	  Clough,	  Principles	  of	  Cybercrime	  (Cambridge,	  UK;	  New	  
York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2010)	  407;	  T	  Hillier,	  Sourcebook	  on	  Public	  International	  Law	  
(London	  ;	  Sydney	  :	  Cavendish,	  1998)	  275	  ff.	  
500	  See	  e.g.	  J	  Goldsmith,	  “Unilateral	  Regulation	  of	  the	  Internet:	  A	  Modest	  Defence”	  (2000)	  11	  
European	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law,	  135,	  138	  (stating	  that	  it	  is	  well	  accepted	  today	  that	  
international	  law	  permits	  a	  nation	  to	  regulate	  the	  harmful	  local	  effects	  of	  foreign	  conduct);	  J	  J	  
Paust,	  “Federal	  Jurisdiction	  Over	  Extraterritorial	  Acts	  of	  Terrorism	  and	  Nonimmunity	  for	  
Foreign	  Violators	  of	  International	  Law	  Under	  the	  FSIA	  and	  the	  Act	  of	  State	  Doctrine”	  (1983)	  23	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The	  rational	  behind	  this	  doctrine	  is	  the	  need	  to	  protect	  national	  economic	  interests.	  
The	  effects	  doctrine	  was	  first	  clearly	  stated	  in	  the	  Alcoa	  decision	  (US	  v	  Aluminium	  Co	  of	  
America	  (1945)).501	  While	  other	  states	  first	  objected	  to	  the	  United	  States’s	  application	  
of	  its	  economic	  regulations,	  such	  as	  antitrust	  laws,	  to	  extraterritorial	  conduct,	  the	  
principle	  is	  now	  generally	  accepted.502	  	  Thus	  under	  certain	  circumstances,	  international	  
law	  doctrines	  allow	  states	  to	  prescribe	  rules	  limiting	  certain	  extraterritorial	  conduct.	  	  
	  However,	  returning	  to	  the	  brief	  example	  above,	  the	  enforcement	  of	  a	  states’	  law	  
outside	  its	  territory-­‐	  whether	  through	  actions	  of	  its	  courts	  or	  actions	  of	  its	  executive	  
officials-­‐	  is	  not	  permissible	  under	  international	  law.503	  	  
Despite	  this,	  there	  are	  many	  cases	  where	  states	  have	  claimed	  the	  right	  to	  their	  own	  law	  
enforcement	  abroad,504	  such	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  kidnapping	  of	  Adolf	  Eichmann	  in	  
Argentina	  by	  Israeli	  agents.	  In	  1960,	  Israeli	  Mossad	  agents	  kidnapped	  the	  Nazi	  criminal	  
Adolf	  Eichmann	  in	  Argentina,	  and	  took	  him	  to	  Israel	  for	  trial,	  where	  he	  was	  later	  
sentenced	  to	  death	  and	  executed.505	  The	  abduction	  of	  Eichmann	  was	  neither	  discussed	  
with,	  nor	  approved	  by	  the	  Argentinean	  state.	  As	  a	  result,	  a	  long	  international	  dispute	  
between	  Argentina	  and	  Israel	  evolved,	  with	  Argentina	  claiming	  that	  the	  illicit	  and	  
clandestine	  transfer	  of	  Eichmann	  to	  Israel	  constituted	  a	  violation	  of	  Argentine	  
sovereignty.506	  	  
Another	  example	  is	  the	  kidnapping	  in	  the	  Alvarez-­‐Machain	  case	  by	  US	  agents.507	  
Humberto	  Alvarez	  Machain	  was	  kidnapped	  in	  Mexico	  by	  US	  agents,	  and	  brought	  to	  trial	  
in	  the	  US	  for	  allegedly	  being	  involved	  in	  the	  kidnapping,	  torture,	  and	  murder	  of	  the	  US	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Virginia	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law,	  191;	  O	  Schachter,	  International	  Law	  in	  Theory	  and	  Practice	  
(Dordrecht,	  The	  Netherlands;	  Boston:	  M.	  Nijhoff	  Publishers,	  1991)	  264.	  
501	  (1945)	  148	  F	  28	  147.	  Here,	  the	  US	  Second	  Circuit	  Court	  of	  Appeals	  stated	  that	  any	  state	  may	  
impose	  liabilities,	  even	  upon	  persons	  not	  within	  its	  allegiance,	  for	  conduct	  outside	  its	  borders	  
that	  has	  consequences	  within	  its	  border	  which	  the	  state	  reprehends.	  
502	  T	  Hillier,	  note	  499,	  at	  277;	  H	  G	  Maier,	  “Extraterritorial	  Jurisdiction	  at	  a	  Crossroads:	  an	  
Intersection	  Between	  Public	  and	  Private	  International	  Law”	  (1982)	  76	  American	  Journal	  of	  
International	  Law,	  280,	  294.	  
503	  See	  generally,	  J	  A	  Bush,	  “How	  Did	  We	  Get	  Here?	  Foreign	  Abduction	  after	  Alvarez-­‐Machain”	  
(1993)	  45:4	  Stanford	  Law	  Review,	  939.	  
504	  See	  e.g.	  P	  Malanczuk,	  note	  497,	  at	  110	  for	  a	  listing.	  
505	  See	  e.g.	  R	  Rein,	  Argentine	  Jews	  or	  Jewish	  Argentines?:	  Essays	  on	  Ethnicity,	  Identity,	  and	  
Diaspora	  (Leiden,	  Netherlands:	  Martinus	  Nijhoff,	  2010)	  170;	  M	  Lippman,	  “Genocide:	  The	  Trial	  of	  
Adolf	  Eichmann	  and	  the	  Quest	  for	  Global	  Justice”	  (2002)	  8	  Buffalo	  Human	  Rights	  Law	  Review,	  45.	  
506	  M	  Lippman,	  note	  ibid,	  at	  58,	  also	  for	  a	  detailed	  account	  of	  the	  dispute.	  
507	  United	  States	  v	  Alvarez-­‐Machain,	  946	  F.2d	  1466	  (9th	  Cir.	  1991),	  rev'd,	  112	  S.	  Ct.	  2188	  
(1992).	  
	   169	  
agent	  Enrique	  Camarena	  Salazar	  in	  Mexico.	  He	  was	  later	  acquitted.508	  This	  case	  equally	  
caused	  an	  international	  dispute	  between	  US	  and	  Mexico	  over	  the	  violation	  of	  Mexico’s	  
sovereignty.	  	  
These	  examples	  demonstrate	  that	  while	  states	  sometimes	  try	  to	  enforce	  their	  own	  law	  
on	  foreign	  territory,	  this	  generally	  constitutes	  violations	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  territorial	  
integrity	  and	  non-­‐intervention.509	  	  
Generally,	  no	  state	  has	  the	  authority	  to	  infringe	  the	  territorial	  integrity	  of	  another	  state	  
in	  order	  to	  investigate	  a	  crime,	  or	  apprehend	  an	  alleged	  criminal.510	  	  
Hence,	  to	  summarise,	  under	  international	  law	  states	  have	  under	  certain	  preconditions	  
the	  right	  to	  prescribe	  laws	  regulating	  and	  limiting	  certain	  extraterritorial	  conduct.	  
However	  under	  no	  circumstances	  have	  states	  the	  power	  to	  conduct	  a	  law	  enforcement	  
investigation	  within	  the	  territory	  of	  another	  state	  without	  that	  state’s	  permission.	  Thus	  
the	  territoriality	  principle	  is	  absolute	  in	  the	  case	  of	  enforcement	  jurisdiction,	  whereas	  it	  
can	  be	  restricted	  in	  the	  case	  of	  legislative	  jurisdiction.	  Under	  international	  law,	  
investigators	  are	  therefore	  limited	  to	  operate	  within	  their	  designated	  territory.	  	  	  
	  
As	  highlighted	  in	  the	  brief	  case	  scenario	  in	  the	  introductory	  part	  of	  this	  chapter	  (5),	  
traditionally	  the	  borders	  of	  this	  territory	  are	  obvious,	  and	  investigators	  are	  unlikely	  to	  
(accidentally)	  cross	  these.	  However,	  MIA	  tools	  investigating	  the	  virtual	  living	  space	  are	  
not	  restricted	  by	  these	  territorial	  borders	  and,	  given	  the	  infrastructure	  of	  the	  Internet,	  
are	  likely	  to	  undertake	  cross-­‐jurisdictional	  activities.	  
	  
Hence	  the	  question	  is	  whether	  such	  cross-­‐jurisdictional	  activities,	  for	  example	  the	  
search	  and	  seizure	  of	  digital	  data	  during	  an	  online	  search	  of	  a	  suspect	  in	  a	  different	  
jurisdiction,	  qualifies	  as	  an	  infringement	  of	  the	  territoriality	  principle,	  and	  therefore	  
violates	  international	  law	  and	  would	  be	  improper.	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
508	  For	  more	  details	  on	  the	  case	  see	  e.g.	  J	  A	  Bush,	  note	  503;	  M	  J	  Matorin,	  “Unchaining	  the	  Law:	  
The	  Legality	  of	  Extraterritorial	  Abduction	  in	  Lieu	  of	  Extradition”	  (1992)	  41:4	  Duke	  Law	  Journal,	  
907.	  
509	  There	  can	  be,	  under	  certain	  circumstances,	  exceptions	  to	  this	  rule	  under	  the	  self-­‐defence	  
doctrine.	  Article	  51	  of	  the	  Charter	  of	  the	  United	  Nations,	  for	  example,	  recognises	  an	  “inherent	  
right	  of	  individual	  or	  collective	  self-­‐defence	  if	  an	  armed	  attack	  occurs	  against	  a	  Member	  of	  the	  
United	  Nations.”	  Charter	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  Art	  51,	  59	  Stat	  1031,	  Treaty	  Ser	  No	  993	  (1945).	  
See	  also	  Jennings	  and	  Watts,	  note	  21,	  at	  421	  stating	  that	  “the	  justification	  of	  self-­‐defence	  for	  
action	  which	  onvolves	  the	  violation	  of	  another	  state’s	  territory	  is	  an	  exception	  to	  the	  general	  
duty	  of	  all	  states	  to	  respect	  the	  territorial	  sovereignty	  of	  other	  states”.	  
510	  P	  Malanczuk,	  note	  497,	  at	  110.	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This	  question,	  however,	  would	  be	  irrelevant	  if	  mechanisms	  between	  states	  have	  been	  
developed	  to	  adequately	  deal	  with	  the	  gap	  between	  their	  ability	  to	  prescribe	  laws	  
governing	  extraterritorial	  conduct	  and	  their	  inability	  to	  investigate	  this,	  and	  if	  such	  
mechanisms	  could	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  extra-­‐jurisdictional	  investigation	  of	  the	  virtual	  
living	  space	  by	  MIA	  tools.	  
The	  following	  section	  therefore	  analyses	  whether	  mechanisms	  have	  been	  developed,	  
and	  in	  how	  far	  these	  are	  applicable	  and	  adequate	  to	  regulate	  such	  cross-­‐jurisdictional	  
investigative	  actions.	  
6.2 Mechanisms of Legal Assistance 
The	  need	  for	  monitoring	  suspects,	  or	  seizing	  evidence	  in	  other	  states	  is	  not	  novel.	  As	  a	  
result,	  mechanisms	  have	  been	  developed	  addressing	  this	  need,	  while	  respecting	  the	  
territoriality	  principal	  of	  the	  other	  state.	  In	  this	  section,	  these	  mechanisms	  are	  
analysed,	  and	  it	  is	  examined	  whether	  these	  are	  applicable	  to	  cross-­‐jurisdictional	  
investigations	  of	  the	  virtual	  living	  space	  by	  MIA	  tools,	  and	  particularly	  online	  searches	  
of	  ICTs.	  	  
6.2.1 Letters Rogatory 
One	  of	  the	  traditional	  mechanisms	  developed	  to	  serve	  states	  seeking	  evidence	  from	  
other	  states	  in	  both	  civil	  and	  criminal	  matters	  are	  Letters	  Rogatory.	  Letters	  Rogatory	  
are	  requests	  for	  evidence	  issued	  by	  a	  court	  in	  one	  country,	  submitted	  through	  
diplomatic	  channels	  and	  seeking	  the	  assistance	  of	  a	  court	  in	  another	  country.511	  They	  
provide	  a	  mechanism	  for	  nations	  to	  share	  and	  request	  criminal	  information.	  The	  
Letters	  Rogatory	  process	  involves	  one	  country’s	  judicial	  authority	  writing	  a	  formal	  
request	  to	  the	  counterpart	  authority	  in	  a	  different	  country	  for	  legal	  assistance	  with	  a	  
single	  specific	  criminal	  activity.	  In	  the	  US,	  for	  example,	  the	  Letters	  Rogatory	  process	  is	  
authorised	  under	  Title	  28	  USC,	  ჼ1781-­‐	  82.512	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
511	  B	  Zagaris,	  International	  White	  Collar	  Crime:	  Cases	  and	  Materials	  (Cambridge,	  UK:	  Cambridge	  
University	  Press,	  2010)	  275.	  
512	  M	  Goodman,	  “International	  Dimensions	  of	  Cybercrime”	  in	  S	  Gosh,	  E	  Turrini	  (eds)	  
Cybercrimes:	  A	  Multidisciplinary	  Analysis	  (Berlin,	  Heidelberg:	  Springer-­‐Verlag,	  2010)	  311-­‐339,	  
322.	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However,	  Letters	  Rogatory	  can	  be	  of	  limited	  use.	  Zagaris	  points	  out	  that	  these	  are	  
executed	  solely	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  comity.513	  This	  means	  that	  requests	  can	  be	  refused,	  or	  
delayed	  as	  deemed	  appropriate	  because	  the	  nation	  receiving	  the	  request	  is	  under	  no	  
obligation	  to	  comply.	  The	  average	  processing	  time	  of	  such	  a	  request	  can	  be	  up	  to	  two	  
years.514	  This	  long	  processing	  time	  is	  also	  caused	  by	  the	  many	  difficult	  procedural	  
requirements	  necessary.	  Letters	  Rogatory	  must	  be	  made	  through	  the	  courts	  in	  both	  
countries	  with	  the	  involvement	  of	  various	  foreign	  ministries,	  justice	  ministries,	  and	  in	  
some	  cases	  embassies.515	  	  
Already	  for	  traditional	  investigations,	  this	  mechanism	  was	  only	  of	  real	  value	  if	  the	  
information	  requested	  was	  solely	  to	  confirm	  already	  existing	  evidence,	  a	  fast	  receipt	  of	  
the	  information	  was	  not	  crucial,	  and	  there	  was	  no	  risk	  of	  loss	  of	  the	  requested	  evidence	  
during	  the	  processing	  of	  the	  letter	  rogatory.	  However,	  for	  investigations	  of	  the	  virtual	  
living	  space,	  a	  timely	  recovery	  of	  the	  evidence	  is	  of	  high	  importance.	  Digital	  data	  can	  
easily	  be	  removed,	  altered,	  or	  destroyed,	  and	  therefore	  lost	  for	  investigators.516	  
Furthermore,	  as	  the	  time	  span	  increases,	  there	  is	  a	  growing	  risk	  of	  the	  offender	  finding	  
out	  about	  the	  investigation	  against	  him	  and	  benefiting	  from	  the	  ease	  with	  which	  data	  of	  
evidentiary	  value	  may	  be	  deleted.517	  
Thus	  Letters	  Rogatory	  are	  hardly	  promising	  for	  investigations	  of	  the	  virtual	  living	  
space.	  
6.2.2 Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties 
The	  limits	  of	  Letters	  Rogatory	  have	  led	  to	  the	  development	  of	  other	  mechanisms	  to	  
ensure	  that	  states	  have	  access	  to	  extraterritorial	  evidence	  in	  criminal	  matters.	  Most	  
notably	  among	  these	  mechanisms	  are	  treaties	  on	  mutual	  legal	  assistance	  in	  criminal	  
matters.	  These	  treaties	  regulate	  that	  contracting	  parties	  shall	  provide	  assistance	  in	  
both	  criminal	  investigations	  and	  proceedings.	  These	  agreements	  exist	  in	  form	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
513	  B	  Zagaris,	  “United	  States	  Treaties	  on	  Mutual	  Assistance	  in	  Criminal	  Matters”	  in	  M	  C	  Bassiouni	  
(ed)	  International	  Criminal	  Law:	  Multilateral	  and	  Bilateral	  Enforcement	  Mechanisms	  ((Leiden,	  
Netherlands:	  Martinus	  Nijhoff,	  2008),	  385.	  
514	  N	  Seitz,	  “Transborder	  Search:	  A	  new	  Perspective	  in	  Law	  Enforcement?”	  (2005)	  23	  Yale	  
Journal	  of	  Law	  and	  Technology,	  23,	  28.	  
515	  B	  Zagaris,	  note	  513,	  at	  386.	  
516	  Y	  Uzunay,	  D	  Incebacak,	  K	  Bicakci,	  “Towards	  Trustable	  Digital	  Evidence	  with	  PKIDEV:	  PKI	  
Based	  Digital	  Evidence	  Verification	  Model”	  in	  A	  Blyth,	  I	  Sutherland	  (eds.)	  EC2ND	  2006:	  
Proceedings	  of	  the	  Second	  European	  Conference	  on	  Computer	  Network	  Defense,	  in	  conjunction	  
with	  the	  First	  Workshop	  on	  Digital	  Forensics	  and	  Incident	  Analysis	  (London:	  Springer,	  2007),	  105.	  
517	  W	  Bär,	  Der	  Zugriff	  auf	  Computerdaten	  im	  Strafverfahren	  (Köln:	  Heymanns	  Verlag,	  1992)	  41.	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bilateral	  treaties	  between	  two	  states,	  and	  multilateral	  treaties	  between	  a	  number	  of	  
states.	  	  
A	  good	  example	  for	  the	  latter	  category,	  which	  is	  also	  most	  relevant	  for	  this	  chapter	  and	  
will	  therefore	  serve	  as	  the	  prime	  example	  of	  multilateral	  treaties	  here,518	  is	  the	  
European	  Convention	  on	  Mutual	  Assistance	  in	  Criminal	  Matters	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe	  
and	  its	  two	  additional	  protocols,	  which	  also	  includes	  non	  EU-­‐member	  States.519	  	  
The	  states	  party	  to	  this	  Convention	  have	  agreed	  to	  grant	  each	  other	  the	  widest	  possible	  
assistance	  in	  criminal	  matters.520	  While	  the	  treaty	  considers	  letters	  rogatory	  as	  one	  of	  
the	  main	  tools	  to	  seek	  assistance,	  with	  some	  exceptions	  it	  obligates	  the	  parties	  to	  carry	  
out	  such	  requests.521	  States	  have	  retained	  the	  right	  to	  make	  declarations	  and	  
reservations	  to	  the	  treaty,	  and	  most	  states	  have	  made	  use	  of	  this	  right.	  Such	  
declarations	  are,	  for	  example,	  made	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  specification	  of	  Article	  3	  of	  the	  
Convention,	  which	  states	  that	  a	  request	  for	  mutual	  legal	  assistance	  must	  be	  made	  by	  a	  
judicial	  authority.	  Most	  countries	  have	  made	  declarations	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  they	  
recognise	  members	  of	  the	  judiciary,	  as	  well	  as	  officers	  from	  public	  prosecutor’s	  
department	  as	  judicial	  authorities.522	  Thus	  the	  content	  and	  extent	  of	  these	  declarations	  
does	  not	  limit	  the	  general	  scope	  and	  aim	  of	  the	  Convention.	  Generally,	  the	  Convention	  
is	  not	  limited	  by	  an	  exclusive	  list	  of	  types	  of	  assistance,	  however,	  some	  examples,	  such	  
as	  the	  search	  and	  seizure	  of	  evidence,	  questioning	  of	  witnesses,	  and	  the	  exchange	  of	  
information	  from	  judicial	  records	  are	  given.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  Convention	  is	  
relatively	  neutral	  as	  to	  what	  type	  of	  assistance	  can	  be	  sought	  and	  provided.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
518	  For	  a	  full	  account	  and	  discussion	  of	  other	  multilateral	  treaties	  see	  e.g.	  C	  Joubert,	  Judicial	  
Control	  of	  Foreign	  Evidence	  in	  Comparative	  Perspective	  (Amsterdam,	  Netherlands:	  Rozenberg	  
Publishers,	  2005).	  
519	  European	  Convention	  on	  Mutual	  Assistance	  in	  Criminal	  Matters	  (hereafter	  the	  Convention),	  
entered	  into	  force	  June	  12,	  1962,	  European	  Treaty	  Series	  No.	  30.	  This	  convention	  is	  presently	  in	  
force	  between	  Austria,	  Belgium,	  Bulgaria,	  Cyprus,	  Czech	  Republic,	  Denmark,	  Estonia,	  Finland,	  
France,	  Germany,	  Greece,	  Hungary,	  Ireland,	  Italy,	  Latvia,	  Lithuania,	  Luxembourg,	  Malta,	  
Netherlands,	  Poland,	  Portugal,	  Romania,	  Slovakia,	  Slovenia,	  Spain,	  Sweden,	  and	  United	  Kingdom	  
(as	  of	  29/09/2010),	  see	  Council	  of	  Europe,	  Chart	  showing	  Signatures	  and	  Ratifications	  of	  
Council	  of	  Europe	  Conventions	  and	  Agreements,	  at	  
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/Commun/ListeParGroupe.asp?GR=1&MA=20&CM=15&CL=E
NG;	  Additional	  Protocol	  to	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Mutual	  Assistance	  in	  Criminal	  Matters	  of	  
17.03.1978	  (ETS	  No.	  99);	  Second	  Additional	  Protocol	  to	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Mutual	  
Assistance	  in	  Criminal	  Matters	  of	  08.11.2001	  (ETS	  No.	  182).	  
520	  Article	  1.1	  of	  the	  Convention.	  
521	  Article	  3.1	  of	  the	  Convention.	  
522	  C	  Joubert,	  note	  518,	  at	  89.	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This	  treaty	  has	  recently	  been	  updated	  by	  the	  2000	  EU	  Convention	  on	  Mutual	  Assistance	  
in	  Criminal	  Matters	  and	  its	  two	  protocols	  between	  the	  member	  states	  of	  the	  European	  
Union.523	  These	  documents	  supplement	  and	  build	  on	  the	  1959	  Council	  of	  Europe	  
Convention	  on	  Mutual	  Assistance	  in	  Criminal	  Matters	  by	  developing	  and	  modernising	  
existing	  provisions	  governing	  mutual	  assistance.	  An	  example	  for	  such	  a	  modernisation	  
is	  the	  introduction	  of	  provisions	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  interception	  of	  
telecommunications.524	  However,	  the	  Convention	  is	  still	  not	  implemented	  in	  all	  EU	  
Member	  States.	  
	  
In	  addition	  to	  these	  multilateral	  treaties,	  bilateral	  treaties	  between	  two	  states	  exist,	  
containing	  similar	  obligations	  like	  the	  above-­‐discussed	  Convention.	  These	  are	  manifold	  
and	  there	  is	  neither	  space	  nor	  necessity	  to	  discuss	  any	  of	  these	  in	  great	  detail	  here.	  
Instead	  one	  example	  of	  a	  bilateral	  agreement	  is	  discussed	  here,	  to	  provide	  an	  overview	  
of	  the	  scope	  of	  these	  agreements.	  This	  enables	  an	  evaluation	  of	  their	  effectiveness	  and	  
suitability	  to	  be	  applied	  to	  mutual	  assistance	  matters	  relating	  to	  the	  virtual	  living	  space	  
and	  digital	  data.	  	  
The	  US	  is	  not	  party	  to	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe	  Convention,	  and	  thus	  one	  bilateral	  
agreement	  between	  the	  US	  and	  another	  state	  is	  depicted	  here	  to	  include	  this	  
jurisdiction	  into	  the	  analysis.	  	  
The	  US	  was	  particularly	  interested	  in	  establishing	  agreements	  containing	  similar	  
obligations	  to	  those	  included	  in	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe	  Convention	  with	  other	  states,	  
after	  this	  was	  ratified	  in	  1962.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  US	  entered	  into	  negotiations	  with	  
Switzerland	  that	  culminated	  the	  signing	  of	  the	  first	  bilateral	  mutual	  legal	  assistance	  
treaty	  in	  1973.525	  The	  two	  states	  signatory	  to	  this	  treaty	  therein	  agreed	  to	  afford	  each	  
other	  mutual	  assistance	  during	  investigations	  or	  court	  proceedings,	  the	  return	  of	  any	  
objects,	  articles,	  or	  other	  property	  or	  assets	  belonging	  to	  the	  requesting	  state,	  and	  
proceedings	  concerning	  compensation	  for	  damages	  suffered	  by	  a	  person	  through	  
unjustified	  detention	  as	  a	  result	  of	  actions	  taken	  pursuant	  to	  the	  treaty.526	  Thus	  the	  
scope	  of	  the	  mutual	  assistance	  in	  this	  case	  is	  not	  as	  broad	  as	  the	  one	  of	  the	  European	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
523	  OJ	  C197,	  12	  July	  2000.	  One	  protocol	  provides	  for	  mutual	  assistance	  in	  relation	  to	  bank	  
accounts	  and	  banking	  transactions;	  the	  other	  improves	  and	  supplements	  the	  1959	  Council	  of	  
Europe	  Convention	  on	  Mutual	  Assistance	  in	  Criminal	  Matters	  and	  its	  additional	  Protocol.	  
524	  See	  Articles	  18-­‐22	  of	  the	  Convention.	  	  
525	  See	  Treaty	  with	  the	  Swiss	  Confederation	  on	  Mutual	  Assistance	  in	  Criminal	  Matters,	  Senate	  
Executive	  Report	  94-­‐29,	  94th	  Cong,	  2d	  Sess	  1	  (1976);	  Treaty	  on	  Mutual	  Assistance	  in	  Criminal	  
Matters,	  US-­‐Switzerland,	  27	  UST	  2019,	  TIAS	  No	  8302	  (1977).	  
526	  US-­‐Switzerland	  Treaty,	  note	  532,	  Article	  1.	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Convention.	  The	  treaty	  equally	  defines,	  though	  is	  not	  limited	  to,	  certain	  types	  of	  
assistance.	  These	  are,	  for	  example,	  the	  ascertaining	  of	  the	  whereabouts	  and	  addresses	  
of	  persons,	  the	  taking	  of	  a	  testimony	  or	  statement	  of	  persons,	  and	  the	  authentication	  of	  
documents.	  In	  addition,	  the	  treaty	  specifies	  that	  states	  are	  requested	  to	  designate	  a	  
central	  authority	  to	  expeditiously	  process	  assistance	  requests,	  and	  that	  requests	  must	  
be	  executed	  in	  a	  manner	  consistent	  with	  their	  own	  laws.527	  While	  the	  Swiss-­‐US	  treaty	  is	  
the	  longest	  and	  most	  complicated	  of	  any	  of	  the	  mutual	  assistance	  treaties	  presently	  
negotiated	  by	  the	  US,	  all	  provide	  for	  a	  similar	  range	  of	  assistance	  in	  criminal	  matters.528	  
	  
Thus	  both,	  bilateral	  and	  multilateral	  treaties	  are	  an	  improvement	  to	  letters	  rogatory	  
because	  they	  better	  specify	  the	  duties	  and	  responsibilities	  of	  signatory	  states.	  
Furthermore,	  they	  are	  binding,	  thus	  assistance	  has	  to	  be	  provided	  upon	  request.	  
However,	  the	  procedural	  process	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  undergone	  to	  request	  assistance	  is	  
cumbersome	  and	  time-­‐consuming.	  Formal	  requests	  for	  specified	  information,	  and	  
oftentimes	  judicial	  authorisation	  are	  required.529	  These	  mutual	  assistance	  mechanisms	  
are	  thus	  ill	  suited	  to	  deal	  with	  requests	  of	  Internet	  related	  investigations,	  where	  timely	  
assistance	  and	  responses	  are	  crucial.	  In	  particular	  for	  investigations	  by	  MIA	  tools,	  
where	  the	  software	  tool	  itself	  makes	  the	  decisions	  about	  accessing	  data	  and	  monitoring	  
communications.	  
6.2.3 International Police Cooperation 
In	  addition	  to	  the	  mutual	  legal	  assistance	  treaties,	  mechanisms	  are	  in	  place	  for	  
cooperation	  between	  states	  at	  police	  level.	  Of	  greatest	  importance	  for	  this	  chapter	  are	  
two	  associations	  of	  police	  forces:	  the	  International	  Criminal	  Police	  Organization	  
(Interpol)	  on	  international	  level,	  and	  the	  European	  Police	  Office	  (Europol)	  on	  European	  
level.	  The	  aim	  of	  both	  organisations	  is	  to	  provide	  and	  promote	  cross-­‐border	  
cooperation	  between	  criminal	  police	  authorities,	  and	  establish	  procedures	  to	  facilitate	  
assistance	  during	  criminal	  investigations.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
527	  This	  means,	  for	  example,	  if	  Switzerland	  requests	  the	  US	  to	  conduct	  a	  search	  within	  their	  
territory,	  this	  must	  meet	  the	  requirements	  of	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment	  and	  other	  applicable	  US	  
law.	  
528	  A	  Ellis,	  R	  L	  Pisani,	  “The	  United	  States	  Treaties	  on	  Mutual	  Assistance	  in	  Criminal	  Matters:	  A	  
Conparative	  Analysis”	  (1985)	  19	  International	  Lawyer,	  189,	  198.	  
529	  I	  Brown,	  D	  Korff,	  “Terrorism	  and	  the	  Proportionality	  of	  Internet	  Surveillance”	  (2009)	  6:2	  
European	  Journal	  of	  Criminology,	  119,	  124.	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Interpol	  was	  originally	  formed	  in	  Vienna	  in	  1923,	  and	  has	  steadily	  grown	  in	  
membership	  but	  never	  substantially	  changed	  in	  form	  or	  objectives.530	  	  
Interpol	  is	  not	  a	  supranational	  police	  agency	  with	  investigative	  powers	  or	  an	  
organisation	  sanctioned	  by	  an	  international	  governing	  body	  such	  as	  the	  United	  Nations.	  
Rather,	  it	  is	  a	  cooperative	  network	  formed	  independently	  among	  police	  agencies	  to	  
foster	  collaboration	  and	  provide	  assistance	  in	  police	  work	  across	  nations.531	  To	  achieve	  
this,	  Interpol	  has	  established	  a	  central	  headquarters,	  located	  in	  Lyon,	  France,	  with	  
specialised	  bureaus,	  so-­‐called	  National	  Central	  Bureaus	  (NCB),	  in	  the	  countries	  of	  
participating	  police	  agencies.532	  At	  present,	  Interpol	  counts	  188	  member	  countries.533	  
Interpol’s	  primary	  challenge	  has	  been	  to	  develop	  a	  system	  that	  allows	  for	  the	  sharing	  
and	  dissemination	  of	  information	  among	  the	  member	  countries.	  To	  achieve	  this,	  
Interpol	  has	  set	  up	  a	  variety	  of	  databases	  (for	  example,	  the	  Interpol	  weapons	  and	  
electronic	  tracking	  system	  [IWETS]),	  which	  member	  countries	  can	  access,	  as	  well	  as	  
introduced	  the	  communication	  system	  I-­‐24/7,	  which	  enables	  police	  officers	  a	  secure	  
communication	  channel	  with	  other	  police	  forces	  all	  over	  the	  world	  at	  any	  time.534	  
	  
Europol	  is	  the	  criminal	  police	  agency	  of	  the	  European	  Union.	  The	  establishment	  of	  
Europol	  was	  agreed	  in	  the	  1992	  Treaty	  on	  European	  Union,	  also	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  
Maastricht	  Treaty.	  However,	  the	  Europol	  Convention,	  which	  officially	  formed	  the	  
organisation,	  was	  not	  ratified	  by	  all	  member	  states	  until	  1998.	  Europol	  commenced	  its	  
full	  activities	  on	  1	  July	  1999.535	  The	  Convention	  is	  still	  the	  instrument	  governing	  the	  
constitution	  of	  Europol,	  but	  has	  been	  significantly	  amended	  since	  its	  establishment.536	  
Europol	  has	  its	  headquarters	  in	  The	  Hague,	  where	  it	  allocates	  its	  resources.	  The	  aim	  of	  
Europol	  is	  to	  assist	  law	  enforcement	  authorities	  of	  Member	  States	  in	  their	  fight	  against	  
serious	  forms	  of	  organised	  crime.537	  Its	  objectives	  are	  to	  improve	  the	  effectiveness	  of	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  M	  Deflem,	  “Bureaucratization	  and	  Social	  Control:	  Historical	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  of	  International	  
Police	  Cooperation”	  (2000)	  34:3	  Law	  &	  Society	  Review,	  739-­‐778.	  
531	  M	  Deflem,	  “Global	  Rule	  of	  Law	  or	  Global	  Rule	  of	  Law	  Enforcement?	  International	  Police	  
Cooperation	  and	  Counterterrorism”	  (2006)	  603	  Law,	  Society,	  and	  Democracy:	  Comparative	  
Perspectives,	  240-­‐251.	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  Ibid.	  
533	  See	  http://www.interpol.int/public/icpo/default.asp.	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  Interpol,	  “General	  Secretariat	  2002	  Activity	  Report”,	  available	  online	  at	  
http://www.interpol.int/content/download/773/6131/version/5/file/agn72r01.pdf.	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  House	  of	  Lords,	  European	  Union	  Committee,	  Europol:	  Coordinating	  the	  Fight	  Against	  Serious	  
and	  Organised	  Crime,	  29th	  Report	  of	  Session	  2007-­‐2008,	  12.	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and	  cooperation	  among	  the	  police	  authorities	  of	  the	  EU	  member	  states.	  Similar	  to	  the	  
structure	  of	  Interpol,	  Europol	  is	  not	  an	  executive	  police	  force	  with	  autonomous	  
investigative	  powers.538	  Deflem	  lists	  its	  core	  activities	  as:	  (a)	  the	  facilitation	  of	  
information	  exchange	  among	  the	  so-­‐called	  Europol	  Liaison	  Officers,	  who	  are	  seconded	  
to	  the	  Europol	  headquarters	  in	  The	  Hague	  by	  the	  member	  states	  to	  act	  as	  
representatives	  of	  their	  national	  police;	  (b)	  the	  supply	  of	  operational	  analysis	  in	  
support	  of	  relevant	  police	  operations	  conducted	  by	  the	  member	  states;	  (c)	  the	  drawing	  
up	  of	  strategic	  reports,	  such	  as	  threat	  assessments,	  and	  crime	  analyses	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  
information	  supplied	  by	  police	  of	  the	  member	  states	  or	  generated	  at	  Europol	  
headquarters;	  and	  (d)	  the	  offering	  of	  technical	  support	  for	  police	  investigations	  
conducted	  in	  the	  EU	  member	  states.539	  	  
	  
Comparably	  with	  Interpol,	  Europol’s	  most	  important	  instruments	  are	  databases	  and	  
communication	  systems.	  The	  Europol	  Computer	  System	  facilitates	  the	  exchange	  and	  
analysis	  of	  data.	  This	  is	  supplemented	  by	  two	  databases:	  the	  EU	  Customs	  Information	  
System	  that	  provides	  customs	  agencies	  with	  the	  ability	  to	  exchange	  information	  on	  
smuggling,	  and	  the	  FIDE,	  which	  provides	  information	  on	  subjects	  involved	  in	  a	  criminal	  
investigation.540	  	  
	  
Both	  associations	  have	  significantly	  improved	  mutual	  assistance	  during	  criminal	  
investigations.	  However,	  both	  Interpol	  and	  Europol	  suffer	  from	  the	  lack	  of	  enforcement	  
power	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  neither	  of	  these	  associations	  is	  a	  supranational	  force.	  The	  
cooperation	  of	  the	  member	  states	  with	  the	  associations	  is	  voluntary,	  which	  means	  that	  
crucial	  information	  is	  oftentimes	  not	  shared.	  	  
An	  indication	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  cooperation	  among	  European	  member	  states	  was	  revealed	  
after	  the	  Madrid	  bombings,	  when	  French	  police	  officials	  were	  outraged	  over	  the	  fact	  
that	  their	  Spanish	  counterparts	  refused	  to	  share	  information	  on	  the	  types	  of	  explosives	  
that	  had	  been	  used.541	  	  
As	  with	  other	  mutual	  assistance	  measures	  discussed	  above,	  the	  mechanisms	  in	  place	  to	  
facilitate	  cross-­‐jurisdictional	  cooperation	  at	  police	  level	  are	  of	  somewhat	  limited	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  Ibid,	  at	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benefit	  to	  investigations	  involving	  the	  Internet,	  and	  in	  particular	  where	  MIA	  tools	  are	  
used.	  The	  main	  focus	  of	  cooperation	  of	  existing	  measures	  is	  on	  the	  collective	  
accumulation	  of	  data.	  However,	  data	  relevant	  for	  cross-­‐jurisdictional	  investigations	  of	  
the	  virtual	  living	  space,	  and	  particularly	  online	  searches,	  is	  usually	  fluctuant	  and	  
pertains	  to	  one	  specific	  person,	  who	  has	  not	  necessarily	  been	  a	  suspect	  previously.	  
Thus	  data	  is	  unlikely	  to	  be	  stored	  in	  any	  of	  the	  databases,	  and	  rapid	  assistance	  in	  form	  
of	  searches	  and	  seizures	  is	  not	  part	  of	  the	  activities	  supported	  by	  either	  Interpol	  or	  
Europol.	  In	  addition,	  as	  indicated	  above,	  cooperation	  is	  not	  mandatory,	  which	  poses	  the	  
same	  problems	  discussed	  above	  for	  Letters	  Rogatory.	  	  
	  
The	  analysis	  of	  existing	  mechanisms	  of	  legal	  assistance	  has	  shown	  that	  mechanisms	  
obligating	  states	  to	  assist	  one	  another	  in	  extraterritorial	  investigations	  are	  in	  place.	  	  
However,	  it	  has	  also	  highlighted	  that	  traditional	  mechanisms,	  governing	  the	  mutual	  
assistance	  in	  criminal	  matters	  while	  respecting	  the	  territorial	  sovereignty	  of	  other	  
states	  are	  ill	  suited	  for	  the	  regulation	  of	  mutual	  assistance	  requests	  for	  cross-­‐
jurisdictional	  investigations	  by	  MIA	  tools.	  The	  technological	  advancements,	  and	  the	  
development	  of	  the	  Internet	  and	  related	  ICT	  technologies	  significantly	  change	  the	  
nature	  of	  mutual	  assistance	  requests.	  The	  searching	  and	  seizing	  of	  digital	  data	  requires	  
speedy	  actions,	  which	  are	  in	  stark	  contrast	  to	  the	  formal	  and	  lengthy	  procedures	  
required	  for	  the	  mutual	  assistance	  requests	  under	  existing	  mechanisms.	  	  
While	  the	  number	  of	  transnational	  crimes	  has	  historically	  been	  rising,	  cases	  where	  the	  
relevant	  evidence	  is	  primarily	  located	  abroad	  were	  still	  the	  exception	  rather	  than	  the	  
rule.	  Thus	  traditional	  mechanisms	  of	  mutual	  assistance	  were	  sufficient	  to	  deal	  with	  
these	  requests.	  However,	  during	  investigations	  of	  the	  virtual	  living	  space	  and	  of	  ICT	  
devices,	  investigators	  will	  often	  find	  that	  crucial	  evidence	  is	  located	  in	  a	  different	  
jurisdiction.	  This	  might	  even	  be	  the	  case	  when	  a	  crime	  has	  no	  other	  international	  
element,	  as	  described	  in	  the	  brief	  example	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  chapter.	  The	  use	  of	  
free	  email	  accounts	  and	  cloud	  computing	  applications	  means	  that	  relevant	  data	  is	  
stored	  on	  servers	  outside	  of	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  investigating	  country.	  Thus	  the	  
physical	  location	  of	  digital	  evidence	  depends	  upon	  the	  fortuity	  of	  network	  architecture,	  
rather	  then	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  crime.	  	  
	  
Particularly	  those	  working	  for	  law	  enforcement	  units	  have	  also	  confirmed	  the	  problem	  
of	  mutual	  assistance	  requests	  for	  digital	  evidence.	  Here,	  it	  was	  pointed	  out	  that	  existing	  
mechanisms	  governing	  such	  requests	  are	  unapt	  to	  govern	  cooperation	  among	  states.	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The	  interviewees	  highlighted	  two	  aspects.	  Firstly,	  it	  was	  pointed	  out	  that	  traditional	  
channels	  (mechanisms	  described	  above)	  for	  obtaining	  evidence	  abroad	  are	  not	  flexible	  
and	  fast	  enough	  in	  cases	  of	  Internet	  investigations.	  Secondly,	  it	  was	  stated	  that	  from	  a	  
technical	  point	  of	  view,	  cross-­‐jurisdictional	  searches	  and	  the	  seizure	  of	  digital	  evidence	  
abroad	  could	  be	  undertaken	  without	  any	  problems.	  Thus	  a	  dichotomy	  exists	  between	  
what	  is	  technically	  possible	  and	  legally	  allowed.	  It	  was	  also	  said	  that	  the	  legal	  
uncertainty	  negatively	  impacts	  the	  work	  of	  officers,	  and	  sometimes	  halts	  the	  
development	  of	  new	  investigation	  technologies.	  	  
	  
Therefore,	  the	  widespread	  of	  the	  Internet	  and	  the	  increased	  relevance	  of	  digital	  data	  
for	  investigations	  creates	  new	  legal	  challenges	  for	  cooperation	  among	  law	  enforcement	  
agents	  from	  different	  jurisdictions.	  Thus	  the	  question	  posed	  in	  section	  6.1	  of	  this	  
chapter,	  whether	  cross-­‐border	  searches	  using	  MIA	  tools	  qualify	  as	  an	  infringement	  of	  
the	  territoriality	  principle,	  and	  therefore	  violate	  international	  law	  and	  would	  be	  
improper	  needs	  to	  be	  addressed.	  	  
6.3 Beyond Traditional Legal Assistance Mechanisms 
The	  question	  whether	  cross-­‐jurisdictional	  investigations	  are	  legal	  is	  far	  from	  
straightforward.	  Most	  countries	  do	  not	  have	  any	  specific	  legislation	  regulating	  the	  issue	  
of	  cybercrime	  jurisdiction,	  and	  therefore	  rely	  on	  the	  traditional	  mechanisms	  described	  
above,	  which	  leads	  to	  unsatisfying	  results	  as	  has	  been	  highlighted	  in	  the	  previous	  part	  
of	  this	  chapter.	  Those	  countries	  that	  do	  have	  cybercrime	  jurisdiction	  legislation	  in	  place	  
can	  often	  be	  placed	  at	  the	  other	  extreme	  end.	  Malaysia,	  for	  example,	  has	  provisions	  
stating	  that	  it	  can	  theoretically	  claim	  jurisdiction	  for	  any	  cybercrime	  committed	  
anywhere.542	  	  
To	  answer	  the	  question	  whether	  cross-­‐jurisdictional	  investigations	  of	  the	  virtual	  living	  
space	  are	  permissible	  under	  international	  law,	  a	  closer	  analysis	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  these	  
investigations	  needs	  to	  be	  undertaken.	  	  
	  
Generally,	  a	  cross-­‐jurisdictional	  investigation	  of	  the	  virtual	  living	  space	  refers	  to	  the	  
searching	  and	  seizure	  of	  digital	  data	  located	  in	  a	  jurisdiction	  other	  than	  the	  one	  of	  the	  
acting	  state.	  These	  activities	  are	  usually	  carried	  out	  remotely	  from	  the	  home	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jurisdiction	  of	  the	  investigating	  authority.	  This	  is	  true	  for	  both	  cases,	  investigations	  
conducted	  by	  human	  officers	  and	  those	  by	  MIA	  tools.	  
However,	  the	  type	  of	  data	  to	  be	  investigated	  can	  differ.	  Two	  different	  types	  need	  to	  be	  
distinguished:	  a)	  freely	  accessible	  data,	  and	  b)	  non-­‐freely	  accessible	  data.	  	  
In	  the	  first	  case,	  this	  can,	  for	  example,	  be	  data	  located	  on	  openly	  accessible	  websites,	  or	  
on	  online	  fora	  that	  can	  be	  accessed	  with	  guest	  accounts,	  as	  well	  as	  communication	  data	  
that	  is	  openly	  accessible,	  such	  as	  open	  chat	  rooms.	  	  
The	  latter	  case	  is	  data	  that	  is	  located	  on	  private	  accounts	  (such	  as	  email	  accounts),	  or	  
on	  the	  hard	  drive	  of	  private	  computers,	  as	  well	  as	  communication	  data	  solely	  intended	  
for	  one	  or	  more	  specified	  persons,	  such	  as	  conversations	  on	  Voice-­‐over-­‐IP	  (VOIP)	  
applications.	  	  	  
	  
The	  following	  analysis	  of	  the	  legality	  of	  cross-­‐jurisdictional	  investigations	  differentiates	  
between	  these	  two	  types	  of	  data.	  This	  is	  important	  because	  the	  potential	  impact	  on	  the	  
person	  to	  be	  investigated	  differs	  significantly	  whether	  freely	  accessible	  data,	  or	  non-­‐
freely	  accessible	  data	  about	  him	  is	  investigated.	  In	  the	  latter	  case,	  the	  potential	  privacy	  
and	  data	  protection	  implications	  can	  be	  much	  more	  significant,	  and	  thus	  states	  have	  a	  
higher	  interest	  to	  protect	  their	  citizens	  and	  therefore	  claim	  jurisdiction	  over	  any	  
investigative	  acts.	  Additionally,	  the	  technical	  steps	  required	  for	  the	  accessing	  of	  
protected	  data	  are	  considerably	  more	  complex,	  which	  means	  the	  investigative	  actions	  
required	  are	  more	  intrusive.	  	  
6.3.1 Cross-Jurisdictional Investigations of Freely Accessible Data 
6.3.1.1 Literature Debate  
Those	  authors	  who	  have	  written	  on	  the	  subject	  have	  discussed	  cross-­‐jurisdictional	  
investigations	  of	  freely	  accessible	  digital	  data	  controversially.	  	  
A	  large	  number	  of	  scholars	  find	  that	  a	  cross-­‐border	  search	  of	  openly	  accessible	  data	  is	  
compatible	  with	  international	  principles	  of	  territory	  and	  sovereignty.543	  The	  reasoning	  
for	  this	  stance,	  however,	  varies	  significantly.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
543	  See	  e.g.	  P	  de	  Hert,	  “Cybercrime	  and	  Jurisdiction	  in	  Belgium	  and	  the	  Netherlands.	  Lotus	  in	  
Cyberspace	  –	  Whose	  Sovereignty	  is	  At	  Stake?”	  in	  B-­‐J	  Koops,	  S	  Brenner	  (eds)	  Cybercrime	  and	  
Jursidiction	  –	  An	  International	  Survey	  (The	  Hague:	  Asser	  Press,	  2006)	  107,	  who	  states	  that	  he	  
cannot	  see	  international	  law	  prohibiting	  police	  to	  consult	  foreign	  publicly-­‐accessible	  files,	  
newsgroups,	  or	  websites;	  N	  Seitz,	  note	  514,	  at	  33;	  M	  Germann,	  Gefahrenabwehr	  und	  
Strafverfolgung	  im	  Internet	  (Berlin:	  Duncker	  &	  Humblot,	  2000)	  652.	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Maybe	  the	  most	  forthright,	  de	  Hert,	  states	  without	  further	  explanation	  that	  the	  
consultation	  of	  publicly	  available	  data	  on	  the	  Internet	  by	  police	  stored	  on	  foreign	  
servers	  is	  uncontroversial	  and	  not	  problematic.544	  	  
Similarly,	  Goldsmith	  reasons	  that	  cross-­‐jurisdictional	  investigations	  of	  freely	  accessible	  
digital	  data	  are	  consistent	  with	  international	  principles	  of	  enforcement	  jurisdiction.545	  
However,	  he	  supports	  his	  position	  by	  arguing	  that	  states	  have	  always	  exercised	  a	  
certain	  amount	  of	  extraterritorial	  regulation,	  by	  exercising	  territorial	  power	  in	  ways	  
that	  changed	  behaviour	  in	  other	  nations,	  which	  he	  refers	  to	  as	  indirect	  extraterritorial	  
regulation.546	  Indirect	  extraterritorial	  regulation	  works	  through	  force	  (or	  threat	  of	  
force)	  that	  states	  impose	  nationally,	  but	  which	  has	  also	  an	  effect	  on	  behaviour	  in	  
another	  state’s	  jurisdiction.	  For	  example,	  if	  an	  offshore	  person	  or	  firm	  causes	  local	  
harm	  from	  abroad,	  the	  local	  government	  can	  indirectly	  regulate	  the	  harmful	  foreign	  
activity	  by	  threatening	  to	  seize	  the	  offshore	  firm’s	  local	  assets.	  	  
Technological	  advancements,	  as	  Goldsmith	  argues,	  have	  merely	  expanded	  indirect	  
extraterritorial	  regulatory	  activities	  but	  not	  introduced	  them.	  Thus	  his	  argument	  is	  that	  
such	  activities	  have	  always	  existed,	  and	  are	  therefore	  commonly	  accepted	  and	  
customary.	  He	  compares	  cross-­‐jurisdictional	  searches	  with	  the	  use	  of	  orbital	  
reconnaissance	  satellites.547	  However,	  he	  also	  cautions	  that	  such	  cross-­‐border	  searches	  
can	  negatively	  impact	  on	  privacy	  and	  free	  speech	  rights	  of	  the	  target	  person.548	  For	  the	  
case	  of	  freely	  accessible	  data	  these	  concerns	  can	  be	  neglected	  because	  only	  data	  the	  
target	  person	  voluntarily	  reveals	  is	  accessed.	  	  
Coming	  to	  the	  same	  conclusion,	  but	  with	  a	  different	  argumentation,	  Graf,	  the	  then-­‐
senior	  prosecutor	  at	  the	  German	  Federal	  Court	  of	  Justice	  (BGH)	  argues	  that	  cross-­‐
jurisdictional	  searches	  of	  freely	  accessible	  digital	  data	  need	  to	  be	  allowed	  for	  reasons	  of	  
practicability.549	  He	  believes	  that	  a	  reliable	  conclusion	  about	  the	  location	  of	  the	  
computer	  cannot	  be	  drawn	  based	  on	  the	  Uniform	  Resource	  Locator	  (URL).	  Thus	  he	  
reasons	  that	  cross-­‐jurisdictional	  investigations	  of	  freely	  accessible	  data	  are	  a	  necessity	  
to	  conduct	  any	  kind	  of	  Internet	  related	  investigations,	  and	  therefore	  must	  be	  allowed.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
544	  De	  Hert,	  ibid,	  at	  107.	  
545	  J	  L	  Goldsmith,	  “The	  Internet	  and	  the	  Legitimacy	  of	  Remote	  Cross-­‐Border	  Searches”	  (2001)	  
The	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Legal	  Forum	  103-­‐118,	  104.	  
546	  Ibid,	  at	  110.	  
547	  Ibid,	  at	  114.	  
548	  Ibid,	  at	  105.	  
549	  J	  P	  Graf,	  “Befugnisse	  und	  Grenzen	  der	  Ermittlungsbehörden”	  Deutsches	  Polizeiblatt	  4/2001,	  
6,	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Jofer,	  who	  also	  agrees	  that	  cross-­‐jurisdictional	  searches	  of	  freely	  accessible	  data	  should	  
be	  allowed,	  argues	  that	  the	  traditional	  concept	  for	  defining	  an	  infringement	  of	  the	  
territoriality	  principle	  is	  unsuitable	  here.550	  	  
Traditionally,	  the	  territoriality	  principle	  is	  violated	  if	  a	  law	  enforcement	  agent	  enters	  
the	  territory	  of	  another	  state	  to	  conduct	  investigative	  measures.	  	  
However,	  as	  Jofer	  argues,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  cross-­‐jurisdictional	  investigations	  of	  freely	  
accessible	  digital	  data	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  Law	  enforcement	  officers	  are	  conducting	  the	  
investigative	  measures	  from	  their	  own	  territory.	  Jofer	  finds	  that	  by	  tolerating	  the	  
Internet	  as	  an	  institution,	  the	  state	  has	  permitted	  data	  traffic	  in	  its	  national	  territory,	  
which	  includes	  the	  retrieval	  of	  data	  from	  abroad.551	  
	  
Jofer’s	  argument	  that	  tolerating	  the	  Internet	  as	  an	  institution	  necessarily	  means	  that	  all	  
data	  traffic	  within	  a	  state’s	  territory	  needs	  to	  be	  accepted	  is	  difficult,	  particularly	  
because	  often	  data	  traffic	  is	  prompted	  from	  a	  different	  jurisdiction.	  This	  would	  mean	  
that	  any	  form	  of	  data	  traffic,	  whether	  malicious	  or	  harmful,	  would	  have	  to	  be	  accepted.	  
	  
A	  better	  approach	  in	  the	  author’s	  opinion	  is	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  intensity	  of	  the	  violation.	  
The	  relevant	  criterion	  is	  not	  where	  the	  violation	  occurs,	  but	  only	  the	  intensity	  of	  the	  
violation	  of	  the	  legal	  framework	  of	  the	  country	  where	  the	  data	  is	  retrieved.	  The	  degree	  
of	  intensity	  depends	  on	  whether	  the	  rights	  of	  a	  foreign	  citizen	  are	  breached	  by	  the	  acts.	  
In	  case	  of	  openly	  accessible	  data,	  the	  acting	  agents	  are	  not	  breaching	  any	  rights	  of	  
citizens,	  because	  no	  acts	  of	  deception,	  or	  other	  coercive	  measures	  are	  necessary	  to	  
access	  the	  data.	  This	  approach	  equally	  acknowledges	  how	  the	  Internet	  has	  changed	  
policing,	  but	  avoids	  the	  potentially	  difficult	  generalisation	  of	  Jofer’s	  approach.	  
	  
Some	  scholars	  disagree	  and,	  discussing	  cross-­‐jurisdictional	  searches,	  reject	  the	  
permissibility	  of	  the	  measure,	  even	  in	  the	  case	  of	  freely	  accessible	  digital	  data.	  	  
Gercke	  states	  that	  the	  territoriality	  principle	  prohibits	  any	  form	  of	  extraterritorial	  
activity	  by	  law	  enforcement	  agents	  in	  foreign	  territory,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  it	  
is	  a	  measure	  that	  requires	  the	  physical	  intrusion	  of	  an	  agent.552	  Due	  to	  this	  absolute	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  R	  Jofer,	  Strafverfolgung	  im	  Internet:	  Phänomenologie	  und	  Bekämpfung	  kriminellen	  Verhaltens	  
in	  internationalen	  Computernetzen	  (Frankfurt	  am	  Main:	  Lang,	  1999)	  193.	  
551	  Ibid.	  
552	  M	  Gercke,	  Rechtswidrige	  Inhalte	  im	  Internet:	  eine	  Diskussion	  ausgewählter	  Problemfelder	  des	  
Internet-­Strafrechts	  unter	  Berücksichtigung	  strafprozessualer	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interpretation	  of	  the	  territoriality	  principle,	  he	  comes	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  also	  the	  
mere	  accessing	  of	  publicly	  accessible	  websites	  constitutes	  a	  violation,	  even	  though	  it	  
does	  not	  establish	  an	  intrusion	  due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  intensity	  of	  the	  measure.553	  This	  is	  
because	  the	  territoriality	  and	  sovereignty	  principles	  are	  violated	  by	  any	  kind	  of	  
extraterritorial	  actions,	  not	  only	  those	  establishing	  an	  intrusion.554	  	  
Coming	  to	  the	  same	  conclusion,	  Bär	  argues	  that	  the	  new	  possibilities	  the	  networked	  
environment	  of	  the	  Internet	  offers	  for	  extraterritorial	  data	  processing	  would	  be	  used	  as	  
an	  “extended	  arm”	  by	  law	  enforcement	  agencies	  in	  the	  case	  of	  cross-­‐jurisdictional	  
searches,	  and	  the	  intensity	  of	  such	  actions	  would	  therefore	  be	  comparable	  to	  the	  
physical	  presence	  of	  agents	  in	  foreign	  territory.555	  	  
Similarly,	  Spatscheck	  reasons	  that	  the	  right	  of	  the	  state	  to	  independently	  decide	  
whether	  or	  not	  investigations	  shall	  be	  undertaken	  in	  its	  sovereign	  territory	  must	  not	  be	  
circumvented	  with	  the	  help	  of	  advanced	  communication	  technologies.556	  
	  
One	  central	  question	  in	  the	  above-­‐depicted	  debate	  whether	  cross-­‐jurisdictional	  
searches	  of	  freely	  accessible	  data	  constitute	  a	  violation	  of	  the	  territoriality	  principle	  is	  
in	  how	  far	  such	  actions	  are	  comparable	  to	  traditional	  investigative	  and	  monitoring	  
measures,	  such	  as	  the	  use	  of	  satellites.	  The	  opposing	  authors	  all	  refer	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  
new	  technologies	  should	  not	  offer	  ways	  to	  circumvent	  existing	  legal	  concepts,	  such	  as	  
the	  territoriality	  concept,	  and	  agree	  that	  cross-­‐jurisdictional	  searches	  go	  beyond	  the	  
possibilities	  existing	  investigation	  measures	  offer.	  Whereas	  according	  to	  conventional	  
wisdom	  the	  mere	  accessing	  of	  publicly	  accessible	  extraterritorial	  data	  on	  the	  Internet	  is	  
not	  an	  action	  significantly	  different	  from	  traditional	  measures,	  such	  as	  the	  consulting	  of	  
foreign	  newspapers,	  or	  the	  monitoring	  of	  foreign	  territory	  from	  a	  domestic	  position,	  
such	  as	  by	  border	  police	  or	  by	  satellite.	  	  
6.3.1.2 Legislation  
Hardly	  any	  international	  legislation	  dealing	  with	  matters	  of	  Internet	  regulation,	  and	  in	  
particular	  questions	  of	  jurisdiction	  exists.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  potential	  issue	  of	  cross-­‐
jurisdictional	  cyber-­‐investigations	  and	  the	  resulting	  jurisdiction	  problem	  has	  been	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
553	  Ibid.	  
554	  U	  Sieber,	  in	  T	  Hoeren,	  U	  Sieber	  (eds)	  Handbuch	  Multimedia-­Recht:	  Rechtsfragen	  des	  
elektronischen	  Geschäftsverkehrs	  (München:	  Beck,	  2000)	  Nr.	  19	  RN	  736.	  
555	  Bär,	  note	  517,	  at	  235.	  
556	  R	  Spatscheck,	  “Steuerhinterziehung	  im	  Internet”	  (2000)	  28	  Strafverteidiger	  Forum,	  1,	  6.	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discussed	  at	  the	  European	  level	  as	  early	  as	  1995.	  The	  Council	  of	  Europe	  engaged	  in	  
discussions	  about	  this	  topic	  under	  the	  working	  title	  of	  ‘transborder	  network	  search’	  as	  
part	  of	  the	  preparation	  for	  Recommendation	  R	  (95)	  13	  on	  Problems	  of	  Criminal	  
Procedure	  Law	  connected	  with	  Information	  Technology.557	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  any	  
concrete	  national	  or	  international	  case	  law,	  it	  remained	  undecided	  whether	  a	  state	  
whose	  law	  enforcement	  agents	  would	  access	  digital	  data	  on	  the	  territory	  of	  another	  
state,	  would	  interfere	  with	  the	  internal	  affairs	  of	  the	  latter	  state.558	  It	  was	  
recommended	  at	  the	  time	  that	  states	  should	  enter	  into	  mutual	  agreements	  as	  to	  what	  
extent	  cross-­‐	  jurisdictional	  investigations	  could	  be	  authorised.	  However,	  as	  Kaspersen	  
reports,	  two	  states	  involved	  in	  the	  negotiations	  of	  the	  Recommendation	  (95)	  13	  
attempted	  to	  conclude	  such	  a	  bilateral	  agreement,	  but	  failed	  because	  of	  the	  sensitivity	  
and	  complexity	  of	  the	  issue.559	  	  
Due	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  topic,	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe	  recommended	  at	  the	  time	  that	  
generally	  access	  to	  data	  stored	  on	  international	  networks	  should	  be	  permitted	  in	  cases	  
where	  immediate	  action	  is	  necessary.560	  
	  
Thus	  the	  discussions	  of	  this	  topic	  surrounding	  the	  negotiations	  of	  the	  Recommendation	  
(95)	  13	  did	  not	  deliver	  any	  concrete	  results	  at	  the	  time.	  	  
The	  topic	  was	  also	  discussed	  at	  a	  ministerial	  conference	  of	  the	  G-­‐8	  countries	  on	  
combating	  transnational	  organised	  crime.561	  Here,	  recommendations	  and	  principles	  in	  
relation	  to	  cross-­‐	  jurisdictional	  investigations	  of	  publicly	  accessible	  data,	  similar	  to	  
those	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe,	  were	  developed.	  It	  was	  stated	  that	  the	  accessing	  of	  
publicly	  available	  (open	  source)	  data,	  regardless	  of	  where	  the	  data	  is	  geographically	  
located,	  could	  be	  undertaken	  without	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  affected	  state.562	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
557	  Council	  of	  Europe,	  Recommendation	  No.	  R	  (95)	  13	  of	  the	  Committee	  of	  Ministers	  to	  Member	  
States	  Concerning	  Problems	  of	  Criminal	  Procedure	  Law	  connected	  with	  Information	  Technology	  
(adopted	  11	  September	  1995).	  
558	  H	  W	  K	  Kaspersen,	  “Jurisdiction	  in	  the	  Cybercrime	  Convention”	  in	  B-­‐J	  Koops,	  S	  Brenner	  (eds)	  
Cybercrime	  and	  Jursidiction	  –	  An	  International	  Survey	  (The	  Hague:	  Asser	  Press,	  2006)	  19.	  
559	  Ibid,	  at	  footnote	  24.	  
560	  Council	  of	  Europe,	  at	  565,	  Appendix	  §	  VII	  (17):	  The	  power	  to	  extend	  a	  search	  to	  other	  
computer	  systems	  should	  also	  be	  applicable	  when	  the	  system	  is	  located	  in	  a	  foreign	  jurisdiction,	  
provided	  that	  immediate	  action	  is	  required.	  In	  order	  to	  avoid	  possible	  violations	  of	  state	  
sovereignty	  or	  international	  law,	  an	  unambiguous	  legal	  basis	  for	  such	  extended	  search	  and	  
seizure	  should	  be	  established.	  Therefore,	  there	  is	  an	  urgent	  need	  for	  negotiating	  international	  
agreements	  as	  to	  how,	  when	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  such	  search	  and	  seizure	  should	  be	  permitted.	  
561	  Ministerial	  Conference	  of	  the	  G-­‐8	  Countries	  on	  Combating	  Transnational	  Organized	  Crime,	  
Moscow,	  October	  1999,	  at	  http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/adhoc/crime99.htm.	  
562	  Ibid,	  Annex	  1	  (6a).	  ).	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The	  issue	  was	  debated	  again	  during	  the	  discussions	  of	  the	  2001	  Council	  of	  Europe	  
Convention	  on	  Cybercrime	  (CoC).563	  The	  CoC	  was	  developed	  in	  response	  to	  a	  growing	  
concern	  about	  the	  adequacy	  of	  legislation	  criminalising	  certain	  activities	  occurring	  over	  
computer	  networks.564	  It	  has	  thus	  far	  been	  signed	  by	  46	  countries,	  including	  the	  US,	  
Canada	  and	  Japan,	  and	  was	  ratified	  by	  30	  countries.	  The	  CoC	  contains	  a	  number	  of	  rules	  
dealing	  with	  questions	  of	  jurisdiction	  (Article	  22	  CoC),	  which	  reflect	  the	  application	  of	  a	  
number	  of	  different	  jurisdiction	  principles.	  The	  aim	  of	  Article	  22	  is	  to	  ensure	  that	  
parties	  to	  the	  CoC	  establish	  the	  required	  level	  of	  extraterritorial	  jurisdiction.565	  
However,	  these	  jurisdictional	  rules	  do	  not	  regulate	  extraterritorial	  investigative	  
actions.	  During	  the	  discussions	  of	  the	  CoC	  the	  importance	  as	  well	  as	  difficulties	  of	  cross-­‐	  
jurisdictional	  investigations	  were	  highlighted	  again.	  It	  was	  stated	  that	  extraterritorial	  
investigations	  had	  to	  be	  considered	  a	  violation	  of	  international	  law	  and	  could	  only	  be	  
permissible	  if	  a	  specific	  regulation	  would	  be	  drafted	  and	  included	  in	  the	  CoC.566	  As	  a	  
result	  of	  these	  discussions,	  Article	  32	  was	  drafted	  and	  included	  into	  the	  CoC.567	  
According	  to	  Article	  32	  (a)	  CoC,	  a	  state	  may	  access	  publicly	  accessible	  data	  that	  is	  in	  the	  
‘open	  source’.	  This	  is	  the	  case	  if	  data	  can	  be	  accessed	  without	  the	  need	  for	  further	  
procedures,	  such	  as	  logins	  with	  passwords.	  States	  are	  allowed	  to	  retrieve	  this	  data	  
independently	  of	  the	  geographical	  location	  of	  its	  storage	  medium.568	  	  
	  
The	  CoC	  therefore	  establishes	  a	  legal	  basis	  explicitly	  allowing	  the	  extraterritorial	  
investigation	  of	  openly	  accessible	  data.	  While	  not	  all	  states	  have	  ratified	  the	  CoC	  
(Germany	  and	  the	  UK	  are	  examples),	  it	  provides	  at	  the	  very	  least	  a	  model	  that	  states	  
should	  adapt.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
563	  Council	  of	  Europe,	  Convention	  on	  Cybercrime,	  Budapest,	  23	  November	  2001	  (CETS	  185),	  
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=185&CL=ENG.	  
564	  Frequently	  Asked	  Questions	  and	  Answers	  About	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe	  Convention	  on	  
Cybercrime	  (Final	  Draft,	  released	  June	  29,	  2001),	  A2,	  at	  
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/COEFAQs.htm.	  
565	  Kaspersen,	  note	  558,	  at	  10,	  see	  also	  here	  for	  a	  more	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  the	  background	  and	  
meaning	  of	  Article	  22	  CoC.	  
566	  Ibid,	  at	  20.	  
567	  Article	  32	  is	  the	  result	  of	  lengthy	  and	  controversial	  discussions,	  which	  will	  be	  further	  
discussed	  in	  the	  next	  section	  of	  this	  thesis,	  where	  these	  are	  of	  more	  relevance.	  	  
568	  Article	  32	  (a)	  of	  the	  CoC	  reads	  “A	  Party	  may,	  without	  the	  authorization	  of	  another	  Party,	  (a)	  
access	  publicly	  available	  (open	  source)	  stored	  computer	  data,	  regardless	  of	  where	  the	  data	  is	  
located	  geographically.”	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In	  addition,	  given	  the	  fact	  that	  consent	  about	  the	  legality	  of	  cross-­‐jurisdictional	  
investigations	  of	  openly	  accessible	  data	  was	  reached	  during	  the	  discussions	  of	  the	  CoC	  
it	  appears	  a	  valid	  option	  that	  this	  could	  be	  recognised	  and	  legit	  under	  customary	  
international	  law.	  	  
Customary	  international	  law	  is	  binding	  even	  for	  nations	  that	  have	  not	  formally	  
accepted	  law	  regulating	  the	  matter	  in	  question.569	  Customary	  international	  law	  is	  
regarded	  as	  a	  primary	  form	  of	  international	  law.570	  It	  is	  defined	  as	  “the	  collection	  of	  
international	  behavioural	  regularities	  that	  nations	  over	  time	  come	  to	  view	  as	  binding	  
as	  a	  matter	  of	  law.”571	  Kelly	  defines	  customary	  law	  as	  “a	  set	  of	  norms	  derived	  from	  
practice	  that	  is	  invested	  with	  binding	  authority	  by	  the	  relevant	  community.”	  He	  goes	  on	  
to	  add	  that	  customary	  law	  “is	  not	  mere	  practice	  or	  habitual	  behaviour,	  rather	  it	  is	  a	  
normative	  order	  consisting	  of	  rights	  and	  duties	  abstracted	  from	  practice.”572	  Arend	  and	  
Beck	  note	  that	  customary	  international	  law	  is	  developed	  as	  a	  result	  of	  state	  behaviour.	  
They	  state	  that	  “if,	  over	  a	  period	  of	  time,	  states	  begin	  to	  act	  in	  a	  certain	  way	  and	  come	  
to	  regard	  that	  behaviour	  as	  being	  required	  by	  law,	  a	  norm	  of	  customary	  law	  has	  been	  
developed.”573	  	  
There	  are	  two	  central	  pre-­‐requisites	  for	  the	  development	  of	  customary	  law:	  state	  
practice	  and	  opinio	  juris.	  According	  to	  Roberts,	  “state	  practice	  refers	  to	  general	  and	  
consistent	  practice	  by	  states,	  while	  opinio	  juris	  means	  that	  the	  practice	  is	  followed	  out	  
of	  a	  belief	  of	  legal	  obligation.”574	  	  
Doehring	  finds	  that	  the	  central	  pre-­‐requisite	  is	  that	  “a	  behaviour	  is	  practiced	  over	  a	  
certain	  period	  of	  time	  and	  be	  considered	  justifiable	  by	  all	  involved	  parties.”575	  	  
	  
The	  examination	  of	  openly	  accessible	  extraterritorial	  websites	  for	  investigative	  
purposes	  has	  been	  and	  is	  being	  practiced	  daily	  without	  states	  taking	  offense	  at	  this	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  J	  W	  Dellapenna,	  “The	  Internet	  and	  Public	  International	  Law:	  Law	  in	  a	  Shrinking	  World:	  The	  
Interaction	  of	  Science	  and	  Technology	  with	  International	  Law”	  (1999-­‐2000)	  88:4	  Kentucky	  Law	  
Journal,	  809,	  841.	  	  	  
570	  See	  e.g.	  J	  L	  Goldsmith,	  E	  A	  Posner,	  “A	  Theory	  of	  Customary	  International	  Law”	  (1999)	  66:4	  
The	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Law	  Review,	  1113,	  1116.	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  Ibid.	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  J	  P	  Kelly,	  “The	  Twilight	  of	  Customary	  International	  Law”	  (2000)	  40:2	  Virginia	  Journal	  of	  
International	  Law,	  449,	  461.	  
573	  A	  C	  Arend,	  R	  J	  Beck,	  International	  Law	  and	  the	  Use	  of	  Force:	  Beyond	  the	  UN	  charter	  Paradigm	  
(London:	  Routledge,	  1993),	  6-­‐7.	  
574	  A	  E	  Roberts,	  “Traditional	  and	  Modern	  Approaches	  to	  Customary	  International	  Law:	  A	  
Reconciliation”	  (2001)	  95:4	  The	  American	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law,	  757.	  
575	  K	  Doehring,	  Völkerrecht	  (Heidelberg:	  C.F.	  Müller,	  2004)	  §4,	  286.	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practice.576	  Thus	  this	  behaviour	  has	  and	  is	  being	  practiced	  regularly	  and	  by	  different	  
states.	  This	  implies	  that	  the	  cross-­‐jurisdictional	  searching	  and	  monitoring	  of	  openly	  
accessible	  websites	  is	  not	  only	  tolerated	  but	  also	  considered	  lawful.	  Cross-­‐jurisdictional	  
investigations	  of	  openly	  accessible	  data	  are	  therefore	  permissible	  under	  customary	  
international	  law.	  	  
	  
No	  case	  law	  that	  could	  confirm	  this	  has,	  to	  the	  best	  knowledge	  of	  the	  author,	  been	  
generated.	  
	  
Therefore,	  it	  can	  be	  summarised	  as	  a	  first	  result	  that	  cross-­‐jurisdictional	  investigations	  
of	  openly	  accessible	  data	  are	  permissible.	  On	  this	  specific	  issue,	  relative	  consent	  exists	  
between	  conventional	  wisdom	  in	  literature	  and	  existing	  international	  regulations.	  As	  
indicated	  above,	  the	  author	  agrees	  that	  the	  examination	  of	  extraterritorial	  openly	  
accessible	  data	  should	  be	  permissible.	  The	  very	  nature	  of	  the	  Internet	  supports	  the	  
accessibility	  of	  websites	  from	  any	  place	  in	  the	  world.	  The	  geographical	  location	  of	  the	  
server	  storing	  the	  data	  is	  irrelevant.	  Thus,	  the	  accessing	  of	  freely	  accessible	  data	  on	  the	  
Internet	  by	  law	  enforcement	  agencies	  should	  not	  be	  determined	  by	  this	  factor.	  	  
6.3.2 Cross-Jurisdictional Investigations of Protected Data 
Generally,	  information	  relevant	  for	  criminal	  investigations	  is	  seldom	  published	  on	  
openly	  accessible	  websites.	  In	  most	  cases,	  relevant	  data	  is	  stored	  on	  hard	  disks	  of	  
personal	  computers,	  distributed	  via	  emails,	  or	  published	  on	  access-­‐restricted	  websites	  
and	  in	  online	  fora.	  Chapter	  2	  has	  highlighted	  that	  the	  main	  interest	  of	  (German)	  law	  
enforcement	  authorities	  lies	  indeed	  in	  the	  use	  of	  MIA	  tools	  for	  the	  investigation	  and	  
monitoring	  of	  protected	  data,	  since	  online	  searches	  primarily	  target	  data	  stored	  on	  
ICTs,	  and	  thus	  protected	  from	  public	  access.	  	  
	  
More	  important	  is	  therefore	  the	  question	  whether	  searches	  of	  extraterritorial,	  
protected	  data	  are	  permissible	  under	  international	  law.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
576	  See	  for	  a	  recent	  example	  the	  UK	  police	  monitoring	  websites	  for	  threats	  against	  the	  Pope	  
during	  his	  UK	  visit,	  A	  Arco,	  “Police	  Monitor	  Internet	  for	  Threats	  Against	  the	  Pope	  During	  his	  
Visit”	  (2010)	  Catholic	  Herald,	  available	  online	  at	  
http://www.catholicherald.co.uk/news/2010/07/21/police-­‐are-­‐monitoring-­‐internet-­‐for-­‐
threats-­‐against-­‐the-­‐pope/;	  Switzerland	  is	  monitoring	  the	  Inernet,	  N	  Luethi,	  “Cybercops	  nehmen	  
Dienst	  wieder	  auf”	  (2003)	  Telepolis,	  http://www.heise.de/tp/r4/artikel/13/13911/1.html.	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6.3.2.1 Literature Debate  
The	  opinions	  in	  the	  literature	  are	  considerably	  more	  univocal	  on	  this	  topic	  than	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  openly	  accessible	  data.	  The	  strongly	  prevalent	  view	  holds	  that	  cross-­‐border	  
searches	  of	  protected	  data	  are	  impermissible.577	  While	  again	  the	  argumentation	  of	  the	  
authors	  differs	  slightly	  as	  will	  be	  highlighted	  below,	  the	  reason	  for	  most	  of	  the	  authors	  
coming	  to	  the	  same	  conclusion	  is	  that	  extraterritorial	  investigations	  of	  access-­‐
restricted	  and	  private	  data	  fundamentally	  differ	  from	  those	  of	  openly	  accessible	  data.	  	  
The	  investigation	  and	  retrieval	  of	  such	  data	  requires,	  as	  illustrated	  in	  chapters	  4	  and	  5	  
of	  this	  thesis,	  intrusive	  acts	  that	  can	  significantly	  influence	  and	  alter	  the	  network	  and	  
server	  where	  the	  data	  is	  stored,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  computer	  or	  other	  ICT	  device	  that	  is	  
being	  infiltrated.	  Such	  actions	  have	  a	  much	  higher	  potential	  to	  interfere	  with	  the	  
sovereignty	  of	  a	  state,	  and	  therefore	  violate	  international	  law.	  	  
	  
De	  Hert	  finds	  that	  “the	  accessing	  of	  foreign	  secured	  files	  and	  data	  amounts	  to	  plain	  
judicial	  hacking,	  and	  is	  therefore	  impermissible.”578	  	  
Wilske	  and	  Schiller	  note	  that	  “especially	  concerning	  measures	  in	  aid	  of	  enforcement	  of	  
criminal	  law,	  a	  state’s	  law	  enforcement	  officers	  may	  exercise	  their	  functions	  in	  the	  
territory	  of	  another	  state	  only	  with	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  state,	  given	  by	  duly	  authorised	  
officials	  of	  that	  state.”579	  From	  this	  they	  conclude	  that	  “as	  a	  consequence	  for	  any	  
‘cybersearch’	  measure	  targeting	  a	  hard	  drive	  or	  other	  restricted	  data	  in	  the	  course	  of	  a	  
law	  enforcement	  investigation	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  territorial	  sovereign	  in	  which	  the	  
target	  is	  located	  is	  required.	  Otherwise,	  the	  action	  violates	  the	  territoriality	  principle	  
and	  other	  international	  law	  principles.”580	  	  
Ringel	  agrees	  with	  this,	  stating	  that	  most	  states	  would	  regard	  such	  actions	  as	  a	  
violation	  of	  their	  sovereignty	  in	  a	  transnational	  investigation	  that	  has	  not	  been	  
permitted.581	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
577	  A	  selection	  of	  opinions	  is	  provided	  here,	  however,	  this	  is	  by	  no	  means	  the	  entire	  literature	  
debate	  on	  the	  topic.	  
578	  De	  Hert,	  note	  543,	  at	  107.	  
579	  S	  Wilske,	  T	  Schiller,	  “International	  Jurisdiction	  in	  Cyberspace:	  Which	  States	  May	  Regulate	  the	  
Internet?”	  (1997)	  50	  Federal	  Communications	  Law	  Journal,	  171.	  
580	  Ibid,	  at	  174.	  
581	  K	  Ringel,	  “Rechtsprobleme	  beim	  Zugriff	  auf	  EDV-­‐Beweismittel”	  (1998)	  3	  Deutsches	  
Polizeiblatt,	  14,	  17.	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Bellia	  argues	  along	  the	  same	  lines,	  stating	  “remote	  cross-­‐border	  searches	  conducted	  
without	  the	  permission	  of	  the	  state	  in	  which	  the	  searched	  data	  is	  stored	  generally	  will	  
violate	  customary	  international	  law.”582	  	  
	  
The	  reasoning	  behind	  these	  arguments	  is,	  as	  analysed	  above	  under	  6.1,	  that	  no	  state	  
has	  enforcement	  jurisdiction	  over	  another	  country.	  Thus	  no	  law	  enforcement	  officer	  
has	  the	  right	  to	  conduct	  activities	  in	  another	  states	  territory.	  	  
	  
A	  smaller	  number	  of	  authors	  argue	  that	  cross-­‐border	  investigations	  are	  permissible	  
under	  international	  law	  even	  in	  the	  case	  of	  protected	  data.	  
	  
The	  most	  drastic	  are	  von	  Briehl	  and	  Ehlscheid,	  who	  argue	  that	  extraterritorial	  cross-­‐
border	  searches	  of	  private	  and	  access-­‐restricted	  data	  should	  generally	  be	  allowed,	  
because	  the	  intensity	  of	  the	  intrusion	  is	  so	  low,	  given	  the	  fact	  that	  no	  law	  enforcement	  
agent	  enters	  the	  foreign	  territory,	  that	  the	  cross-­‐border	  search	  cannot	  be	  considered	  an	  
infringement	  of	  foreign	  sovereignty.583	  This	  view	  completely	  ignores	  that	  access	  to	  
private,	  protected	  data	  per	  se	  constitutes	  a	  violation	  of	  a	  person’s	  data	  protection	  
rights,	  no	  matter	  whether	  access	  occurs	  from	  within	  or	  outside	  of	  a	  state’s	  territory.	  
Such	  actions	  are	  therefore	  reserved	  to	  the	  nation’s	  law	  enforcement	  and	  thus	  violate	  
sovereignty	  rights	  if	  conducted	  by	  other	  nations.	  
	  
Similarly,	  Sofaer	  et	  al.	  in	  their	  proposal	  for	  an	  international	  convention	  on	  cybercrime	  
and	  terrorism	  suggest	  “state	  parties	  shall	  be	  free	  to	  engage	  in	  reasonable,	  electronic	  
methods	  of	  investigation,	  even	  if	  such	  conduct	  results	  in	  transfer	  of	  electronic	  signals	  
into	  the	  territory	  of	  other	  states.”584	  However,	  they	  add	  that	  affected	  states	  should	  be	  
informed	  of	  such	  actions	  as	  soon	  as	  practicable.	  
Sussman,	  who	  is	  more	  cautious	  about	  the	  permissibility	  of	  such	  actions,	  reasons	  that	  
extraterritorial	  cross-­‐border	  searches	  of	  non-­‐openly	  accessible	  data	  are	  likely	  to	  occur,	  
and	  should	  therefore	  be	  permissible	  under	  exigent	  circumstances.585	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  P	  L	  Bellia,	  “Chasing	  Bits	  Across	  Borders”	  (2001)	  35	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Legal	  Forum,	  80.	  	  
583	  O	  G	  von	  Briel,	  D	  Ehlscheid,	  Steuerstrafrecht	  (Bonn:	  Deutscher	  Anwaltverlag,	  2001)	  451.	  
584	  A	  Sofaer	  et	  al.,	  “A	  Proposal	  for	  an	  International	  Convention	  on	  Cybercrime	  and	  Terrorism”	  
(2000)	  Centre	  for	  International	  Security	  and	  Cooperation,	  Stanford	  University,	  Article	  6	  (5),	  
available	  online	  at	  http://iis-­‐db.stanford.edu/pubs/11912/sofaergoodman.pdf	  .	  
585	  M	  Sussmann,	  “The	  Critical	  Challenges	  from	  International	  High-­‐Tech	  and	  Computer-­‐related	  
Crime	  at	  the	  Millenium”	  (1999)	  9	  Duke	  Journal	  of	  Computer	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  International	  Law,	  451,	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Goldsmith	  argues	  along	  the	  same	  lines.	  He	  reasons	  that	  technological	  developments	  
will	  make	  cross-­‐border	  searches	  of	  access-­‐restricted	  data	  necessary,	  however,	  sensible	  
limits	  to	  such	  actions	  will	  emerge	  in	  form	  of	  customary	  international	  law	  principles.586	  
He	  states	  further	  that	  states	  will	  limit	  their	  actions	  because	  aggressive	  cross-­‐border	  
searches	  can	  easily	  be	  reciprocated.	  He	  also	  suggests	  that	  this	  will	  be	  an	  incentive	  for	  
states	  to	  develop	  cooperative	  principles.587	  	  
	  
The	  problem	  with	  these	  arguments	  of	  the	  minority	  opinion	  is	  that	  all	  authors	  fail	  to	  
recognise	  that	  cross-­‐jurisdictional	  investigations	  of	  protected	  digital	  data	  are	  highly	  
intrusive	  measures,	  comparable	  to	  the	  search	  of	  a	  living	  space	  in	  the	  physical	  world.588	  
This,	  however,	  according	  to	  prevailing	  opinion,	  violates	  international	  law	  if	  it	  is	  
conducted	  by	  a	  foreign	  agent.	  
6.3.2.2 Legislation 
As	  noted	  above	  in	  the	  discussion	  of	  the	  permissibility	  of	  cross-­‐border	  searches	  of	  
openly	  accessible	  data	  (6.3.1),	  this	  measure	  has	  been	  discussed	  among	  legislators,	  and	  
some	  international	  legislation	  regulating	  cross-­‐border	  searches	  exists.	  The	  question	  is,	  
however,	  whether	  existing	  legislation	  permits	  cross-­‐border	  searches	  of	  non-­‐publicly	  
accessible	  data.	  
The	  Council	  of	  Europe’s	  1995	  Recommendation	  R	  (95)	  13	  on	  Problems	  of	  Criminal	  
Procedural	  Law	  Connected	  with	  Information	  Technology	  (Recommendation)	  indicates	  
that	  such	  searches	  should	  be	  permitted	  in	  emergency	  cases.589	  However,	  the	  
Recommendation	  does	  not	  provide	  a	  legal	  basis	  for	  such	  measures.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  the	  
Recommendation	  highlights	  the	  need	  for	  the	  establishment	  of	  an	  unambiguous	  legal	  
basis,	  to	  avoid	  violations	  of	  state	  sovereignty	  or	  international	  law.	  The	  use	  of	  the	  term	  
unambiguous	  highlights	  the	  fact	  that	  cross-­‐border	  searches	  of	  access	  restricted	  data	  
are	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  problematic	  issue,	  and	  require	  a	  unified	  approach	  and	  sound	  
legal	  basis	  to	  be	  permissible	  under	  international	  law.	  This	  is	  emphasised	  by	  the	  fact	  
that	  at	  the	  time,	  this	  measure	  was	  seen	  as	  the	  ultima	  ratio	  and	  envisaged	  to	  be	  only	  
applicable	  in	  cases	  of	  emergency.	  In	  the	  discussions	  preceding	  the	  Recommendation,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
586	  Goldsmith,	  note	  570,	  at	  116.	  
587	  Goldsmith,	  note	  570,	  at	  117.	  
588	  See	  chapter	  2,	  p.	  34	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  this.	  
589	  Council	  of	  Europe,	  Recommendation	  No.	  R	  (95)	  13	  of	  the	  Committee	  of	  Ministers	  to	  Member	  
States	  Concerning	  Problems	  of	  Criminal	  Procedure	  Law	  connected	  with	  Information	  Technology	  
(adopted	  11	  September	  1995);	  Appendix	  §	  VII	  (17)	  see	  for	  details	  text	  of	  note	  565.	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however,	  no	  unity	  could	  be	  established,	  and	  hence	  no	  legal	  basis	  was	  integrated	  into	  
the	  Recommendations.590	  	  
As	  analysed	  above,	  the	  2001	  Council	  of	  Europe	  Convention	  on	  Cybercrime	  (CoC)	  includes	  
provisions	  on	  the	  permissibility	  of	  cross-­‐border	  searches.	  Article	  32	  (a)	  determines	  
that	  parties	  to	  the	  Convention	  may	  access	  publicly	  accessible	  data.591	  The	  drafters	  of	  
the	  CoC	  discussed	  the	  issue	  whether	  a	  country	  is	  permitted	  to	  access	  private	  and	  
access-­‐restricted	  data	  stored	  in	  another	  country	  without	  seeking	  mutual	  assistance	  at	  
length.592	  	  
However,	  in	  again	  consulting	  the	  CoC,	  it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  contrary	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  
access	  to	  freely	  accessible	  data,	  the	  access	  to	  protected	  data	  remains	  unregulated	  in	  the	  
CoC.	  Article	  32	  (b)	  CoC	  only	  establishes	  that	  in	  cases	  where	  consent	  of	  the	  legally	  
authorised	  person	  exists,	  law	  enforcement	  agencies	  are	  permitted	  to	  access	  stored	  
data.593	  Thus	  for	  this	  alternative,	  it	  is	  irrelevant	  whether	  the	  data	  is	  secured	  by	  access	  
codes	  or	  security	  measures,	  as	  long	  as	  the	  person	  referred	  to	  has	  the	  right	  of	  lawful	  
access,	  irrespective	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  other	  persons	  also	  may	  have	  access	  rights.	  
Remarkably,	  neither	  the	  COC,	  nor	  the	  explanatory	  report	  provide	  a	  legal	  definition	  of	  
“authorised	  person”.	  The	  explanatory	  report	  generally	  states	  that	  the	  authorised	  
person	  must	  be	  defined	  according	  to	  the	  circumstances	  and	  the	  applicable	  law	  of	  each	  
individual	  case.594	  Further,	  the	  person	  in	  question	  must	  have	  the	  right	  to	  disclose	  the	  
data,	  which	  means	  that	  the	  operation	  cannot	  be	  undertaken	  if	  the	  person	  is	  bound	  by	  a	  
duty	  of	  secrecy.595	  The	  explanatory	  report	  provides	  an	  example,	  illustrating	  that	  an	  ISP	  
could	  possibly	  be	  regarded	  as	  such	  an	  authorised	  person,	  if	  the	  data	  is	  stored	  in	  
another	  country	  by	  this	  body.596	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
590	  Kaspersen,	  note	  558.	  
591	  See	  note	  555.	  
592	  Council	  of	  Europe,	  Explanatory	  Report,	  
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/reports/html/185.htm,	  at	  para.	  293.	  
593	  Article	  32	  (b)	  of	  the	  CoC	  reads	  “A	  Party	  may,	  without	  the	  authorization	  of	  another	  
Party,	  […]	  (b)	  access	  or	  receive,	  through	  a	  computer	  system	  in	  its	  territory,	  stored	  computer	  
data	  located	  in	  another	  Party,	  if	  the	  Party	  obtains	  the	  lawful	  and	  voluntary	  consent	  of	  the	  person	  
who	  has	  the	  lawful	  authority	  to	  disclose	  the	  data	  to	  the	  Party	  through	  that	  computer	  system.”	  
594	  Council	  of	  Europe,	  note	  599,	  at	  294.	  
595	  Kaspersen,	  note	  558,	  at	  21.	  
596	  Council	  of	  Europe,	  note	  599,	  para.	  294	  reads:	  “Who	  is	  a	  person	  that	  is	  "lawfully	  authorised"	  
to	  disclose	  data	  may	  vary	  depending	  on	  the	  circumstances,	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  person	  and	  the	  
applicable	  law	  concerned.	  For	  example,	  a	  person’s	  e-­‐mail	  may	  be	  stored	  in	  another	  country	  by	  a	  
service	  provider,	  or	  a	  person	  may	  intentionally	  store	  data	  in	  another	  country.	  These	  persons	  
may	  retrieve	  the	  data	  and,	  provided	  that	  they	  have	  the	  lawful	  authority,	  they	  may	  voluntarily	  
disclose	  the	  data	  to	  law	  enforcement	  officials	  or	  permit	  such	  officials	  to	  access	  the	  data,	  as	  
provided	  in	  the	  Article.”	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The	  term	  ‘authorised	  person’	  is	  therefore	  not	  restricted	  to	  the	  person	  directly	  affected	  
by	  the	  measure.	  It	  may	  be	  a	  third	  person	  in	  cases	  where	  the	  decision	  to	  store	  data	  
abroad	  stems	  from	  another	  person	  or	  body	  other	  than	  the	  affected	  person,	  and	  this	  
third	  person	  has	  de	  facto	  access	  to	  the	  data.	  However,	  importantly,	  Article	  32	  (b)	  is	  not	  
a	  means	  for	  coercion	  to	  demand	  the	  retrieval	  of	  data	  from	  a	  third	  person,	  such	  as	  an	  
ISP.	  	  
During	  the	  negotiations	  of	  the	  CoC	  a	  third	  alternative	  to	  Article	  32	  (a,b)	  	  was	  discussed	  
but	  not	  included	  in	  the	  final	  text	  of	  the	  Convention.	  This	  alternative	  provided	  that	  a	  
cross-­‐border	  search	  should	  be	  permissible	  in	  cases	  of	  emergencies,	  such	  as	  in	  matters	  
of	  life	  and	  death	  concerning	  law	  enforcement	  officers,	  undercover	  agents,	  and	  
witnesses.597	  However,	  during	  the	  course	  of	  the	  negotiations	  no	  common	  
understanding	  of	  emergency	  cases	  could	  be	  established,	  and	  participating	  states	  felt	  
unable	  to	  commit	  to	  binding	  provisions.598	  It	  was	  also	  felt	  that	  further	  experiences	  
should	  be	  gained	  and	  further	  discussions	  held	  before	  other	  alternatives	  could	  be	  
introduced.599	  Thus	  no	  further	  provision	  was	  included	  into	  the	  CoC.	  
Consequently,	  Article	  32	  CoC	  constitutes	  the	  lowest	  common	  denominator	  on	  which	  
states	  involved	  in	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Convention	  could	  agree.	  Thus	  the	  logical	  
conclusion	  is	  that	  cross-­‐jurisdictional	  are	  impermissible	  under	  international	  law.	  
However,	  this	  conclusion	  is	  averted	  by	  Article	  39	  CoC,	  which	  states	  that	  none	  of	  the	  
provisions	  laid	  down	  in	  the	  Convention	  shall	  affect	  or	  impair	  other	  rights.600	  	  
Therefore,	  neither	  the	  permissibility,	  nor	  the	  impermissibility	  of	  cross-­‐jurisdictional	  
investigations	  of	  protected	  data	  can	  be	  concluded	  from	  Article	  32	  CoC.	  However,	  what	  
can	  be	  concluded	  is	  that	  the	  CoC	  does	  not	  explicitly	  allow	  the	  cross-­‐jurisdictional	  
investigations	  of	  protected	  data.	  
	  
The	  G-­‐8,	  during	  its	  conference	  on	  combating	  transnational	  organised	  crime	  developed	  
similar	  recommendations,	  finding	  that	  accessing,	  searching,	  copying,	  or	  seizing	  data	  
stored	  on	  a	  computer	  system	  located	  in	  another	  state	  is	  permissible	  and	  can	  be	  
conducted	  without	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  affected	  state,	  if	  acting	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
597	  Kaspersen,	  note	  558,	  at	  21.	  
598	  Seitz,	  note	  514,	  at	  47.	  
599	  de	  Hert,	  note	  543,	  at	  107.	  
600	  Article	  39(3)	  CoC	  reads	  “Nothing	  in	  this	  Convention	  shall	  affect	  other	  rights,	  restrictions,	  
obligations	  and	  responsibilities	  of	  a	  Party.”	  See	  also	  Council	  of	  Europe,	  note	  571,	  para.	  293,	  
(“stating	  that	  Article	  39,	  paragraph	  3	  provides	  that	  other	  situations	  are	  neither	  authorized,	  nor	  
precluded”).	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lawful	  and	  voluntary	  consent	  of	  a	  person	  who	  has	  the	  lawful	  authority	  to	  disclose	  the	  
data.601	  
	  
Thus	  under	  written	  international	  law	  cross-­‐jurisdictional	  investigations	  of	  protected	  
data	  are	  impermissible.	  	  
	  
The	  focus	  is	  therefore	  on	  existing	  case	  law	  to	  establish	  whether	  such	  measures	  are	  
permissible	  under	  customary	  international	  law.	  The	  incident	  that	  has	  become	  know	  as	  
the	  Gorshkov-­Ivanov	  case,	  constitutes	  a	  case	  in	  point.602Around	  the	  end	  of	  1999,	  the	  FBI	  
identified	  Russians	  Vasiliy	  Gorshkov	  and	  Alexey	  Ivanov	  as	  the	  hackers	  who	  had	  been	  
breaking	  unauthorised	  into	  US	  businesses,	  including	  banks,	  credit	  card	  institutions,	  and	  
internet	  service	  providers.603	  The	  offenders	  gained	  access	  to	  credit	  card	  numbers	  and	  
other	  information	  about	  financial	  transactions	  and	  used	  these	  to	  commit	  fraud.	  The	  FBI	  
created	  a	  bogus	  company	  called	  “Invita”	  located	  in	  Washington,	  allegedly	  specialising	  in	  
security	  consultation	  for	  Internet	  firms.	  Invita	  offered	  jobs	  to	  both	  of	  the	  suspects,	  but	  
demanded	  proof	  of	  their	  qualifications.	  To	  demonstrate	  their	  skills,	  and	  “interview”	  for	  
the	  jobs,	  the	  FBI	  brought	  the	  hackers	  to	  Seattle.	  As	  part	  of	  the	  “interview”	  and	  to	  
demonstrate	  their	  skills,	  they	  were	  asked	  to	  hack	  into	  a	  network	  set	  up	  by	  the	  FBI.	  604	  In	  
doing	  so,	  they	  used	  laptops	  provided	  by	  the	  FBI	  to	  access	  Russian	  computers,	  where	  
they	  kept	  hacking	  tools.605	  The	  FBI	  had	  installed	  a	  keylogger	  program	  on	  each	  of	  the	  
laptops	  and	  the	  program	  recorded	  the	  usernames	  and	  passwords	  the	  hackers	  used	  to	  
access	  their	  Russian	  computers.606	  Ivanov	  and	  Gorshov	  were	  arrested	  the	  same	  day.	  
The	  FBI	  agents	  used	  the	  information	  retrieved	  by	  the	  keylogger	  program	  to	  access	  the	  
Russian	  computers	  and	  download	  files	  they	  contained,	  including	  stolen	  credit	  card	  
numbers	  and	  other	  evidence.607	  All	  this	  was	  done	  without	  obtaining	  a	  warrant.	  The	  two	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
601	  G-­‐8,	  see	  note	  561,	  Annex	  1	  (6b).	  
602	  See	  the	  resulting	  judgments	  of	  the	  incident:	  United	  States	  v	  Gorshkov,	  2001	  WL	  1024026	  
(W.D.	  Wash.	  2001);	  United	  States	  v	  Ivanov,	  175	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  367	  (D.	  Conn.	  2001);	  For	  a	  summary	  
of	  the	  case,	  and	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  the	  technical	  aspects	  see,	  P	  Attfield,	  “United	  States	  v	  
Gorshkov:	  Detailed	  Forensics	  and	  Case	  Study;	  Expert	  Witness	  Perspsective”	  (2005)	  Proceedings	  
of	  the	  First	  International	  Workshop	  on	  Systematic	  Approaches	  to	  Digital	  Forensic	  Engineering	  
(SSADFE’05),	  3.	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Russians	  were	  charged	  with	  multiple	  misdemeanours,	  and	  with	  the	  help	  of	  the	  data	  
downloaded	  from	  Russia,	  both	  were	  convicted	  to	  fines	  and	  prison	  sentences.608	  	  
	  
This	  is,	  to	  the	  best	  knowledge	  of	  the	  author,	  to	  date	  the	  only	  reported	  case	  where	  a	  
court	  had	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  issue	  of	  cross-­‐jurisdictional	  investigations	  of	  protected	  data.	  
Primarily,	  the	  court	  focused	  in	  its	  judgment	  on	  the	  charges	  against	  the	  two	  Russian	  
citizens.	  However,	  in	  connection	  with	  an	  attempt	  by	  Gorshkov	  to	  suppress	  the	  evidence	  
obtained	  from	  the	  Russian	  computers,	  the	  court	  reasoned	  about	  the	  permissibility	  of	  
cross-­‐jurisdictional	  investigations	  of	  protected	  data.	  	  Gorshkov	  argued	  that	  the	  
evidence	  obtained	  from	  Russian	  computers	  was	  the	  product	  of	  a	  search	  and	  seizure	  
that	  (a)	  violated	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment	  and/or	  (b)	  violated	  Russian	  law.609	  However,	  
the	  court	  denied	  the	  notion,	  arguing	  that	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment	  did	  not	  apply	  because	  
it	  does	  not	  encompass	  extraterritorial	  searches	  directed	  at	  non-­‐US	  citizens.610	  The	  
court	  further	  held	  that	  the	  agents’	  actions	  did	  not	  violate	  Russian	  law	  and	  even	  if	  they	  
did,	  it	  was	  no	  basis	  for	  suppressing	  evidence	  in	  a	  US	  proceeding.611	  	  
Russia	  felt	  that	  the	  FBI	  agents	  violated	  Russian	  sovereignty	  by	  conducting	  the	  cross-­‐
border	  search,	  and	  subsequently	  charged	  the	  agent	  primarily	  responsible	  for	  the	  
intrusion	  with	  hacking	  and	  asked	  that	  he	  be	  turned	  over	  for	  trial.	  The	  US	  authorities	  did	  
not	  comply	  with	  this	  request.	  
The	  conclusion	  that	  can	  be	  drawn	  from	  this	  judgment	  is	  that	  US	  authorities	  and	  the	  
respective	  judges	  consider	  a	  cross-­‐jurisdictional	  investigations	  of	  protected	  data	  to	  be	  
permissible	  under	  international	  law	  in	  exceptional	  cases,	  such	  as	  the	  one	  on	  hand,	  
where	  there	  was	  a	  perceived	  risk	  that	  the	  evidence	  might	  be	  deleted	  quickly.	  The	  
United	  States	  Department	  of	  Justice	  (USDOJ)	  confirms	  this,	  stating	  that	  cross-­‐
jurisdictional	  investigations	  of	  computers	  (thus	  access-­‐restricted	  data)	  can	  generally	  
only	  be	  conducted	  with	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  foreign	  state,612	  however,	  in	  cases	  of	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  Ibid.	  
609	  Ibid.	  
610	  See	  S	  Brenner,	  “’Our’”	  Fourth	  Amendment”,	  CYB3RCRIM3,	  11.03.2006,	  available	  online	  at	  
http://cyb3rcrim3.blogspot.com/2006/03/our-­‐fourth-­‐amendment.html,	  for	  a	  critical	  
discussion	  of	  this	  argument.	  
611	  United	  States	  v	  Gorshkov,	  2001	  WL	  1024026	  (W.D.	  Wash.	  2001).	  
612	  United	  States	  Department	  of	  Justice,	  Searching	  and	  Seizing	  Computers	  and	  Obtaining	  
Electronic	  Evidence	  in	  Criminal	  Investigations	  (3rd	  edition,	  OLE	  Litigation	  series,	  2009),	  56,	  
available	  online	  at	  http://www.cybercrime.gov/ssmanual/ssmanual2009.pdf.	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emergency,	  such	  as	  a	  terrorist	  attack,	  a	  non-­‐	  or	  pre-­‐consensual	  cross-­‐border	  search	  can	  
be	  permissible.613	  
It	  can,	  however,	  also	  be	  concluded	  from	  this	  judgment	  that	  Russia	  does	  not	  agree	  with	  
this.	  Russia	  considered	  the	  cross-­‐border	  search	  conducted	  by	  US	  agents	  as	  a	  violation	  
of	  their	  territorial	  sovereignty.	  This	  is	  demonstrated	  by	  Russia’s	  lawsuit	  against	  the	  FBI	  
agent.	  Thus	  Russia	  regards	  cross-­‐jurisdictional	  investigations	  of	  protected	  data	  as	  
impermissible	  under	  international	  law.	  
	  
These	  conclusions	  are	  important	  for	  the	  question	  whether	  cross-­‐jurisdictional	  
investigations	  of	  protected	  data	  are	  permissible	  under	  customary	  international	  law.	  As	  
established	  above	  under	  6.3.1,	  for	  customary	  international	  law	  to	  develop,	  state	  
practice	  and	  opinio	  juris	  are	  required,	  thus	  general	  and	  consistent	  practice	  by	  states,	  
which	  is	  followed	  out	  of	  a	  belief	  of	  legal	  obligation.614	  These	  pre-­‐requisites	  are	  not	  
fulfilled,	  with	  Russia	  objecting	  to	  the	  measure.	  Therefore,	  even	  though	  no	  further	  case	  
law	  exists	  on	  this	  matter,	  given	  Russias	  clear	  objection	  on	  the	  matter	  and	  also	  the	  
consent	  of	  several	  states	  on	  this	  topic	  during	  the	  legislative	  discussions,	  it	  can	  be	  
concluded	  that	  cross-­‐border	  searches	  of	  restricted	  data	  are	  also	  impermissible	  under	  
customary	  international	  law.	  	  
6.3.3 Cross-Jurisdictional Investigations of Protected Data by MIA Tools 
The	  above	  arguments	  and	  discussions	  all	  assume	  that	  human	  officers	  conduct	  these	  
cross-­‐jurisdictional	  investigations	  of	  protected	  data.	  As	  discussed	  above,615	  MIA	  tools	  
increasingly	  replace	  human	  officers	  for	  these	  cyber-­‐investigations.	  Their	  abilities	  allow	  
these	  tools	  to	  conduct	  the	  required	  actions	  without	  human	  intervention	  and	  
supervision.	  	  
Thus,	  the	  question	  is	  whether	  it	  makes	  a	  difference	  under	  international	  law	  if	  cross-­‐
jurisdictional	  investigations	  of	  protected	  data	  are	  undertaken	  by	  pieces	  of	  software	  
instead	  of	  human	  officers.	  Could	  these	  investigative	  actions	  be	  lawful	  because	  no	  
human	  officer	  is	  directly	  involved	  in	  the	  cross-­‐jurisdictional	  investigative	  activities?	  
	  
As	  discussed	  above	  under	  6.3.1.1,	  a	  violation	  of	  the	  territoriality	  principle	  can	  be	  
determined	  according	  to	  the	  impact	  that	  the	  action	  has	  on	  the	  affected	  state’s	  sovereign	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
613	  Ibid,	  at	  58.	  	  
614	  Roberts,	  note	  574.	  
615	  See	  chapters	  1	  and	  2	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  this.	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interests.	  Principally,	  the	  search	  of	  a	  hard	  disk	  or	  other	  protected	  data	  by	  foreign	  law	  
enforcement	  has	  in	  essence	  the	  same	  effect	  as	  a	  traditional	  search	  of	  premises.616	  	  It	  is	  
highly	  intrusive	  and	  potentially	  infringes	  privacy	  and	  data	  protection	  rights	  of	  the	  
person	  concerned.	  Hence,	  this	  is	  a	  measure	  reserved	  to	  the	  sovereign	  law	  enforcement.	  
Territorial	  sovereignty	  serves,	  inter	  alia,	  to	  protect	  the	  residents	  from	  physical	  
persecution	  by	  other	  states.617	  	  
	  
Thus	  in	  this	  case,	  the	  question	  is	  whether	  a	  cross-­‐jurisdictional	  investigation	  of	  
protected	  data	  by	  MIA	  tools	  converts	  the	  affront	  to	  sovereignty	  that	  a	  human	  police	  
officer	  would	  cause	  when	  conducting	  these	  investigative	  actions	  from	  an	  intentional	  
performance	  of	  sovereign	  functions	  on	  another	  state’s	  territory	  into	  mere	  interference	  
with	  the	  goals	  of	  a	  regulatory	  scheme,	  here	  the	  regulatory	  scheme	  designed	  to	  protect	  
persons	  or	  property	  within	  its	  territory?	  
	  
It	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  this	  is	  the	  case	  if	  a	  cross-­‐jurisdictional	  investigation	  by	  MIA	  
tools	  would	  be	  less	  invasive	  than	  one	  by	  a	  human	  officer.	  	  
	  
As	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  4,	  618	  MIA	  tools	  are	  more	  complex	  than	  common	  software	  
products,	  which	  are	  heavily	  reliant	  on	  human	  input	  to	  function.	  MIA	  tools	  operate	  
autonomously,	  without	  direct	  intervention	  by	  human	  operators.619	  They	  independently	  
select	  computers	  and	  other	  ICTs,	  and	  the	  relevant	  data	  to	  search.	  Hence,	  no	  human	  
officer	  necessarily	  knows	  of	  the	  cross-­‐jurisdictional	  nature	  of	  the	  investigation.	  The	  
question	  is	  whether	  this	  makes	  the	  act	  less	  invasive,	  and	  thus	  lawful.	  
	  
As	  discussed	  above,620	  MIA	  tools	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  quasi-­‐officers,	  whose	  role	  goes	  
beyond	  that	  of	  a	  mere	  tool	  (such	  as	  the	  keylogger	  in	  the	  case	  example	  above)	  assisting	  
human	  officers	  in	  their	  work.	  However,	  thus	  far	  no	  legal	  status	  has	  been	  ascribed	  to	  
these	  tools.	  This	  causes	  difficulties	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  classifying	  their	  acts	  in	  the	  context	  
of	  legal	  concepts,	  such	  as	  sovereignty.	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  See	  note	  591.	  
617	  S	  T	  Bernardez,	  “Territorial	  Sovereignty”	  in	  R	  Bernhardt	  (ed)	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Public	  
International	  Law	  (4th	  ed.,	  North-­‐Holland	  Publishing	  Co.:	  Amsterdam,	  2000)	  823,	  827.	  
618	  See	  p.	  104ff.	  
619	  See	  chapters	  4	  and	  5	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  their	  abilities.	  
620	  See	  p.	  9ff.	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Their	  actions,	  however,	  mirror	  those	  of	  human	  officers.	  Just	  because	  software	  tools	  
conduct	  the	  relevant	  investigative	  actions	  does	  not	  make	  these	  less	  invasive	  for	  the	  
affected	  person.	  Ultimately,	  the	  aim	  is	  to	  collect	  protected	  data	  to	  use	  as	  evidence	  
against	  the	  suspect.	  The	  potential	  for	  rights	  violations	  in	  the	  course	  of	  such	  an	  
investigation	  is	  equally	  high	  if	  MIA	  tools	  conduct	  these	  investigations.	  
	  
Thus	  the	  question	  is	  whether	  the	  fact	  that	  human	  officers	  do	  not	  make	  the	  decision	  to	  
investigate	  cross-­‐jurisdictional	  data	  and	  also	  do	  not	  know	  about	  this	  influences	  the	  
permissibility	  of	  these	  actions.	  This	  could	  be	  the	  case	  if	  actions	  by	  MIA	  tools	  could	  not	  
be	  attributed	  to	  authorities.	  
	  
The	  question	  of	  liability	  of	  actions	  of	  intelligent	  technologies	  is	  one	  that	  has	  also	  arisen	  
in	  related	  research	  areas,	  such	  as	  robotics,	  however,	  without	  a	  definitive	  result	  thus	  
far.621	  The	  problem	  is	  again	  that	  the	  legal	  status	  of	  these	  tools	  has	  yet	  to	  be	  defined.	  
However,	  as	  a	  principle,	  in	  criminal	  investigations	  a	  state	  should	  not	  be	  able	  to	  divert	  
liability	  for	  actions	  because	  intelligent	  tools	  are	  deployed	  instead	  of	  human	  officers.	  
Two	  analogies	  can	  assist	  to	  clarify	  this	  situation.	  Firstly,	  if	  human	  officers	  use	  
technologies,	  such	  as	  bugs	  or	  keyloggers	  to	  assist	  their	  work	  all	  actions	  are	  attributed	  
to	  the	  acting	  authority,	  even	  if	  the	  technology	  has,	  unwanted	  by	  the	  operator,	  caused	  
harm.	  	  
Secondly,	  if	  authorities	  enter	  into	  public-­‐private	  partnerships	  with	  private	  companies	  
and	  these	  conduct	  certain	  acts	  normally	  executed	  by	  police	  officers	  (such	  as	  private	  
security	  companies)	  their	  actions	  are	  attributable	  to	  the	  authority.622	  	  
These	  examples	  highlight	  that	  actions	  of	  MIA	  tools,	  as	  quasi-­‐police	  officers	  acting	  on	  
behalf	  of	  the	  authority,	  are	  in	  any	  case	  attributable	  to	  the	  authority	  deploying	  these	  
tools.	  This	  is	  also	  the	  case	  if	  human	  operators	  do	  not	  know	  about	  the	  cross-­‐
jurisdictional	  nature	  of	  the	  investigation.	  
International	  legislation	  cannot	  be	  circumvented	  by	  deploying	  new	  technologies	  that	  
are	  capable	  of	  replacing	  human	  officers	  for	  intrusive	  actions.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
621	  See	  e.g.	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  this	  E	  Schaerer,	  “Robots	  As	  Animals:	  A	  Framework	  for	  Liability	  
and	  Responsibility	  in	  Human-­‐Robot	  Interactions”	  (2009)	  18th	  IEEE	  International	  Symposium	  on	  
Robot	  and	  Human	  Interactive	  Communication,	  72-­‐77;	  U	  Pagallo,	  “Killers,	  Fridges,	  and	  Slaves:	  A	  
Legal	  Journey	  in	  Robotics”	  (2011)	  26:4	  AI	  &	  Society,	  347-­‐354.	  	  
622	  J	  Becker,	  “Rechtsrahmen	  für	  Public	  Private	  Partnerships”	  (2002)	  Zeitschrift	  für	  Rechtspolitik,	  
303-­‐308.	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Cross-­‐jurisdictional	  investigations	  of	  digital	  data	  by	  MIA	  tools	  are	  therefore	  
comparable	  to	  actions	  of	  human	  officers	  entering	  the	  territory	  of	  another	  state,	  and	  
therefore	  violate	  the	  territorial	  sovereignty	  of	  the	  affected	  state,	  unless	  the	  state	  has	  
agreed	  to	  the	  action.	  
	  
It	  can	  therefore	  be	  concluded	  that	  under	  international	  law	  and	  existing	  jurisprudence,	  
cross-­‐jurisdictional	  investigations	  of	  digital	  data	  are	  impermissible	  (with	  the	  exception	  
of	  those	  cases	  where	  consent	  is	  granted).	  Thus,	  international	  legislation	  confirms	  the	  
views	  of	  conventional	  wisdom	  on	  this	  issue.	  	  
6.4 Cross-Border MIA Searches: An Outlook 
The	  above	  analysis	  and	  discussion	  of	  the	  permissibility	  of	  cross-­‐jurisdictional	  
investigations	  has	  shown	  that	  these	  are	  under	  the	  existing	  international	  legal	  
framework	  only	  permissible	  under	  certain	  circumstances.	  	  
	  
The	  below	  figure	  visualises	  the	  different	  options.	  
	  
	  
Figure	  1:	  Permissibility	  of	  Cross-­‐Jurisdictional	  Investigations	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As	  shown,	  cross-­‐jurisdictional	  investigations	  are	  permissible	  where	  investigators	  
access	  data	  in	  the	  open	  domain,	  or	  have	  the	  explicit	  consent	  of	  an	  authorised	  person.	  
However,	  previous	  chapters	  have	  shown	  that	  MIA	  tools	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  used	  for	  
investigations	  of	  private	  and	  protected	  data,	  located	  on	  personal	  ICTs	  of	  suspects.	  
Currently,	  states	  are	  not	  permitted	  to	  undertake	  such	  investigative	  actions	  of	  data	  
located	  in	  other	  sovereign	  territories,	  even	  if	  they	  are	  acting	  in	  “good	  faith”.	  In	  addition	  
to	  the	  violation	  of	  international	  law	  principles,	  investigators	  could	  also	  violate	  national	  
laws	  regulating	  access	  to	  computer	  systems,623	  and	  therefore	  make	  themselves	  liable	  
for	  legal	  prosecution	  in	  the	  affected	  country.	  
	  
Generally	  speaking,	  this	  is	  a	  favourable	  outcome.	  Using	  advanced	  technology	  instead	  of	  
traditional	  methods	  should	  not	  circumvent	  existing	  legal	  practice.	  This	  could	  lead	  to	  
far-­‐reaching	  consequences,	  such	  as	  the	  Gorshkov	  and	  Ivanov	  case,	  where	  the	  US	  
ignored	  international	  law	  principles,	  and	  thereby	  accepted	  that	  cross-­‐border	  searches	  
of	  restricted	  data	  are	  permissible	  in	  cases	  of	  emergency,	  and	  thus	  made	  itself	  liable	  to	  
become	  a	  target	  for	  such	  actions	  by	  other	  nations.	  The	  recent	  Stuxnet	  case	  is	  another	  
example	  that	  highlights	  the	  negative	  impact	  of	  circumventing	  existing	  legal	  practice	  
and	  legislation.624	  	  	  
	  
However,	  as	  highlighted	  above,	  digital	  data	  has	  a	  pronounced	  tendency	  to	  cross	  
national	  borders,	  and	  is	  by	  nature	  evanescent.	  Additionally,	  the	  use	  of	  MIA	  tools	  by	  law	  
enforcement	  will	  increase	  as	  highlighted	  in	  chapters	  2	  and	  3,	  particularly	  because	  
international	  bodies	  recommend	  the	  introduction	  of	  new	  software-­‐based	  investigative	  
powers,	  such	  as	  the	  online	  searching	  of	  computers.625	  Traditional	  methods	  of	  mutual	  
legal	  assistance	  are,	  as	  discussed	  above,	  not	  adequate	  to	  assist	  law	  enforcement	  agents	  
in	  cases	  of	  access	  to	  extraterritorial	  digital	  data.	  It	  is	  essential,	  therefore,	  to	  establish	  
legal	  certainty,	  and	  define	  circumstances	  and	  conditions	  under	  which	  cross-­‐
jurisdictional	  investigations	  are	  permissible.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
623	  Such	  as	  the	  UK	  Computer	  Misuse	  Act	  1990.	  
624	  Falliere/Murchu/Chien,	  note	  476.	  
625	  Council	  of	  the	  European	  Union,	  “Council	  Conclusions	  on	  a	  Concerted	  Work	  Strategy	  and	  
Practical	  Measures	  Against	  Cybercrime”,	  2987th	  Justice	  and	  Home	  Affairs	  Council	  meeting,	  27	  –	  
28	  November	  2008,	  available	  at	  http://www.ue2008.fr/webdav/site/PFUE/shared/import/	  	  
1127_JAI/Conclusions/JHA_Council_conclusions_Cybercrime_EN.pdf	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The	  European	  Commission	  has	  announced	  in	  September	  2010,	  that	  it	  wants	  to	  
harmonise	  the	  laws	  of	  EU	  member	  states	  dealing	  with	  cyber	  attacks.626	  One	  of	  the	  
action	  points	  outlined	  in	  the	  proposal	  is	  the	  improvement	  of	  European	  criminal	  
justice/police	  cooperation	  by	  strengthening	  the	  existing	  structure	  of	  24/7	  contact	  
points,	  including	  an	  obligation	  to	  answer	  within	  8	  hours	  to	  urgent	  requests.	  While	  the	  
exact	  details	  of	  the	  proposed	  Directive,	  and	  in	  particular	  the	  extend	  to	  which	  matters	  of	  
jurisdiction	  will	  be	  addressed,	  are	  at	  this	  point	  still	  very	  much	  unclear,	  this	  would	  be	  a	  
great	  opportunity	  to	  address	  the	  problems	  surrounding	  cross-­‐jurisdictional	  
investigations	  of	  data	  by	  MIA	  tools.	  	  
	  
However,	  the	  general	  question	  is	  how	  cross-­‐jurisdictional	  investigations	  of	  protected	  
data	  should	  be	  regulated,	  and	  whether	  these	  should	  be	  allowed	  at	  all.	  As	  has	  been	  
discussed	  above,	  such	  acts	  are	  significantly	  infringing	  privacy	  and	  data	  protection	  
rights	  of	  the	  targeted	  person,	  as	  well	  as	  sovereign	  rights	  of	  the	  affected	  state.	  The	  
approach	  must	  be	  an	  outweighing	  of	  the	  interests	  and	  needs	  of	  the	  acting	  state	  (taking	  
into	  consideration	  that	  the	  use	  of	  MIA	  tools	  will	  be	  much	  more	  common	  in	  the	  future)	  
against	  the	  interests	  and	  rights	  of	  the	  affected	  state.	  	  
	  
One	  key	  requirement	  that	  was	  mentioned	  by	  all	  the	  different	  views	  in	  literature,	  and	  
during	  policy	  debates	  is	  the	  need	  for	  obtaining	  consent	  to	  cross-­‐border	  searches	  of	  the	  
affected	  state.	  Informing	  the	  affected	  state	  before	  any	  actions	  are	  undertaken	  is	  
necessary	  and	  important	  to	  minimize	  the	  violation	  of	  international	  law.	  However,	  as	  
discussed	  under	  6.2,	  with	  regard	  to	  digital	  data	  and	  Internet	  investigations	  the	  process	  
of	  gaining	  consent	  needs	  to	  be	  remodelled	  and	  more	  adequately	  tailored	  to	  cross-­‐
jurisdictional	  investigations	  by	  MIA	  tools.	  If	  a	  satisfying	  solution	  could	  be	  found	  for	  this	  
issue,	  many	  of	  the	  doubts	  raised	  by	  the	  different	  countries	  would	  be	  resolved,	  and	  
consent	  of	  policymakers	  on	  this	  topic	  achieved.	  This	  would	  enable	  the	  development	  of	  
international	  legislation	  regulating	  such	  actions.	  	  
The	  unique	  abilities	  of	  MIA	  tools	  (as	  analysed	  and	  illustrated	  in	  chapters	  4	  and	  5	  of	  this	  
thesis)	  could	  pose	  a	  solution	  to	  this	  issue.	  The	  advantage	  of	  software	  code	  is	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
626	  European	  Commission,	  “Proposal	  for	  a	  Directive	  on	  Attacks	  against	  Information	  Systems,	  
repealing	  the	  Framework	  Decision	  2005/222/JHA,	  30	  September	  2010,	  available	  online	  at:	  
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/10/463&format=HTML&ag
ed=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.	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specific	  rules	  and	  commands	  can	  be	  implemented	  into	  the	  tool.627	  This	  approach,	  
regulation	  through	  code,	  is	  analysed	  and	  discussed	  in	  detail	  in	  chapter	  8.	  However,	  a	  
brief	  outlook	  of	  how	  this	  approach	  could	  solve	  the	  issue	  in	  question	  is	  provided	  here.	  
MIA	  tools	  could,	  for	  example,	  be	  designed	  to	  detect	  whether	  data	  is	  located	  within	  or	  
outside	  of	  the	  territory	  of	  the	  operating	  country.	  This	  could,	  for	  example,	  be	  achieved	  
by	  designing	  the	  tool	  to	  check	  IP	  addresses.	  Thus	  in	  cases	  where	  data,	  or	  the	  target	  ICT	  
tool	  is	  identified	  by	  the	  MIA	  tool	  to	  be	  located	  in	  a	  different	  sovereign	  territory,	  a	  pre-­‐
defined	  procedure	  is	  set	  into	  motion.	  The	  MIA	  tool	  can	  initiate	  communication	  with	  a	  
virtual	  police	  station,	  designed	  for	  this	  purpose.628	  At	  this	  point	  of	  contact,	  the	  MIA	  tool	  
can	  communicate	  the	  request	  and	  specific	  details	  of	  the	  planned	  search.	  The	  software	  
installed	  to	  reply	  to	  these	  requests	  can	  verify	  that	  such	  a	  search	  would	  be	  in	  line	  with	  
existing	  legislation	  in	  the	  state,	  and	  allow	  or	  reject	  the	  request.	  Such	  a	  communication	  
would	  take	  very	  little	  time,	  and	  no	  human	  officers	  would	  be	  required	  at	  this	  stage.	  In	  
case	  of	  a	  rejection	  of	  the	  request,	  human	  officers	  could	  take	  over	  negotiations.	  
	  
This,	  still	  somewhat	  futuristic	  scenario,	  would	  require	  all	  states	  to	  develop	  legislation	  
regulating	  investigations	  of	  the	  virtual	  living	  space,	  such	  as	  the	  online	  search	  of	  
computers,	  and	  define	  under	  which	  circumstances	  other	  states	  would	  be	  allowed	  to	  
conduct	  such	  measures	  on	  their	  territory.	  Given	  the	  recent	  recommendation	  of	  the	  
Council	  of	  Europe	  that	  member	  states	  should	  facilitate	  clandestine	  remote	  searches	  of	  
computers	  of	  suspects,	  is	  a	  first	  indicator	  that	  more	  countries	  will	  consider	  introducing	  
legislation	  dealing	  with	  this	  matter	  in	  the	  near	  future.629	  
6.5 Conclusion 
Concluding,	  it	  can	  be	  summarised	  that	  cross-­‐jurisdictional	  investigations	  of	  the	  virtual	  
living	  space	  are	  only	  permissible	  under	  international	  law	  if	  freely	  accessible	  data	  is	  
searched.	  The	  investigation	  of	  protected	  data	  located	  in	  a	  different	  jurisdiction	  violates	  
international	  law,	  unless	  an	  authorised	  person	  approves	  the	  action.	  This	  is	  the	  case	  for	  
both;	  investigations	  conducted	  by	  human	  officers	  and	  MIA	  tools.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
627	  See	  e.g.	  Lessig,	  note	  24;	  and	  the	  updated	  version	  L	  Lessig,	  Code	  Version	  2.0	  (New	  York:	  Basic	  
Books,	  2006).	  for	  a	  detailed	  discussion	  on	  how	  laws	  could	  be	  implemented	  into	  software.	  
628	  See	  e.g.	  M	  Valeri,	  “Europe’s	  first	  ‘Online	  Police	  Station’”,	  (2006)	  presented	  at	  6th	  Computer	  
Law	  World	  Conference,	  Edinburgh,	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  a	  simpler	  version	  of	  such	  an	  institution.	  
629	  See	  note	  627.	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However,	  increasingly	  data	  located	  in	  the	  virtual	  living	  space	  is	  crucial	  for	  the	  success	  
of	  investigations.	  The	  relevant	  data	  is	  mainly	  protected	  data	  stored	  on	  hard	  drives	  of	  
suspects	  and	  exchanged	  during	  communications.630	  	  
	  
MIA	  tools	  targeting	  such	  data	  are	  oblivious	  to	  where	  the	  data	  is	  stored.	  As	  highlighted	  
by	  the	  short	  case	  scenario	  under	  6	  above,	  country	  borders	  no	  longer	  restrict	  the	  actions	  
of	  these	  tools.	  Given	  the	  fluctuant	  nature	  of	  online	  data	  and	  the	  networked	  
environment	  of	  the	  Internet,	  this	  is	  necessary.	  However,	  as	  shown	  in	  this	  chapter,	  this	  
causes	  significant	  problems	  for	  the	  law.	  	  	  
	  
The	  specific	  abilities	  of	  the	  new	  class	  of	  investigative	  technologies	  therefore	  profoundly	  
challenge	  existing	  legal	  frameworks	  regulating	  investigations.	  The	  empirical	  research	  
in	  chapter	  3	  suggested	  that	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  and	  this	  chapter	  has	  highlighted	  that	  the	  
existing	  legal	  framework	  is	  inapt	  to	  adequately	  regulate	  actions	  of	  MIA	  tools	  for	  the	  
specific	  case	  of	  cross-­‐jurisdictional	  investigations	  of	  the	  virtual	  living	  space.	  	  
	  
However,	  the	  unique	  abilities	  of	  the	  software	  code	  of	  MIA	  tools	  could	  constitute	  a	  
solution	  for	  this	  problem.	  Just	  like	  human	  officers,	  MIA	  cyber-­‐cops	  should	  obey	  to	  
existing	  legislation	  and	  rules	  when	  conducting	  their	  investigative	  actions.	  The	  concept	  
of	  regulation	  through	  code,	  as	  introduced	  in	  section	  6.4	  could	  enable	  tools	  to	  act	  
















	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
630	  See	  chapter	  2	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  online	  searching	  method.	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7 DOUBLE DIGITALITY  
	  
The	  previous	  chapters	  have	  highlighted	  that	  digital	  data	  is	  increasingly	  important	  for	  
investigations,	  and	  particularly	  private	  and	  protected	  data	  stored	  on	  ICTs.	  For	  the	  
investigation	  of	  this	  data	  and	  the	  policing	  of	  the	  virtual	  living	  space	  more	  frequently	  
novel	  MIA	  tools	  are	  deployed.	  
	  
The	  previous	  chapter	  has	  analysed	  how	  this	  challenges	  international	  laws	  regulating	  
cross-­‐jurisdictional	  investigations.	  Another	  pertinent	  problem	  identified	  by	  the	  
interviewed	  experts	  is	  the	  use	  of	  the	  evidence	  collected	  by	  MIA	  tools	  for	  criminal	  
proceedings.631	  This	  chapter	  focuses	  on	  this	  issue	  and	  analyses	  the	  particular	  problems	  
of	  protected	  data	  seized	  from	  ICTs	  and	  the	  virtual	  living	  space	  by	  MIA	  tools.	  
	  
This	  evidence	  collected	  by	  MIA	  tools	  is	  in	  digital	  format.	  This	  type	  of	  evidence	  is	  also	  
referred	  to	  as	  ‘digital	  evidence’,	  ‘electronic	  evidence’,	  or	  ‘computer	  evidence’.632	  	  
The	  mere	  existence	  of	  these	  different	  concepts	  describing	  this	  type	  of	  evidence	  
indicates	  that	  this	  class	  of	  evidence	  is	  significantly	  different	  from	  traditional	  evidence,	  
and	  therefore	  raises	  particular	  problems	  and	  issues.	  	  
	  
In	  addition,	  digital	  evidence	  seized	  by	  MIA	  tools	  raises	  another	  problem:	  the	  “double	  
digital	  paradigm”.	  This	  concept	  developed	  in	  this	  thesis	  refers	  to	  digital	  data	  that	  is	  
seized	  by	  (digital)	  software	  from	  live	  systems.	  
	  
A	  short	  case	  scenario	  is	  again	  introduced	  here,	  to	  better	  illustrate	  the	  differences	  
between	  traditional	  physical	  and	  documentary	  evidence	  and	  digital	  evidence,	  and	  in	  
particular	  digital	  evidence	  collected	  by	  MIA	  tools.	  
	  
This	  case	  scenario	  highlights	  that	  existing	  legislation	  governing	  the	  collection	  and	  
preservation	  of	  evidence	  during	  criminal	  investigations	  and	  procedures	  is	  challenged	  
by	  digital	  evidence,	  and	  particularly	  if	  seized	  by	  MIA	  tools.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
631	  See	  chapter	  3,	  p.	  79	  ff.	  
632	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  chapter,	  the	  author	  chooses	  to	  refer	  to	  this	  type	  of	  evidence	  as	  ‘digital	  
evidence’.	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Traditionally,	  if	  investigators	  gain	  a	  warrant	  to	  search	  the	  premises	  of	  a	  suspect	  and	  
seize	  relevant	  documents	  and	  other	  items	  of	  (potentially)	  evidentiary	  value,	  this	  
includes	  the	  physical	  entering	  of	  human	  officers	  of	  the	  suspect’s	  flat	  or	  other	  relevant	  
premises	  (such	  as	  his	  work	  place).	  These	  officers	  are	  trained	  to	  undertake	  search	  and	  
seizure	  procedures	  in	  compliance	  with	  existing	  legislation	  regulating	  these	  actions.	  In	  
addition,	  these	  officers	  can	  serve	  as	  eyewitnesses	  during	  court	  proceedings,	  testifying	  
that	  certain	  circumstances	  were	  as	  stated	  in	  reports.	  The	  evidence	  that	  is	  traditionally	  
seized	  during	  such	  procedures	  is	  documentary	  and	  physical	  evidence.	  Hence,	  
depending	  on	  the	  crime	  the	  suspect	  is	  accused	  of,	  this	  could	  be	  documents,	  weapons,	  
clothing,	  or	  other	  relevant	  items.	  	  
Photographs	  of	  the	  premises	  and	  the	  location	  of	  the	  seized	  items	  may	  be	  taken,	  and	  the	  
evidence	  is	  catalogued	  and	  taken	  away.	  These	  procedures	  ensure	  that	  during	  court	  
proceedings,	  it	  can	  be	  proven	  beyond	  reasonable	  doubt	  that	  the	  seized	  evidence	  was	  
indeed	  found	  at	  the	  suspect’s	  premises,	  and	  has	  not	  been	  tampered	  with	  after	  the	  
seizure.	  To	  ensure	  this,	  the	  original	  pieces	  of	  documentary	  and	  physical	  evidence	  are	  
presented	  and	  examined	  during	  the	  court	  proceedings.	  	  
Additionally,	  documentary	  and	  physical	  evidence	  can	  help	  to	  connect	  a	  crime	  to	  a	  
suspect	  beyond	  a	  reasonable	  doubt.	  For	  example,	  documents	  with	  distinctive	  
handwriting,	  a	  specific	  weapon,	  or	  clothing	  with	  traces	  of	  DNA	  can	  create	  a	  powerful	  
tangible	  connection	  between	  a	  suspect	  and	  a	  crime.	  Thus	  physical	  evidence	  has	  an	  
important	  probative	  value,	  and	  is	  of	  significant	  value	  to	  investigations.	  	  
	  
What	  then	  is	  the	  difference	  between	  documentary	  and	  physical	  evidence,	  and	  digital	  
evidence,	  and	  in	  particular	  the	  search	  and	  seizure	  of	  digital	  evidence	  by	  MIA	  tools?	  	  
	  
The	  brief	  scenario	  on	  digital	  evidence	  is	  divided	  into	  two	  parts.	  Firstly,	  a	  scenario	  is	  
described	  that	  highlights	  the	  problems	  and	  differences	  between	  digital	  and	  physical	  
evidence	  a).	  This	  is	  followed	  by	  a	  variation	  to	  this	  scenario,	  highlighting	  the	  specific	  
problems	  with	  digital	  evidence	  collected	  by	  MIA	  tools	  b).	  
	  
a)	  The	  widespread	  use	  of	  ICTs	  means	  that	  investigators	  are	  frequently	  faced	  with	  
evidence	  in	  digital	  form.	  Thus,	  when	  investigators	  gain	  a	  warrant	  to	  search	  a	  suspect’s	  
premises	  and	  seize	  evidence	  (potentially)	  relevant	  to	  a	  crime,	  upon	  entering	  the	  
premises	  of	  the	  suspect	  they	  are	  frequently	  faced	  with	  the	  problem	  that	  documents	  and	  
data	  of	  potential	  importance	  are	  stored	  on	  computers	  and	  other	  ICTs,	  as	  well	  as	  the	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virtual	  living	  space.	  These	  devices	  have	  replaced	  traditional	  files	  and	  personal	  
calendars	  as	  means	  for	  producing	  and	  storing	  documents.	  In	  addition,	  the	  increase	  in	  
online	  communication	  means	  that	  emails	  have	  largely	  replaced	  traditional	  letters	  as	  the	  
mainstream	  communication	  means.	  Thus,	  emails	  of	  evidentiary	  value	  could	  be	  stored	  
on	  the	  email	  account	  of	  the	  suspect.	  	  
This	  means	  that	  relevant	  documents	  are	  stored	  in	  digital	  format	  on	  ICTs	  and	  the	  virtual	  
living	  space	  and	  do	  not	  exist	  as	  physical	  documents.	  The	  search	  of	  a	  premise	  therefore	  
requires	  the	  investigators	  to	  seize	  computers	  and	  other	  ICTs	  to	  search	  these	  for	  
relevant	  documents	  and	  data.	  However,	  as	  opposed	  to	  documentary	  and	  physical	  
evidence,	  digital	  evidence	  stored	  on	  ICTs	  cannot	  be	  inspected	  and	  catalogued	  at	  the	  
premise.	  Relevant	  documents	  stored	  on	  ICTs	  in	  digital	  format	  are	  essentially	  consisting	  
of	  zeros	  and	  ones	  in	  electronic	  format.	  Therefore,	  these	  documents	  are	  not	  readable	  by	  
a	  human	  unless	  decoded	  by	  a	  program	  (such	  as	  Microsoft	  Word).	  This	  means	  that	  
officers	  present	  during	  the	  search	  cannot	  testify	  in	  court	  that	  certain	  evidence	  was	  
found	  at	  the	  scene,	  and	  therefore	  likely	  belonged	  to	  the	  suspect.	  The	  evidence	  is	  not	  the	  
computer	  itself,	  but	  the	  data	  stored	  on	  its	  hard	  drive	  or	  on	  online	  accounts	  of	  the	  
suspect.	  	  
To	  retrieve	  digital	  evidence	  from	  ICTs,	  these	  devices	  are	  seized	  and	  then	  inspected	  by	  
forensic	  analysts.	  	  
Computer	  forensic	  experts	  have	  developed	  a	  detailed	  set	  of	  procedures	  that	  forensic	  
analysts	  ordinarily	  follow	  when	  they	  seize	  and	  analyse	  ICTs.633	  	  
While	  the	  technical	  details	  are	  not	  important	  at	  this	  stage,	  the	  general	  structure	  of	  this	  
analysis	  is	  relevant	  to	  show	  the	  differences	  between	  seizing	  digital	  evidence	  and	  
physical	  evidence.	  As	  a	  first	  step,	  ICTs	  are	  seized	  by	  investigators	  at	  the	  scene,	  and	  
returned	  to	  a	  government	  forensic	  laboratory	  for	  analysis.634	  At	  the	  forensic	  laboratory,	  
as	  a	  first	  step	  a	  “bit-­‐stream”	  or	  “mirror	  image”	  of	  the	  hard	  drive	  is	  generated.635	  The	  bit-­‐
stream	  copy	  is	  an	  exact	  duplicate,	  not	  just	  of	  the	  files,	  but	  of	  every	  single	  bit	  and	  byte	  
stored	  on	  the	  drive.636	  The	  forensic	  analyst	  then	  performs	  his	  work	  on	  the	  copy	  rather	  
than	  the	  original	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  original	  is	  not	  be	  damaged	  or	  altered	  by	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
633	  See	  generally	  B	  Nelson	  et	  al.,	  Guide	  to	  Computer	  Forensics	  and	  Investigations	  (Boston,	  MA:	  
Cengage	  Learning,	  2009),	  surveying	  and	  explaining	  current	  computer	  forensics	  practices.	  
634	  Computer	  Crime	  and	  Intellectual	  Property	  Section,	  US	  Department	  of	  Justice,	  Searching	  and	  
Seizing	  Computers	  and	  Obtaining	  Electronic	  Evidence	  in	  Criminal	  Investigations	  (Office	  of	  Legal	  
Education	  Executive	  Office	  for	  United	  States	  Attorneys,	  2009),	  76.	  
635	  M	  Meyers,	  M	  Rogers,	  “Computer	  Forensics:	  The	  Need	  for	  Standardization	  and	  Certification”	  
(2004)	  3:2	  International	  Journal	  of	  Digital	  Evidence,	  6.	  
636	  Ibid.	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analyst’s	  investigation.	  Thus,	  the	  original	  ICT	  device	  remains	  intact	  for	  court	  
proceedings,	  should	  the	  need	  to	  compare	  the	  copy	  with	  the	  original	  occur.	  	  
A	  deviation	  of	  this	  procedure	  might	  be	  necessary	  if	  one	  of	  the	  ICT	  devices	  is	  still	  
switched	  on	  during	  the	  seizure.	  Many	  modern	  computers	  have	  large	  amounts	  of	  
Random	  Access	  Memory	  (RAM)	  where	  process	  context	  information,	  network	  state	  
information,	  and	  much	  more	  are	  maintained.	  Once	  a	  system	  is	  powered	  down	  the	  
immediate	  contents	  of	  that	  memory	  is	  lost	  and	  can	  never	  be	  completely	  recovered.	  So,	  
when	  dealing	  with	  a	  crime	  or	  incident	  involving	  digital	  evidence,	  it	  may	  be	  necessary	  to	  
perform	  operations	  on	  a	  system	  that	  contains	  evidence,	  especially	  in	  a	  networked	  
environment.637	  	  
Therefore,	  one	  significant	  difference	  between	  the	  seizure	  of	  documentary	  and	  physical	  
evidence,	  and	  the	  seizure	  of	  digital	  evidence	  that	  becomes	  obvious	  is	  that	  in	  the	  
traditional	  investigative	  context,	  seizure	  implies	  the	  ‘confiscation’	  or	  ‘taking	  possession’	  
of	  physical	  material	  for	  later	  inspection,	  which	  in	  itself	  constitutes	  the	  evidence.	  
Whereas	  in	  the	  digital	  realm,	  seizure	  implies	  the	  ‘confiscation’	  or	  ‘taking	  possession’	  of	  
a	  data	  storage	  medium,	  that	  may	  contain	  the	  evidence.	  The	  relevant	  (digital)	  evidence	  
is	  very	  volatile,	  and	  can	  therefore	  be	  lost	  or	  altered	  almost	  immediately	  upon	  seizure.	  
However,	  similarities	  exist	  in	  that	  specifically	  trained	  experts,	  who	  document	  every	  
step	  of	  their	  activities	  and	  can	  testify	  in	  court	  what	  they	  have	  detected	  and	  where,	  
undertake	  the	  procedures.	  
	  
b)	  Search	  and	  seizure	  of	  digital	  data	  conducted	  by	  MIA	  tools,	  significantly	  changes	  the	  
scenario.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  first	  important	  difference	  to	  a	  traditional	  search	  and	  seizure	  
of	  documentary	  and	  physical	  evidence	  is	  that	  no	  physical	  premise	  of	  a	  suspect	  is	  
searched.	  The	  place	  of	  interest	  is	  the	  virtual	  living	  sphere	  of	  the	  suspect.638	  In	  addition,	  
the	  operation	  is	  not	  conducted	  by	  a	  human	  officer,	  but	  rather	  by	  a	  piece	  of	  software	  
programmed	  to	  execute	  certain	  actions.	  The	  search	  and	  seizure	  of	  the	  virtual	  living	  
space	  of	  a	  suspect	  by	  MIA	  tools	  therefore	  entails	  the	  remote	  infiltration	  of	  an	  ICT	  tool	  to	  
gain	  access	  to	  the	  data	  stored	  on	  it.	  Once	  this	  has	  been	  accomplished,	  the	  MIA	  tool	  
searches	  for	  relevant	  data,	  copies	  this	  and	  returns	  it	  to	  the	  investigators.	  The	  entire	  
process	  occurs	  without	  direct	  supervision	  or	  participation	  of	  a	  human	  officer,	  or	  
forensic	  analyst.	  The	  tool	  operates	  autonomously.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
637	  E	  Casey,	  Digital	  Evidence	  and	  Computer	  Crime:	  Forensic	  Science,	  Computers	  and	  The	  Internet	  
(Amsterdam:	  Elsevier	  Academic	  Press,	  3rd	  edition,	  2011)	  245.	  	  
638	  See	  chapter	  2,	  p.	  53	  for	  a	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  this	  notion.	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The	  search	  and	  seizure	  of	  data	  with	  MIA	  tools	  raises	  several	  issues	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  
traditional	  search	  of	  a	  premise.	  In	  addition	  to	  those	  identified	  above	  for	  the	  digital	  
realm,	  no	  human	  officers	  are	  present,	  who	  could	  act	  as	  eyewitnesses	  after	  the	  
operation.	  In	  addition,	  the	  data	  is	  seized	  from	  live	  systems.	  The	  ICT	  device	  (such	  as	  the	  
computer)	  itself	  is	  not	  seized	  and	  examined	  by	  a	  forensic	  specialist	  according	  to	  widely	  
recognised	  procedures.	  Thus	  no	  original	  system	  exists	  to	  verify	  the	  authenticity	  of	  the	  
seized	  data.	  Even	  if	  the	  ICT	  tool	  is	  seized	  after	  the	  MIA	  tool	  has	  retrieved	  relevant	  data,	  
the	  system	  will	  not	  be	  in	  the	  identical	  state	  it	  was	  in	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  search	  and	  
seizure	  of	  the	  data.	  	  
This	  means	  that	  no	  physical	  source	  exists	  for	  later	  comparison	  with	  the	  admitted	  
evidence.	  In	  other	  words,	  “a	  live	  image	  (or	  copy)	  can	  only	  be	  verified	  against	  itself	  from	  
the	  point	  when	  acquisition	  occurred,	  whereas	  images	  of	  ‘dead’	  machines	  can	  be	  verified	  
against	  the	  original	  media”.639	  More	  problematically,	  data	  can	  be	  manipulated.	  For	  
example,	  as	  Nikkel	  points	  out,	  ‘IP	  and	  MAC	  addresses	  can	  be	  spoofed,	  various	  protocol	  
headers	  can	  be	  faked,	  and	  the	  content	  transmitted	  can	  be	  fabricated.	  Network	  traffic	  
can	  be	  intercepted	  and	  modified	  during	  transit’.640	  Significantly,	  MIA	  tools	  are	  not	  
primarily	  designed	  with	  evidence	  preservation	  in	  mind.641	  
The	  case	  of	  R	  v	  Aaron	  Caffrey	  highlights	  in	  particular	  how	  difficult	  it	  can	  be	  to	  prove	  the	  
reliability	  of	  MIA	  tools	  and	  therefore	  the	  authenticity	  of	  the	  seized	  data.642	  	  
Caffrey	  was	  acquitted	  of	  a	  section	  3(1)	  Computer	  Misuse	  Act	  1990	  offence	  of	  causing	  
unauthorised	  modifications	  of	  computer	  material,	  allegedly	  having	  gained	  
unauthorised	  administrator	  rights	  to	  Web	  services	  on	  the	  Port	  of	  Houston	  computer	  by	  
using	  a	  known	  exploit	  within	  Microsoft	  software.	  He	  claimed	  in	  his	  defence	  that	  
hackers	  had	  used	  a	  Trojan	  virus	  to	  gain	  control	  over	  his	  computer	  and	  launch	  programs	  
to	  hack	  into	  the	  Port	  of	  Houston	  computer.	  Although	  no	  traces	  of	  a	  Trojan	  virus	  were	  
found	  on	  his	  computer	  and	  it	  was	  therefore	  highly	  unlikely	  that	  hackers	  had	  gained	  
control	  over	  his	  computer,	  he	  was	  acquitted	  of	  the	  crime	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  the	  
possibility	  that	  a	  Trojan	  virus	  had	  been	  installed	  on	  the	  computer	  and	  had	  destroyed	  
itself,	  leaving	  no	  traces,	  could	  not	  be	  excluded.	  Since	  MIA	  tools	  are	  very	  similar	  in	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  E	  E	  Kenneally,	  “Confluence	  of	  Digital	  Evidence	  and	  the	  Law:	  On	  the	  Forensic	  Soundness	  of	  
Live-­‐Remote	  Digital	  Evidence	  Collection”	  (2005)	  9:2	  UCLA	  Journal	  of	  Law	  and	  Technology,	  3.	  
640	  B	  J	  Nikkel,	  “Improving	  Evidence	  Acquisition	  from	  Live	  Network	  Sources”	  (2006)	  3	  Digital	  
Investigation,	  89.	  
641	  E	  Casey,	  A	  Stanley,	  “Tool	  Review	  –	  Remote	  Forensic	  Preservation	  and	  Examination	  Tools”	  
(2004)	  1	  Digital	  Investigation,	  284.	  
642	  E	  George,	  “UK	  Computer	  Misuse	  Act	  –	  The	  Trojan	  Virus	  Defence	  Regina	  v	  Aaron	  Caffrey,	  
Southwark	  Crown	  Court,	  17	  October	  2003”	  (2004)	  1:2	  Digital	  Investigation,	  89.	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nature	  to	  Trojan	  software,643	  this	  highlights	  the	  difficulties	  of	  proving	  that	  the	  MIA	  tool	  
operated	  faultlessly	  during	  an	  investigation	  and,	  hence,	  that	  the	  evidence	  collected	  is	  
reliable.	  	  
If	  a	  person	  is	  acquitted	  because	  of	  the	  mere	  possibility	  that	  a	  Trojan	  infected	  his	  
computer,	  a	  fortiori	  an	  acquittal	  could	  be	  expected	  if	  it	  is	  known	  that	  a	  Trojan,	  albeit	  
under	  police	  control,	  was	  operative	  –	  first	  because	  the	  police	  Trojan	  itself	  might	  have	  
compromised	  the	  crime	  scene,	  second	  because	  it	  proves	  that	  the	  suspect’s	  computer	  
was	  vulnerable	  to	  attacks	  in	  principle.	  If	  the	  police	  were	  able	  to	  gain	  access,	  it	  is	  highly	  
likely	  that	  the	  computer	  was	  vulnerable	  and,	  indeed,	  that	  some	  malware	  will	  have	  
exploited	  this	  vulnerability.	  
	  
These	  case	  scenarios	  have	  highlighted	  the	  fundamental	  differences	  between	  
documentary	  and	  physical,	  and	  digital	  evidence.	  While	  a	  weapon	  on	  a	  physical	  crime	  
scene	  remains	  the	  same	  after	  collection	  by	  police	  and	  inspection	  by	  experts	  and	  jury,	  
and	  can	  at	  any	  time	  during	  the	  proceedings	  be	  used	  as	  an	  objective	  comparator	  for	  the	  
claims	  made	  by	  either	  side,	  digital	  evidence	  potentially	  changes	  every	  time	  it	  is	  opened	  
and	  viewed	  on	  a	  computer.	  In	  some	  sense,	  there	  is	  no	  ‘enduring	  original’	  that	  can	  serve	  
as	  an	  objective	  comparator.	  	  
The	  “double	  digital	  paradigm”	  pertinent	  to	  evidence	  seized	  by	  MIA	  tools	  challenges	  
existing	  legislation	  regulating	  the	  search	  and	  seizure	  of	  evidence	  even	  further.	  Software	  
code	  seizing	  software	  code	  from	  live	  systems	  stands	  in	  grave	  contrast	  to	  traditional	  
procedures	  of	  physical	  objects	  by	  human	  officers.	  	  
	  
Therefore,	  the	  question	  arises	  whether	  digital	  evidence	  seized	  by	  MIA	  tools	  would	  
stand	  in	  court.	  	  
	  
As	  mentioned	  elsewhere	  in	  this	  thesis,644	  the	  author	  has	  been	  a	  partner	  on	  two	  
European	  projects	  dealing	  with	  this	  question.645	  	  
The	  first	  project	  in	  particular	  focused	  on	  determining	  whether	  digital	  evidence	  is	  
admissible,	  and	  whether	  specific	  regulations	  dealing	  with	  this	  type	  of	  evidence	  exist.	  
The	  project	  was	  comparative	  and	  empirical	  in	  nature.	  Experts	  from	  16	  member	  states	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
643	  See	  chapter	  4	  p.	  93ff.	  
644	  See	  generally	  pp.	  24	  and	  31,	  and	  p.77ff	  for	  a	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  the	  project.	  
645	  1.	  “Admissibility	  of	  Electronic	  Evidence	  (A.E.E.C.)”	  project,	  and	  2.	  “European	  Certificate	  on	  
Cybercrime	  and	  Electronic	  Evidence	  (ECCE)”	  project.	  Both	  projects	  were	  financed	  by	  the	  
European	  Commission	  under	  the	  Framework	  Program.	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carried	  out	  an	  analysis	  of	  existing	  procedural	  legislation	  in	  their	  jurisdiction	  dealing	  
with	  matters	  of	  (digital)	  evidence,	  and	  undertook	  interviews	  with	  legal	  professionals	  
directly	  involved	  in	  the	  process	  of	  obtaining,	  analysing	  and	  presenting	  digital	  evidence	  
in	  court	  (e.g.	  police	  officers,	  computer	  forensic	  analysts,	  lawyers,	  judges).	  The	  main	  
findings	  of	  the	  project	  with	  regards	  to	  digital	  evidence	  were	  that	  no	  country	  had	  
introduced	  specific	  legislation	  dealing	  with	  digital	  evidence	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  study	  
(2005-­‐2006).	  The	  interviewees	  indicated	  that	  existing	  legislation	  was	  applied	  
analogously	  to	  the	  new	  type	  of	  evidence	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  interviews.	  	  
About	  half	  of	  the	  interviewees,	  however,	  indicated	  that	  the	  introduction	  of	  new	  
legislation	  (or	  the	  amendment	  of	  existing)	  to	  specifically	  regulate	  digital	  evidence	  
would	  be	  beneficial.	  Generally,	  all	  interviewees	  agreed	  that	  the	  current	  situation	  was	  
unsatisfactory,	  and	  could	  lead	  to	  much	  confusion	  and	  legal	  uncertainty.	  Most	  of	  the	  
interviewees	  also	  stressed	  that	  there	  was	  a	  significant	  lack	  of	  technical	  knowledge	  
among	  the	  legal	  experts.646	  
	  
The	  second	  project	  was	  a	  continuation	  of	  the	  first,	  focusing	  on	  addressing	  the	  issues	  
highlighted	  by	  the	  experts	  interviewed	  for	  the	  first	  project.	  These	  were	  in	  particular	  the	  
lack	  of	  knowledge	  about	  legal	  and	  technical	  issues	  relating	  to	  cybercrime	  and	  digital	  
evidence	  among	  members	  of	  the	  judiciary	  and	  lawyers.	  Thus	  the	  project	  aimed	  at	  
developing	  the	  first	  European	  Certificate	  on	  Cybercrime	  and	  Electronic	  Evidence.	  The	  
first	  stage	  of	  the	  project	  consisted	  of	  developing	  a	  training	  program	  on	  cybercrime	  and	  
electronic	  evidence,	  which	  incorporated	  knowledge	  about	  the	  technical	  and	  legal	  issues	  
pertaining	  to	  these	  topics.	  The	  second	  stage	  of	  the	  project	  consisted	  of	  training	  
seminars	  in	  11	  European	  and	  3	  Latin	  American	  countries	  for	  judges,	  prosecutors	  and	  
lawyers,	  who	  could	  gain	  the	  certificate	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  course.	  The	  development	  of	  the	  
teaching	  material,	  and	  particularly	  the	  teaching	  experiences	  highlighted	  again	  the	  
significant	  lack	  of	  technical	  knowledge	  about	  digital	  evidence	  among	  legal	  professionals	  
in	  all	  countries,	  and	  the	  insecurity	  about	  the	  regulation	  of	  this	  type	  of	  evidence.	  	  
	  
The	  findings	  of	  the	  empirical	  results	  presented	  in	  chapter	  3	  are	  remarkably	  similar	  to	  
those	  of	  the	  two	  European	  projects.	  This	  highlights	  that	  little	  research	  and	  law	  and	  
policy	  making	  has	  occurred	  on	  this	  topic.	  The	  interviewees	  stated	  that	  no	  legislation	  
exists	  explicitly	  regulating	  the	  use	  of	  digital	  evidence,	  and	  in	  particular	  digital	  evidence	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  See	  for	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  project	  and	  the	  main	  findings	  Insa,	  note	  179.	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seized	  by	  software	  tools	  from	  live	  systems	  (“double	  digital	  paradigm”).	  They	  also	  
highlighted	  that	  a	  significant	  lack	  of	  knowledge	  about	  the	  technical	  aspects	  of	  this	  type	  
of	  evidence	  exists,	  which	  can	  lead	  to	  problems	  with	  admitting	  and	  interpreting	  the	  
evidence.	  It	  was	  stated	  that	  legal	  analytical	  work	  is	  required	  to	  establish	  legal	  certainty.	  
	  
This	  chapter	  introduces	  in	  paragraph	  7.1	  the	  notion	  of	  digital	  evidence.	  It	  attempts	  to	  
define	  the	  notion	  in	  section	  7.1.1,	  and	  highlights	  the	  most	  pertinent	  technical	  
characteristics	  of	  this	  evidence	  class	  in	  section	  7.1.2.	  The	  convergence	  of	  science	  and	  
law,	  and	  the	  influence	  of	  forensic	  science	  on	  the	  law	  of	  evidence	  are	  examined	  in	  
section	  7.1.3.	  In	  section	  7.2	  the	  admissibility	  of	  digital	  evidence	  in	  England	  and	  Wales,	  
and	  Germany	  is	  analysed,	  and	  the	  particular	  problems	  with	  digital	  evidence	  collected	  
by	  MIA	  tools	  highlighted.	  Section	  7.4	  examines	  potential	  solutions	  for	  the	  admissibility	  
of	  digital	  evidence	  collected	  with	  MIA	  tools.	  
7.1 Digital Evidence 
The	  term	  digital	  evidence	  (as	  well	  as	  the	  synonyms	  electronic	  and	  computer	  evidence)	  
indicates	  that	  this	  type	  of	  evidence	  differs	  from	  documentary	  and	  physical	  evidence,	  if	  
only	  by	  explicitly	  making	  a	  differentiation	  through	  the	  additional	  term	  “digital”.	  The	  
short	  case	  scenarios	  presented	  in	  section	  7	  have	  indicated	  that	  this	  type	  of	  evidence	  has	  
some	  distinguishing	  features	  that	  set	  it	  apart	  from	  physical,	  and	  therefore	  the	  
traditional	  notion	  of	  evidence.	  A	  thorough	  understanding	  of	  what	  digital	  evidence	  is,	  is	  
necessary	  for	  the	  evaluation	  of	  the	  legal	  problems	  it	  triggers.	  
7.1.1 Definition 
No	  generally	  accepted	  definition	  of	  the	  term	  digital	  evidence	  exists.	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  
is	  that	  the	  relevance	  of	  this	  type	  of	  evidence	  for	  criminal	  investigations	  is	  only	  a	  very	  
recent	  phenomenon	  that	  is	  rooted	  in	  the	  advent	  of	  the	  Internet	  and	  widespread	  of	  ICT	  
devices.647	  The	  technological	  development	  and	  its	  simultaneous	  integration	  into	  
societies	  occur	  at	  such	  speed	  that	  legal	  concepts	  based	  on	  these	  technologies	  are	  
difficult	  to	  develop.	  As	  Mason	  and	  Schafer	  put	  it,	  “any	  definition	  that	  is	  too	  narrowly	  
tailored	  to	  the	  current	  state	  of	  technology	  faces	  the	  risk	  of	  becoming	  obsolete	  within	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
647	  M	  Pollitt,	  R	  Bianchi,	  “Digital	  Evidence”	  in	  A	  Mozayani,	  C	  Noziglia	  (eds)	  The	  Forensic	  
Laboratory	  Handbook	  Procedures	  and	  Practice	  (New	  York,	  Dordrecht,	  Heidelberg,	  London:	  
Springer,	  2011	  2nd	  ed),	  213.	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years	  if	  not	  months.	  Definitions	  that	  are	  suitably	  future	  proof	  by	  contrast	  tend	  to	  focus	  
on	  the	  most	  abstract	  aspects	  of	  the	  technology,	  and	  will	  therefore	  cut	  across	  traditional	  
divisions	  and	  categories	  in	  the	  law	  of	  evidence	  that	  have	  historically	  grown.”648	  In	  
addition,	  digital	  evidence	  can	  be	  found	  in	  an	  ever-­‐increasing	  number	  of	  places	  and	  in	  a	  
great	  number	  of	  formats.	  	  
Several	  authors	  have	  attempted	  to	  define	  the	  term	  digital	  evidence,	  and	  these	  
definitions	  should	  not	  be	  dismissed	  upfront	  for	  either	  being	  too	  technology	  specific	  or	  
neutral.	  These	  are	  important	  sources	  for	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  concept	  and	  
both,	  the	  technical	  and	  legal	  issues	  attached	  to	  it.	  Thus	  some	  of	  these	  definitions	  are	  
introduced	  here,	  and	  a	  working	  definition	  of	  the	  term	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  thesis	  
determined.	  	  
Digital	  evidence	  has	  been	  defined	  as	  “any	  information	  of	  probative	  value	  that	  is	  either	  
stored	  or	  transmitted	  in	  a	  digital	  form.”649	  A	  slight	  modification	  of	  this	  definition	  is	  
“digital	  evidence	  is	  information	  stored	  or	  transmitted	  in	  binary	  form	  that	  may	  be	  relied	  
on	  in	  court”.650	  
The	  problem	  with	  these	  definitions	  is	  that	  they	  focus	  too	  heavily	  on	  the	  evidentiary	  
value	  of	  the	  data,	  and	  neglect	  data	  that	  may	  further	  an	  investigation.	  In	  addition,	  as	  
Casey	  points	  out,	  “the	  term	  binary	  in	  the	  latter	  definition	  is	  inexact,	  describing	  just	  one	  
of	  many	  common	  representations	  of	  computerised	  data.”651	  	  
Casey	  therefore	  goes	  on	  to	  define	  digital	  evidence	  as	  “any	  data	  stored	  or	  transmitted	  
using	  a	  computer	  that	  support	  or	  refute	  a	  theory	  of	  how	  an	  offense	  occurred	  or	  that	  
address	  critical	  elements	  of	  the	  offense	  such	  as	  intent	  or	  alibi”.652	  	  
This	  definition	  is	  much	  broader,	  because	  it	  refers	  to	  data	  as	  information	  of	  various	  
kinds,	  including	  text	  images,	  audio	  and	  video.	  The	  focus	  is	  clearly	  on	  data	  collected	  
during	  and	  for	  criminal	  investigations.	  However,	  the	  use	  of	  the	  term	  computer	  is	  
potentially	  misleading,	  as	  it	  could	  be	  read	  to	  exclude	  other	  ICT	  devices	  transmitting	  or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
648	  S	  Mason,	  B	  Schafer,	  “The	  Characteristics	  of	  Electronic	  Evidence”	  in	  S	  Mason	  (ed)	  Electronic	  
Evidence	  (London:	  Lexis	  Nexis	  Butterworths,	  2010),	  22.	  
649	  Scientific	  Working	  Group	  on	  Digital	  Evidence	  (SWGDE),	  “Digital	  Evidence:	  Standards	  and	  
Principles”	  (2000)	  2:2	  Forensic	  Science	  Communications,	  available	  online	  at:	  
http://www.fbi.gov/about-­‐us/lab/forensic-­‐science-­‐communications/forensic-­‐science-­‐
communications-­‐april-­‐2010.	  
650	  J	  R	  Vacca,	  Computer	  Forensics:	  Computer	  Crime	  Scene	  Investigation	  (Hingham,	  MA:	  Charles	  
River	  Media,	  2nd	  edition,	  2005),	  700.	  
651	  Casey,	  note	  637,	  at	  7.	  
652	  Ibid.	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storing	  data.	  In	  addition,	  this	  definition	  requires	  that	  the	  data	  must	  be	  directly	  linked	  to	  
the	  course	  of	  a	  crime,	  and	  that	  it	  is	  reliable	  and	  therefore	  admissible	  in	  court.	  	  
Mason	  and	  Schafer	  define	  digital	  evidence653	  as	  “data	  (comprising	  the	  output	  of	  
analogue	  devices	  or	  data	  in	  digital	  format)	  that	  is	  manipulated,	  stored	  or	  
communicated	  by	  any	  man-­‐made	  device,	  computer	  or	  computer	  system	  or	  transmitted	  
over	  a	  communication	  system,	  that	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  make	  the	  factual	  account	  of	  
either	  party	  more	  probable	  or	  less	  probable	  than	  it	  would	  be	  without	  the	  evidence”.654	  	  
This	  definition	  is	  much	  wider	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  storage	  device.	  It	  intends,	  as	  Schafer	  
and	  Mason	  point	  out,	  to	  include	  all	  forms	  of	  devices	  that	  can,	  in	  its	  widest	  meaning,	  be	  
considered	  a	  computer	  (thereby	  explicitly	  excluding	  the	  human	  brain),	  store	  or	  
transmit	  data,	  including	  analogue	  devices	  producing	  an	  output.655	  The	  relevant	  data	  is	  
also	  further	  specified.	  Here,	  the	  focus	  is	  not	  so	  much	  on	  crime	  investigations,	  but	  more	  
on	  legal	  disputes	  in	  general,	  implying	  that	  the	  data	  must	  be	  relevant	  for	  the	  process	  of	  
deciding	  a	  dispute	  between	  different	  parties.	  	  
	  
The	  conclusions	  that	  can	  be	  drawn	  from	  analysing	  existing	  definitions	  of	  digital	  
evidence	  is	  that	  the	  state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	  of	  technology,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  technical	  meaning	  of	  
terms	  used	  is	  of	  high	  relevance	  for	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  definition.	  Equally	  important	  is	  
the	  context	  setting	  to	  which	  the	  definition	  applies.	  	  
It	  also	  highlights	  just	  how	  much	  technical	  progress	  affects	  legal	  concepts	  regulating	  
technologies.	  While	  initially	  computers	  were	  the	  main	  and	  only	  source	  of	  digital	  
evidence,	  this	  changed	  with	  the	  development	  of	  other	  ICTs,	  such	  as	  wearable	  (e.g.	  
smart	  phones)	  and	  even	  implantable	  (brain-­‐computer	  interaction	  chips)	  ICTs.	  	  
Thus	  before	  developing	  a	  working	  definition	  of	  digital	  evidence,	  these	  above	  identified	  
issues	  need	  to	  be	  addressed	  and	  taken	  into	  account.	  	  
As	  analysed	  in	  chapters	  2	  to	  5,	  MIA	  tools	  are	  used	  to	  infiltrate	  a	  variety	  of	  data	  
processing	  and	  storing	  devices.	  However,	  one	  condition	  is	  that	  the	  devices	  are	  
connected	  to	  the	  Internet.	  Without	  an	  Internet	  connection	  the	  infiltration	  is	  impossible.	  
This	  is	  an	  important	  difference	  to	  more	  traditional	  search	  and	  seizure	  procedures	  of	  
digital	  evidence	  conducted	  by	  human	  officers	  (see	  case	  variation	  a	  above).	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  However,	  choosing	  the	  term	  electronic	  evidence.	  
654	  Mason/Schafer,	  note	  648,	  at	  25.	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  Ibid.	  
	   212	  
The	  definition	  should	  be	  a	  guideline	  and	  provide	  a	  common	  understanding	  of	  the	  term	  
for	  those	  parties	  involved	  in	  the	  handling	  of	  digital	  data	  collected	  by	  MIA	  tools.	  The	  
working	  definition	  for	  this	  thesis	  is	  therefore:	  
	  
Digital	  evidence	  is	  data	  stored,	  processed,	  or	  transmitted	  by	  any	  information	  and	  
communication	  (ICT)	  device	  that	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  support	  or	  refute	  a	  theory	  about	  
unlawful	  behaviour	  occurred	  or	  to	  occur	  in	  the	  future.	  
	  
This	  definition	  has	  two	  aspects	  that	  set	  it	  apart	  from	  other	  definitions	  of	  this	  concept,	  
but	  are	  relevant	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  evidence	  is	  collected	  by	  MIA	  tools.	  Firstly,	  the	  use	  
of	  the	  term	  ICT	  instead	  of	  computer	  indicates	  that	  any	  data	  that	  is	  processed,	  stored	  or	  
transmitted	  by	  devices	  that	  can	  be	  connected	  to	  the	  Internet	  is	  included	  in	  this	  
definition.	  This	  takes	  into	  account	  the	  rapid	  advancements	  in	  technology,	  not	  limiting	  
the	  definition	  span	  to	  now	  outdated	  concepts	  of	  computers	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  PC	  or	  
laptop.	  This	  guarantees	  that	  also	  smart	  phones,	  navigation	  systems,	  and	  even	  smart	  
implantable	  microchips	  are	  included	  in	  the	  definition.	  However,	  it	  excludes	  devices	  that	  
are	  not	  connected	  to	  the	  Internet,	  and	  therefore	  cannot	  be	  infiltrated	  by	  MIA	  tools.	  	  
Secondly,	  the	  definition	  restricts	  the	  data	  to	  information	  that	  is	  relevant	  to	  the	  claim	  of	  
a	  party	  that	  a	  breach	  of	  law	  has	  occurred,	  or	  that	  an	  initial	  suspicion	  exists	  that	  this	  will	  
occur	  in	  the	  near	  future.	  Thus,	  the	  data	  needs	  to	  be	  relevant	  to	  the	  claim.	  However,	  as	  
opposed	  to	  the	  two	  early	  and	  Casey’s	  definition	  but	  in	  accordance	  with	  Mason	  and	  
Schafer’s	  interpretation,	  admissibility	  of	  the	  evidence	  is	  not	  a	  decisive	  aspect	  here.	  
Hence	  this	  working	  definition	  tries	  to	  sufficiently	  address	  the	  conclusions	  drawn	  from	  
existing	  definitions	  above.	  
	  
Mason	  and	  Schafer	  make	  an	  important	  statement	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  use	  of	  the	  term	  
data	  that	  is	  also	  of	  relevance	  for	  this	  thesis’	  working	  definition.	  The	  term	  data	  is	  used	  
here	  in	  a	  non-­‐technical	  sense	  meaning	  roughly	  ‘a	  gathered	  body	  of	  facts’.656	  Computer	  
scientists	  often	  distinguish	  between	  ‘data’	  and	  ‘programs’,	  and	  the	  distinction	  is	  indeed	  
constitutive	  for	  the	  definition	  of	  computer.	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  thesis,	  however,	  this	  
distinction	  is	  unhelpful.	  In	  a	  copyright	  case,	  if	  the	  defendant	  has	  allegedly	  installed	  an	  
unauthorised	  operating	  system,	  the	  ‘presence	  of	  the	  system	  on	  the	  computer’	  is	  digital	  
data	  for	  this	  purpose.657	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  Mason/Schafer,	  note	  648,	  at	  25.	  
657	  Mason/Schafer,	  note	  648,	  at	  25.	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Summarising,	  it	  can	  be	  concluded	  that	  no	  one	  widely	  accepted	  definition	  of	  digital	  
evidence	  exists.	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  is	  that	  the	  validity	  of	  such	  a	  definition	  greatly	  
depends	  on	  the	  context,	  and	  the	  state	  of	  the	  art	  of	  technology.	  However,	  the	  existence	  of	  
a	  definition	  applicable	  to	  digital	  evidence	  collected	  by	  MIA	  tools	  is	  relevant	  for	  the	  
common	  understanding	  of	  this	  type	  of	  evidence	  among	  the	  different	  parties	  involved	  in	  
the	  process	  of	  seizing,	  examining,	  analysing,	  and	  assessing	  the	  data.	  Therefore,	  a	  
working	  definition	  of	  digital	  data	  has	  been	  developed	  for	  this	  thesis,	  which	  is	  
sufficiently	  technology	  neutral	  to	  ensure	  it	  remains	  valid	  in	  case	  of	  technological	  
progress.	  The	  analysis	  of	  the	  various	  definitions	  facilitated	  the	  development	  of	  this	  
definition.	  
7.1.2 Characteristics of Digital Evidence 
The	  above	  definition	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  short	  scenarios	  in	  part	  7	  have	  already	  
indicated	  the	  most	  pertinent	  characteristic	  of	  digital	  evidence:	  It	  is	  latent	  to	  the	  human	  
observer,	  unless	  made	  visible	  by	  a	  computer	  process	  or	  program.	  However,	  a	  forensic	  
expert	  is	  required	  to	  find	  and	  evaluate	  all	  “hidden”	  data	  relevant	  to	  the	  investigation.	  
Thus	  the	  virtual	  living	  space	  fundamentally	  differs	  from	  the	  physical	  world,	  in	  which	  
the	  laws	  of	  physics	  uniquely	  render	  objects.	  	  
If	  the	  police	  found	  a	  gun	  with	  an	  alleged	  perpetrator’s	  fingerprints	  on	  it,	  the	  prosecutor	  
could	  argue	  that	  the	  gun	  should	  be	  accepted	  as	  circumstantial	  evidence.	  Because	  
various	  physical	  and	  chemical	  investigations	  are	  possible,	  it	  would	  be	  almost	  pointless	  
for	  the	  defendant	  to	  claim	  that	  the	  object	  is	  not	  a	  gun,	  the	  fingerprints	  belong	  to	  
somebody	  else,	  and	  so	  forth.	  A	  defendant	  could,	  of	  course,	  challenge	  the	  validity	  of	  a	  
specific	  fingerprint	  identification,	  among	  other	  things,	  but	  the	  general	  facts	  are	  
indisputable.	  	  
Digital	  world	  objects	  on	  the	  contrary	  are	  bits	  and	  bitstrings,	  exhibiting	  no	  measurable	  
intrinsic	  physical	  properties	  (weight,	  size,	  age,	  and	  so	  forth).	  Furthermore,	  as	  Oppliger	  
and	  Rytz	  point	  out,	  deciding	  whether	  a	  bitstring	  is	  genuine	  or	  synthetically	  generated	  is	  
difficult.658	  In	  addition,	  digital	  evidence	  stored	  on	  an	  ICT	  device	  cannot	  be	  compared	  to	  
similar	  documentary	  and	  physical	  evidence.	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  R	  Oppliger,	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  Rytz,	  “Digital	  Evidence:	  Dream	  and	  Reality”	  (2003)	  1:5	  IEEE	  Security	  and	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For	  example,	  an	  electronic	  document,	  even	  if	  it	  looks	  remarkably	  like	  a	  traditional	  piece	  
of	  paper	  containing	  handwritten	  information	  on	  a	  screen	  of	  an	  ICT	  device	  is	  nothing	  
like	  the	  physical	  counterpart.	  	  
Mason	  and	  Schafer	  explain	  that	  it	  is	  not	  an	  object	  that	  exists	  somewhere	  on	  the	  device,	  
in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  a	  paper	  document	  is	  filed	  in	  a	  physical	  file.	  Instead,	  the	  digital	  
document	  is	  better	  understood	  as	  a	  process	  by	  which	  otherwise	  unintelligible	  pieces	  of	  
data	  that	  are	  distributed	  over	  the	  storage	  medium	  are	  assembled,	  processed	  and	  
rendered	  legible	  for	  a	  human	  user.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  document	  is	  nowhere;	  it	  does	  not	  
exist	  independently	  from	  the	  process	  that	  recreates	  it	  every	  time	  a	  user	  opens	  it	  on	  
screen.659	  	  
This	  means	  that	  digital	  evidence	  is	  generally	  an	  abstraction	  of	  some	  event	  or	  digital	  
object.	  When	  a	  person	  instructs	  a	  computer	  to	  perform	  a	  task	  such	  as	  compiling	  a	  
document,	  the	  resulting	  activities	  generate	  data	  remnants	  that	  give	  only	  a	  partial	  view	  
of	  what	  occurred.660	  Thus	  the	  human	  user	  never	  sees	  the	  actual	  data	  but	  only	  a	  
representation,	  and	  each	  layer	  of	  abstraction	  can	  introduce	  errors.661	  
Hence,	  digital	  data	  is	  a	  messy	  and	  slippery	  form	  of	  evidence	  that	  can	  be	  very	  difficult	  to	  
handle.	  For	  instance,	  a	  hard	  drive	  platter	  contains	  a	  messy	  amalgam	  of	  data	  –	  pieces	  of	  
information	  mixed	  together	  and	  layered	  on	  top	  of	  each	  other	  over	  time.	  662	  Only	  a	  small	  
portion	  of	  this	  amalgam	  might	  be	  relevant	  to	  a	  case,	  making	  it	  necessary	  to	  extract	  
useful	  pieces,	  fit	  them	  together,	  and	  translate	  them	  into	  a	  form	  that	  can	  be	  interpreted	  
by	  a	  human.663	  	  
In	  addition,	  unlike	  documentary	  and	  physical	  evidence	  encountered	  during	  
investigations,	  digital	  evidence	  can	  be	  very	  fragile.	  Its	  very	  existence	  may	  not	  be	  
obvious	  until	  an	  expert	  has	  further	  examined	  the	  hardware	  containing	  the	  digital	  data.	  	  	  
However,	  it	  also	  means	  that	  digital	  evidence,	  by	  its	  fragile	  nature	  can	  easily	  be	  
disrupted,	  changed	  or	  replaced.664	  Physical	  and	  documentary	  evidence	  tends	  to	  obey	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  Mason/Schafer,	  note	  648,	  at	  28.	  
660	  D	  Farmer,	  W	  Venema,	  “Forensic	  Computing	  Analysis:	  An	  Introduction”	  (2000)	  Dr.Dobb’s,	  
available	  online	  at:	  
http://www.drdobbs.com/184404242;jsessionid=UUDPHDMG32RETQE1GHPSKH4ATMY32JV
N.	  
661	  B	  Carrier,	  “Defining	  Digital	  Forensic	  Examination	  and	  Analysis	  Tool	  Using	  Abstraction	  
Layers”	  (2003)	  1:4	  International	  Journal	  of	  Digital	  Evidence,	  4.	  
662	  Casey,	  note	  637,	  at	  25.	  
663	  Ibid.	  
664	  Uzunay/Incebacak/Bicakci,	  note	  515,	  at	  105.	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the	  “Dead	  Body	  Theorem”,	  meaning,	  “it	  is	  not	  going	  anywhere”.665	  Digital	  evidence	  can	  
be	  altered	  maliciously	  by	  offenders	  or	  accidentally	  during	  collection	  without	  leaving	  
any	  obvious	  signs	  of	  distortion.	  	  
It	  can,	  for	  example,	  be	  tainted	  or	  destroyed	  by	  performing	  a	  simple	  action	  like	  turning	  
off	  the	  power	  of	  the	  ICT	  device.	  In	  addition,	  the	  exact	  same	  data	  can	  easily	  be	  recreated	  
by	  any	  person	  who	  has	  access	  to	  the	  ICT	  device.666	  If	  the	  ICT	  device	  is	  connected	  to	  a	  
network	  (such	  as	  the	  Internet	  or	  an	  Intranet),	  data	  can	  maliciously	  be	  tainted	  or	  
deleted	  if	  the	  ICT	  device	  is	  accessed	  through	  another	  device	  connected	  to	  the	  same	  
network.	  	  
However,	  digital	  evidence	  possesses	  several	  features	  that	  mitigate	  the	  problem	  of	  its	  
fragility.	  The	  fact	  that	  digital	  evidence	  can	  be	  duplicated	  exactly	  means	  that	  a	  copy	  can	  
be	  examined	  as	  if	  it	  was	  the	  original,	  therefore	  avoiding	  the	  risk	  of	  damaging	  the	  
original.667	  Furthermore,	  with	  the	  right	  tools	  it	  is	  relatively	  easy	  to	  determine	  whether	  
digital	  evidence	  has	  been	  modified	  or	  tampered	  with	  by	  comparing	  it	  with	  an	  original	  
copy.668	  In	  addition,	  digital	  evidence	  is	  difficult	  to	  destroy.	  Even	  when	  a	  file	  is	  deleted,	  
or	  a	  hard	  drive	  is	  formatted,	  digital	  evidence	  can	  be	  recovered.669	  Moreover,	  when	  
suspects	  attempt	  to	  destroy	  digital	  evidence,	  copies	  and	  associated	  remnants	  can	  
remain	  in	  places	  that	  they	  were	  not	  aware	  of.670	  
However,	  these	  advantages	  do	  not	  always	  apply	  to	  digital	  evidence	  seized	  using	  MIA	  
tools.	  The	  reason	  is	  that	  MIA	  tools	  seize	  evidence	  from	  ICT	  tools	  and	  live	  networks	  
without	  confiscating	  the	  tool	  itself.	  Hence,	  the	  suspect	  continues	  to	  use	  the	  ICT	  tool	  and	  
therefore	  modifies	  the	  data	  and	  the	  system	  itself,	  and	  thus	  no	  possibility	  exists	  to	  create	  
a	  duplicate	  of	  the	  seized	  data.	  This	  means,	  no	  later	  comparison	  of	  the	  copied	  data	  with	  
the	  original	  is	  possible	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  data	  has	  been	  modified	  or	  tampered	  
with.	  	  
Another	  problem	  during	  investigations	  of	  the	  virtual	  living	  space	  is	  that	  digital	  
evidence	  can	  exist	  in	  large	  volumes,	  as	  opposed	  to	  physical	  evidence.	  Data	  storage	  
needs	  and	  data	  storage	  capacities	  are	  ever	  increasing.	  Last	  century,	  it	  was	  common	  to	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  J	  Kornblum,	  “Preservation	  of	  Fragile	  Digital	  Evidence	  by	  First	  Responders”	  (2002)	  Digital	  
Forensics	  Research	  Workshop,	  1,	  available	  online	  at:	  
http://dfrws.org/2002/papers/Papers/Jesse_Kornblum.pdf.	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  Uzunay/Incebacak/Bicakci,	  note	  515,	  at	  106.	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acquire	  hard	  disks	  in	  700	  MB	  image	  segments	  in	  order	  to	  burn	  an	  entire	  image	  to	  a	  
handful	  of	  CD-­‐ROMs.	  Now,	  “small”	  cases	  often	  involve	  several	  hundred	  gigabytes	  of	  
data,	  and	  multi-­‐terabyte	  corporate	  cases	  are	  commonplace.	  In	  2007,	  for	  example,	  the	  
size	  of	  Wal-­‐Mart’s	  data	  warehouse	  exceeded	  the	  petabyte	  mark.671	  	  
In	  addition,	  the	  advent	  of	  computer	  networks,	  the	  most	  well	  known	  of	  which	  is	  the	  
Internet,	  has	  also	  contributed	  to	  the	  increase	  of	  data	  potentially	  relevant	  for	  
investigations.	  Networked	  ICTs	  enable	  users	  to	  create	  and	  transmit	  large	  volumes	  of	  
data,	  a	  phenomenon	  described	  as	  networked	  communication.672	  For	  example,	  one	  
word-­‐processing	  document	  can	  be	  sent	  to	  any	  number	  of	  people	  across	  the	  globe.	  If	  the	  
creator	  of	  the	  document	  sends	  the	  file	  to	  20	  people,	  the	  number	  of	  copies	  will	  far	  
exceed	  20	  when	  each	  person	  copies	  the	  file	  to	  another	  drive	  on	  their	  computer,	  and	  the	  
organisation	  backs	  up	  the	  email	  database	  each	  day,	  then	  backs	  up	  the	  main	  database	  
each	  week,	  and	  copies	  are	  burnt	  on	  to	  CD-­‐ROMs	  or	  copied	  on	  to	  external	  storage	  
devices.673	  As	  a	  result	  of	  this,	  investigators	  are	  faced	  with	  large	  volumes	  of	  data	  that	  
need	  to	  be	  identified	  to	  obtain	  relevant	  documents	  pertaining	  to	  the	  investigation	  of	  a	  
suspect.	  	  
	  
The	  above	  analysis	  of	  the	  most	  pertinent	  characteristics	  of	  digital	  evidence	  has	  shown	  
that	  this	  type	  of	  evidence	  fundamentally	  differs	  from	  traditional	  documentary	  and	  
physical	  evidence,	  and	  therefore	  challenges	  existing	  legislation	  regulating	  the	  seizing	  
and	  use	  of	  evidence	  during	  criminal	  investigations.	  However,	  the	  question	  arises	  
whether	  digital	  evidence	  and	  its	  characteristics	  and	  challenges	  for	  the	  law	  and	  law	  
enforcement	  are	  unique,	  and	  therefore	  unprecedented.	  
7.1.3 Digital Evidence – An Entirely New Challenge? 
The	  previous	  sections	  have	  shown	  that	  digital	  evidence	  is	  a	  distinctive	  new	  class	  of	  
evidence	  that	  differs	  significantly	  from	  traditional	  evidence	  types	  that	  are	  commonly	  
seized	  and	  used	  during	  criminal	  investigations.	  The	  conclusion	  appears	  to	  be	  that	  
digital	  evidence	  is	  unlike	  any	  other	  existing	  evidence	  type,	  and	  therefore	  requires	  
entirely	  new	  procedures	  and	  legislation	  regulating	  its	  seizure	  and	  use.	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  M	  Hayes	  Weier,	  “Hewlett-­‐Packard	  Data	  Warehouse	  Lands	  In	  Wal-­‐Mart’s	  Shopping	  Cart”	  
InformationWeek,	  4	  August	  2007,	  available	  online	  at:	  
http://www.informationweek.com/news/storage/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=201203024.	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  Mason/Schafer,	  note	  648,	  at	  31.	  
673	  Ibid.	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Legal	  professionals	  expressed	  this	  opinion	  and	  supported	  this	  theory,	  particularly	  
when	  digital	  evidence	  first	  gained	  relevance	  for	  investigations	  and	  court	  proceedings.	  
General	  apprehension	  towards	  digital	  evidence	  by	  legal	  practitioners	  was	  uniformly	  
found	  across	  jurisdictions.674	  
	  
However,	  science	  has	  provided	  a	  foundation	  for	  legal	  proceedings	  for	  more	  than	  100	  
years.675	  During	  this	  time,	  the	  science	  practiced	  in	  the	  legal	  system	  has	  differed	  from	  
traditional	  scientific	  endeavours	  in	  its	  form	  and	  application,	  though	  not	  in	  its	  
content.676	  While	  traditional	  science	  deploys	  the	  “scientific	  method”	  to	  drive	  methods	  
of	  proof,	  the	  legal	  system	  has	  demanded	  additional	  approaches	  to	  ensure	  the	  reliability	  
of	  evidence,	  the	  scientific	  methods	  applied	  and	  the	  resulting	  testimony.	  These	  
requirements	  are	  the	  result	  of	  judicial	  decisions	  rather	  than	  scientific	  research	  and	  
discourse.677	  	  
Thus	  the	  question	  arises	  whether	  this	  confluence	  and	  convergence	  of	  disciplines	  
(which	  resulted	  in	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  domain	  that	  is	  commonly	  referred	  to	  as	  
forensic	  science)678	  has	  resulted	  in	  general	  principles	  and	  procedures	  applicable	  to	  the	  
handling	  of	  digital	  evidence.	  	  
	  
Kirk	  finds	  that	  “with	  all	  the	  progress	  that	  has	  been	  made	  in	  the	  field	  of	  forensic	  science,	  
on	  a	  wide	  front,	  careful	  examination	  shows	  that	  for	  the	  most	  part,	  progress	  has	  been	  
technical	  rather	  than	  fundamental,	  practical	  rather	  than	  theoretical,	  transient	  rather	  
than	  permanent.”679	  He	  states	  further	  “many	  persons	  can	  identify	  the	  particular	  
weapon	  that	  fired	  a	  bullet,	  but	  few	  if	  any	  can	  state	  a	  single	  fundamental	  principle	  of	  
identification	  of	  firearms.	  Document	  examiners	  constantly	  identify	  handwriting,	  but	  a	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  Ibid,	  at	  23.	  
675	  The	  introduction	  of	  DNA	  evidence,	  for	  example,	  was	  also	  met	  with	  great	  skepticism,	  
however,	  scientific	  results	  and	  principles	  influenced	  the	  law	  and	  enabled	  the	  use	  of	  DNA	  
evidence	  in	  court	  proceedings.	  
676	  M	  Pollitt,	  “Applying	  Traditional	  Forensic	  Taxonomy	  to	  Digital	  Forensics”	  in	  I	  Ray,	  S	  Shenoi	  
(eds)IFIP	  International	  Federation	  for	  Information	  Processing,	  Volume	  285;	  Advances	  in	  Digital	  
Forensics	  IV	  (Boston:	  Springer,	  2008)	  17-­‐26,	  18.	  
677	  C	  H	  Welch,	  “Flexible	  Standards,	  Deferential	  Review:	  Daubert’s	  Legacy	  of	  Confusion”	  (2006)	  
29:3	  Harvard	  Journal	  of	  Law	  and	  Public	  Policy,	  1085.	  
678	  Forensic	  Science	  can	  be	  referred	  to	  as	  “the	  application	  of	  a	  broad	  spectrum	  of	  sciences	  to	  
answer	  questions	  of	  interest	  to	  a	  legal	  system	  that	  may	  be	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  crime	  or	  a	  civil	  action;	  
A	  Pushpalatha,	  B	  Mukunthan,	  “Automation	  of	  DNA	  Finger	  Printing	  for	  Precise	  Pattern	  
Identification	  using	  Neural-­‐fuzzy	  Mapping	  Approach”	  (2011)	  13:3	  International	  Journal	  of	  
Computer	  Applications,	  16,	  17.	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  P	  L	  Kirk,	  “The	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  of	  Criminalistics”	  (1963)	  54:2	  The	  Journal	  of	  Criminal	  Law,	  
Criminology,	  and	  Political	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  235-­‐238,	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class	  of	  beginners	  studying	  under	  these	  same	  persons,	  would	  find	  it	  difficult	  indeed	  to	  
distinguish	  the	  basic	  principles	  used.	  In	  short,	  there	  exists	  in	  the	  field	  of	  criminalistics	  a	  
serious	  deficiency	  in	  basic	  theory	  and	  principles,	  as	  contrasted	  with	  the	  large	  
assortment	  of	  effective	  technical	  procedures.”680	  	  
However,	  having	  identified	  the	  lack	  of	  comprehensive	  fundamental	  principles	  in	  
forensic	  science,	  Kirk	  fails	  to	  develop	  a	  set	  of	  these	  in	  his	  work.	  This	  does	  not,	  however,	  
render	  the	  importance	  of	  his	  ascertainment.	  	  
Following	  Kirk’s	  criticism	  (though	  not	  necessarily	  as	  a	  direct	  result	  of	  this),	  a	  
theoretical	  framework	  defining	  fundamental	  concepts	  for	  the	  application	  of	  scientific	  
knowledge	  to	  the	  legal	  forensic	  domain	  has	  evolved.	  These	  concepts	  are	  pillars	  guiding	  
the	  forensic	  analysis	  in	  a	  logical	  progression,	  starting	  with	  understanding	  the	  origin	  of	  
evidence,	  culminating	  in	  a	  statement	  of	  the	  significance	  of	  an	  analytical	  result.681	  As	  the	  
most	  important	  concepts	  for	  the	  work	  of	  traditional	  forensic	  practitioners	  can	  be	  
identified	  two	  principles	  and	  four	  processes:682	  
	  
1. Divisibility	  of	  Matter:	  	  This	  principle	  refers	  to	  the	  ability	  to	  impute	  
characteristics	  to	  the	  whole	  from	  a	  separated	  piece.683	  It	  is	  built	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  
matter	  must	  divide	  before	  it	  can	  be	  transferred.684	  Inman	  and	  Rudin	  explain	  this	  
further	  stating	  that	  “matter	  divides	  into	  smaller	  component	  parts	  when	  
sufficient	  force	  is	  applied.	  The	  component	  parts	  will	  acquire	  characteristics	  
created	  by	  the	  process	  of	  division	  itself	  and	  retain	  physico-­‐chemical	  properties	  
of	  the	  larger	  piece.”685 
 
2. Transfer:	  This	  principle	  is	  derived	  from	  Locard’s	  exchange	  principle,	  which	  
states,	  “with	  contact	  between	  two	  items,	  there	  will	  be	  an	  exchange	  of	  
material.”686	  Locard	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  the	  pioneer	  of	  modern	  forensic	  
science,687	  and	  while	  his	  exchange	  principle	  may	  appear	  obvious	  in	  
retrospective,	  it	  is	  the	  fundament	  of	  the	  existing	  corpus	  of	  forensic	  scientific	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  K	  Inman,	  N	  Rudin,	  “The	  Origin	  of	  Evidence”	  (2002)	  126	  Forensic	  Science	  International,	  11.	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  Pollitt,	  note	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  at	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  at	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  Ibid.	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  Paris,	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knowledge.	  Such	  exchanges	  can	  include	  for	  example	  fingerprints	  and	  footprints,	  
hair,	  fibres	  of	  clothes,	  scratches,	  wounds,	  or	  oil	  stains.	  These	  examples	  show	  
that	  transfer	  should	  not	  only	  be	  reduced	  to	  transfer	  on	  a	  microscopic	  scale.688	  
	  
3. Identification:	  This	  process	  refers	  to	  the	  categorisation	  of	  evidence	  into	  a	  class.	  
Saferstein,	  who	  can	  be	  credited	  with	  defining	  this	  principle,	  refers	  to	  it	  as	  “the	  
physiochemical	  nature	  of	  the	  evidence.”689	  Inman	  and	  Rudin	  note	  that	  being	  
able	  to	  accurately	  describe	  an	  item	  or	  its	  composition	  may	  be	  sufficient	  for	  a	  
given	  forensic	  purpose.	  For	  example,	  when	  the	  mere	  presence	  of	  illicit	  drugs	  is	  
an	  important	  element	  of	  a	  crime	  being	  investigated,	  the	  identification	  of	  a	  white	  
powder	  as	  containing	  cocaine,	  dextrose	  and	  talc	  may	  be	  all	  that	  is	  required.690	   
 
4. Individualisation:	  This	  process	  is	  based	  on	  the	  physical	  and	  logical	  paradigm	  
that	  any	  individual	  object	  is	  unique.	  Its	  aim	  is	  to	  uniquely	  identify	  a	  specimen	  
using	  a	  set	  of	  characteristics.691	  This	  process	  answers	  the	  questions:	  “which	  one	  
is	  it?”	  or	  “whose	  is	  it?”	  depending	  on	  whether	  the	  item	  is	  animate	  or	  inanimate	  
by	  inferring	  a	  common	  source	  or	  origin.692	  The	  notion	  can	  be	  clarified	  using	  an	  
example.	  A	  video	  surveillance	  camera	  captures	  the	  shooting	  death	  of	  a	  victim.	  
The	  perpetrator	  cannot	  be	  identified	  from	  the	  video,	  but	  the	  image	  is	  clear	  
enough	  to	  identify	  the	  type	  of	  firearm.	  A	  bullet	  is	  recovered	  from	  the	  victim	  and	  
submitted	  for	  examination.	  Based	  on	  the	  bullet’s	  weight	  and	  composition,	  and	  
the	  size	  and	  twist	  of	  the	  rifling	  marks,	  the	  examiner	  may	  be	  able	  to	  identify	  an	  
ammunition	  manufacturer,	  the	  caliber	  of	  the	  weapon	  and,	  potentially,	  its	  
manufacturer.	  These	  are	  all	  class	  characteristics,	  which,	  on	  their	  own,	  do	  not	  
link	  the	  suspect	  to	  the	  weapon	  or	  the	  weapon	  to	  the	  bullet.	  After	  a	  suspect	  is	  
identified,	  a	  search	  reveals	  a	  box	  of	  unused	  ammunition	  and	  a	  weapon	  
consistent	  with	  the	  one	  in	  the	  surveillance	  video.	  The	  characteristics	  of	  the	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  Springer,	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  at	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seized	  ammunition	  are	  identical	  to	  the	  bullet	  obtained	  from	  the	  victim.	  As	  a	  
result,	  it	  can	  be	  determined	  that	  the	  bullets	  have	  a	  common	  origin	  and	  are	  
therefore	  “class	  evidence.”	  The	  recovered	  weapon	  is	  test-­‐fired	  and	  the	  resulting	  
bullet	  and	  the	  bullet	  recovered	  from	  the	  victim	  are	  microscopically	  examined.	  
Matching	  the	  micro-­‐striations	  on	  the	  bullets	  allows	  the	  examiner	  to	  identify	  the	  
two	  bullets	  as	  coming	  from	  the	  recovered	  weapon,	  to	  the	  exclusion	  of	  all	  others.	  
This	  is	  the	  process	  of	  identification,	  which	  yields	  what	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  
“individual	  evidence.”	  
	  
5. Association:	  This	  process	  refers	  to	  the	  linking	  of	  a	  person	  with	  a	  crime	  scene.	  It	  
can	  be	  defined	  as	  “an	  inference	  of	  contact	  between	  the	  source	  of	  the	  evidence	  
and	  a	  target”.693	  Such	  an	  inference	  is	  based	  on	  the	  detection	  of	  transferred	  
evidence.	  The	  source	  and	  the	  target	  are	  relative	  operational	  definitions	  defined	  
by	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  case;	  if	  transfer	  is	  detected	  in	  both	  directions,	  for	  
instance,	  each	  item	  is	  both	  a	  source	  and	  a	  target	  of	  evidence.	  An	  example	  can,	  
again,	  clarify	  the	  notion.	  Consider	  a	  fiber	  collected	  from	  the	  body	  of	  a	  deceased	  
individual.	  The	  evidence	  fiber	  from	  the	  body	  and	  the	  reference	  fibers	  from	  the	  
van	  carpet	  are	  found	  to	  be	  the	  same	  type	  and	  to	  contain	  indistinguishable	  dye	  
components.	  These	  physico-­‐chemical	  similarities	  are	  expected	  if	  the	  van	  carpet	  
is	  the	  source	  of	  the	  evidence	  fiber,	  if	  the	  fiber	  was	  transferred	  during	  the	  crime,	  
and	  if	  it	  persisted	  on	  the	  body	  until	  collected.	  Next,	  an	  evaluation	  is	  made	  of	  all	  
other	  possible	  sources	  of	  fibers	  indistinguishable	  from	  the	  evidence	  fiber,	  
including	  all	  carpets	  made	  from	  such	  fibers	  and	  any	  other	  items	  manufactured	  
from	  indistinguishable	  fibers.	  From	  this	  information,	  the	  probability	  of	  finding	  
the	  fiber	  on	  the	  deceased	  if	  it	  derived	  from	  some	  other	  source	  can	  be	  estimated.	  
	  
6. Reconstruction:	  This	  process	  refers	  to	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  sequence	  of	  past	  
events.694	  This	  principle	  attempts	  to	  answer	  the	  questions:	  “where,	  how,	  and	  
when”.	  It	  can	  also	  be	  referred	  to	  as	  “the	  ordering	  of	  associations	  in	  space	  and	  
time.”695	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  Inman/Rudin	  (2002),	  note	  681,	  at	  15.	  
694	  P	  DeForest,	  R	  Gaensslen,	  H	  Lee,	  see	  note	  691,	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  8.	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This	  framework	  of	  principles	  and	  processes	  has	  evolved	  as	  the	  underlying	  paradigm	  of	  
forensic	  science.	  It	  is	  the	  guideline	  for	  forensic	  examinations,	  and	  has	  stood	  the	  tests	  of	  
time	  and	  the	  courts.	  It	  facilitates	  the	  formulation	  of	  an	  accepted	  practice	  that	  adds	  to	  
the	  efficiency,	  effectiveness	  and	  reliability	  of	  the	  practitioner’s	  work.	  Figure	  1	  is	  a	  
pictorial	  representation	  of	  this	  framework,	  which	  serves	  to	  better	  illustrate	  the	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This	  figure	  illustrates	  that	  the	  two	  principles	  (divisibility	  of	  matter	  and	  transfer)	  
generate	  the	  evidence,	  and	  are	  the	  two	  fundamental	  principles	  upon	  which	  the	  forensic	  
analysis	  of	  physical	  evidence	  is	  based.	  The	  processes	  (identification,	  individualisation,	  
association,	  and	  reconstruction)	  serve	  to	  reconstruct	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  evidence	  and	  the	  
event	  that	  led	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  evidence,	  and	  therefore	  form	  the	  infrastructure	  for	  
the	  practice	  of	  forensic	  science.	  
The	  question	  is	  now,	  whether	  this	  fundamental	  paradigm	  of	  forensic	  science	  developed	  
for	  the	  handling	  of	  physical	  evidence	  is	  applicable	  (if	  only	  in	  parts)	  to	  digital	  evidence.	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Looking	  at	  Figure	  1	  above,	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  see	  how	  the	  two	  principles	  divisibility	  of	  matter	  
and	  transfer	  underlie	  many	  of	  the	  biological,	  physical	  and	  chemical	  examinations	  
conducted	  by	  traditional	  forensic	  scientist.	  However,	  it	  is	  questionable	  whether	  this	  
also	  applies	  to	  the	  handling	  of	  digital	  evidence,	  which	  differs	  significantly	  from	  
traditional	  evidence	  as	  discussed	  above	  in	  section	  7.1.1	  and	  7.1.2.	  	  However,	  as	  shown	  
above,	  one	  characteristic	  of	  digital	  evidence	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  can	  be	  duplicated	  
easily.696	  	  Thus	  digital	  evidence	  exhibits	  divisibility	  of	  matter	  when	  duplicates	  are	  
created.	  This	  is	  the	  case	  because	  electronic	  duplicates	  are	  representatives	  of	  the	  
original	  evidentiary	  items.	  The	  content	  of	  an	  electronic	  document	  is	  identical	  with	  the	  
original	  content,697	  however,	  in	  the	  process	  of	  duplicating	  the	  original,	  the	  new	  
document	  acquires	  its	  own	  characteristics.	  The	  force	  required	  for	  the	  division	  of	  
physical	  evidence,698	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  act	  of	  instructing	  the	  ICT	  device	  to	  produce	  the	  
duplicate,	  and	  the	  execution	  of	  this	  order	  by	  the	  tool.	  	  
	  
Transference	  can	  be	  detected	  in	  digital	  evidence	  in	  its	  interactions.	  As	  analysed	  in	  
section	  7.1.2,	  digital	  evidence	  is	  fragile,	  and	  easily	  modified.699	  Any	  modification,	  even	  
the	  turning	  on	  of	  the	  ICT	  device,	  can	  modify	  data,	  and	  therefore	  digital	  evidence.	  Any	  
new	  application	  or	  process	  will	  leave	  a	  digital	  fingerprint	  behind.	  
	  
Thus	  the	  two	  principles	  of	  divisibility	  of	  matter	  and	  transfer	  can	  also	  be	  applied	  to	  
digital	  evidence.	  However,	  as	  Pollitt	  remarks,	  these	  principles	  do	  not	  have	  a	  great	  deal	  
to	  offer	  in	  terms	  of	  developing	  guidelines	  for	  the	  examination	  process	  of	  digital	  
evidence.700	  This	  is	  also	  highlighted	  by	  Figure	  1	  above,	  which	  shows	  that	  the	  two	  
principles	  are	  relevant	  for	  the	  generation	  of	  the	  evidence,	  not,	  however,	  for	  the	  
examination	  process.	  The	  examination	  process	  is	  of	  high	  relevance	  for	  the	  question	  of	  
reliability	  of	  evidence,	  and	  the	  applicability	  of	  existing	  paradigms	  to	  digital	  evidence	  
therefore	  potentially	  valuable	  for	  the	  handling	  of	  this	  new	  type	  of	  evidence.	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  See	  p.	  216.	  
697	  See	  p.	  216.	  
698	  Inman/Rudin	  (2002)	  note	  681,	  at	  12.	  
699	  See	  p.	  217.	  
700	  Pollitt,	  note	  676,	  at	  20.	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The	  process	  of	  identification	  is	  of	  equal	  importance	  for	  digital	  evidence	  handling	  as	  it	  is	  
for	  documentary	  and	  physical.	  However,	  here	  it	  is	  a	  two-­‐fold	  process.701	  First	  the	  
hardware	  (for	  example,	  computers,	  PDA,	  memory	  stick,	  network	  cable)	  that	  contains	  
digital	  evidence	  needs	  to	  be	  recognised.	  Second,	  digital	  data	  stored	  on	  the	  hardware,	  
and	  the	  distinction	  between	  irrelevant	  data	  and	  information	  linked	  to	  the	  investigation	  
needs	  to	  be	  recognised	  and	  distinguished.	  In	  traditional	  forensic	  science,	  the	  
identification	  process	  leads	  to	  the	  classification	  of	  the	  evidence	  into	  classes.	  As	  Pollitt	  
states,	  in	  the	  discipline	  of	  digital	  forensics,	  the	  identification	  process	  helps	  describe	  and	  
class	  digital	  evidence	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  context	  –	  physically	  (a	  particular	  brand	  of	  hard	  
drive),	  structurally	  (the	  number	  of	  cylinders,	  heads	  and	  sectors),	  logically	  (a	  FAT32	  
partition),	  location	  (directory	  and	  file)	  or	  content	  (a	  memo,	  spreadsheet,	  email	  or	  
photograph).702	  The	  presence	  of	  metadata	  or	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  particular	  letter	  (not	  
necessarily	  their	  content)	  may	  be	  probative	  in	  an	  investigation.	  The	  process	  of	  
identification	  involves	  classifying	  digital	  objects	  based	  on	  similar	  characteristics,	  called	  
class	  characteristics.703	  	  
For	  example,	  there	  are	  different	  types	  of	  graphic	  files	  (e.g.	  JPEG,	  GIF,	  TIFF)	  making	  it	  
possible	  to	  be	  specific	  when	  classifying	  them.	  Such	  class	  characteristics	  are	  useful	  for	  
locating	  fragments	  of	  digital	  objects	  on	  a	  disk.	  For	  instance,	  searching	  an	  entire	  hard	  
drive	  for	  all	  occurrences	  of	  class	  characteristics	  like	  “JFIF”	  is	  a	  more	  thorough	  way	  to	  
search	  for	  JPEG	  images	  than	  simply	  looking	  at	  the	  file	  system	  level	  for	  files	  with	  a	  “.jpg”	  
file	  extension.	  In	  addition	  to	  finding	  fragments	  of	  deleted	  images	  in	  unallocated	  space,	  
searching	  for	  class	  characteristics	  will	  identify	  JPEG	  files	  that	  have	  been	  renamed	  with	  
a	  “.doc”	  extension	  to	  hide	  them	  from	  forensic	  examiners.	  Evaluating	  the	  source	  of	  a	  
piece	  of	  digital	  evidence	  essentially	  means	  to	  compare	  items	  to	  determine	  if	  they	  are	  
the	  same	  as	  each	  other	  or	  if	  they	  came	  from	  the	  same	  source.704	  The	  aim	  in	  this	  process	  
is	  to	  compare	  the	  items,	  characteristic	  by	  characteristic,	  until	  the	  examiner	  is	  satisfied	  
that	  they	  are	  sufficiently	  alike	  to	  conclude	  that	  they	  are	  related	  to	  one	  another.	  
Constellations	  of	  similar	  characteristics	  are	  relevant	  in	  evaluating	  the	  relationships	  
between	  digital	  evidence	  and	  its	  source.	  The	  more	  characteristics	  an	  item	  and	  potential	  
source	  have	  in	  common,	  the	  more	  likely	  it	  is	  that	  they	  are	  related.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
701	  Casey,	  note	  637,	  at	  468.	  
702	  Pollitt,	  note	  676,	  at	  20.	  
703	  Casey,	  note	  637,	  at	  488.	  
704	  Casey,	  note	  637,	  at	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The	  relevance	  of	  the	  process	  of	  individualisation	  for	  digital	  evidence	  is	  relatively	  
apparent.	  File	  systems,	  partitions	  and	  individual	  files	  have	  characteristics	  that	  uniquely	  
set	  them	  apart	  from	  others.	  Thus	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  significant	  difference	  is	  important	  
because	  it	  can	  be	  just	  such	  a	  difference	  that	  distinguishes	  an	  object	  from	  all	  other	  
similar	  objects,	  that	  is,	  it	  may	  be	  an	  individual	  characteristic.705	  Although	  such	  
characteristics	  are	  rarer	  than	  class	  characteristics,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  keep	  in	  mind	  that	  
digital	  evidence	  may	  contain	  unique	  characteristics	  that	  individualise	  it,	  that	  is,	  link	  it	  
to	  a	  particular	  source	  with	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  probability.	  An	  example	  is	  a	  Microsoft	  Word	  
file,	  which	  has	  a	  well-­‐documented	  internal	  structure.	  It	  would	  be	  accurate	  to	  describe	  
the	  origin	  of	  such	  a	  file	  as	  being	  produced	  by	  Microsoft	  Word.	  All	  of	  these	  are	  class	  
characteristics.	  Conversely,	  a	  file	  may	  be	  positively	  identified	  based	  on	  its	  mathematical	  
signature	  (i.e.	  hash	  value),	  which	  corresponds	  to	  the	  process	  of	  identification.	  	  
	  
	  The	  process	  of	  association	  is	  slightly	  more	  abstract	  in	  digital	  forensics,	  albeit	  relevant.	  
The	  physical	  transfer	  of	  evidence	  is	  uncommon	  in	  digital	  evidence	  cases.	  In	  digital	  
forensics,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  identify	  the	  items	  (files,	  data	  structures	  and	  code)	  that	  need	  
to	  be	  associated	  and	  to	  determine	  where	  they	  might	  be	  located	  and	  the	  tools	  that	  could	  
be	  used	  to	  locate	  the	  items.706	  	  
	  
The	  process	  of	  reconstruction	  however,	  is	  more	  common	  and	  easier	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
digital	  evidence	  than	  physical	  evidence.	  Digital	  evidence	  is	  a	  rich	  and	  often	  unexplored	  
source	  of	  information	  because	  of	  the	  dates	  and	  times	  stamped	  on	  metadata	  pertaining	  
to	  data,	  files,	  file	  systems	  and	  network	  communications.	  It	  can	  establish	  action,	  
position,	  origin,	  association,	  function,	  sequence	  and	  more,	  enabling	  an	  investigator	  to	  
create	  an	  incredibly	  detailed	  picture	  of	  events	  surrounding	  the	  crime.	  	  
	  
The	  above	  analysis	  of	  the	  forensic	  science	  paradigm	  has	  highlighted,	  that	  scientific	  
research	  has	  greatly	  impacted	  and	  influenced	  the	  legal	  concept	  of	  evidence.	  The	  
evolvement	  of	  forensic	  science	  has	  allowed	  for	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  principles	  
underlying	  physical	  evidence,	  and	  therefore	  enabled	  the	  development	  of	  generally	  
accepted	  guidelines	  for	  the	  adequate	  and	  proper	  examination	  of	  evidence.	  This	  has	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  note	  637,	  at	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  676,	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facilitated	  the	  efficiency,	  effectiveness	  and	  reliability	  of	  legal	  forensic	  examiner’s	  
work.707	  	  
The	  analysis	  of	  the	  application	  of	  the	  existing	  forensic	  paradigm	  to	  digital	  evidence	  has	  
shown,	  that	  digital	  evidence,	  despite	  its	  unique	  characteristics	  identified	  in	  section	  
7.1.2,	  can	  be	  subsumed	  under	  the	  existing	  forensic	  science	  principles	  and	  processes.	  
One	  important	  lesson	  can	  be	  drawn	  from	  this	  finding:	  from	  a	  scientific	  perspective,	  
digital	  evidence	  shares	  fundamental	  features	  with	  traditional	  types	  of	  evidence.	  	  
	  
This	  finding	  is	  of	  importance	  for	  the	  following	  analysis	  of	  the	  conceptual	  problems	  
digital	  evidence	  generates	  for	  the	  law.	  The	  reliability	  of	  digital	  evidence,	  and	  therefore	  
admissibility	  of	  this	  evidence	  for	  court	  proceedings	  has	  been	  questioned	  by	  legal	  
professionals	  from	  the	  time	  of	  the	  introduction	  of	  this	  new	  evidence	  class.708	  However,	  
the	  fact	  that	  traditional	  forensic	  science	  has	  developed	  an	  effective	  and	  relatively	  
efficient	  process	  for	  the	  proper	  examination	  of	  evidence	  that	  has	  stood	  the	  tests	  of	  time	  
and	  the	  courts,709	  which	  is	  applicable	  to	  digital	  evidence,	  means	  that	  scientific	  findings	  
can	  be	  used	  to	  overcome	  legal	  insecurities	  and	  problems.	  	  
7.2 Use As Evidence 
The	  above	  analysis	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  digital	  evidence	  has	  shown	  that	  fundamental	  
differences	  between	  physical	  and	  digital	  evidence	  exist.	  As	  shown,	  these	  problems	  have	  
led	  to	  scepticism	  about	  digital	  evidence	  among	  legal	  practitioners.	  This	  was	  also	  
highlighted	  by	  the	  empirical	  research	  conducted	  for	  the	  European	  projects.710	  	  
This	  difference	  also	  impacts	  on	  the	  use	  of	  digital	  evidence	  in	  court	  proceedings,	  and	  in	  
particular	  on	  the	  use	  of	  digital	  evidence	  collected	  by	  MIA	  tools.	  However,	  the	  previous	  
chapters	  of	  this	  thesis	  have	  proven,	  that	  the	  deployment	  of	  MIA	  tools	  is	  already	  well	  
underway,	  and	  will	  likely	  occur	  more	  frequently	  in	  the	  future.	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  crucial	  to	  
assess	  the	  usability	  of	  digital	  evidence	  in	  court	  proceedings.	  	  
If	  data	  collected	  by	  MIA	  tools	  cannot	  be	  used	  during	  court	  proceedings,	  the	  practical	  
relevance	  of	  this	  class	  of	  investigative	  technologies	  would	  be	  minor.	  To	  evaluate	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
707	  Pollitt,	  note	  676,	  at	  19.	  
708	  See	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  this	  e.g.	  E	  van	  Buskirk,	  V	  T	  Liu,	  “Digital	  Evidence:	  Challenging	  the	  
Presumption	  of	  Reliability”	  (2006)	  1:1	  Journal	  of	  Digital	  Forensic	  Practice,	  19-­‐26.	  
709	  Pollitt,	  note	  676,	  at	  25.	  
710	  See	  p.	  77.	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usability	  of	  this	  type	  of	  evidence	  for	  legal	  proceedings,	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  relevant	  
evidence	  law	  principles	  is	  undertaken	  in	  this	  section.	  	  
This	  exercise	  is	  comparative	  in	  nature,	  examining	  the	  situation	  in	  two	  jurisdictions:	  
England	  &	  Wales,	  and	  Germany.	  There	  are	  two	  reasons	  for	  this:	  firstly,	  these	  two	  
jurisdictions	  have	  been	  the	  prime	  focus	  of	  this	  thesis,	  with	  case	  studies	  from	  both	  
discussed.	  The	  focus	  on	  these	  two	  jurisdictions	  in	  this	  chapter	  ensures	  that	  the	  legal	  
evaluation	  of	  this	  type	  of	  evidence	  in	  common	  law,	  as	  well	  as	  civil	  law	  jurisdictions	  
occurs.	  This	  is	  also	  relevant	  for	  the	  second	  reason,	  namely	  the	  cross-­‐jurisdiction	  nature	  
of	  MIA	  tools,	  as	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  6.	  The	  introduction	  of	  MIA	  technologies	  for	  law	  
enforcement	  authorities	  is	  an	  international	  development,711	  and	  it	  is	  therefore	  
important	  to	  establish	  whether	  different	  jurisdictions	  are	  apt	  to	  handle	  digital	  evidence	  
collected	  by	  MIA	  tools.	  	  
7.2.1 Background 
Evidence	  in	  legal	  proceedings712	  is	  information	  with	  which	  the	  matters	  of	  requiring	  
proof	  in	  a	  trial	  are	  proved.713	  Conceptually,	  the	  admissibility	  requirements	  for	  digital	  
evidence	  are	  the	  same	  as	  those	  imposed	  on	  any	  type	  of	  evidence:	  the	  evidence	  must	  be	  
both	  reliable	  and	  relevant.	  This	  is	  the	  case	  for	  both	  jurisdictions	  in	  question.714	  	  
The	  previous	  paragraph	  (7.1.3)	  has	  concluded,	  that	  science	  can	  play	  an	  important	  role	  
in	  assisting	  the	  law	  in	  overcoming	  conceptual	  insecurities.	  For	  the	  application	  of	  
scientific	  findings	  to	  the	  law	  and	  legal	  proceedings,	  it	  is,	  however,	  important	  to	  
ascertain	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  scientific	  results.	  
It	  is	  inherent	  that	  the	  process	  of	  “fact-­‐finding”	  in	  both	  the	  law	  and	  in	  science	  is	  a	  
probabilistic	  quest,	  (though	  this	  is	  not	  always	  recognised	  in	  the	  case	  of	  science).715	  	  
Legal	  proceedings	  typically	  include	  standards	  allocating	  a	  burden	  of	  proof:	  beyond	  a	  
reasonable	  doubt	  is	  the	  standard	  for	  guilt	  in	  criminal	  matters.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
711	  See	  p.	  55ff.	  
712	  This	  is	  true	  for	  both	  criminal	  and	  civil	  law	  proceedings.	  However,	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  
thesis	  the	  focus	  will	  be	  solely	  on	  criminal	  proceedings.	  	  
713	  A	  L-­‐T	  Choo,	  Evidence	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2006)	  1.	  
714	  For	  a	  general	  overview	  of	  evidence	  law	  and	  its	  principles	  in	  England	  &	  Wales	  see	  H	  M	  Malek	  
(ed),	  Phipson	  on	  Evidence	  (London:	  Sweet	  &	  Maxwell,	  17th	  ed,	  2010).	  For	  Germany	  see	  U	  
Eisenberg,	  Beweisrecht	  der	  StPO	  (München:	  C.H.	  Beck	  Verlag,	  2011).	  
715	  R	  M	  Wheate,	  A	  Jamieson,	  “A	  Tale	  of	  Two	  Approaches	  –	  The	  NAS	  Report	  and	  the	  Law	  
Commission	  Consultation	  Paper	  on	  Forensic	  Science”	  (2009)	  7:2	  International	  Commentary	  on	  
Evidence,	  3.	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The	  law	  does	  not	  pronounce	  culpability	  based	  on	  absolute	  certainty,	  but	  in	  accord	  with	  
legally	  required	  degrees	  of	  belief.716	  Similarly,	  science,	  though	  perhaps	  a	  search	  for	  “the	  
truth”,	  is	  nevertheless	  still	  probabilistic:	  the	  only	  certainty	  in	  science,	  particularly	  in	  a	  
forensic	  context,	  is	  exclusion.	  Scientific	  laws	  are	  typically	  developed	  during	  a	  long	  
process	  of	  attempting	  to	  disprove	  a	  certain	  hypothesis,	  in	  addition	  to	  testing	  and	  
retesting	  alternative	  hypotheses.717	  This	  accords	  with	  the	  Popperian	  view	  of	  science718	  
(although	  a	  number	  of	  authors	  consider	  that	  falsifiability	  may	  not	  be	  the	  touchstone	  
claimed	  by	  Popper’s	  adherents719).	  
Therefore,	  it	  is	  important	  that	  scientific	  results	  applied	  to	  the	  law,	  and	  in	  particular	  
criminal	  legal	  proceedings	  are	  soundly	  scientific	  based,	  and	  are	  not	  raised	  above	  their	  
supportable	  scientific	  value.	  	  
7.2.2 The Admissibility of Digital Evidence – England & Wales 
The	  aim	  of	  this	  section	  is	  to	  set	  out	  the	  main	  principles	  of	  the	  admissibility	  of	  evidence	  
in	  digital	  format	  in	  criminal	  proceedings	  in	  England	  &	  Wales,	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  
existing	  legal	  framework	  is	  appropriate	  and	  sufficient	  to	  deal	  with	  this	  type	  of	  evidence.	  
This	  is	  by	  no	  means	  an	  account	  of	  the	  existing	  evidence	  law	  in	  its	  entirety	  in	  England	  
and	  Wales,	  nor	  meant	  to	  be.720	  It	  serves	  to	  highlight	  the	  challenging	  and	  problematic	  
aspects	  of	  this	  type	  of	  evidence.	  
	  
As	  a	  start,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  identify	  the	  considerations	  upon	  which	  the	  law	  of	  criminal	  
evidence	  is	  premised.	  Essentially,	  it	  can	  be	  said	  that	  underlying	  the	  principles	  of	  
criminal	  evidence	  are	  considerations	  of	  both	  intrinsic	  policy	  and	  extrinsic	  policy.721	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
716	  See	  R	  v	  Stevens	  [2002]	  All	  ER	  (D)	  34	  (Jun)	  for	  example,	  in	  which	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  
(Criminal	  Division)	  reiterated,	  in	  response	  to	  jury	  questions	  about	  the	  definition	  of	  a	  reasonable	  
doubt,	  that	  it	  was	  not	  helpful	  for	  a	  judge	  to	  direct	  a	  jury	  to	  distinguish	  between	  being	  sure	  and	  
being	  certain	  and	  a	  judge	  should	  avoid	  doing	  so“.	  
717	  Wheate/Jamieson,	  note	  715,	  at	  3.	  
718	  See	  generally,	  K	  Popper,	  The	  Logic	  of	  Scientific	  Discovery	  (New	  York:	  Basic	  Books,	  1959).	  
Popper	  noted	  that	  corroboration	  of	  a	  theory	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  its	  past	  performance	  only,	  and	  “says	  
nothing	  whatever	  about	  future	  performance,	  or	  about	  the	  “reliability”	  of	  a	  theory.’	  K	  Popper,	  
Objective	  Knowledge:	  An	  Evolutionary	  Approach	  (Oxford:	  Clarendon	  Press,	  1982),	  18.	  
719	  See	  works	  by	  T	  Kuhn (eg The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago:	  University	  of	  
Chicago	  Press,	  1962)),	  C	  Hempel	  (eg The Philosophy of Carl G.Hempel: Studies in Science, 
Explanation and Rationality	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2001)) and	  P	  Feyerabend (eg 
Against Method (London: Verso, 1993)) for	  the	  ongoing	  debate	  as	  to	  the	  definition	  of	  “science”	  
and	  the	  “scientific	  method”.	  
720	  For	  this	  see	  e.g.	  Malek,	  note	  714.	  
721	  L-­‐T	  Choo,	  note	  713,	  at	  19.	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The	  concern	  of	  intrinsic	  policy	  is	  with	  the	  promotion	  of	  accurate	  fact-­‐finding	  or	  truth722	  
discovery,	  or,	  in	  other	  words,	  with	  what	  Bentham	  referred	  to	  as	  “rectitude	  of	  
decision.”723	  It	  is	  important	  to	  ensure	  that	  evidence	  is	  as	  reliable	  as	  possible.	  Dworkin	  
states	  that	  ‘people	  have	  a	  profound	  right	  not	  to	  be	  convicted	  of	  crimes	  of	  which	  they	  
are	  innocent.”724	  	  
This	  intrinsic	  consideration	  is	  the	  basis	  for	  evidence	  principals	  regulating	  the	  
admissibility	  of	  evidence	  (such	  as	  the	  hearsay	  principle).	  	  It	  is	  also	  relevant	  for	  the	  
discussed	  value	  and	  reliability	  of	  scientific	  findings	  applied	  to	  evidence	  law.725	  	  
The	  concept	  of	  extrinsic	  policy,	  as	  explained	  by	  Wigmore,	  “has	  no	  relation	  to	  the	  
scientific	  principles	  of	  proof.	  Rather	  it	  excludes	  good	  evidence	  on	  other	  grounds	  of	  
policy,	  which	  are	  supposed	  to	  override	  the	  policy	  of	  obtaining	  all	  possible	  useful	  
evidence.	  They	  seek	  to	  preserve	  unharmed	  the	  extrinsic	  interests	  that	  would	  be	  injured	  
by	  using	  the	  evidence,	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  to	  let	  justice	  be	  done	  by	  establishing	  the	  
truth	  in	  the	  case	  in	  hand.”726	  Galligan	  states	  that	  extrinsic	  policy	  “refers	  to	  the	  exclusion	  
of	  evidence	  for	  reasons	  other	  than	  reasons	  of	  evidentiary	  value.	  The	  issue	  is	  whether	  
certain	  kinds	  of	  evidence,	  which	  are	  likely	  of	  probative	  value,	  should	  be	  excluded,	  in	  
order	  to	  advance	  other	  values	  of	  policies.”727	  
The	  concept	  of	  extrinsic	  policy	  therefore	  regulates	  the	  case	  of	  improperly	  obtained	  
evidence.728	  
	  
From	  this,	  it	  can	  be	  derived	  that	  for	  digital	  evidence	  to	  be	  admissible,	  it	  must	  be	  
reliable,	  and	  not	  otherwise	  be	  excluded.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
722	  For	  a	  critical	  discussion	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘truth’	  see	  generally	  K	  D	  Killback,	  M	  D	  Tochor,	  
“Searching	  for	  Truth	  but	  Missing	  the	  Point”	  (2002)	  40	  Alberta	  Law	  Journal	  Review,	  333.	  
723	  J	  Bentham,	  Rationale	  of	  Judicial	  Evidence,	  Specially	  Applied	  to	  English	  Practice,	  Vol	  1	  (London:	  
Hunt	  and	  Clarke,	  1827)	  1.	  
724	  R	  Dworkin,	  A	  Matter	  of	  Principle	  (Havard:	  Havard	  University	  Press,	  1985)	  72.	  
725	  See	  p.	  216ff.	  
726	  J	  H	  Wigmore,	  The	  Science	  of	  Judicial	  Proof,	  as	  given	  by	  Logic,	  Psychology,	  and	  General	  
Experience,	  and	  Illustrated	  in	  Judicial	  Trials	  (Boston:	  Little	  Brown	  and	  Co,	  3rd	  ed,	  1937)	  945.	  
727	  D	  J	  Galligan,	  “More	  Scepticism	  About	  Scepticism”	  (1988)	  8	  Oxford	  Journal	  of	  Legal	  Studies,	  
249,	  255.	  
728	  See	  for	  a	  general	  discussion	  of	  improperly	  obtained	  evidence	  for	  example	  J	  Allan,	  “To	  
Exclude	  or	  Not	  to	  Exclude	  Improperly	  Obtained	  Evidence:	  Is	  a	  Humean	  Approach	  More	  
Helpful?”	  (1999)	  18	  University	  of	  Tasmania	  Law	  Review,	  263;	  C	  J	  W	  Allen,	  “Discretion	  and	  
Security:	  Excluding	  Evidence	  Under	  Section	  78(1)	  of	  the	  Police	  and	  Criminal	  Evidence	  Act	  1984”	  
(1990)	  Cambridge	  Law	  Journal,	  80;	  A	  J	  Ashworth,	  “Excluding	  Evidence	  As	  Protecting	  Rights”	  
(1977)	  Criminal	  Law	  Review,	  723;	  B	  Fitzpatrick,	  N	  Taylor,	  “Human	  Rights	  and	  the	  Discretionary	  
Exclusion	  of	  Evidence”	  (2001)	  65	  Journal	  of	  Criminal	  Law,	  349.	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However,	  another	  admissibility	  criteria	  exists:	  relevance.	  Relevance729	  is	  the	  
fundamental	  condition	  of	  admissibility	  of	  evidence.730	  The	  question	  whether	  evidence	  
is	  relevant	  depends	  not	  on	  abstract	  legal	  theory	  but	  on	  the	  individual	  circumstances	  of	  
each	  particular	  case.731	  Stephen	  has	  defined	  relevance	  as	  “The	  word	  ‘relevant’	  means	  
that	  any	  two	  facts	  to	  which	  it	  is	  applied	  are	  so	  related	  to	  each	  other	  that	  according	  to	  
the	  common	  course	  of	  events,	  one	  either	  taken	  by	  itself	  or	  in	  connection	  with	  other	  
facts	  proves	  or	  renders	  probable	  the	  past,	  present	  or	  future	  existence	  or	  non-­‐existence	  
of	  the	  other.”732	  Thus,	  an	  item	  of	  evidence	  is	  relevant	  as	  long	  as	  it	  has	  probative	  value	  or	  
probative	  force,733	  however	  little.734	  Lord	  Simon	  of	  Glaisdale	  explained	  in	  DPP	  v	  
Kilbourne,	  that	  “evidence	  is	  relevant	  if	  it	  is	  logically	  probative	  or	  disprobative	  of	  some	  
matter	  which	  requires	  proof.	  […]	  It	  is	  sufficient	  to	  say,	  even	  at	  the	  risk	  of	  etymological	  
tautology,	  that	  relevant	  (ie,	  logically	  probative	  or	  disprobative)	  evidence	  is	  evidence	  
which	  makes	  the	  matter	  which	  requires	  proof	  more	  or	  less	  probable.”735	  	  
The	  requirement	  of	  relevance	  of	  evidence	  is	  not	  further	  discussed	  here.736	  It	  was	  
depicted	  for	  sake	  of	  completeness,	  but	  does	  not	  in	  itself	  raise	  problems	  for	  digital	  
evidence.	  However,	  implicitly,	  it	  contains	  an	  interesting	  issue:	  the	  question	  of	  what	  
constitutes	  an	  admissible	  type	  of	  evidence.	  Given	  the	  unique	  characteristics	  of	  digital	  
evidence	  as	  described	  above,737	  the	  question	  arises	  whether	  digital	  data,	  given	  its	  
unique	  nature,	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  an	  admissible	  type	  of	  evidence.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
729	  For	  a	  general	  discussion	  of	  relevance	  see	  Law	  Commission	  (Consultation	  Paper	  No	  141),	  
Criminal	  Law-­Evidence	  in	  Criminal	  Proceedings:	  Previous	  Misconduct	  of	  a	  Defendant-­A	  
Consultation	  Paper	  (1996)	  [6.7]-­‐[6.9],	  available	  at	  http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/cp141.pdf.	  
730	  For	  a	  more	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  this	  concept	  see:	  I	  Dennis,	  The	  Law	  of	  Evidence	  (London:	  
Sweet	  &	  Maxwell,	  2010),	  40ff.	  
731	  R	  v	  Guney	  [1998]	  2	  Cr	  App	  R	  242,	  265.	  
732	  J	  F	  Stephen,	  A	  Digest	  of	  the	  Law	  of	  Evidence,	  ed.	  by	  H	  L	  Stephen,	  L	  F	  Sturge	  (London:	  
Macmillan,	  1948),	  Art.	  1.	  
733	  R	  v	  Hartz	  [1967]	  AC	  760,	  785	  per	  Thesiger	  J:	  ‘the	  word	  “relevant”	  is	  to	  all	  intents	  and	  
purposes	  synonymous	  with	  the	  phrase	  “of	  probative	  value”.	  
734	  ‘It	  is	  enough	  if	  the	  item	  could	  reasonably	  show	  that	  a	  fact	  is	  slightly	  more	  probable	  than	  it	  
would	  appear	  without	  that	  evidence’:	  E	  W	  Cleary	  (ed),	  McCormick	  on	  Evidence,	  3rd	  ed.	  (St.	  Paul:	  
West,	  1984)	  542.	  
735	  [1973]	  AC	  729,	  756.	  
736	  See	  for	  a	  detailed	  discussion,	  note	  728;	  L-­‐T	  Choo,	  note	  713,	  at	  3,	  also	  depicting	  the	  
controversly	  debated	  Wigmore	  approach	  to	  relevance.	  
737	  See	  p.	  214ff.	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7.2.2.1. Types of Evidence 
Generally,	  the	  types	  of	  evidence	  admissible	  during	  criminal	  procedures	  fit	  into	  two	  
categories:	  direct	  and	  indirect	  (or	  circumstantial)	  evidence.738	  	  
	  
Direct	  evidence	  is	  evidence	  that	  proves	  a	  fact	  or	  proposition	  directly	  rather	  than	  by	  
secondary	  deduction	  or	  inference.739	  Examples	  of	  direct	  evidence	  include	  eyewitness	  
testimony,	  the	  oral	  confession	  of	  a	  defendant,	  or	  a	  victim’s	  first-­‐hand	  account	  of	  a	  
criminal	  assault.	  In	  addition,	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  physical	  object	  constitutes	  direct	  
evidence.740	  Its	  existence	  can	  be	  proven	  by	  its	  production,	  or	  by	  the	  testimony	  or	  
declaration	  (which	  must	  be	  admissible)	  of	  a	  person	  who	  actually	  perceived	  the	  object.	  	  
Considering	  these	  characteristics	  of	  direct	  evidence	  it	  appears	  doubtful	  whether	  digital	  
evidence,	  given	  its	  volatile	  nature,	  can	  be	  direct	  evidence.	  
Casey	  remarks,	  “it	  is	  a	  common	  misconception	  that	  digital	  evidence	  cannot	  be	  direct	  
evidence	  because	  of	  its	  separation	  from	  the	  events	  it	  represents.”741	  However,	  digital	  
evidence	  can	  prove	  facts	  just	  like	  physical	  evidence	  can.	  The	  human	  perception	  of	  a	  
screen	  printout	  is	  admissible	  as	  direct	  evidence.742	  Further	  examples	  of	  digital	  data	  
admitted	  as	  direct	  evidence	  are	  records	  of	  the	  product	  of	  mechanical	  devices	  and	  
automatic	  recordings,	  including	  photographs,743	  video	  recordings,744	  and	  computer	  
printouts.745	  Furthermore,	  system	  data,	  such	  as	  the	  computer	  logon	  record	  is	  direct	  
evidence	  that	  a	  given	  account	  was	  used	  to	  log	  into	  a	  system	  at	  a	  given	  time.	  	  
Indirect	  or	  circumstantial	  evidence	  is	  evidence	  from	  which	  a	  fact	  in	  issue	  may	  be	  
inferred.746	  Thus,	  indirect	  evidence	  is	  evidence	  of	  a	  relevant	  fact	  as	  opposed	  to	  evidence	  
of	  a	  fact	  in	  issue.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
738	  Malek,	  note	  714,	  paras	  1	  –	  10	  to	  1	  –	  16.	  
739	  C	  P	  Nemeth,	  Law	  and	  Evidence:	  A	  Primer	  for	  Criminal	  Justice,	  Criminology	  and	  Legal	  Studies,	  
2nd	  ed	  (Sudburry:	  Jones	  and	  Bartlett,	  2011)	  16.	  
740	  S	  Mason,	  “England	  &	  Wales”	  in	  S	  Mason	  (ed)	  Electronic	  Evidence	  (London:	  Lexis	  Nexis	  
Butterworths,	  2010),	  301.	  
741	  Casey,	  note	  637,	  at	  72.	  
742	  In	  R	  v	  Gilham	  [2009]	  EWCA	  Crim	  2293,	  173	  CL&J	  749,	  the	  image	  on	  a	  screen	  was	  considered	  
to	  constitute	  sufficient	  evidence	  of	  data	  copied	  on	  to	  the	  RAM	  of	  a	  computer	  used	  to	  play	  
counterfeit	  games	  to	  establish	  an	  offence	  of	  breach	  of	  copyright.	  
743	  R	  v	  Tolson	  (1864)	  4	  F	  &	  F	  103,	  176	  ER	  488,	  where	  a	  photograph	  was	  admitted	  in	  a	  case	  of	  
alleged	  bigamy	  to	  illustrate	  oral	  testimony;	  E	  Goldstein,	  “Photographic	  and	  Videotape	  Evidence	  
in	  the	  Criminal	  Courts	  of	  England	  and	  Canada”	  (1987)	  Criminal	  Law	  Review	  384.	  
744	  Kajala	  v	  Noble	  [1982]	  75	  Cr	  App	  R	  149;	  R	  V	  Grimer	  [1982]	  Crim	  LR	  674,	  126	  SJ	  641;	  R	  v	  
Thomas	  (Stephen)	  [1986]	  Crim	  LR	  682.	  
745	  R	  v	  Wood	  [1983]	  76	  Cr	  App	  R	  23.	  
746	  L-­‐T	  Choo,	  note	  713,	  at	  7.	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Most	  of	  the	  digital	  evidence	  that	  can	  be	  admitted	  as	  direct	  evidence	  also	  comprises	  
indirect	  evidence.	  The	  computer	  logon	  record	  example	  above	  comprises	  indirect	  
evidence	  that	  the	  individual	  who	  owns	  the	  account	  logged	  into	  the	  system,	  and	  
therefore	  was	  responsible.	  However,	  someone	  else	  may	  have	  used	  the	  individual’s	  
account	  and	  other	  evidence	  would	  be	  required	  to	  prove	  that	  the	  suspect	  actually	  logged	  
into	  the	  system.	  
	  
Thus	  it	  can	  be	  concluded	  that	  digital	  data	  can	  generally	  be	  admitted	  as	  direct	  or	  
indirect	  evidence	  in	  criminal	  court	  proceedings.	  The	  unique	  nature	  of	  this	  type	  of	  
evidence	  does	  not	  exclude	  it	  from	  falling	  into	  one	  of	  the	  existing	  admissible	  evidence	  
classes.	  However,	  other	  evidence	  principles	  could	  preclude	  the	  admissibility	  of	  digital	  
evidence.	  
7.2.2.2 Best Evidence 
Best	  evidence	  is	  a	  concept	  that	  can	  best	  be	  described	  as	  “the	  nature	  of	  the	  fact	  admitted,	  
or	  the	  best	  evidence	  that	  the	  circumstances	  would	  allow,	  or	  the	  best	  evidence	  the	  party	  
could	  produce.747	  Originally,	  the	  concept	  was	  relevant	  when	  dealing	  with	  the	  contents	  
of	  a	  writing,	  recording,	  or	  photograph,	  where	  the	  original	  evidence	  was	  sometimes	  
required	  to	  prevent	  a	  witness	  testimony	  from	  misrepresenting	  such	  materials.748	  
Mason	  notes	  that	  this	  rule	  is	  no	  longer	  as	  relevant	  as	  it	  used	  to	  be,	  and	  now	  confined	  to	  
written	  documents	  in	  the	  strictest	  sense.749	  Essentially,	  as	  Casey	  states,	  “with	  the	  
advent	  of	  photocopiers,	  scanners,	  computers	  and	  other	  technology	  that	  can	  create	  
effectively	  identical	  duplicates,	  copies	  became	  acceptable	  in	  place	  of	  the	  original,	  unless	  
a	  genuine	  question	  is	  raised	  as	  to	  the	  authenticity	  of	  the	  original	  or	  the	  accuracy	  of	  the	  
copy	  or	  under	  circumstances	  it	  would	  be	  unfair	  to	  admit	  the	  copy	  in	  lieu	  of	  the	  
original.”750	  	  
Generally,	  an	  exact	  copy	  of	  digital	  evidence	  can	  be	  created,	  and	  the	  presentation	  of	  the	  
copy	  might	  even	  be	  preferable,	  because	  the	  original	  stored	  on	  the	  ICT	  device	  will	  not	  
accidentally	  be	  altered.751	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
747	  Malek,	  note	  714,	  para	  7	  –	  40.	  	  
748	  Casey,	  note	  637,	  at	  64.	  
749	  Mason,	  note	  740,	  at	  309.	  
750	  Casey,	  note	  637,	  at	  64.	  
751	  See	  p.	  215,	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  volatile	  nature	  of	  digital	  evidence.	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However,	  this	  is	  not	  as	  straightforward	  if	  MIA	  tools	  collect	  the	  digital	  evidence.	  As	  
discussed	  above	  in	  the	  short	  case	  scenario,752	  MIA	  tools	  seize	  the	  data	  from	  live	  
systems,	  and	  therefore,	  the	  ICT	  device	  from	  which	  the	  data	  stems	  might	  not	  be	  
available	  for	  a	  cross-­‐checking.	  Even	  if	  it	  was	  seized	  after	  the	  search,	  the	  data	  in	  
question	  might	  be	  lost.	  	  
Thus	  the	  best	  evidence	  rule	  might	  require	  that	  the	  target	  system	  be	  taken	  offline	  at	  the	  
time	  of	  evidence	  collection.	  This	  would	  contradict	  the	  envisaged	  use	  of	  MIA	  tools,	  
where	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  evidence	  is	  collected	  from	  live-­‐systems	  is	  one	  of	  the	  key	  aspects	  
of	  these	  tools.	  Hence,	  the	  question	  is	  whether	  the	  best	  evidence	  rule	  precludes	  the	  
admissibility	  of	  digital	  evidence	  collected	  by	  MIA	  tools.	  	  
	  
In	  Bobo	  v	  State,	  the	  judge	  decided	  that	  printouts	  of	  emails	  that	  no	  longer	  existed	  on	  the	  
computer	  of	  the	  suspect	  because	  they	  had	  been	  deleted	  “were	  the	  best	  evidence	  of	  the	  
emails	  originally	  exchanged.”753	  	  This	  case	  is	  a	  strong	  indicator	  that	  evidence	  seized	  
from	  live	  systems	  might	  still	  be	  regarded	  as	  the	  best	  evidence	  if	  certain	  technical	  
standards	  are	  obeyed.754	  	  
No	  case	  similar	  to	  this	  has	  to	  date	  been	  decided	  on	  in	  England	  or	  Wales.	  However,	  given	  
the	  current	  understanding	  of	  the	  best	  evidence	  rule,	  it	  seems	  likely	  that	  a	  similar	  
decision	  would	  be	  reached.755	  Looking	  at	  the	  historical	  change	  of	  the	  best	  evidence	  rule	  
also	  leads	  to	  this	  assumption.	  This	  rule	  has	  been	  amended	  and	  thereby	  lost	  in	  
significance	  synchronously	  with	  technical	  advancements,	  which	  made	  the	  historical	  
meaning	  of	  the	  rule	  obsolete	  (perfect	  copies	  could	  be	  produced).	  Thus	  under	  the	  
condition	  that	  the	  authenticity	  of	  evidence	  seized	  from	  a	  live	  system	  can	  be	  verified,	  it	  
can	  be	  assumed	  that	  the	  best	  evidence	  principle	  would	  not	  contradict	  the	  admissibility	  
of	  digital	  evidence	  collected	  by	  MIA	  tools	  in	  court.	  
	  
Thus	  it	  can	  be	  concluded	  that	  generally	  digital	  evidence	  is	  an	  admissible	  type	  of	  
evidence	  in	  court	  proceedings	  in	  England	  and	  Wales.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
752	  See	  p.	  204f.	  
753	  Bobo	  v	  State,	  2008	  WL	  2191159.	  
754	  See	  section	  7.3,	  and	  chapters	  8	  and	  9	  for	  an	  introduction	  and	  discussion	  of	  a	  technical	  
solution	  to	  this.	  
755	  See	  e.g.	  Masquerade	  Music	  Ltd	  v	  Springsteen;	  Springsteen	  v	  Flute	  International	  Ldt;	  sub	  nom.	  
Springsteen	  v	  Masquerade	  Music	  Ltd	  [2001]	  EWCA	  Civ	  563;	  [2001]	  C.P.	  Rep.	  85;	  [2001]	  C.P.L.R.	  
369;	  [2001]	  E.M.L.R.	  25,	  CA	  (Civ	  Div),	  where	  some	  of	  the	  relevant	  documents	  to	  prove	  a	  title	  to	  
copyrights	  were	  missing,	  but	  the	  judge	  ruled	  that	  the	  best	  evidence	  rule	  has	  expired,	  and	  the	  
presentation	  of	  the	  original	  documents	  was	  not	  necessary.	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7.2.2.3 Exclusionary Principles – Improperly Obtained Evidence 
However,	  evidence	  can	  be	  ruled	  inadmissible	  based	  on	  a	  number	  of	  exclusionary	  
principles.756	  	  
Particularly	  relevant	  for	  digital	  evidence,	  and	  especially	  digital	  evidence	  seized	  by	  MIA	  
tools	  is	  the	  principle	  of	  improperly	  obtained	  evidence.	  	  
Evidence	  can	  be	  excluded,	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  law	  or	  discretion,	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  it	  was	  
obtained	  illegally,	  improperly	  or	  unfairly.757	  Evidence	  can	  be	  obtained	  improperly,	  for	  
example,	  by	  trickery,	  deception	  bribes,	  threats	  or	  inducements,	  or	  in	  violation	  of	  a	  
person’s	  human	  rights	  guaranteed	  by	  the	  European	  Convention	  of	  Human	  Rights	  
(ECHR).	  Particularly	  Article	  8	  ECHR,	  which	  guarantees	  the	  right	  to	  privacy,	  could	  be	  of	  
relevance	  for	  digital	  evidence	  obtained	  remotely	  from	  ICTs	  and	  computer	  networks	  
after	  infiltrating	  these.	  	  
As	  shown	  in	  chapter	  2,	  this	  potentially	  violates	  privacy	  and	  data	  protection	  rights	  of	  
affected	  persons,	  and	  hence	  would	  be	  obtained	  improperly.758	  Additionally,	  digital	  
evidence	  obtained	  by	  MIA	  tools	  could	  be	  in	  breach	  of	  international	  legislation	  as	  shown	  
in	  chapter	  6	  and	  therefore	  be	  obtained	  improperly	  on	  those	  grounds.	  
Principally,	  there	  is	  no	  automatic	  exclusion	  of	  improperly	  obtained	  evidence	  in	  England	  
and	  Wales.759	  Courts	  have	  discretion	  whether	  to	  admit	  evidence	  that	  is	  improperly	  
obtained	  in	  criminal	  cases,	  subject	  to	  the	  provision	  of	  s	  78	  of	  the	  Police	  and	  Criminal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
756	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  thesis,	  the	  focus	  is	  solely	  on	  the	  principle	  of	  improperly	  obtained	  
evidence.	  The	  use	  of	  MIA	  tools	  makes	  this	  the	  potentially	  most	  immediately	  relevant	  principle.	  
For	  an	  overview	  of	  all	  exclusionary	  principles,	  see	  e.g.	  H	  L	  Ho,	  A	  Philosophy	  of	  Evidence	  Law	  
(Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2008)	  48-­‐9,	  for	  discussion	  of	  all	  existing	  exclusionary	  
principles.	  	  
While	  the	  hearsay	  principle	  is	  probably	  the	  most	  commonly	  known,	  this	  principal	  is	  no	  longer	  
seen	  as	  problematic.	  It	  is	  based	  on	  the	  perceived	  unreliability	  of	  hearsay	  evidence	  (Teper	  v	  R	  
[1952]	  AC	  480,	  486	  per	  Lord	  Normand).	  However,	  the	  Criminal	  Justice	  Act	  2003	  repealed	  the	  
provisions	  relating	  to	  hearsay	  in	  the	  Criminal	  Justice	  Act	  1988	  (Criminal	  Justice	  Act	  2003,	  
s.115).	  In	  any	  case,	  computer	  self-­‐generated	  output	  is	  not	  hearsay	  but	  real	  evidence	  (R	  v	  Saward	  
[2005]	  EWCA	  Crim	  318	  at	  44).	  This	  category	  has	  two	  sub-­‐divisions:	  firstly	  output	  that	  contains	  
no	  input	  from	  human	  thought,	  such	  as	  that	  created	  by	  a	  web	  camera,	  or	  automated	  screen	  
capture	  (R	  v	  Skinner	  [2005]	  EWCA	  Crim	  1439	  at	  21).	  Secondly,	  computer	  self-­‐generated	  output	  
that	  draws	  directly	  or	  indirectly	  on	  information	  fed	  into	  the	  device	  by	  a	  person.	  The	  first	  
category	  is	  admissible	  if	  legally	  relevant.	  The	  second	  is	  inadmissible	  unless	  it	  is	  proven	  to	  the	  
judge’s	  satisfaction	  that	  the	  information	  supplied	  was	  accurate	  (R	  Pattenden,	  “Authenticating	  
‘things’	  in	  English	  law:	  Principles	  for	  adducing	  tangible	  evidence	  in	  common	  law	  jury	  trials”	  
(2009)	  12	  The	  International	  Journal	  of	  Evidence	  &	  Proof,	  273,	  275).	  	  
757	  A	  Keane,	  The	  Modern	  Law	  of	  Evidence	  (Oxford,	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  7th	  
edition,	  2008)	  53.	  
758	  See	  the	  discussion	  of	  the	  BVerfG	  judgment	  in	  chapter	  2.	  
759	  R	  v	  P	  [2002]	  1	  AC	  146;	  Attorney-­General's	  Reference	  (No.	  3	  of	  1999)	  [20011	  2	  AC	  91.	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Evidence	  Act	  1984.760	  Courts	  may	  refuse	  to	  admit	  evidence	  on	  which	  the	  prosecution	  
propose	  to	  rely	  if	  it	  appears	  to	  the	  court	  that,	  having	  regard	  to	  all	  the	  circumstances,	  
including	  the	  circumstances	  in	  which	  the	  evidence	  was	  obtained,	  the	  admission	  of	  the	  
evidence	  would	  have	  such	  an	  adverse	  effect	  on	  the	  fairness	  of	  the	  proceedings	  that	  the	  
court	  ought	  not	  to	  admit	  it	  under	  s	  78.761	  It	  is,	  of	  course,	  impossible	  to	  list	  all	  the	  kinds	  
of	  impropriety,	  which	  will	  be	  treated	  as	  having	  an	  adverse	  effect	  on	  the	  fairness	  of	  the	  
proceedings	  here.762	  
However,	  principally	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  in	  every	  case	  of	  a	  significant	  or	  even	  
substantial	  breach	  the	  evidence	  in	  question	  will	  be	  excluded.763	  The	  task	  of	  the	  court	  is	  
not	  merely	  to	  consider	  whether	  there	  will	  be	  an	  adverse	  effect	  on	  the	  fairness	  of	  the	  
proceedings,	  but	  such	  an	  adverse	  effect	  that	  justice	  requires	  the	  evidence	  to	  be	  
excluded.764	  	  
No	  case	  law	  exists,	  to	  the	  best	  knowledge	  of	  the	  author,	  on	  the	  exclusion	  of	  digital	  
evidence	  (and	  particularly	  not	  digital	  evidence	  seized	  remotely)	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  it	  
was	  obtained	  improperly.	  However,	  cases	  of	  intercepted	  (and	  electronically	  recorded)	  
communication	  improperly	  obtained	  can	  serve	  as	  a	  comparison	  here.	  	  Evidence	  of	  
intercepted	  communications	  recorded	  electronically	  was	  not	  automatically	  
inadmissible,	  even	  if	  the	  recording	  device	  had	  been	  placed	  by	  an	  illegal	  act,	  and	  on	  the	  
premises	  of	  a	  third	  party,765	  and	  if	  the	  opportunity	  to	  plant	  it	  had	  been	  secured	  by	  
deception.766	  
This	  can	  be	  compared	  to	  the	  investigation	  of	  the	  vitual	  living	  space	  by	  MIA	  tools.	  Even	  if	  
the	  tools	  are	  planted	  illegally	  and	  communication	  data	  and	  other	  evidence	  is	  seized,	  
this	  does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  that	  the	  evidence	  is	  excluded	  from	  court	  proceedings.	  	  
Intercepted	  communications	  data	  was	  excluded	  under	  the	  s	  78	  discretion	  when	  the	  
police	  had,	  in	  bad	  faith,	  manipulated	  facilities	  for	  prisoners	  to	  be	  interviewed	  by	  their	  
legal	  advisers	  so	  that	  these	  conversations	  could	  be	  overheard.767	  Thus	  only	  if	  and	  when	  
confidential	  communication	  data	  was	  intercepted	  did	  courts	  in	  the	  past	  decide	  that	  this	  
should	  be	  excluded	  as	  evidence.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
760	  Mason,	  note	  740,	  at	  405.	  
761	  A	  Samuels,	  “Illegally	  Obtained	  Evidence:	  In	  or	  Out?”	  (2003)	  67	  Journal	  of	  Criminal	  Law	  411-­‐
414.	  
762	  See	  e.g.	  Keane,	  note	  757,	  at	  57	  ff;	  Allen,	  note	  728,	  for	  more	  details	  on	  this.	  
763	  Keane,	  note	  757,	  at	  64.	  
764	  R	  v	  Walsh	  (1989)	  91	  Cr	  App	  R	  161	  at	  163,	  CA	  and	  R	  v	  Ryan	  [1992]	  Crim	  LR	  187,	  CA.	  
765	  R	  v	  Khan	  [1994] 4 All ER 426.	  
766	  R	  v	  Chalkley	  [1998]	  QB	  848,	  [1998]	  2	  All	  ER	  155.	  
767	  R	  v	  Grant	  [2005]	  EWCA	  Crim	  1089,	  [2006]	  QB	  60.	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Applying	  these	  results	  to	  digital	  data,	  and	  particularly	  data	  seized	  by	  MIA	  tools,	  it	  can	  
be	  concluded	  that	  such	  data	  is	  likely	  only	  excluded	  under	  the	  s	  78	  discretion	  if	  it	  was	  
improperly	  seized	  confidential	  data.	  
7.2.2.4 Authentication of Digital Evidence 
The	  previous	  sections	  have	  shown,	  that	  digital	  evidence	  is	  admissible	  in	  criminal	  
proceedings,	  if	  it	  is	  relevant,	  can	  be	  considered	  an	  admissible	  evidence	  type,	  and	  is	  not	  
otherwise	  excluded.	  	  
However,	  in	  addition	  documents	  and	  all	  other	  forms	  of	  tangible	  evidence	  must	  be	  
authenticated,	  to	  establish	  the	  reliability	  of	  the	  evidence	  in	  question	  and	  show	  that	  they	  
are	  what	  they	  purport	  to	  be.	  The	  term	  authentic	  is	  used	  to	  describe	  whether	  a	  
document	  or	  data	  is	  genuine,	  or	  that	  the	  document	  (in	  the	  case	  of	  digital	  data)	  “matches	  
the	  claims	  made	  about	  it”.768	  	  
Authentication	  means	  satisfying	  the	  court	  (a)	  that	  the	  contents	  of	  the	  record	  have	  
remained	  unchanged,	  (b)	  that	  the	  information	  in	  the	  record	  does	  in	  fact	  originate	  from	  
its	  purported	  source,	  whether	  human	  or	  machine,	  and	  (c)	  that	  extraneous	  information	  
such	  as	  the	  apparent	  date	  of	  the	  record	  is	  accurate.769	  	  
	  
To	  prove	  the	  aforementioned	  requirements,	  the	  identity,	  provenance,	  continuity,	  
integrity,	  and	  originality	  of	  the	  evidence	  need	  to	  be	  established.770	  	  
Identity	  attempts	  to	  proof	  that	  two	  ‘things’	  are	  the	  same.771	  Provenance	  refers	  to	  the	  
mechanical	  or	  physical	  origin	  of	  the	  evidence.772	  Continuity	  is	  the	  chain	  of	  custody	  or	  
transmission	  between	  seizure	  and	  examination	  by	  an	  expert	  or	  use	  in	  court.773	  Integrity	  
determines	  whether	  deterioration,	  interference	  and	  contamination	  between	  seizure	  
and	  examination	  has	  been	  avoided.774	  Originality	  refers	  to	  the	  original	  ‘thing’	  in	  its	  
initial	  state.775	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
768	  Pattenden,	  see	  note	  756,	  at	  275.	  	  	  
769	  C	  Reed,	  “The	  Admissibility	  and	  Authentication	  of	  Computer	  Evidence	  –	  A	  Confusion	  of	  
Issues”	  (2005)	  5th	  BILETA	  Conference	  British	  and	  Irish	  Legal	  Technology	  Association,	  5.	  
770	  Pattenden,	  note	  756,	  at	  277.	  
771	  Wigmore,	  Wigmore	  on	  Evidence,	  3rd	  ed.,	  Vol.	  7	  (Boston:	  Chardbourn,	  1940)	  §2129;	  Boyle	  v	  
Wiseman	  (1855)	  11	  Ex.	  360	  at	  367-­‐8.	  	  
772	  Trimcoll	  Pty	  Ltd	  v	  Deputy	  Commissioner	  of	  Taxation	  [2007]	  NSWCA	  307	  at	  30.	  
773	  R	  v	  Stubbs	  [2002]	  EWCA	  Crim	  2254	  at	  16;	  R	  v	  Early	  [2002]	  EWCA	  Crim	  1904	  at	  21;	  R	  v	  Emu	  
[2004]	  EWCA	  Crim	  2296	  at	  26.	  
774	  R	  v	  Hoey	  [2007]	  NICC	  49	  at	  46.	  
775	  R	  v	  Robson	  [1972]	  1	  WLR	  651	  at	  653,	  655.	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As	  established	  above,776	  digital	  evidence	  is	  a	  particularly	  volatile	  and	  fragile	  type	  of	  
evidence.	  It	  can	  easily	  be	  tainted	  and	  altered	  in	  many	  ways.	  Thus	  proving	  the	  integrity	  
of	  this	  type	  of	  evidence	  is	  much	  more	  difficult	  than	  doing	  so	  with	  a	  piece	  of	  physical	  
evidence,	  such	  as	  a	  knife.	  This	  can	  be	  photographed	  at	  the	  crime	  scene,	  to	  establish	  
identity	  and	  provenance,	  placed	  in	  a	  clean	  bag	  to	  avoid	  contamination,	  and	  therefore	  
establish	  integrity	  and	  originality.	  The	  chain	  of	  custody	  is	  established	  by	  
documentation	  of	  the	  people	  coming	  in	  contact	  with	  the	  piece.777	  	  
For	  digital	  data,	  the	  establishment	  of	  authenticity,	  and	  therefore	  of	  the	  above-­‐
mentioned	  criteria,	  incorporates	  a	  technical	  process	  of	  a	  protocol	  of	  checks	  and	  
balances	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  history	  of	  how	  the	  digital	  data	  has	  been	  managed	  since	  its	  
seizure.778	  It	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  process	  of	  demonstrating	  the	  authenticity	  of	  a	  
digital	  object	  is	  “a	  process	  of	  examining	  and	  assigning	  confidence	  to	  a	  collection	  of	  
claims.”779	  Proving	  the	  authenticity	  of	  a	  digital	  object	  means	  providing	  sufficient	  
evidence	  to	  convince	  an	  adjudicator	  that	  the	  object	  that	  has	  been	  retrieved	  is	  a	  faithful	  
representation	  of	  the	  object	  that	  was	  relied	  upon	  by	  the	  originator.780	  	  
The	  technical	  process	  required	  for	  seizing	  and	  analysing	  digital	  evidence	  in	  a	  way	  that	  
allows	  later	  authentication	  during	  court	  proceedings	  needs	  to	  be	  undertaken	  by	  a	  
forensic	  expert.781	  As	  shown	  above	  in	  the	  short	  case	  example,	  digital	  evidence	  is	  latent	  
to	  the	  human	  eye,	  and	  it	  requires	  an	  expert	  to	  make	  it	  visible	  and	  ensure	  that	  it	  remains	  
in	  its	  original	  state.782	  This	  process	  is	  complex	  and	  very	  technical,	  and	  only	  the	  basic	  
structure	  will	  be	  depicted	  in	  this	  thesis.783	  	  
	  
Generally,	  whether	  examining	  digital	  data	  acquired	  from	  a	  desktop	  drive,	  mobile	  phone	  
memory,	  or	  network	  trace,	  a	  forensic	  examiner	  must	  ensure	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  entire	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
776	  See	  p.	  214ff.	  
777	  Casey,	  note	  637,	  at	  470.	  
778	  S	  Mason,	  “Authenticating	  Digital	  Data”	  in	  S	  Mason	  (ed)	  Electronic	  Evidence	  (London:	  Lexis	  
Nexis	  Butterworths,	  2010),	  89.	  
779	  C	  Lynch,	  Authenticity	  and	  integrity	  in	  the	  digital	  environment:	  An	  exploratory	  analysis	  of	  the	  
central	  role	  of	  trust”	  in	  Authenticity	  in	  a	  Digital	  Environment	  (2000),	  Council	  on	  Library	  
Information	  Resource,	  40.	  
780	  Mason,	  note	  778,	  at	  90.	  
781	  Casey,	  note	  637,	  at	  471.	  
782	  See	  p.	  204ff.	  
783	  For	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  and	  discussion	  of	  this	  process	  see	  e.g.	  Casey,	  note	  637,	  at	  227	  ff.	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investigation.784	  At	  the	  most	  basic	  level,	  digital	  forensics	  has	  three	  major	  phases:	  1)	  
acquisition,	  2)	  analysis,	  and	  3)	  presentation.785	  The	  entire	  process	  is	  based	  on	  the	  
forensic	  science	  paradigm	  depicted	  above	  in	  section	  7.1.3.786	  	  
The	  acquisition	  phase	  saves	  the	  state	  of	  a	  digital	  system,	  so	  that	  it	  can	  be	  analysed	  
later.787	  To	  ensure	  that	  the	  digital	  evidence	  remains	  intact,	  the	  evidence	  containing	  ICT	  
system	  is	  taken	  offline	  and	  a	  bit-­‐stream	  image	  of	  the	  entire	  original	  evidence	  disk	  is	  
created.788	  This	  process,	  known	  as	  “bit-­‐stream	  imaging”,	  involves	  copying	  all	  data	  from	  
the	  original	  disk,	  sector-­‐by-­‐sector,	  to	  a	  target	  working	  disk	  or	  image	  file.789	  Forensic	  
tools	  are	  used	  to	  accomplish	  this.790	  These	  tools	  must	  modify	  the	  suspect	  device	  as	  little	  
as	  possible	  and	  copy	  all	  data.791	  	  
	  
The	  analysis	  phase	  takes	  the	  acquired	  data	  and	  examines	  it	  to	  identify	  relevant	  pieces	  
of	  evidence.792	  The	  examination	  of	  the	  data	  is	  carried	  out	  on	  the	  created	  copy	  to	  ensure	  
that	  the	  original	  is	  kept	  intact.	  Again,	  forensic	  tools	  are	  used	  to	  analyse	  and	  examine	  the	  
relevant	  data.	  Throughout	  this	  process,	  the	  chain	  of	  custody	  of	  the	  digital	  evidence	  is	  
ensured	  by	  properly	  marking	  and	  identifying	  the	  hardware	  seized,	  tracking	  and	  
maintaining	  all	  the	  required	  signatures,	  secure	  storage,	  and	  properly	  time-­‐stamping	  
digital	  documents,	  and	  archiving	  system	  logs.793	  
Thus	  the	  process	  heavily	  relies	  on	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  methods,	  and	  the	  forensic	  
soundness	  and	  verification	  of	  the	  specific	  tools	  that	  are	  used.	  
To	  ensure	  the	  methods	  are	  valid	  and	  consistent,	  general	  guidelines	  on	  good	  practice	  for	  
computer-­‐based	  electronic	  evidence	  have	  been	  introduced	  in	  the	  UK794	  by	  the	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  B	  N	  Levine,	  M	  Liberatore,	  “DEX:	  Digital	  Evidence	  Provenance	  Supporting	  Reproducibility	  and	  
Comparison”	  (2009)	  DFRWS	  Annual	  Conference,	  1.	  
785	  B	  Carrier,	  “Open	  Source	  Digital	  Forensics	  Tools:	  The	  Legal	  Argument”	  (2002)	  @stake	  
Research	  Report,	  2.	  
786	  See	  p.	  222.	  
787	  Carrier,	  note	  785,	  at	  2.	  
788	  Kenneally,	  note	  639,	  at	  12.	  
789	  Ibid.	  
790	  An	  example	  for	  such	  a	  forensic	  tool	  is	  EnCase,	  
http://www.guidancesoftware.com/forensic.htm.	  
791	  Carrier,	  note	  785,	  at	  2.	  
792	  Ibid.	  
793	  P	  Turner,	  “Digital	  provenance	  –	  interpretation,	  verificaton	  and	  corroboration”	  (2005)	  2	  
Digital	  Investigation,	  45,	  48.	  
794	  While	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  on	  England	  and	  Wales	  only,	  these	  guidelines	  are	  drafted	  to	  
include	  Scotland	  and	  Northern	  Ireland	  (see	  p.	  2).	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Association	  of	  Chief	  Police	  Officers’	  (ACPO).795	  While	  some	  authors	  have	  doubted	  the	  
validity	  of	  such	  guidelines,	  and	  of	  existing	  methods,796	  these	  are	  generally	  accepted	  in	  
the	  literature	  as	  a	  sound	  basis.797	  
	  
The	  verification	  of	  the	  reliability	  of	  the	  tools	  used,	  and	  the	  reliability	  of	  the	  evidence	  
collected	  with	  these	  is	  a	  somewhat	  different	  matter.	  Evaluating	  them	  as	  scientific	  
evidence	  has	  challenged	  these	  tools	  and	  the	  techniques	  used	  to	  process	  digital	  
evidence.	  Because	  of	  the	  power	  of	  science	  to	  persuade,	  courts	  are	  careful	  to	  assess	  the	  
validity	  of	  a	  scientific	  process	  before	  accepting	  its	  results.	  	  
In	  the	  United	  States,	  scientific	  evidence	  is	  evaluated	  based	  on	  the	  principles	  developed	  
in	  Daubert	  v	  Merrell	  Dow	  Pharmaceuticals,	  Inc.,	  1993,798	  and	  the	  Federal	  Rule	  702.799	  
At	  present,	  no	  legislated	  equivalent	  to	  the	  Daubert	  test,	  or	  the	  Federal	  Rule	  702	  exists	  
in	  England	  and	  Wales	  (or	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  UK).	  The	  position	  is	  that	  where	  the	  court	  
needs	  assistance,	  a	  reliable	  body	  of	  relevant	  knowledge	  exists,	  and	  a	  suitably	  qualified	  
expert800	  can	  render	  an	  opinion	  on	  the	  issue	  at	  hand,	  the	  court	  will	  call	  such	  
evidence.801	  Thus	  the	  common	  law	  in	  England	  and	  Wales	  requires	  the	  court	  to	  be	  
satisfied	  that	  the	  scientific	  evidence	  is	  “sufficiently	  reliable”	  in	  order	  for	  it	  to	  be	  
admitted.802	  
The	  Law	  Commission	  (LC)	  in	  its	  report	  on	  admissibility	  of	  expert	  evidence	  in	  criminal	  
proceedings803	  proposed	  that	  a	  Daubert-­‐like	  test,	  enshrined	  in	  legislation	  alongside	  a	  
list	  of	  guidelines	  for	  the	  court	  to	  consider	  (namely,	  the	  admission	  of	  expert	  evidence	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
795	  ACPO,	  “Guide	  for	  Computer-­‐Based	  Electronic	  Evidence”	  available	  online	  at	  
http://www.7safe.com/electronic_evidence/ACPO_guidelines_computer_evidence.pdf.	  
796	  See	  e.g.	  M	  Reith,	  C	  Carr,	  G	  Gunsch,	  “An	  Examination	  of	  Digital	  Forensic	  Models”	  (2002)	  1:3	  
International	  Journal	  of	  Digital	  Evidence,	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  existing	  guidelines.	  
797	  See	  e.g.	  Casey,	  note	  637,	  at	  230.	  
798	  Daubert	  v	  Merrell	  Dow	  Pharmaceuticals	  509	  US	  579	  (1993).	  
799	  The	  Daubert	  decision	  (replacing	  the	  Frye	  test,	  which	  relied	  on	  scientific	  acceptance	  as	  the	  
sole	  criteria;	  Frye v United States 293 F 1013 (1923))	  and	  Rule	  702	  of	  the	  Federal	  Rules	  of	  
Evidence	  altered	  and	  expanded	  the	  indicia	  that	  judges	  should	  consider	  in	  ruling	  on	  the	  
admissibility	  of	  expert	  evidence.	  The	  Court	  looked	  not	  only	  to	  acceptance	  by	  the	  scientific	  
community,	  but	  also	  considered	  whether	  the	  theory/technique	  had	  been	  tested,	  subject	  to	  peer	  
review	  and	  publication,	  had	  a	  known	  or	  potential	  error	  rate,	  and	  was	  the	  subject	  of	  standards	  as	  
to	  its	  application	  and	  operation.	  
800	  By	  study	  or	  experience	  (R	  v	  Hodges	  [2003]	  EWCA	  Crim	  290)	  although	  in	  some	  fields	  
qualifications	  may	  be	  of	  increased	  importance	  (R	  v	  Robb	  [1991]	  93	  Cr	  App	  R	  161).	  
801	  Wheate/Jamieson,	  note	  715,	  at	  6.	  
802	  R	  v	  Dallagher	  [2002]	  EWCA	  Crim	  1903	  at	  [29];	  R	  v	  Ciantar	  [2005]	  EWCA	  Crim	  3559	  at	  [25].	  
803	  The	  Law	  Commission	  “The	  Admissibility	  of	  Expert	  Evidence	  in	  Criminal	  Proceedings	  in	  
England	  and	  Wales:	  A	  New	  Approach	  to	  the	  Determination	  of	  Evidentiary	  Reliability”	  (2009)	  
Consultation	  Paper	  190.	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which	  is	  relevant,	  scientifically	  valid,	  and	  proffered	  by	  a	  witness	  who	  is	  an	  expert,	  and	  
exclusion	  of	  evidence	  that	  fails	  those	  standards)	  should	  be	  introduced,804	  to	  avoid	  
miscarriages	  of	  justice	  due	  to	  the	  current	  practice.805	  	  
However,	  to	  date	  no	  such	  test	  has	  been	  introduced,	  thus	  the	  traditional	  approach	  of	  
receiving	  the	  opinion	  of	  an	  expert	  on	  the	  tools	  and	  methods	  in	  question	  continues.	  	  
Thus	  far,	  digital	  evidence	  processing	  tools	  and	  techniques	  have	  withstood	  scrutiny	  
when	  evaluating	  scientific	  evidence.806	  	  
However,	  what	  has	  become	  clear	  when	  analysing	  the	  above	  authentication	  methods	  for	  
digital	  evidence,	  is	  that	  these	  are	  premised	  on	  physical	  interaction	  with	  a	  static	  system,	  
and	  the	  seizure	  of	  the	  system	  by	  a	  human	  officer,	  obeying	  to	  a	  generally	  accepted	  
method.	  
MIA	  tools,	  however,	  seize	  evidence	  remotely	  from	  live	  systems.	  As	  shown	  in	  the	  case	  
example	  above,807	  this	  means	  that	  no	  original,	  of	  which	  a	  bit-­‐stream	  image	  could	  be	  
created,	  exists.	  Therefore,	  the	  identity	  and	  provenance	  of	  the	  data	  collected	  are	  
questionable,	  and	  thus	  the	  authenticity	  of	  the	  evidence	  cannot	  be	  established.	  
It	  can	  therefore	  be	  concluded,	  that	  generally	  digital	  evidence	  can	  be	  authenticated	  
under	  the	  current	  legal	  framework	  in	  England	  and	  Wales.	  	  
However,	  the	  authentication	  of	  digital	  evidence	  collected	  by	  MIA	  tools	  based	  on	  the	  
current	  methods	  for	  authentication	  is	  not	  possible.	  
This	  means	  that	  digital	  evidence	  collected	  by	  MIA	  tools	  can	  be	  classified	  as	  an	  
admissible	  evidence	  type;	  however,	  it	  will	  most	  likely	  be	  considered	  unreliable.	  	  
7.2.3 The Admissibility of Digital Evidence – Germany 
This	  section	  aims	  to	  introduce	  the	  main	  structure	  and	  principles	  of	  the	  German	  
evidence	  law	  in	  criminal	  proceedings,	  and	  analyse	  whether	  the	  existing	  legal	  
framework	  is	  sufficient	  and	  adequate	  to	  deal	  with	  matters	  of	  admissibility	  of	  digital	  
evidence	  (standard	  digital	  evidence	  and	  that	  collected	  by	  MIA	  tools).808	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
804	  The	  Law	  Commission,	  ibid,	  at	  Part	  6.	  
805	  The	  Law	  Commission	  recognises	  that	  miscarriages	  of	  justice	  have	  occurred	  under	  the	  
existing	  system,	  and	  goes	  into	  some	  detail	  outlining	  a	  few	  examples,	  The	  Law	  Commission,	  ibid,	  
at	  2.13-­‐24.	  
806	  Casey,	  note	  637,	  at	  75.	  
807	  See	  p.	  204ff.	  	  
808	  This	  is	  by	  no	  means	  an	  account	  of	  the	  existing	  evidence	  law	  in	  its	  entirety	  in	  Germany,	  nor	  
meant	  to	  be.	  See	  e.g.	  C	  Roxin,	  H	  Achenbach,	  Strafprozessrecht	  (München:	  Beck,	  2006,	  16th	  ed),	  
for	  an	  extensive	  discussion	  of	  the	  law	  of	  evidence	  in	  Germany.	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The	  law	  of	  evidence	  for	  criminal	  procedures	  is	  rooted	  in	  Germany	  in	  the	  German	  
Federal	  Criminal	  Procedure	  Act	  (Strafprozessordnung	  -­‐	  StPO).809	  	  
It	  is	  premised	  on	  two	  main	  principles:	  the	  principle	  of	  judicial	  investigation	  (§§	  155	  II	  2,	  
160	  II,	  244	  II	  2	  StPO),	  and	  the	  principle	  of	  free	  assessment	  of	  evidence	  (§	  261	  StPO).	  
These	  two	  principles	  greatly	  influence	  the	  admissibility	  of	  evidence	  in	  criminal	  
proceedings.	  	  
The	  principle	  of	  judicial	  investigation	  (Untersuchungsgrundsatz)	  according	  to	  §§	  155	  II	  
2,	  160	  II,	  244	  II	  2	  StPO,	  obligates	  the	  court	  to	  investigate	  the	  truth.	  It	  further	  states	  that	  
all	  relevant	  pieces	  of	  evidence	  need	  to	  be	  evaluated.810	  The	  introduction	  of	  evidence	  at	  
trial	  serves	  the	  investigation	  of	  facts	  and	  other	  matters	  relevant	  to	  the	  court’s	  decision.	  
Thus,	  presentation	  and	  evaluation	  of	  the	  evidence	  is	  the	  core	  of	  the	  trial	  and	  the	  
primary	  task	  of	  the	  court.	  	  
The	  reason	  for	  this	  is	  that	  the	  aim	  of	  the	  criminal	  procedure	  is	  to	  establish	  the	  true	  facts	  
to	  enable	  a	  fair	  judgment.811	  	  
According	  to	  §	  261	  StPO,	  the	  court	  decides	  in	  criminal	  proceedings	  about	  the	  value	  of	  
the	  proffered	  evidence	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  convictions	  formed	  in	  the	  course	  of	  the	  
proceedings.	  This	  is	  the	  principle	  of	  the	  judge’s	  ‘free	  assessment	  of	  evidence’	  (freie	  
Beweiswürdigung).	  The	  judge	  is	  thus	  not	  bound	  by	  any	  formal	  rules	  in	  deciding	  
whether	  a	  fact	  has	  been	  proven	  or	  not.812	  	  	  
The	  process	  of	  establishing	  the	  truth	  in	  criminal	  proceedings	  requires	  that	  the	  judge	  
gains	  a	  personal	  certainty	  about	  the	  relevant	  facts.813	  However,	  the	  principle	  of	  in	  dubio	  
pro	  reo	  establishes	  that	  the	  accused	  enjoys	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  doubt,	  thus	  after	  
evaluating	  the	  evidence,	  the	  court	  needs	  to	  be	  convinced	  of	  the	  guilt	  of	  the	  accused	  
beyond	  reasonable	  doubt.814	  
The	  above-­‐described	  principles	  highlight	  that	  the	  question	  of	  evidentiary	  weight	  under	  
German	  law	  is	  premised	  on	  the	  discretion	  and	  opinion	  of	  the	  judge,	  as	  opposed	  to	  
English	  law,	  where	  the	  focus	  is	  on	  the	  specifics	  of	  the	  evidence.	  
Thus	  the	  judge	  has	  the	  power	  to	  determine	  whether	  a	  fact	  is	  proven	  by	  a	  proffered	  
piece	  of	  evidence.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
809	  As	  amended	  and	  promulgated	  on	  7th	  April	  1987.	  
810	  K	  Haller,	  K	  Conzen,	  Das	  Strafverfahren	  (Heidelberg,	  München:	  C.F.	  Müller,	  2008)	  7.	  
811	  BGH,	  NJW	  2005,	  1442.	  
812	  U	  Hellmann,	  Strafprozessrecht	  (Berlin,	  Heidelberg:	  Springer,	  2006,	  2nd	  ed)	  280.	  
813	  OLG	  Celle,	  NJW	  1976,	  2030,2031.	  
814	  Haller/Conzen,	  note	  810,	  at	  14.	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The	  question	  of	  admissibility	  of	  evidence,	  however,	  is	  more	  restricted	  and	  premised	  on	  
the	  regulations	  in	  the	  German	  criminal	  procedure	  code.	  
Traditionally,	  the	  criminal	  procedure	  law	  in	  Germany	  recognises	  physical	  objects	  as	  
evidence.815	  As	  highlighted	  in	  the	  case	  scenario	  above,	  this	  could	  be	  a	  knife	  or	  a	  
document.816	  The	  question	  is	  therefore	  whether	  digital	  data	  is	  recognised	  as	  a	  means	  of	  
proof	  by	  German	  criminal	  procedure	  law.	  	  
As	  analysed	  above,	  digital	  evidence	  fundamentally	  differs	  from	  physical	  evidence.817	  
Most	  significantly,	  it	  is	  latent	  to	  the	  human	  eye.	  Therefore,	  data	  as	  such	  is	  not	  
recognised	  as	  a	  means	  of	  proof	  under	  criminal	  procedure	  law.818	  	  
However,	  it	  is	  generally	  accepted	  that	  if	  digital	  data	  is	  stored	  on	  a	  data	  storage	  medium,	  
this	  medium	  can	  be	  proffered	  as	  evidence	  into	  criminal	  proceedings.	  819	  Nevertheless,	  
the	  problem	  of	  introducing	  the	  digital	  data	  stored	  on	  the	  device	  as	  evidence	  remains.	  As	  
discussed	  above,820	  digital	  data	  can	  only	  be	  of	  relevance,	  if	  it	  is	  transformed	  into	  
readable	  format,	  on	  screen	  or	  as	  printouts.	  These	  outputs	  could	  therefore	  be	  proffered	  
as	  evidence	  into	  criminal	  proceedings.	  
Criminal	  procedure	  law	  only	  recognises	  those	  types	  of	  proof	  that	  are	  specified	  in	  the	  
Criminal	  Procedure	  Code.	  Digital	  data	  in	  readable	  format	  therefore	  must	  fall	  into	  these	  
recognised	  classes	  of	  evidence.	  
7.2.3.1 Types of Evidence 
The	  Criminal	  Procedure	  Code	  recognises	  4	  different	  classes	  of	  permissible	  evidence:	  	  
-­‐ Witness	  (§	  48	  ff	  StPO)	  
-­‐ Expert	  (§	  72	  ff	  StPO)	  
-­‐ Certificate	  (§	  249	  ff	  StPO)	  
-­‐ Observational	  evidence	  (Augenscheinbeweis)	  (§§	  86	  ff,	  225	  StPO)	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
815	  M	  Gercke,	  P	  W	  Brunst,	  Praxishandbuch	  Internetstrafrecht	  (Stuttgart:	  Kohlhammer,	  2009)	  
374.	  
816	  See	  p	  204.	  
817	  See	  p	  214ff.	  
818	  Gercke/Brunst,	  note	  815,	  at	  374.	  
819	  See	  e.g.	  BVerfGE,	  113,	  29,	  where	  the	  German	  Federal	  Constitutional	  Court	  decided	  that	  
digital	  data	  from	  seized	  data	  storage	  media	  can	  be	  used	  as	  evidence	  in	  criminal	  proceedings.	  
820	  See	  p	  214ff.	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Proof	  by	  witness	  and	  expert	  is	  thereby	  classed	  as	  personal	  proof,	  whereas	  proof	  by	  
certificate	  or	  visual	  inspection	  is	  classed	  as	  factual	  proof.	  821	  	  
	  
Proof	  by	  witness	  (§	  48	  ff	  StPO)	  refers	  to	  the	  statement	  of	  a	  person	  about	  his	  own	  
perception	  of	  facts	  in	  question.822	  Perception	  in	  this	  context	  also	  encompasses	  
information	  the	  witness	  has	  heard	  from	  a	  third	  person	  about	  the	  matter	  in	  question	  
(i.e.	  hearsay,	  which	  German	  law	  does	  not	  exclude	  as	  evidence).823	  
A	  witness,	  such	  as	  a	  police	  officer	  present	  at	  the	  search,	  can	  make	  a	  statement	  about	  
digital	  data	  perceived	  on	  the	  screen	  of	  an	  ICT	  device.	  Thus,	  digital	  data	  could	  be	  
introduced	  indirectly,	  through	  the	  perception	  of	  a	  witness.	  Such	  a	  proof	  could	  be	  
relevant,	  if	  certain	  data	  was	  visible	  on	  the	  screen	  but	  later,	  for	  example,	  deleted	  from	  
the	  hard	  disk.	  However,	  such	  proof	  by	  witness	  needs	  to	  be	  handled	  with	  great	  care,	  
since	  perceptions	  can	  be	  very	  subjective,	  and	  in	  particular	  if	  the	  data	  cannot	  be	  
reconstructed	  at	  a	  later	  stage.824	  	  Knopp	  therefore	  excludes	  proof	  by	  witness	  for	  digital	  
data,	  though	  justifying	  this	  only	  generally	  stating	  that	  this	  is	  an	  unsuitable	  means	  of	  
proof	  for	  digital	  data.825	  	  Generally,	  this	  means	  of	  proof	  should	  not	  be	  excluded	  outright,	  
however,	  the	  weight	  of	  evidence	  in	  this	  form	  will	  probably	  be	  very	  low	  in	  court	  
proceedings,	  and	  can	  only	  be	  used	  to	  back	  up	  other	  facts.	  
	  
Expert	  witnesses	  (§	  72	  ff	  StPO)	  are	  primarily	  assistants	  to	  the	  court.	  They	  provide	  
expertise,	  which	  the	  court	  lacks.826	  The	  expert	  witness	  has	  three	  potential	  functions.	  
Firstly,	  he	  may	  acquaint	  the	  court	  with	  general	  matters	  of	  knowledge	  and	  experience	  
established	  within	  his	  area	  of	  expertise.	  Secondly,	  he	  may	  determine	  facts	  that	  may	  
only	  be	  perceived,	  understood	  or	  assessed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  particular	  knowledge.	  And	  
thirdly,	  he	  may	  use	  scientific	  principles	  and	  methods	  to	  draw	  inferences	  from	  facts.827	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
821	  W	  Beulke,	  Strafprozessrecht	  (Heidelberg,	  München:	  C.F.	  Müller,	  2010,	  11th	  ed)	  116;	  
Hellmann,	  note	  815,	  at	  248.	  
822	  O	  Klemke,	  H	  Elbs,	  Einführung	  in	  die	  Praxis	  der	  Strafverteidigung	  (Heidelberg,	  München:	  C.F.	  
Müller,	  2010)	  275.	  
823	  Beulke,	  note	  821,	  at	  270.	  
824	  Gercke/Brunst,	  note	  815,	  at	  375.	  
825	  M	  Knopp,	  “Rechtliche	  Perpektiven	  zur	  digitalen	  Beweisführung”	  (2009)	  Proceedings	  of	  GI	  
Jahrestagung'2009,	  1552-­‐1566.	  
826	  Beulke,	  note	  821,	  at	  126.	  
827	  See	  for	  a	  detailed	  analysis:	  F	  Toepel,	  Grundstrukturen	  des	  Sachverständigenbeweises	  im	  
Strafprozessrecht	  (Tübingen:	  Mohr	  Siebeck,	  2002).	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Therefore,	  an	  expert	  witness	  can	  also	  indirectly	  introduce	  digital	  evidence	  during	  court	  
proceedings.	  He	  can,	  for	  example,	  be	  requested	  by	  the	  court	  to	  examine	  seized	  ICT	  
devices	  and	  report	  about	  the	  content	  and	  reliability	  of	  the	  devices.	  Thus	  a	  forensic	  
examiner	  can,	  as	  an	  expert	  witness,	  provide	  proof	  of	  digital	  evidence	  in	  criminal	  
proceedings.	  This	  method	  of	  proof	  for	  digital	  evidence	  is	  undisputed	  in	  literature.828	  	  
	  
In	  addition	  to	  these	  two	  personal	  means	  of	  proof,	  the	  factual	  methods	  of	  proof	  could	  
introduce	  digital	  evidence	  directly	  into	  criminal	  proceedings.	  
	  
A	  certificate	  under	  criminal	  procedure	  law	  (§	  249	  ff	  StPO)	  refers	  to	  a	  document	  with	  a	  
readable	  thought	  content.829	  In	  criminal	  procedural	  law,	  the	  author	  of	  the	  document	  
does	  not	  need	  to	  be	  recognisable	  (e.g.	  by	  signature).830	  Importantly,	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  
proof	  is	  on	  the	  readable	  content	  of	  the	  document,	  not	  the	  outer	  appearance	  of	  the	  
document.	  
Digital	  data	  can	  therefore	  be	  introduced	  into	  criminal	  procedures	  in	  form	  of	  readable	  
printouts	  that	  constitute	  certificates	  according	  to	  §	  249	  StPO.831	  However,	  only	  if	  it	  is	  a	  
readable	  reproduction	  of	  digital	  data	  stored	  on	  the	  device	  (such	  as	  a	  word	  processing	  
document).	  
	  
Observational	  evidence	  (§§	  86	  ff,	  225	  StPO)	  is	  derived	  from	  the	  sensory	  perception	  of	  
persons	  or	  things	  by	  sight,	  hearing,	  touch,	  taste,	  or	  smell.832	  This	  includes,	  for	  example,	  
the	  viewing	  of	  corpses,	  weapons,	  and	  pictures	  or	  movies.	  It	  also	  includes	  listening	  to	  
recordings.833	  	  
All	  digital	  data	  that	  does	  not	  satisfy	  the	  requirements	  of	  readable	  content	  can	  therefore	  
be	  classified	  as	  observational	  evidence.834	  Digital	  data	  in	  form	  of	  a	  printout	  of	  a	  
screenshot,	  or	  of	  an	  image	  can	  therefore	  be	  proffered	  as	  observational	  evidence	  into	  
criminal	  procedures.835	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
828	  See	  e.g.	  Knopp,	  note	  825,	  at	  8;	  Gercke/Brunst,	  note	  815,	  at	  376.	  
829	  Beulke,	  see	  note	  821,	  at	  129.	  	  
830	  Note	  that	  the	  meaning	  of	  certificate	  in	  criminal	  procedure	  law	  differs	  from	  that	  in	  civil	  
procedure	  law	  and	  criminal	  law.	  In	  civil	  law,	  for	  example,	  a	  signature	  is	  required	  for	  a	  document	  
to	  be	  considered	  a	  certificate.	  
831	  Gercke/Brunst,	  note	  815,	  at	  374.	  
832	  BGHSt,	  18,	  51,	  53;	  Beulke,	  note	  821,	  at	  130.	  
833	  BGHSt	  14,	  339.	  
834	  Böckenförde,	  note	  188,	  at	  313.	  
835	  Gercke/Brunst,	  note	  815,	  at	  374.	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Therefore,	  both	  types	  of	  factual	  evidence	  are	  applicable	  to	  digital	  data.	  The	  reason	  why	  
German	  criminal	  procedure	  law	  is	  relatively	  flexible	  as	  to	  admissibility	  of	  digital	  
evidence	  is,	  as	  stated	  above,	  that	  it	  is	  premised	  on	  the	  principal	  of	  judicial	  investigation,	  
which	  obligates	  the	  court	  to	  determine	  the	  truth.836	  The	  introduction	  of	  evidence	  at	  
trial	  serves	  the	  investigation	  of	  facts	  and	  other	  matters	  relevant	  to	  the	  courts	  decision	  
(§	  244	  II	  StPO).	  Thus,	  presentation	  and	  evaluation	  of	  all	  available	  evidence	  is	  at	  the	  core	  
of	  the	  trial	  and	  the	  primary	  task	  of	  the	  court.837	  
7.2.3.2 Authenticity of Digital Evidence 
The	  previous	  section	  has	  shown	  that	  digital	  evidence	  is	  generally	  admissible	  under	  
German	  criminal	  procedural	  law,	  if	  it	  can	  be	  subsumed	  under	  one	  of	  the	  evidence	  
classes.	  However,	  the	  weight	  of	  the	  evidence	  is	  to	  be	  freely	  assessed	  by	  the	  judge	  (§	  261	  
StPO).838	  	  Generally,	  this	  assessment	  takes	  into	  consideration	  the	  authenticity	  and	  
integrity	  of	  evidence,	  and	  the	  credibility	  of	  witness	  statements.	  	  
The	  authenticity	  and	  integrity	  of	  evidence	  derived	  from	  digital	  data	  is	  generally	  
problematic.839	  As	  established	  above,840	  digital	  evidence	  is	  a	  particularly	  volatile	  and	  
fragile	  type	  of	  evidence.	  It	  can	  easily	  be	  tainted	  and	  altered	  in	  any	  way.	  Thus	  proving	  
the	  authenticity	  and	  integrity	  of	  the	  evidence	  is	  much	  more	  difficult	  than	  doing	  so	  with	  
a	  piece	  of	  physical	  evidence.	  
The	  process	  of	  establishing	  authenticity	  of	  evidence	  is	  less	  structured	  under	  German	  
criminal	  procedural	  than	  it	  is	  in	  England	  and	  Wales.	  The	  reason	  is	  that	  it	  is	  the	  
discretion	  of	  the	  judge	  to	  decide	  whether	  evidence	  is	  authentic	  and	  reliable.	  
However,	  as	  a	  general	  rule	  judges	  rely	  on	  forensic	  examiners	  to	  determine	  the	  
authenticity	  of	  digital	  evidence,	  and	  forensic	  science	  plays	  an	  important	  role	  in	  
ensuring	  that	  digital	  evidence	  is	  authentic	  and	  reliable.841	  This	  technical	  process	  is	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
836	  See	  p.	  241.	  
837	  Even	  though	  exclusionary	  principles	  for	  evidence	  exist.	  See	  Roxin,	  note	  808	  for	  a	  discussion	  
of	  this.	  
838	  See	  p.	  241.	  
839	  Böckenförde,	  note	  188,	  at	  317;	  Gercke/Brunst,	  note	  815,	  at	  376.	  
840	  See	  pp.	  214ff.	  
841	  Gercke/Brunst,	  note	  815,	  at	  376.	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same	  in	  Germany,	  as	  it	  is	  in	  England	  and	  Wales.	  Therefore,	  the	  analysis	  above	  in	  section	  
7.2.2.4	  for	  details	  of	  this	  process	  is	  applicable.842	  	  
In	  essence,	  a	  bit-­‐stream	  image	  of	  the	  seized	  ICT	  device	  should	  be	  created,	  and	  all	  
examination	  undertaken	  on	  this	  copy.	  	  
The	  German	  ministry	  for	  security	  in	  information	  technology	  has	  issued	  a	  guideline	  for	  
“IT-­‐Forensic”	  that	  is	  equivalent	  to	  the	  ACPO	  guidelines,	  and	  serves	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  
forensic	  science	  methods	  applied	  are	  standardised,	  and	  therefore	  reliable.843	  	  
The	  approach	  to	  determine	  authenticity	  of	  digital	  evidence	  is	  therefore	  to	  receive	  the	  
opinion	  of	  an	  expert	  on	  the	  tools	  and	  methods	  in	  question.	  Generally,	  courts	  have	  
admitted	  digital	  evidence	  that	  has	  been	  seized	  and	  examined	  in	  line	  with	  the	  best	  
practice	  guidelines	  developed	  in	  forensic	  examinations.	  
	  
However,	  as	  discussed	  above,844	  the	  guidelines	  have	  been	  developed	  with	  static	  
systems	  in	  mind.	  Digital	  evidence	  seized	  from	  live	  systems	  using	  MIA	  tools	  challenges	  
these	  best	  practice	  guidelines,	  and	  it	  seems	  questionable	  that	  a	  forensic	  expert	  could	  
positively	  comment	  on	  the	  reliability	  and	  authenticity	  of	  such	  evidence.	  	  
	  
This	  is	  confirmed	  by	  recent	  case	  law.	  A	  defendant	  was	  acquitted	  of	  blackmail	  because	  
the	  relevant	  digital	  evidence	  was	  seized	  from	  his	  computer	  instead	  of	  creating	  a	  bit-­‐
stream	  image,	  and	  working	  on	  the	  copy.	  The	  court	  found	  that	  it	  could	  not	  be	  proven	  
beyond	  reasonable	  doubt	  that	  during	  the	  examination	  process,	  a	  third	  person	  
implanted	  the	  evidence	  on	  the	  computer.845	  	  
This	  decision	  is	  in	  line	  with	  the	  above	  described	  in	  dubio	  pro	  reo	  principle.846	  	  
	  
Thus	  it	  can	  be	  concluded	  that	  generally	  digital	  evidence	  is	  admissible	  in	  both	  
jurisdictions	  of	  England	  and	  Wales,	  and	  Germany.847	  However,	  digital	  evidence	  seized	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
842	  See	  p.	  237	  onwards,	  see	  also	  Gercke/Brunst,	  note	  815,	  at	  376,	  referring	  to	  English	  scientific	  
literature	  for	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  forensic	  examination	  process.	  
843	  Bundesamt	  für	  Sicherheit	  in	  der	  Informationstechnik,	  Leitfaden	  “IT-­‐Forensik”,	  Version	  1.0	  
(September	  2010)	  available	  online	  at:	  
https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Internetsicherheit/Leitfaden_IT-­‐
Forensik_pdf.pdf?__blob=publicationFile.	  
844	  See	  p.	  240.	  
845	  P	  Mühlbauer,	  “Wie	  verlässlich	  sind	  digitale	  Beweise?”	  (2007)	  Telepolis,	  available	  online	  at	  
http://www.heise.de/tp/r4/artikel/24/24638/1.html;	  in	  this	  case	  the	  accusation	  rested	  
entirely	  on	  the	  digital	  evidence,	  thus	  the	  decision	  to	  acquit	  the	  accused	  of	  the	  offense.	  In	  other	  
cases,	  the	  judge	  would	  merely	  consider	  the	  weight	  of	  the	  evidence	  to	  be	  minimal,	  or	  the	  
evidence	  inadmissible.	  	  
846	  See	  p.	  241.	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by	  MIA	  tools	  challenges	  existing	  legal	  frameworks,	  and	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  above	  
analysis,	  in	  absence	  of	  any	  case	  law	  dealing	  with	  this	  specific	  matter,	  is	  that	  this	  is	  
currently	  inadmissible	  in	  both	  jurisdiction:	  England	  and	  Wales,	  and	  Germany.	  	  
7.3 A Scientific Solution? 
The	  likely	  inadmissibility	  of	  digital	  evidence	  collected	  by	  MIA	  tools	  poses	  a	  problem	  for	  
the	  future	  use	  of	  these	  technologies.	  If	  the	  evidence	  seized	  by	  these	  investigative	  tools	  
cannot	  be	  admitted	  in	  court	  proceedings,	  the	  value	  of	  these	  tools	  is	  limited.	  
As	  discussed	  above,848	  science	  has	  historically	  provided	  a	  foundation	  for	  legal	  
proceedings.	  As	  shown	  there,	  this	  is	  particularly	  the	  case	  in	  forensic	  science.	  The	  
existing	  guidelines	  for	  the	  best	  handling	  of	  digital	  evidence	  evolved	  from	  this	  
confluence	  of	  science	  and	  law.	  The	  above-­‐depicted	  paradigm	  of	  forensic	  science	  (see	  
Figure	  1)	  reflects	  this	  interaction.	  	  
	  
Thus,	  the	  question	  is	  whether	  scientific	  research	  has	  produced	  findings	  that	  could	  be	  
applied	  to	  the	  authentication	  problem	  of	  digital	  evidence	  collected	  by	  MIA	  tools.	  Such	  
findings	  would	  need	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  principles	  and	  processes	  developed	  for	  the	  
forensic	  science	  paradigm,	  and	  be	  consistent	  with	  the	  best	  practice	  regulations	  of	  
forensic	  computing.	  	  
	  
The	  need	  for	  remote	  live	  evidence	  acquisition	  has	  been	  recognised	  by	  several	  authors,	  
and	  scientific	  research	  has	  been	  undertaken	  to	  develop	  robust	  methods	  to	  collect	  
reliable	  and	  authentic	  digital	  data.849	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
847	  The	  research	  for	  this	  chapter	  has	  shown	  that	  this	  is	  generally	  the	  case	  in	  most	  countries.	  See	  
e.g.	  Casey,	  note	  637;	  S	  Mason	  (ed)	  Electronic	  Evidence	  (London:	  Lexis	  Nexis	  Butterworths,	  2010)	  
covering	  Australia,	  Canada,	  England	  &	  Wales,	  Hong	  Kong,	  India,	  Ireland,	  New	  Zealand,	  Scotland,	  
Singapore,	  South	  Africa	  and	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America;	  S	  Mason	  (ed),	  International	  Electronic	  
Evidence	  (London:	  British	  Institute	  for	  International	  and	  Comparative	  Law,	  2008)	  covering	  
Argentina,	  Austria,	  Belgium,	  Bulgaria,	  Croatia,	  Cyprus,	  Czech	  Republic,	  Denmark,	  Egypt,	  Estonia,	  
Finland,	  France,	  Germany,	  Greece,	  Hungary,	  Iceland,	  Italy,	  Japan,	  Latvia,	  Lithuania,	  Luxembourg,	  
Malta,	  Mexico,	  Netherlands,	  Norway,	  Poland,	  Romania,	  Russia,	  Slovakia,	  Slovenia,	  Spain,	  Sweden,	  
Switzerland,	  Thailand	  and	  Turkey;	  O	  Leroux,	  “Legal	  Admissibility	  of	  Electronic	  Evidence”	  (2004)	  
18:2	  International	  Review	  of	  Law,	  Computers	  &	  Technology,	  193,	  for	  a	  comparison	  between	  
common	  law	  and	  civil	  law	  countries.	  
848	  See	  section	  7.1.3	  p	  217ff.	  
849	  See	  e.g.	  Kenneally,	  note	  639;	  Nikkel,	  note	  640;	  A	  Case	  et	  al.,	  “FACE:	  Automated	  digital	  
evidence	  discovery	  and	  correlation”	  (2008)	  5	  Digital	  Investigation	  65;	  F	  Adelstein,	  “Live	  
Forensics:	  Diagnosing	  Your	  System	  Without	  Killing	  it	  First”	  (2006)	  49:2	  Communications	  of	  the	  
ACM,	  63;	  R	  Koen,	  M	  Olivier,	  “An	  Evidence	  Acquisition	  Tool	  for	  Live	  Systems”	  in	  I	  Ray,	  S	  Shenoi	  
(eds.)	  IFIP	  International	  Federation	  for	  Information	  Processing,	  Volume	  285;	  Advances	  in	  Digital	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Generally,	  this	  research	  has	  established	  that	  the	  same	  types	  of	  data	  can	  be	  analysed	  
using	  dead	  and	  live	  analysis	  techniques.850	  	  This	  is	  an	  important	  finding,	  highlighting	  
that	  investigations	  of	  the	  virtual	  living	  space,	  such	  as	  online	  searches	  by	  MIA	  tools	  are	  
apt	  to	  produce	  the	  same	  evidence	  that	  common	  digital	  examinations	  of	  bit-­‐stream	  
images	  can	  produce.	  	  
However,	  considering	  the	  legal	  requirements,	  the	  difference	  between	  live	  and	  dead	  
analysis	  is	  the	  reliability	  of	  the	  results.851	  Thus	  Koen	  and	  Olivier	  establish	  that	  it	  is	  
important	  to	  ensure	  that	  digital	  evidence	  is	  not	  modified	  during	  a	  live	  acquisition	  
process.852	  Walker	  observes	  that	  even	  a	  single	  file	  timestamp	  found	  to	  be	  later	  than	  the	  
date	  of	  acquisition	  may	  cause	  digital	  evidence	  to	  be	  declared	  inadmissible	  in	  court.853	  
Hence,	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  operating	  system	  to	  update	  the	  file	  access	  time	  is	  useful	  for	  
system	  administrators,	  but	  it	  is	  highly	  undesirable	  for	  digital	  forensic	  investigations.	  
Thus	  one	  important	  finding	  is	  that	  the	  use	  of	  standard	  file	  access	  routines	  should	  be	  
avoided	  during	  live	  acquisition.854	  	  
Therefore,	  live	  acquisition	  software	  should	  have	  the	  capability	  to	  perform	  low-­‐level	  file	  
access	  without	  the	  help	  of	  the	  operating	  system,	  and	  access	  all	  files	  in	  read-­‐only	  mode	  
to	  preserve	  the	  integrity	  of	  file	  data	  and	  metadata.855	  	  
	  
To	  satisfy	  these	  requirements,	  Koen	  and	  Olivier	  have	  developed	  the	  Reco	  Platform,	  
which	  provides	  low-­‐level	  functionality	  for	  live	  acquisition	  tools.856	  Tools	  based	  on	  this	  
platform	  can	  be	  used	  to	  access	  files	  on	  a	  live	  target	  without	  compromising	  the	  state	  of	  
the	  files	  and	  their	  metadata.	  	  
Thus,	  developing	  MIA	  tools	  based	  on	  this	  platform	  would	  enable	  the	  examination	  and	  
seizure	  of	  data	  without	  altering	  the	  original	  data	  stored	  on	  the	  ICT	  tool.	  However,	  there	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Forensics	  IV	  (Boston:	  Springer,	  2008)	  325;	  B	  Carrier,	  “Risks	  of	  live	  digital	  forensic	  analysis”	  
(2006)	  49:2	  Communications	  of	  the	  ACM,	  56;	  C	  Hosmer,	  “Digital	  Evidence	  Bag”	  (2006)	  49:2	  
Communications	  of	  the	  ACM,	  69;	  P	  Turner,	  “Selective	  and	  intelligent	  imaging	  using	  digital	  
evidence	  bags”	  (2006)	  3	  Digital	  Investigation,	  59;	  G	  Richard,	  V	  Roussev,	  “File	  System	  Support	  for	  
Digital	  Evidence	  Bags”	  M	  Olivier,	  S	  Shenoi	  (eds)	  Advances	  in	  Digital	  Forensics	  II	  (New	  York:	  
Springer,	  2006)	  30.	  
850	  B	  Carrier,	  ibid,	  at	  59.	  
851	  Ibid.	  
852	  Koen/Olivier,	  note	  849,	  at	  326.	  
853	  C	  Walker,	  “Computer	  Forensics:	  Bringing	  the	  Evidence	  to	  Court”	  (2007)	  infosecwriters,	  
available	  online	  at	  
http://www.infosecwriters.com/text_resources/pdf/Computer_Forensics_to_Court.pdf.	  
854	  Koen/Olivier,	  note	  849,	  at	  326.	  
855	  Casey/Stanley,	  note	  637,	  at	  285.	  
856	  Koen/Olivier,	  note	  849,	  at	  327.	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are	  significant	  limitations	  to	  this	  approach.	  Firstly,	  access	  to	  files	  stored	  on	  the	  ICT	  tool	  
in	  a	  logical	  partition	  requires	  administrator	  privileges.	  Secondly,	  access	  to	  file	  system	  
data	  is	  by	  no	  means	  absolute	  –	  the	  low-­‐level	  data	  access	  mechanism	  can	  be	  bypassed	  by	  
sophisticated	  kernel	  rootkits.857	  	  
Hence,	  this	  approach	  provides	  a	  promising	  starting	  point	  for	  developing	  live	  remote	  
acquisition	  tools	  that	  do	  not	  alter	  the	  data	  on	  the	  target	  ICT	  tool.	  However,	  in	  its	  
current	  state,	  the	  platform	  does	  not	  support	  the	  access	  rights	  necessary	  for	  successful	  
searches	  deploying	  MIA	  tools.	  
	  
Another	  critical	  problem	  that	  arises	  from	  the	  use	  of	  MIA	  tools	  for	  evidence	  seizure	  from	  
live	  systems	  is	  the	  storage	  of	  the	  data	  during	  the	  seizure,	  and	  the	  guarantee	  of	  the	  chain	  
of	  custody.	  As	  discussed	  above,858	  if	  it	  cannot	  be	  proven	  that	  the	  digital	  data	  has	  not	  
been	  altered	  or	  modified	  during	  and	  after	  the	  seizure	  and	  examination,	  its	  authenticity	  
cannot	  be	  proven.	  
This	  problem	  could	  be	  solved	  by	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  digital	  evidence	  bag	  (DEB).859	  The	  
DEB	  was	  developed	  to	  create	  a	  digital	  evidence	  container	  that	  metaphorically	  mimics	  
the	  familiar	  plastic	  evidence	  bag	  used	  by	  crime	  scene	  investigators	  to	  collect	  physical	  
crime	  scene	  evidence.860	  	  
Turner	  explains	  further	  “a	  DEB	  is	  a	  universal	  container	  for	  digital	  information	  from	  any	  
source.	  It	  allows	  the	  provenance	  of	  digital	  information	  to	  be	  recorded	  and	  continuity	  to	  
be	  maintained	  throughout	  the	  life	  of	  the	  exhibit.”861	  DEBs	  bundle	  digital	  evidence,	  
associated	  metadata	  and	  audit	  logs	  into	  a	  single	  structure,	  providing	  an	  audit	  trail	  of	  
operations	  performed	  on	  the	  evidence	  as	  well	  as	  integrity	  checks.862	  
Therefore,	  a	  DEB	  application	  integrated	  into	  a	  live	  acquisition	  tool,	  such	  as	  a	  MIA	  tool,	  
would	  ensure	  that	  the	  digital	  data	  remains	  in	  its	  original	  state,	  and	  could	  prove	  identity	  
and	  provenance	  requirements,	  thus	  establish	  authenticity	  of	  the	  digital	  data.	  
	  
The	  above-­‐presented	  scientific	  findings	  have	  shown	  that	  relevant	  research	  is	  
undertaken	  to	  develop	  applications	  that	  ensure	  the	  reliability	  and	  authenticity	  of	  digital	  
data	  seized	  from	  live	  systems	  with	  remote	  acquisition	  tools,	  such	  as	  MIA	  tools.	  The	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
857	  Koen/Olivier,	  note	  849,	  at	  332.	  
858	  See	  p.	  236ff.	  
859	  Hosmer,	  see	  note	  849,	  at	  69.	  
860	  Ibid.	  
861	  Turner,	  see	  note	  849,	  at	  61.	  
862	  Richard/Roussev,	  see	  note	  849,	  at	  30.	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analysis	  of	  these	  findings	  has	  highlighted	  that	  the	  research	  is	  in	  line	  with	  the	  forensic	  
paradigm,	  and	  incorporates	  the	  legal	  authentication	  principles.	  This	  means	  that	  any	  
reliable	  and	  robust	  results	  are	  likely	  to	  stand	  in	  court.	  
However,	  the	  analysis	  has	  also	  revealed	  that	  the	  research	  is	  currently	  still	  in	  its	  
infancy,863	  and	  thus	  far	  only	  partially	  usable	  for	  MIA	  tools.	  It	  has	  also	  revealed	  that	  
some	  critical	  problems	  have	  yet	  to	  be	  solved.	  Most	  significantly,	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  static	  
original	  system,	  that	  can	  serve	  to	  compare	  the	  evidence	  with	  to	  prove	  that	  the	  data	  
originated	  from	  the	  ICT	  system	  in	  question,	  as	  suggested	  by	  the	  evidence.	  Solving	  this	  is	  
more	  difficult,	  and	  it	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	  whether	  a	  proven	  chain	  of	  custody	  (such	  as	  
through	  DEBs),	  including	  metadata	  that	  shows	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  data,	  is	  sufficient	  and	  
adequate	  to	  establish	  authenticity	  and	  therefore	  admissibility	  of	  the	  data	  in	  criminal	  
court	  proceedings.	  
7.4 Conclusion 
This	  chapter	  has	  analysed	  and	  examined	  the	  admissibility	  of	  digital	  evidence	  in	  
criminal	  proceedings	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  England	  and	  Wales,	  and	  Germany.	  	  
It	  has	  shown	  that	  the	  characteristics	  of	  digital	  evidence	  are	  fundamentally	  different	  
from	  those	  of	  traditional	  physical	  evidence.864	  Therefore,	  this	  new	  type	  of	  evidence	  
challenges	  existing	  legal	  frameworks	  regulating	  the	  admissibility	  of	  evidence.	  	  
However,	  digital	  evidence	  is	  not	  the	  first	  new	  type	  of	  evidence	  to	  challenge	  existing	  
legal	  concepts	  and	  frameworks.	  DNA	  evidence,	  for	  example,	  was	  treated	  initially	  with	  
great	  caution,	  until	  guidelines	  and	  best	  practice	  principles	  had	  evolved.865	  Such	  
guidelines	  and	  principles	  resulted	  from	  the	  application	  of	  scientific	  findings	  to	  the	  law.	  
This	  convergence	  of	  disciplines	  has	  a	  long	  history	  in	  evidence	  law,	  and	  has	  resulted	  in	  
the	  emergence	  of	  forensic	  science.	  	  
Forensic	  science	  has	  generated	  principles	  and	  standards	  for	  the	  handling	  of	  evidence	  
that	  are	  also	  applicable	  to	  digital	  evidence.866	  These	  principles	  set	  out	  the	  proper	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
863	  Generally,	  scientific	  findings	  need	  to	  be	  widely	  accepted	  by	  the	  scientific	  community	  to	  
establish	  authenticity	  of	  evidence.	  This	  could	  be	  the	  case,	  if	  findings	  are	  published	  in	  peer-­‐
reviewed	  journals	  and	  confirmed	  by	  other	  scientists.	  Some	  authors	  have	  raised	  concern	  about	  
the	  general	  validity	  of	  findings	  in	  forensic	  science,	  claiming	  the	  community	  is	  so	  small,	  that	  
general	  acceptance	  cannot	  be	  established	  (see	  e.g.	  Wheate/Jamieson,	  note	  715,	  at	  8	  with	  further	  
references).	  
864	  See	  p	  214.	  
865	  See	  e.g.	  L	  L	  Swafford,	  “Admissibility	  of	  DNA	  Genetic	  Profiling	  Evidence	  in	  Criminal	  
Proceedings”	  (1990)	  18:1	  Pepperdine	  Law	  Review,	  123.	  
866	  See	  p	  236ff.	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handling	  and	  examination	  of	  evidence	  to	  ensure	  that	  it	  is	  authentic	  and	  reliable,	  and	  
therefore	  admissible	  during	  court	  proceedings.	  	  
The	  authenticity	  of	  digital	  evidence	  can	  be	  assessed	  based	  on	  these	  principles,	  and	  past	  
case	  law	  has	  evidenced	  that	  these	  methods	  have	  stood	  in	  courts.	  
	  
However,	  the	  above	  analysis	  has	  also	  highlighted	  that	  digital	  evidence	  collected	  by	  MIA	  
tools	  challenges	  these	  principles	  and	  existing	  legislation.	  Existing	  methods	  proving	  
authenticity	  of	  digital	  evidence	  were	  developed	  with	  static	  systems	  in	  mind,	  and	  
generally	  accepted	  techniques	  to	  examine	  digital	  evidence	  and	  ensure	  the	  chain	  of	  
custody	  is	  intact	  are	  based	  on	  the	  interaction	  with	  offline	  ICT	  systems	  and	  the	  
examination	  of	  copies.	  	  
	  
The	  techniques	  used	  to	  remotely	  seize	  and	  examine	  digital	  evidence	  with	  MIA	  tools	  are	  
fundamentally	  different,	  and	  therefore	  the	  admissibility	  of	  this	  evidence	  questionable.	  	  
	  
However,	  as	  stated	  above,	  it	  seems	  a	  reoccurring	  pattern	  that	  new	  types	  of	  evidence	  
challenge	  existing	  legal	  frameworks.	  Scientific	  findings	  have	  traditionally	  bridged	  the	  
gap	  between	  technological	  possibilities	  and	  legal	  uncertainties.	  Current	  research	  
findings	  already	  indicate	  that	  this	  could	  also	  be	  true	  for	  digital	  evidence	  collected	  
remotely	  from	  live	  ICT	  systems	  by	  MIA	  tools.	  Significantly,	  however,	  here	  the	  focus	  is	  
on	  modifying	  the	  tool	  itself	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  forensic	  science	  principles	  are	  obeyed.	  	  
	  
This	  bears	  a	  resemblance	  with	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  where	  the	  best	  
solution	  to	  the	  cross-­‐jurisdictional	  investigation	  problem	  appeared	  to	  be	  a	  modification	  
of	  the	  tool	  to	  obey	  existing	  international	  legislation.867	  
Whether	  this	  is	  indeed	  the	  best	  option	  to	  regulate	  the	  use	  of	  MIA	  tools,	  and	  enable	  the	  
use	  of	  the	  evidence	  collected	  by	  these	  tools	  is	  discussed	  in	  the	  following	  chapters.	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
867	  See	  p	  201.	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8 MIA LAW 
	  
The	  previous	  two	  chapters	  (6	  and	  7)	  have	  highlighted	  how	  the	  new	  cyber-­‐policing	  
system	  with	  its	  novel	  investigative	  tools	  challenges	  existing	  legislation	  regulating	  
criminal	  investigations.	  The	  substitution	  of	  human	  officers	  by	  cyber-­‐cops,	  and	  human	  
discretion	  by	  technical	  intelligence	  and	  automation	  for	  the	  investigation	  of	  the	  virtual	  
living	  space	  causes	  problems	  for	  the	  traditional	  law	  enforcement	  system,	  which	  is	  still	  
tied	  to	  traditional	  concepts	  of	  policing.	  	  
	  
So	  far,	  this	  new	  cyber-­‐policing	  system	  has	  evolved	  without	  any	  clear	  legal	  structure	  and	  
few	  restraints.	  The	  focus	  has	  predominantly	  been	  on	  the	  technical	  development	  of	  the	  
new	  technologies.	  The	  reasons	  for	  this	  are	  twofold:	  Firstly,	  the	  increasing	  widespread	  
of	  ICTs	  has	  changed	  society	  and	  crime.868	  	  As	  a	  result,	  law	  enforcement	  requires	  novel	  
investigative	  methods	  to	  enable	  the	  policing	  of	  the	  virtual	  living	  space.	  To	  keep	  up	  with	  
the	  technological	  progress,	  the	  focus	  has	  been	  almost	  solely	  on	  the	  development	  of	  new	  
technologies,	  and	  legal	  considerations	  have	  largely	  been	  left	  aside.	  	  
Secondly,	  the	  current	  policing	  system	  of	  new	  technologies	  tends	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  ex-­‐ante	  
authorisation	  or	  prohibition	  of	  individual	  technologies.	  Chapter	  6	  has	  shown	  how	  
difficult,	  and	  often	  even	  impossible,	  it	  is	  to	  reach	  consensus	  among	  the	  international	  
community	  on	  the	  regulation	  of	  a	  single	  software-­‐based	  investigative	  method	  (i.e.	  the	  
online	  search).	  	  
Thus	  the	  current	  regulatory	  system	  in	  place	  has	  facilitated	  the	  evolvement	  of	  a	  new	  
cyber-­‐policing	  system	  without	  any	  or	  very	  little	  adequate	  regulation	  in	  place.	  	  
	  
The	  judgment	  of	  the	  BVerfG	  has	  emphasised	  how	  important	  a	  sustainable	  regulatory	  
approach	  is	  for	  this	  new	  class	  of	  investigative	  tools	  to	  avoid	  rights	  violations	  of	  affected	  
people.869	  Additionally,	  the	  previous	  two	  chapters	  have	  highlighted	  that	  the	  existing	  
legal	  framework	  prevents	  MIA	  tools	  from	  reaching	  their	  maximum	  utility	  during	  
investigations	  (the	  seized	  evidence	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  dismissed	  during	  court	  
proceedings)870	  and	  cannot	  prevent	  actions	  that	  violate	  international	  law.871	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
868	  See	  chapter	  1	  at	  20.	  
869	  See	  chapter	  2	  for	  the	  discussion	  of	  the	  development	  of	  the	  new	  fundamental	  right.	  
870	  See	  chapter	  7.	  
871	  See	  chapter	  6.	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The	  existing	  legal	  framework	  particularly	  struggles	  with	  the	  complexity	  of	  MIA	  tools,	  
and	  their	  unique	  abilities,	  which	  set	  them	  apart	  from	  traditional	  investigative	  tools	  and	  
turn	  them	  into	  autonomous	  entities.	  However,	  this	  complexity	  can	  also	  serve	  as	  a	  
solution	  for	  the	  current	  regulatory	  problem.	  The	  previous	  chapters	  have	  indicated	  how	  
the	  software	  code	  of	  MIA	  tools	  could	  be	  used	  to	  enable	  law-­‐compliant	  behaviour.872	  	  
	  
Software	  code	  as	  a	  regulatory	  means	  is	  not	  a	  new	  concept.	  In	  his	  influential	  book	  Code	  
and	  Other	  Laws	  of	  Cyberspace,	  Lessig	  was	  among	  the	  first	  to	  develop	  a	  notion	  of	  code	  as	  
law.873	  He	  reveals	  how	  architecture	  (software	  code)	  can	  be	  designed	  or	  changed	  to	  
realise	  and	  enforce	  norms.	  	  
	  
Brownsword	  and	  Yeung	  find	  that	  the	  Rule	  of	  Law,	  the	  traditional	  approach	  of	  regulating	  
technologies	  through	  legislation,	  might	  be	  inadequate	  for	  future	  regulation	  of	  software-­‐
based	  investigative	  tools.874	  Instead,	  they	  claim	  that	  the	  Rule	  of	  Technology	  is	  
displacing	  the	  traditional	  Rule	  of	  Law.875	  	  
Koops	  states	  that	  “technology	  increasingly	  enforces	  or	  supplements	  law	  as	  an	  
important	  regulatory	  instrument.”876	  	  
	  
Hence,	  the	  question	  is	  whether	  the	  complex	  software	  code	  of	  MIA	  tools	  that	  currently	  
challenges	  the	  law,	  could	  be	  modified	  to	  make	  these	  tools	  law-­‐complicit.	  	  
	  
In	  section	  8.1	  the	  concept	  of	  regulation	  through	  code	  as	  introduced	  by	  Lessig	  and	  
others	  is	  discussed.	  In	  section	  8.2	  the	  integration	  of	  values	  into	  technology	  is	  discussed	  
as	  a	  link	  between	  Lessig’s	  notion,	  and	  the	  notion	  of	  Ambient	  Law	  discussed	  in	  section	  
8.3.	  Section	  8.4	  develops	  the	  concept	  of	  MIA	  Law.	  Section	  8.5	  discusses	  the	  technical	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
872	  See	  pp.	  200ff,	  251.	  
873	  Lessig	  (1999),	  note	  24;	  Lessig	  (2006),	  note	  627.	  
874	  R	  Brownsword,	  K	  Yeung,	  “Regulating	  Technologies	  –	  Tools,	  Targets	  and	  Thematics”	  in	  R	  
Brownsword,	  K	  Yeung	  (eds)	  Regulating	  Technologies	  –	  Legal	  Futures,	  Regulatory	  Frames	  and	  
Technological	  Fixes	  (Oxford,	  Portland:	  Hart	  Publishing,	  2008)	  3.	  
875	  Ibid.	  
876	  B-­‐J	  Koops,	  “Criteria	  for	  Normative	  Technology	  –	  The	  Acceptability	  of	  ‘Code	  as	  Law’	  in	  Light	  of	  
Democratic	  and	  Constitutional	  Values”	  in	  R	  Brownsword,	  K	  Yeung	  (eds)	  Regulating	  Technologies	  
–	  Legal	  Futures,	  Regulatory	  Frames	  and	  Technological	  Fixes	  (Oxford,	  Portland:	  Hart	  Publishing,	  
2008)	  157.	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and	  legal	  risks	  of	  law-­‐complicit	  technologies.	  Section	  8.6	  concludes	  with	  the	  most	  
important	  findings	  of	  the	  chapter.	  
8.1 Code As Law – Modalities of (Technology) Regulation 
The	  emergence	  and	  widespread	  of	  the	  Internet	  prompted	  a	  debate	  on	  the	  regulability	  
of	  this	  new	  technology.	  Its	  unique	  nature	  required	  new	  regulatory	  approaches,	  since	  
the	  traditional	  approach	  –	  regulation	  through	  law	  –	  was	  challenged	  by	  the	  new	  
medium.877	  	  
This	  led	  to	  the	  development	  of	  regulation	  theories	  concerned	  with	  the	  governance	  of	  
the	  Internet	  and	  its	  many	  applications.878	  These	  theories,	  which	  are	  still	  valid	  today,	  
have	  fundamentally	  influenced	  academic	  thinking	  on	  Internet	  and	  ICT	  regulation.	  	  
8.1.1 Cyber-federalism 
Initially,	  the	  debate	  focused	  on	  the	  question	  whether	  the	  newly	  evolved	  Internet	  could	  
and	  or	  even	  should	  be	  regulated	  at	  all.	  
Cyber-­‐libertarians,	  such	  as	  Johnson	  and	  Post,	  argue	  that	  formal	  and	  centralised	  
regulatory	  mechanisms	  (such	  as	  laws)	  should	  and	  could	  not	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  Internet	  
because	  they	  do	  not	  work	  in	  the	  context	  of	  this	  new	  technology.	  Instead,	  they	  propose	  
that	  a	  decentralised	  decision-­‐making	  mechanism,	  which	  they	  call	  “the	  law	  of	  the	  
Internet”	  and	  “the	  law	  of	  the	  nets”	  should	  be	  applied	  to	  regulate	  this	  medium.879	  	  
Their	  argument	  is	  that	  the	  most	  successful	  regulatory	  model	  for	  the	  Internet	  is	  a	  form	  
of	  “net	  federalism”	  or	  “decentralised,	  emergent	  law”	  that	  is	  the	  result	  of	  the	  complex	  
interplay	  of	  individual	  decisions	  by	  users	  and	  system	  administrators.880	  More	  
specifically,	  they	  argue	  that	  “Internet	  federalism	  looks	  very	  different	  from	  what	  we	  
have	  become	  accustomed	  to,	  because	  here	  individual	  network	  systems,	  rather	  than	  
territorially	  based	  sovereigns,	  are	  the	  essential	  governance	  units.	  The	  law	  of	  the	  
Internet	  has	  emerged,	  and	  we	  believe	  can	  continue	  to	  emerge,	  from	  the	  voluntary	  
adherence	  of	  large	  numbers	  of	  network	  administrators	  to	  basic	  rules	  of	  law,	  with	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
877	  The	  unique	  nature	  of	  cyberspace	  has	  been	  discussed	  elsewhere	  in	  this	  work.	  See	  e.g.	  p.	  14.	  	  
878	  Arguably	  the	  most	  influential	  works	  developing	  these	  theories	  are:	  Lessig	  (1999),	  note	  24;	  
Lessig	  (2006),	  note	  627;	  L	  Lessig,	  “The	  Law	  of	  the	  Horse:	  What	  Cyberlaw	  Might	  Teach”	  (1999)	  
113	  Harvard	  Law	  Review	  501;	  J	  Reidenberg,	  “Lex	  Informatica”	  (1998)	  76	  Texas	  Law	  Review	  553;	  
Johnson/Post,	  note	  477.	  	  
879	  Johnson/Post,	  note	  477,	  at	  90.	  
880	  Johnson/Post,	  note	  477.	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individual	  users	  “voting	  with	  their	  electrons”	  to	  join	  the	  particular	  systems	  they	  find	  
most	  congenial.”881	  	  
Essentially	  what	  Johnson	  and	  Post	  suggest	  is	  a	  form	  of	  self-­‐regulation.882	  It	  is	  therefore	  
not	  a	  suitable	  theoretical	  model	  for	  Internet	  regulation,	  but	  rather	  a	  political	  and	  moral	  
concept	  applied	  to	  the	  new	  technology.	  It	  follows	  the	  directions	  of	  Barlow’s	  Declaration	  
of	  the	  Independence	  of	  Cyberspace,	  where	  he	  argues	  that	  regulators	  of	  the	  offline	  world	  
(i.e.	  governments)	  have	  no	  sovereignty	  over	  cyberspace,	  and	  should	  refrain	  from	  any	  
regulatory	  attempts	  of	  the	  Internet.883	  While	  there	  is	  an	  important	  underlying	  
argument,	  namely	  that	  the	  Internet	  and	  associated	  technologies	  can	  and	  are	  regulated	  
by	  more	  modalities	  than	  government	  enacted	  laws,	  the	  cyber-­‐federalism	  approach	  is	  
insufficient	  for	  the	  regulation	  of	  the	  Internet	  as	  it	  exists	  today,	  where	  economic	  factors	  
are	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  the	  development,	  and	  the	  average	  user	  profile	  has	  changed	  
significantly	  from	  the	  late	  ‘90s.	  	  
In	  addition,	  cybercrimes	  have	  developed	  and	  increased	  immensely.	  Problems	  like	  
spam,	  viruses,	  identity	  theft,	  the	  sexual	  exploitation	  of	  children,	  and	  cyber-­‐terrorism	  
have	  made	  a	  more	  structured	  approach	  to	  the	  regulation	  of	  the	  Internet	  a	  necessity.	  
Self-­‐regulation	  is	  therefore	  not	  an	  adequate	  option	  for	  the	  policing	  of	  the	  virtual	  living	  
space	  by	  MIA	  tools.	  
8.1.2 Lex Informatica 
Reidenberg	  in	  his	  work	  acknowledges	  that	  a	  more	  unified	  approach	  to	  Internet	  
regulation	  is	  necessary	  to	  ensure	  that	  a	  stable	  environment	  is	  provided.884	  	  
He	  states	  that	  default	  rules	  and	  principles	  are	  essential	  for	  participants	  in	  the	  
information	  society.885	  Such	  principles	  governing	  the	  treatment	  of	  digital	  information	  
offer	  stability	  and	  predictability	  so	  that	  participants	  have	  enough	  confidence	  in	  the	  use	  
of	  the	  Internet.886	  This	  is	  particularly	  important	  given	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  virtual	  
living	  space.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
881	  Johnson/Post,	  note	  477,	  at	  89.	  
882	  See	  e.g.	  L	  J	  Gibbons,	  “No	  Regulation,	  Government	  Regulation,	  or	  Self-­‐Regulation:	  Social	  
Enforcement	  or	  Social	  Contracting	  for	  Governance	  in	  Cyberspace”	  (1997)	  6	  Cornell	  Journal	  of	  
Law	  and	  Public	  Policy,	  475,	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  self-­‐regulation	  (as	  opposed	  to	  co-­‐
regulation	  and	  government	  regulation).	  
883	  J	  P	  Barlow,	  note	  477.	  
884	  Reidenberg,	  note	  878,	  at	  553.	  
885	  Reidenberg,	  note	  878,	  at	  554.	  
886	  Ibid.	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Reidenberg	  argues	  that	  in	  the	  digital	  realm,	  law	  and	  government	  regulation	  are	  not	  the	  
best	  approaches	  to	  ensure	  that	  default	  rules	  and	  principles	  are	  enforced.887	  	  He	  
observes	  that	  cyberspace,	  being	  a	  global	  network,	  challenges	  national	  concepts	  of	  
law.888	  Reidenberg	  suggests	  as	  a	  solution	  to	  this	  problem	  the	  implementation	  of	  
information	  policies	  into	  network	  designs	  and	  standards,	  and	  system	  configurations.	  
He	  refers	  to	  this	  regulatory	  approach	  as	  Lex	  Informatica,	  thus	  comparing	  the	  newly	  
emerging	  technology-­‐embedded	  ‘law’	  with	  the	  largely	  bottom-­‐up-­‐developed	  Lex	  
Mercatoria	  of	  the	  Middle	  Ages.889	  
Reidenberg	  explains	  the	  notion	  further,	  stating,	  “in	  the	  context	  of	  information	  flows	  on	  
networks,	  the	  technical	  solutions	  begin	  to	  illustrate	  that	  network	  technology	  itself	  
imposes	  rules	  for	  the	  access	  to	  and	  use	  of	  information.	  Technological	  architectures	  may	  
prohibit	  certain	  actions	  on	  the	  network,	  such	  as	  access	  without	  security	  clearances,	  or	  
may	  impose	  certain	  flows,	  such	  as	  mandatory	  address	  routing	  data	  for	  electronic	  
messages.	  Policy	  choices	  are	  available	  either	  through	  technology	  itself,	  through	  laws	  
that	  cause	  technology	  to	  exclude	  possible	  options,	  or	  through	  laws	  that	  cause	  users	  to	  
restrict	  certain	  actions.”890	  
	  
Reidenberg	  was	  among	  the	  first	  scholars	  to	  suggest	  that	  in	  cyberspace,	  the	  technology	  
itself	  can	  constitute	  a	  means	  of	  regulation.	  That	  is	  the	  design	  of	  hardware	  and	  software	  
can	  be	  amended	  to	  allow	  or	  disallow	  certain	  behaviour.	  He	  states	  that	  Lex	  Informatica	  
has	  distinct	  enforcement	  properties,	  allowing	  for	  automated	  and	  self-­‐executing	  rule	  
enforcement.	  Technology	  standards	  may	  be	  designed	  to	  prevent	  actions	  from	  taking	  
place	  without	  proper	  permission	  or	  authority.891	  	  
He	  identifies	  software	  designers	  (commercial	  and	  private),	  and	  users	  -­‐	  through	  
software	  configuration	  as	  the	  main	  developers	  of	  Lex	  Informatica,	  establishing	  the	  
required	  principles	  through	  software	  design.892	  However,	  he	  also	  states	  that	  
policymakers	  are	  able	  to	  influence	  this	  process,	  and	  should	  “add	  Lex	  Informatica	  to	  
their	  set	  of	  policy	  instruments,	  and	  substitute	  this	  for	  law	  where	  self-­‐executing,	  
customised	  rules	  are	  desirable.”893	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
887	  Ibid.	  
888	  Ibid.	  	  
889	  Ibid.	  
890	  Reidenberg,	  note	  878,	  at	  565.	  
891	  Reidenberg,	  note	  878,	  at	  568.	  
892	  Reidenberg,	  note	  878,	  at	  568.	  
893	  Reidenberg,	  note	  878,	  at	  578.	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8.1.3 Lessig’s Theorem 
Lessig	  has	  developed	  a	  more	  comprehensive	  approach	  to	  cyberspace	  regulation,	  taking	  
into	  account	  the	  complex	  synergies	  that	  exist	  between	  the	  different	  actors	  involved	  in	  
the	  development	  and	  use	  of	  the	  Internet.894	  	  
His	  approach	  rests	  on	  the	  argument	  that	  four	  types	  of	  constraints	  in	  general	  regulate	  
behaviour:	  laws,	  social	  norms,	  markets,	  and	  architecture	  (or	  code).895	  	  
	  
	  
Figure 1: Four modalities of regulation (adapted from Lessig)896 
	  
Laws	  are	  the	  legal	  constraints	  that	  regulate	  behaviour.	  Laws	  typically	  regulate	  
individual	  behaviour	  directly,	  and	  do	  so	  by	  threatening	  ex	  post	  facto	  sanctions.897	  Laws	  
are	  the	  means	  of	  the	  traditional	  regulatory	  approach,	  which	  has	  functioned	  in	  the	  real	  
world	  more	  or	  less	  successfully	  for	  centuries.898	  As	  illustrated	  in	  figure	  1	  above,	  laws,	  
however,	  also	  regulate	  behaviour	  indirectly,	  by	  regulating	  markets,	  norms,	  and	  code.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
894	  Lessig,	  note	  24;	  Lessig,	  note	  878.	  
895	  Lessig,	  note	  878,	  at	  506;	  Lessig	  (2006),	  note	  627,	  at	  123.	  
896	  Lessig	  (2006),	  note	  627,	  at	  130.	  
897	  G	  Greenleaf,	  “An	  Endnote	  on	  Regulating	  Cyberspace:	  Architecture	  vs	  Law?”	  (1998)	  21:1	  
University	  of	  New	  South	  Wales	  Law	  Journal,	  593,	  604.	  
898	  This	  is	  not	  the	  place	  to	  review	  and	  assess	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  regulation	  through	  law	  in	  
general.	  In	  criminology	  in	  particular,	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  regulation	  through	  law	  has	  been	  
questioned	  long	  before,	  and	  regulation	  through	  architecture	  has	  been	  researched	  as	  an	  
alternative	  approach.	  This	  research	  is	  founded	  on	  the	  ideas	  of	  Foucault,	  M	  Foucault,	  Discipline	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Similarly,	  law	  also	  regulates	  behaviour	  in	  cyberspace.	  Copyright	  regulations,	  
defamation,	  and	  obscenity	  law	  are	  equally	  applicable	  to	  the	  online	  sphere,	  and	  threaten	  
ex	  post	  sanctions	  for	  violations.899	  However,	  recent	  regulatory	  attempts	  have	  shown	  
that	  law	  is	  not	  always	  suitable	  to	  regulate	  behaviour	  online.900	  
	  
Norms,	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  social	  norms,	  are	  the	  bundle	  of	  publicly	  accepted	  and	  unaccepted	  
behaviour.	  Like	  law,	  norms	  regulate	  behaviour	  by	  threatening	  punishment	  ex	  post.901	  
But	  unlike	  law,	  as	  Lessig	  highlights,	  the	  punishment	  of	  laws	  is	  not	  centralised.	  Norms	  
are	  enforced	  (if	  at	  all)	  by	  a	  community,	  not	  by	  a	  government.902	  Greenleaf	  explains	  this	  
further,	  stating	  that	  “social	  norms,	  for	  example,	  cause	  us	  to	  frown	  on	  racist	  jokes,	  to	  tell	  
the	  truth	  about	  our	  age	  where	  concessions	  might	  be	  available,	  and	  to	  observe	  other	  
conventions	  both	  because	  we	  have	  been	  brought	  up	  to	  feel	  guilty	  if	  we	  act	  otherwise,	  
and	  also	  because	  we	  fear	  social	  embarrassment	  by	  doing	  otherwise	  (at	  least	  if	  caught).	  
Norms	  also	  aid	  the	  observance	  of	  the	  sanctions	  of	  law	  by	  making	  us	  guilty	  about	  
breaking	  laws	  even	  if	  the	  likelihood	  of	  enforcement	  is	  next	  to	  nil.”903	  
Norms	  in	  cyberspace	  regulate	  behaviour	  in	  particular	  on	  social	  networking	  websites,	  
where	  so	  called	  “Netiquettes”	  attempt	  to	  enforce	  what	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  acceptable	  
behaviour.	  
	  
Markets	  are	  an	  economic	  way	  of	  regulating	  behaviour.	  They	  do	  so	  by	  regulating	  the	  
price	  of	  goods.	  Lessig	  highlights,	  that	  the	  market	  is	  only	  able	  to	  constrain	  in	  this	  
manner	  because	  of	  other	  constraints	  of	  law	  and	  social	  norms:	  property,	  and	  contract	  
law	  govern	  markets;	  markets	  operate	  within	  the	  domain	  permitted	  by	  social	  norms.904	  
The	  influence	  of	  the	  law	  on	  the	  market	  is	  also	  illustrated	  above	  in	  figure	  1.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and	  Punish	  (New	  York:	  Pantheon,	  1977),	  who	  discussed	  in	  his	  work	  how	  architecture	  can	  
regulate	  behaviour.	  See	  e.g	  N	  K	  Katyal,	  “Digital	  Architecture	  as	  Crime	  Control”	  (2003)	  112	  The	  
Yale	  Law	  Journal,	  2261;	  R	  Jones,	  “Architecture,	  Criminal	  Justice,	  and	  Control”	  in	  L	  McAra,	  S	  
Armstrong	  (eds)	  Perspectives	  on	  Punishment:	  The	  Contours	  of	  Control	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  
Press,	  2005)	  471	  for	  an	  application	  of	  those	  ideas	  to	  the	  digital	  realm.	  
899	  Sufficient	  case	  law	  exists	  to	  highlight	  the	  influence	  of	  law	  on	  cyberspace,	  and	  sanctions	  
imposed	  for	  violations.	  See	  e.g.	  Dow	  Jones	  v	  Jameel	  ,	  [2005]	  EWCA	  Civ	  75;	  Al	  Amoudi	  v	  Brisard	  
and	  JCB	  Consulting	  International	  SARL	  [2006]	  EWHC	  1062	  (QB);	  G	  and	  G	  v	  Wikimedia	  
Foundation	  [2009]	  EWHC	  3148	  (QB);	  BGH,	  Az.	  I	  ZR	  57/09,	  17.	  August	  2011.	  
900	  See	  e.g	  the	  above	  discussed	  Digital	  Economy	  Act	  in	  UK,	  and	  the	  Access	  Restriction	  Act	  in	  
Germany,	  p.	  74.	  
901	  Lessig,	  note	  878,	  at	  507.	  
902	  Ibid.	  
903	  Greenleaf,	  note	  897,	  at	  603.	  
904	  Lessig,	  note	  878,	  at	  507.	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In	  cyberspace,	  markets	  regulate	  behaviour	  by,	  for	  example,	  constraining	  access	  through	  
price	  structures,	  as	  Lessig	  explains.905	  In	  addition,	  popular	  websites	  receive	  more	  funds	  
through	  advertisements,	  and	  therefore	  will	  more	  likely	  remain	  online.	  
	  
Architecture,	  or	  code,	  is	  the	  fourth	  modality	  in	  Lessig’s	  approach.	  Architecture	  in	  the	  
real	  world	  regulates	  behaviour	  by	  being	  designed	  in	  a	  certain	  way.	  Lessig	  explains	  that	  
architecture	  in	  the	  physical	  world	  refers	  to	  “how	  it	  has	  been	  made”.906	  Greenleaf	  states	  
further	  that	  when	  considering	  regulation	  in	  real	  space,	  “it	  is	  easy	  to	  ignore	  the	  roles	  of	  
the	  natural	  environment,	  the	  artefacts	  of	  the	  built	  environment,	  and	  human	  biology,	  
because	  we	  so	  often	  take	  them	  as	  the	  ‘givens’	  of	  the	  situation	  being	  regulated.”907	  Bing	  
emphasises	  this	  point	  stating	  “numerous	  instances	  in	  the	  physical	  world	  exist	  where	  
physical	  barriers	  make	  the	  enforcement	  of	  man-­‐made	  rules	  mandatory,	  or	  at	  least	  more	  
efficient.”908	  
In	  cyberspace,	  however,	  architecture,	  or	  rather	  code	  as	  Lessig	  refers	  to	  this	  modality	  in	  
the	  online	  sphere,	  is	  the	  software	  and	  hardware	  that	  constitutes	  cyberspace.	  Lessig	  
further	  describes	  this	  as	  the	  rules	  and	  instructions	  embedded	  in	  the	  software	  and	  
hardware	  that	  together	  constitute	  cyberspace	  as	  is.909	  Code	  can	  change,	  either	  because	  
it	  evolves	  in	  a	  different	  way,	  or	  because	  government	  or	  business	  pushes	  it	  to	  evolve	  in	  a	  
particular	  way.	  The	  code	  constitutes	  a	  set	  of	  constraints	  on	  how	  one	  can	  behave.	  The	  
substance	  of	  these	  constraints	  can	  vary,	  but	  they	  are	  all	  experienced	  as	  conditions	  on	  
one’s	  access	  to	  cyberspace.910	  These	  can,	  for	  example,	  be	  password	  protected	  websites,	  
encryption	  options,	  or	  the	  tracking	  through	  cookies.	  
	  
While	  these	  four	  modalities	  are	  separate	  means	  of	  regulation,	  as	  evidenced	  in	  figure	  1	  
above,	  they	  necessarily	  influence	  each	  other	  in	  their	  regulatory	  quest.	  As	  depicted	  in	  
figure	  1,	  law	  influences	  all	  other	  modalities.	  It	  defines	  the	  principles	  and	  boundaries	  of	  
the	  regulatory	  powers	  of	  the	  other	  modalities.	  The	  analysis	  of	  all	  interactions	  and	  
influences	  of	  these	  modalities	  on	  each	  other	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  thesis.	  The	  
details	  of	  this	  confluence	  of	  modalities	  concern	  this	  thesis	  only	  marginally.	  The	  focus	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
905	  Lessig,	  note	  878,	  at	  508.	  
906	  Lessig,	  note	  878,	  at	  507.	  
907	  Greenleaf,	  note	  897,	  at	  604.	  
908	  J	  Bing,	  “Human	  Rights	  in	  the	  Digital	  Age”	  in	  M	  Klang,	  A	  Murray	  (eds)	  Human	  Rights	  in	  the	  
Digital	  Age	  (London:	  Glasshouse	  Press,	  2006)	  203-­‐217,	  210.	  
909	  Lessig,	  note	  878,	  at	  506.	  
910	  Lessig,	  note	  878,	  at	  509.	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on	  the	  confluence	  of	  law	  and	  code,	  to	  determine	  whether	  regulation	  through	  code	  could	  
be	  a	  solution	  for	  the	  problems	  that	  arise	  from	  the	  regulation	  of	  MIA	  tools	  through	  law.	  
	  
Lessig	  argues	  that	  code	  will	  be	  the	  regulator	  of	  choice	  in	  cyberspace	  because	  it	  is	  the	  
most	  pervasive	  modality.911	  	  
The	  reason	  why	  code	  is	  of	  such	  high	  significance	  for	  the	  regulation	  of	  the	  Internet	  and	  
ICTs	  is	  that	  cyberspace	  is	  a	  man-­‐made	  space.	  By	  changing	  the	  technical	  aspects	  of	  the	  
Internet,	  its	  core	  functionality	  can	  be	  changed,	  and	  behaviour	  can	  be	  regulated.	  Kohl	  
makes	  an	  important	  observation,	  stating	  that	  “while	  often	  change	  of	  design	  means	  an	  
increase	  in	  user-­‐friendliness	  and	  convenience;	  it	  can	  also	  be	  used	  to	  implement	  
regulatory	  objectives.”912	  	  
Lessig	  provides	  an	  example	  in	  point,	  and	  thereby	  illustrates	  the	  difference	  between	  
architecture	  or	  code	  as	  a	  regulatory	  modality	  in	  real	  space	  and	  cyberspace,	  discussing	  
how	  regulators	  can	  invade	  privacy	  through	  design.	  He	  discusses	  the	  example	  of	  a	  
customer	  in	  a	  store,	  being	  tracked	  by	  cameras,	  a	  shop	  assistant	  noting	  down	  every	  item	  
placed	  in	  the	  shopping	  cart,	  and	  calculating	  the	  time	  spent	  in	  any	  given	  aisle.	  The	  
cashier,	  demanding	  to	  see	  identification	  before	  the	  purchase	  can	  be	  made.913	  In	  real	  
space,	  the	  customer	  notices	  this,	  and	  can	  choose	  to	  abandon	  the	  purchase	  at	  this	  
specific	  store.	  	  
In	  cyberspace,	  however,	  he	  argues	  correctly,	  these	  actions	  are	  not	  similarly	  visible.	  The	  
purchaser’s	  movements	  and	  actions	  are	  recorded	  by	  a	  piece	  of	  software	  designed	  into	  
the	  code	  that	  constitutes	  the	  online	  store.	  The	  customer	  is	  unaware	  that	  these	  
monitoring	  actions	  are	  undertaken.914	  	  
Thus	  code	  in	  the	  online	  context	  influences	  how	  people	  can	  behave	  (hard	  criteria),	  
whereas	  law	  influences	  how	  people	  should	  behave	  (soft	  criteria).915	  	  
Brownsword	  adds	  that	  “regulators,	  having	  identified	  a	  desired	  pattern	  of	  behaviour	  
(whether	  morally	  compliant	  or	  not),	  secure	  that	  pattern	  of	  behaviour	  by	  designing	  out	  
any	  option	  of	  non-­‐conforming	  behaviour.	  Such	  measures	  might	  involve	  designing	  
regulatees	  themselves,	  their	  environments,	  or	  the	  products	  that	  they	  use	  in	  their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
911	  Lessig,	  note	  878,	  at	  510.	  
912	  Kohl,	  note	  14,	  at	  31.	  
913	  Lessig,	  note	  878,	  at	  504.	  
914	  Lessig,	  note	  878,	  at	  505.	  
915	  Koops,	  note	  876,	  at	  159.	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environments,	  or	  a	  combination	  of	  these	  elements.	  Where	  this	  techno-­‐regulation	  is	  
perfectly	  instantiated,	  there	  is	  no	  need	  for	  either	  correction	  or	  enforcement.916	  	  
	  
This	  discussion	  about	  the	  different	  regulatory	  approaches	  to	  Internet	  and	  ICT	  
governance	  and	  regulation	  has	  highlighted	  that	  regulation	  through	  code	  (also	  referred	  
to	  as	  Lex	  Informatica,	  or	  techno-­‐regulation)917	  has	  assumed	  a	  central	  role	  in	  the	  
governance	  of	  these	  technologies.	  The	  unique	  problems	  that	  these	  technologies	  pose	  
for	  the	  regulation	  through	  law	  combined	  with	  their	  distinct	  nature	  that	  lends	  itself	  to	  
changes	  in	  design,	  have	  made	  the	  regulatory	  modality	  architecture,	  which	  has	  often	  
been	  disregarded	  in	  the	  real	  world,918	  a	  primary	  choice.	  The	  creation	  or	  existence	  of	  
design	  constraints	  that	  enable	  or	  disable	  certain	  behaviour	  is	  a	  particularly	  effective	  
way	  of	  the	  regulation	  of	  cyberspace.	  	  
	  
Since	  the	  seminal	  works	  of	  Lessig	  and	  Reidenberg,	  the	  concept	  of	  regulation	  through	  
code	  has	  been	  researched	  and	  discussed	  from	  different	  perspectives.919	  
However,	  the	  focus	  of	  all	  this	  research	  has	  been	  on	  the	  regulation	  of	  human	  behaviour	  
through	  code.	  The	  concept	  code	  as	  law	  thus	  refers	  to	  the	  use	  of	  technologies	  to	  enforce	  
law	  and	  legal	  concepts	  online.	  The	  interaction	  of	  code	  and	  law	  in	  this	  concept	  thus	  
refers	  to	  the	  prevention	  of	  illegal	  or	  otherwise	  undesirable	  behaviour	  and	  activities	  on	  
the	  Internet	  by	  design.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
916	  R	  Brownsword,	  “Code,	  Control,	  and	  Choice:	  Why	  East	  is	  East	  and	  West	  is	  West”	  (2005)	  25:1	  
Legal	  Studies,	  1,	  13.	  
917	  Reidenberg,	  note	  878,	  Brownsword,	  ibid.	  
918	  It	  is,	  however,	  important	  to	  note	  that	  this	  is	  not	  per	  se	  a	  new	  regulatory	  modality.	  Bing	  
reasons	  correctly	  that	  “the	  implementation	  of	  regulations	  in	  computer	  programs	  […]	  are	  not	  
radical,	  new	  ways	  of	  forging	  links	  between	  the	  physical	  world	  and	  law.	  It	  is	  rather	  part	  of	  a	  
continuum	  that	  streches	  far	  back	  in	  the	  history	  of	  man,	  to	  the	  very	  origins	  of	  law.	  But	  
information	  technology	  offers	  us	  ever	  more	  subtle	  means	  and	  more	  sophisticated	  possibilities	  
than	  before	  (Bing,	  note	  908,	  at	  210).	  
919	  For	  but	  a	  few	  examples,	  see	  C	  Ahlert,	  “Technology	  of	  Control:	  How	  Code	  Controls	  
Communication”	  (2003)	  in	  Organization	  for	  Security	  and	  Co-­‐operation	  in	  Europe	  (OSCE),	  
Spreading	  the	  Word	  on	  the	  Internet,	  119;	  T	  Wu,	  “When	  Code	  Isn’t	  Law”	  (2003)	  89	  Virginia	  Law	  
Review	  679;	  M	  Rotenberg,	  “Fair	  Information	  Practices	  and	  the	  Architecture	  of	  Privacy”	  (2001)	  
Stanford	  Technology	  Law	  Review	  1;	  L	  J	  Camp,	  S	  Syme,	  “Code	  as	  Governance,	  Governance	  of	  Code”	  
(2001)	  John	  F.	  Kennedy	  School	  Government	  Faculty	  Research	  Working	  Paper	  Series;	  N	  Nguy,	  
“Using	  Architectural	  Contraints	  and	  Game	  Theory	  to	  Regulate	  International	  Cyberspace	  
Behaviour”	  (2004)	  5	  San	  Diego	  International	  Law	  Journal,	  431;	  L	  Edwards,	  “The	  Changing	  Shape	  
of	  Cyberlaw”	  (2004)	  1:3	  SCRIPTed,	  363;	  Z	  Chenwei,	  “In	  Code,	  We	  Trust?	  Regulation	  and	  
Emancipation	  in	  Cyberspace”	  (2004)	  1:4	  SCRIPTed,	  585;	  T	  B	  Nachbar,	  “Paradox	  and	  Structure:	  
Relying	  on	  Government	  Regulation	  to	  Preserve	  the	  Internet’s	  Unregulated	  Character”	  (2000)	  85	  
Minnesota	  Law	  Review,	  215;	  R	  Brownsword,	  “Neither	  East	  Nor	  West,	  Is	  Mid-­‐West	  Best?”	  (2006)	  
3:1	  SCRIPTed,	  15.	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This,	  however,	  is	  not	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  thesis.	  The	  question	  here	  is	  if	  and	  how	  software	  
tools	  can	  be	  designed	  to	  obey	  the	  law.	  Thus	  it	  is	  about	  the	  regulation	  of	  software,	  and	  
not	  the	  user’s	  behaviour.	  The	  question	  is	  therefore	  whether	  the	  concept	  of	  code	  as	  a	  
regulatory	  modality	  is	  applicable	  to	  this	  problem.	  	  
	  
While	  the	  concept	  code	  as	  law	  is	  not	  of	  direct	  relevance	  for	  this	  thesis,	  the	  above	  
discussion	  was	  nevertheless	  important	  for	  the	  general	  understanding	  of	  the	  regulatory	  
modality	  code,	  and	  the	  finding	  that	  technologies	  through	  their	  code	  can	  have	  a	  
normative	  impact.	  	  
8.2 Embodying Values in Code 
What	  can	  be	  derived	  from	  the	  above	  discussion	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  code	  as	  law	  is	  that	  the	  
design	  of	  code	  is	  crucial	  for	  the	  normative	  impact	  it	  can	  potentially	  have.	  Thus	  as	  a	  next	  
step	  it	  needs	  to	  be	  established	  whether	  code	  can	  be	  designed	  to	  obey	  norms	  and	  laws,	  
and	  whether	  this	  can	  constitute	  a	  viable	  regulatory	  option	  for	  the	  governance	  of	  MIA	  
tools.	  	  
	  
Nissenbaum	  has	  contributed	  important	  findings	  to	  this	  debate,	  albeit	  her	  focus	  is	  not	  
specifically	  on	  legal	  norms,	  but	  on	  societal	  norms	  in	  general.920	  She	  established	  that	  the	  
potentially	  significant	  influence	  of	  ICTs	  on	  societies	  challenges	  previous	  commitments	  
to	  values	  and	  principles.921	  These	  values	  could	  include	  liberty,	  justice,	  enlightenment,	  
privacy,	  security,	  friendship,	  comfort,	  trust,	  autonomy	  and	  sustenance,922	  thus	  
substantive	  social,	  moral	  and	  political	  values,	  which	  are	  coherent	  to	  the	  functioning	  of	  
societies.	  To	  address	  these	  challenges,	  she	  suggests	  embodying	  values	  into	  technical	  
systems	  and	  devices.923	  
She	  hypothesises	  that	  ICTs	  pose	  a	  challenge	  for	  societies	  by	  threatening	  values	  that	  
were	  inherent	  to	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  “pre-­‐technology”	  society.	  Privacy	  is	  an	  obvious	  
example	  among	  the	  values	  she	  has	  listed.	  The	  potential	  impact	  of	  ICTs	  on	  privacy	  rights	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
920	  H	  Nissenbaum,	  “How	  Computer	  Systems	  Embody	  Values”	  (2001)	  3	  IEEE	  Computer,	  120;	  M	  
Flanagan,	  D	  C	  Howe,	  H	  Nissenbaum,	  “Embodying	  Values	  in	  Technology	  –	  Theory	  and	  Practice”	  in	  
J	  van	  den	  Hoven,	  J	  Weckert	  (eds)	  Information	  Technology	  and	  Moral	  Philosophy	  (Cambridge:	  
Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2008)	  322.	  
921	  Nissenbaum,	  note	  ibid,	  at	  120.	  
922	  Flanagan/Howe/Nissenbaum,	  note	  920,	  at	  322.	  
923	  Nissenbaum,	  note	  920,	  at	  119.	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has	  been	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  section.924	  She	  argues	  further,	  that	  these	  threats	  to	  
values	  and	  principles	  cannot	  be	  addressed	  by	  existing	  regulatory	  mechanisms.925	  
Therefore,	  asserting	  that	  a	  different	  approach	  is	  required.	  	  
The	  idea	  of	  modifying	  the	  underlying	  architecture/code	  of	  the	  technologies	  to	  address	  
these	  problems,	  is	  a	  logical	  continuum	  (though	  her	  work	  is	  not	  necessarily	  built	  on	  that	  
of	  Lessig	  and	  others	  focusing	  on	  the	  law	  alone)	  of	  the	  concept	  code	  as	  law,	  that	  is	  based	  
on	  the	  fact	  that	  design	  is	  an	  important	  step	  that	  determines	  the	  shape	  of	  technologies.	  
However,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  code	  as	  law	  that	  looks	  at	  modifying	  code	  to	  
influence	  human	  behaviour,	  this	  approach	  suggests	  to	  modify	  code	  of	  technologies	  to	  
adhere	  to	  existing	  normative	  frameworks	  and	  principles.	  Thus,	  this	  line	  of	  research	  
confirms	  the	  hypothesis	  of	  this	  thesis	  that	  code	  can	  be	  designed	  to	  obey	  legal	  concepts.	  
The	  question	  is	  whether	  the	  incorporation	  of	  norms	  as	  suggested	  by	  Nissenbaum	  can	  
be	  accomplished.	  This	  would	  be	  a	  strong	  indicator	  that	  this	  is	  also	  possible	  for	  laws.	  	  
Generally,	  as	  Nissenbaum	  points	  out,	  the	  problem	  is	  that	  technologies	  are	  developed	  
without	  the	  societal	  values	  in	  mind.926	  This	  is	  in	  large	  part	  due	  to	  the	  sparseness	  of	  
methodologies	  that	  exist	  for	  designers	  willing	  to	  incorporate	  values	  into	  
technologies.927	  However,	  this	  is	  also	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  technology	  development	  and	  
design	  focuses	  on	  economic	  demands,	  and	  recent	  scientific	  findings,	  instead	  of	  the	  
impact	  these	  technologies	  can	  have	  on	  societies	  and	  users.	  
Flanagan	  et	  al.	  tested	  the	  theoretical	  idea	  of	  incorporating	  values	  into	  technology	  on	  an	  
experimental	  game	  prototype,	  to	  assess	  the	  feasibility	  of	  the	  approach.928	  While	  the	  
details	  of	  this	  experiment	  are	  not	  relevant	  for	  this	  thesis,	  the	  outcomes	  are.	  	  
In	  this	  experiment	  it	  could	  be	  established	  that	  the	  incorporation	  of	  values	  into	  
technologies	  is	  possible.	  However,	  this	  is	  only	  the	  case	  if	  a	  structured	  methodology	  is	  
applied.929	  This	  methodology930	  includes	  (1)	  a	  discovery	  phase,	  in	  which	  a	  list	  of	  
relevant	  values	  is	  compiled,	  followed	  by	  (2)	  a	  translation	  phase,	  where	  the	  relevant	  
values	  are	  translated	  into	  machine-­‐readable	  code	  and	  implemented	  in	  material	  design	  
features	  corresponding	  to	  these	  values.	  The	  final	  (3)	  verification	  phase	  determines	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
924	  See	  p.	  261.	  
925	  Nissenbaum,	  note	  920,	  at	  120.	  
926	  Nissenbaum,	  note	  920,	  at	  119.	  
927	  Flanagan/Howe/Nissenbaum,	  note	  920,	  at	  329.	  
928	  Flanagan/Howe/Nissenbaum,	  note	  920,	  at	  331.	  
929	  Flanagan/Howe/Nissenbaum,	  note	  920,	  at	  347.	  
930	  Flanagan/Howe/Nissenbaum,	  note	  920,	  at	  347.	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whether	  the	  implementation	  has	  been	  successful,	  using	  a	  variety	  of	  methods	  in	  order	  to	  
ascertain	  whether	  the	  designers’	  intentions	  have	  been	  met.	  	  
	  
One	  potential	  problem	  in	  applying	  these	  academic	  results	  to	  mainstream	  technology	  
design	  is	  the	  potential	  lack	  of	  influence	  that	  designers	  have	  on	  the	  realisation	  of	  the	  end	  
product.931	  The	  design	  is	  influenced	  by	  consumer	  demands	  as	  well	  as	  economic	  factors	  
(i.e.	  the	  market).	  Thus	  incorporating	  values	  might	  contradict	  these	  demands	  and	  
therefore	  render	  any	  potential	  progress	  in	  this	  area.	  Moreover,	  ICT	  technologies	  are	  so	  
manifold	  and	  can	  even	  change	  significantly	  from	  generation	  to	  generation,	  that	  a	  
constant	  evaluation	  of	  the	  relevant	  values	  might	  be	  necessary,	  which	  could	  be	  deemed	  
too	  costly.	  	  	  
	  
All	  these	  problematic	  issues	  would	  not	  apply	  to	  MIA	  tools.	  This	  class	  of	  technologies	  is	  
designed	  for	  a	  specific	  purpose,	  and	  commercial	  factors	  do	  not	  affect	  the	  design.	  	  
Therefore,	  having	  determined	  that	  generally	  code	  can	  be	  designed	  to	  incorporate	  
certain	  rules	  to	  obey	  principles,	  it	  needs	  to	  be	  established	  whether	  this	  is	  also	  true	  for	  
the	  specific	  case	  of	  law.	  	  
8.3 Ambient Law 
Values	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  concepts	  that	  describe	  the	  beliefs	  of	  individuals	  and	  society.	  
These	  concepts,	  such	  as	  the	  general	  understanding	  of	  justice,	  trust,	  and	  privacy,	  often	  
influence	  the	  interpretation	  or	  drafting	  of	  statutory	  laws,932	  but	  are	  in	  general	  more	  
vague	  and	  flexible	  than	  codified	  laws.	  They	  do	  not	  usually	  exist	  in	  written	  form,	  and	  as	  
discussed	  above	  for	  norms,933	  these	  concepts	  are	  not	  centrally	  enforced.	  Indeed	  the	  
precise	  understanding	  can	  vary	  between	  different	  groups	  in	  a	  society.	  While	  the	  
violation	  of	  these	  concepts	  can	  result	  in	  ex	  post	  punishment,	  punishment	  is	  executed	  
through	  a	  community	  and	  not	  normally	  the	  government	  (it	  can	  in	  as	  much	  as	  values	  
influence	  the	  interpretation	  of	  laws).	  	  
Contrary	  to	  this,	  laws	  are	  often	  codified,	  and	  the	  exact	  wording	  is	  important	  for	  the	  
understanding	  and	  interpretation	  of	  the	  laws.	  Violations	  can	  therefore	  occur,	  if	  there	  is	  
a	  lack	  of	  knowledge	  about	  the	  exact	  wording	  of	  a	  specific	  law,	  or	  if	  these	  are	  wrongly	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
931	  Flanagan/Howe/Nissenbaum,	  note	  920,	  at	  349.	  
932	  W	  N	  Eskridge,	  “Public	  Values	  in	  Statutory	  Interpretation”	  (1989)	  137:4	  University	  of	  
Pennsylvania	  Law	  Review,	  1007,	  1009.	  
933	  See	  p.	  259.	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interpreted.	  Thus	  in	  essence,	  values	  are	  vague	  concepts	  of	  interchangeable	  and	  
alterable	  beliefs,	  whereas	  laws	  are	  explicit	  and	  often	  codified	  concepts	  of	  mandatory	  
and	  binding	  rules.	  
This	  means	  that	  the	  requirements	  for	  the	  incorporation	  of	  values	  into	  code	  as	  discussed	  
in	  the	  previous	  paragraph	  differ	  from	  those	  for	  the	  incorporation	  of	  laws.	  The	  
translation	  of	  values	  into	  code	  can	  be	  vague,	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  those	  principles	  relevant	  
for	  the	  specific	  application	  of	  the	  technology	  and	  easily	  translatable	  into	  code.	  It	  is	  
generally	  sufficient	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  main	  principles	  of	  the	  specific	  value	  to	  ensure	  the	  
technology	  is	  value-­‐complicit.	  Contrary	  to	  this,	  the	  exact	  wording	  and	  meaning	  of	  laws,	  
including	  every	  detail	  and	  possible	  variation	  and	  exclusion,	  need	  to	  be	  translated	  into	  
code	  to	  ensure	  technology	  is	  law-­‐complicit.	  
It	  is	  therefore	  essential	  to	  analyse	  whether	  research	  has	  been	  undertaken	  into	  the	  
incorporation	  of	  laws	  into	  technologies	  to	  assess	  whether	  this	  is	  a	  viable	  option	  for	  the	  
regulation	  of	  MIA	  tools.	  
	  
The	  above-­‐discussed	  concept	  of	  code	  as	  law	  has	  evidenced	  that	  code	  can	  constitute	  a	  
modality	  for	  technology	  regulation.	  934	  	  This	  concept	  was	  developed	  for	  the	  regulation	  
of	  a	  specific	  technology	  –	  the	  Internet	  –	  that	  was	  at	  the	  time	  in	  a	  transition	  phase	  from	  
being	  a	  specialised	  tool,	  mainly	  deployed	  by	  academics	  and	  other	  technology-­‐aware	  
groups	  of	  people,	  to	  becoming	  a	  mainstream	  medium.	  	  
This	  transition	  has	  also	  included	  the	  development	  of	  a	  class	  of	  ICTs,	  most	  commonly	  
referred	  to	  as	  ambient	  technologies	  (such	  as	  RFID	  chips,	  CCTV)	  that	  are	  fully	  integrated	  
into	  every	  day	  life,	  and	  can	  be	  highly	  pervasive	  and	  covert.935	  These	  technologies	  have	  
given	  rise	  to	  a	  number	  of	  legal	  concerns,936	  and	  their	  adequate	  regulation	  has	  been	  one	  
of	  the	  aspects	  researched	  by	  scholars.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
934	  See	  e.g.	  p.	  255ff.	  
935	  See	  e.g.	  D	  J	  Cook,	  J	  C	  Augusto,	  V	  R	  Jakkula,	  “Ambient	  Intelligence:	  Technologies,	  applications,	  
and	  opportunities”	  (2009)	  5:4	  Pervasive	  and	  Mobile	  Computing,	  277,	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  
technologies	  and	  their	  application.	  The	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  this	  class	  of	  technologies	  goes	  
beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  thesis.	  In	  fact,	  the	  exact	  nature	  of	  these	  technologies	  is	  only	  of	  minor	  
interest	  for	  this	  work.	  What	  is	  relevant	  is	  the	  fundamental	  conceptual	  similarity	  between	  
ambient	  technologies	  and	  MIA	  technologies.	  
936	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  legal	  problems	  of	  these	  technologies	  see	  e.g.	  A	  Rouvroy,	  “Privacy,	  
Data	  Protection,	  and	  the	  Unprecedented	  Challenges	  of	  Ambient	  Intelligence”	  (2008)	  2:1	  Studies	  
in	  Ethics,	  Law,	  and	  Technology,	  Article	  3;	  P	  de	  Hert	  et	  al.,	  “Legal	  Safeguards	  for	  Privacy	  and	  Data	  
Protection	  in	  Ambient	  Intelligence”	  (2009)	  13	  Personal	  Ubiquitous	  Computing,	  435.	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The	  reason	  why	  the	  results	  of	  this	  research	  could	  be	  relevant	  for	  the	  research	  question	  
at	  hand	  is	  that	  ambient	  technologies	  share	  certain	  fundamental	  characteristics	  with	  
MIA	  technologies.	  	  
Ambient	  technologies	  are	  dependent	  on	  the	  networked	  environment	  of	  the	  Internet,	  
while	  they	  are	  at	  the	  same	  time	  self-­‐contained	  technologies	  that	  are	  primarily	  designed	  
and	  deployed	  to	  monitor	  people	  and	  collect	  data.	  	  
One	  major	  difference	  is	  that	  these	  technologies,	  as	  opposed	  to	  MIA	  tools,	  consist	  of	  
software	  and	  hardware.	  Similar	  to	  MIA	  tools,	  the	  use	  of	  ambient	  technologies	  has	  
challenged	  existing	  legislation	  and	  regulatory	  approaches,	  which	  has	  stipulated	  
research	  into	  alternative	  ways	  of	  regulation.	  
	  
Ambient	  technologies	  are	  smart	  environments	  that	  continuously	  make	  instantaneous	  
decisions	  on	  citizens	  and	  consumers	  based	  on	  profiles	  and	  large	  collections	  of	  personal	  
data.937	  These	  technologies	  are	  the	  outputs	  of	  a	  research	  field	  called	  ambient	  
intelligence	  (AmI).	  The	  vision	  of	  AmI	  is	  that	  “technology	  will	  become	  invisible,	  
embedded	  in	  our	  natural	  surroundings,	  present	  whenever	  we	  need	  it,	  enabled	  by	  
simple	  and	  effortless	  interactions,	  attuned	  to	  all	  our	  senses,	  adaptive	  to	  users	  and	  
context-­‐sensitive,	  and	  autonomous.”938	  	  
Hildebrandt	  and	  Koops	  explain	  further	  that	  “the	  vision	  of	  AmI	  assumes	  that	  keyboards	  
and	  computer	  screens	  will	  disappear	  as	  human-­‐machine-­‐interfaces,	  and	  instead,	  the	  
environment	  will	  infer	  a	  persons’	  preferences	  from	  her	  machine-­‐readable	  behaviours,	  
recorded	  by	  a	  set	  of	  invisible	  technologies,	  stored	  in	  large	  databases	  and	  mined	  by	  
means	  of	  mathematical	  techniques	  that	  allow	  the	  detection	  of	  relevant	  patterns.”939	  
Thus	  by	  virtue	  of	  its	  very	  definition,	  the	  vision	  of	  AmI	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  create	  an	  
invisible	  and	  comprehensive	  surveillance	  network,	  covering	  an	  unprecedented	  share	  of	  
our	  public	  and	  private	  life.940	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
937	  Koops,	  note	  876,	  at	  172.	  
938	  W	  Weber,	  J	  Rabaey,	  E	  Aarts,	  “Introduction”	  in	  W	  Weber,	  J	  Rabaey,	  E	  Aarts	  (eds)	  Ambient	  
Intelligence	  (Berlin,	  Heidelberg,	  New	  York:	  Springer,	  2005),	  1.	  
939	  M	  Hildebrandt,	  B-­‐J	  Koops,	  “The	  Challenges	  of	  Ambient	  Law	  and	  Legal	  Protection	  in	  the	  
Profiling	  Era”	  (2010)	  73:3	  Modern	  Law	  Review,	  428,	  430.	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  Bohn	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  al.,	  “Ethical	  Implications	  of	  Ambient	  Intelligence	  and	  Ubiquitous	  Computing”	  in	  W	  
Weber,	  J	  Rabaey,	  E	  Aarts	  (eds)	  Ambient	  Intelligence	  (Berlin,	  Heidelberg,	  New	  York:	  Springer,	  
2005),	  14.	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Therefore,	  this	  new	  paradigm	  (while	  undoubtedly	  providing	  opportunities,	  as	  among	  
others	  Hildebrandt	  and	  Koops	  point	  out)941	  has	  potentially	  negative	  implications	  for	  
privacy	  and	  data	  protection	  rights.	  	  
However,	  as	  established	  by	  scholars	  undertaking	  research	  in	  this	  area,	  existing	  privacy	  
and	  data	  protection	  laws	  are	  inapt	  to	  regulate	  these	  implications	  posed	  by	  AmI	  
technologies.942	  Thus	  similarly	  to	  the	  regulatory	  problems	  of	  MIA	  tools	  analysed	  in	  the	  
previous	  chapters,	  a	  different	  approach	  to	  regulation	  through	  law	  needed	  to	  be	  
explored.	  	  	  
Hildebrandt	  and	  Koops	  have	  introduced	  an	  alternative	  regulatory	  approach	  they	  
coined	  Ambient	  Law.943	  This	  notion	  builds	  on	  the	  findings	  of	  Lessig	  that	  code	  is	  a	  
regulatory	  modality,	  and	  can	  be	  designed	  to	  support	  specific	  legal	  norms,	  inducing	  
compliant	  behaviour,944	  and	  those	  of	  Nissenbaum	  that	  values	  can	  be	  embedded	  into	  
software	  code.945	  	  It	  pays	  tribute	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  process	  of	  digitalisation	  has	  an	  
impact	  on	  the	  law	  as	  shown	  above.	  	  
Hildebrandt	  argues	  that	  “if	  ‘regulating	  technologies’	  is	  indeed	  understood	  as	  the	  double	  
challenge	  of	  sustaining	  a	  legal	  framework	  that	  regulates	  emerging	  technologies,	  while	  
acknowledging	  that	  technologies	  themselves	  have	  a	  regulative	  (normative)	  impact	  on	  
human	  society,	  we	  need	  to	  urgently	  face	  the	  issue	  of	  digitilisation	  as	  a	  process	  that	  will	  
regulate	  and	  constitute	  our	  life	  world	  and	  for	  that	  very	  reason	  needs	  to	  be	  regulated	  
and	  constituted	  by	  law.	  In	  that	  sense	  ‘regulating	  technologies’	  implies	  mutual	  
transformations	  of	  law	  and	  technology.”946	  The	  concept	  of	  Ambient	  Law	  represents	  
such	  a	  transformation	  of	  law	  and	  technology,	  merging	  both	  disciplines.	  
Ambient	  Law	  refers	  to	  the	  incorporation	  of	  legal	  norms	  into	  the	  socio-­‐technical	  
infrastructures	  to	  enable	  ambient	  technologies	  to	  guarantee	  the	  safeguarding	  of	  
privacy	  and	  data	  protection	  rights.947	  It	  thus	  requires	  the	  translation	  and	  incorporation	  
of	  legislation	  into	  technologies	  to	  ensure	  that	  these	  are	  law-­‐complicit.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
941	  Hildebrandt/Koops,	  note	  939,	  at	  433.	  
942	  For	  details	  on	  why	  existing	  legislation	  is	  challenged	  by	  AmI	  technologies	  see	  e.g.	  
Hildebrandt/Koops,	  note	  939,	  at	  429,	  439;	  de	  Hert	  et	  al.,	  note	  936,	  at	  440.	  
943	  Hildebrandt/Koops,	  note	  939,	  at	  429;	  Koops,	  note	  876,	  at	  172;	  M	  Hildebrandt,	  “A	  Vision	  of	  
Ambient	  Law”	  in	  R	  Brownsword,	  K	  Yeung	  (eds)	  Regulating	  Technologies	  –	  Legal	  Futures,	  
Regulatory	  Frames	  and	  Technological	  Fixes	  (Oxford,	  Portland:	  Hart	  Publishing,	  2008)	  175.	  
944	  See	  p	  255ff.	  
945	  See	  p	  263ff.	  
946	  Hildebrandt,	  note	  943,	  at	  186.	  
947	  Hildebrandt/Koops,	  note	  939,	  at	  459;	  while	  not	  referring	  to	  it	  as	  Ambient	  Law,	  de	  Hert	  et	  al.,	  
note	  936,	  suggest	  a	  similar	  regulatory	  model	  for	  these	  technologies.	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However,	  this	  migration	  from	  ‘law	  in	  the	  books’	  to	  ‘law	  in	  technologies’	  poses	  several	  
problems.948	  As	  indicated	  in	  the	  first	  part	  of	  this	  section,	  the	  translation	  of	  laws	  into	  
code	  constitutes	  a	  technical	  challenge.	  “Sustaining	  the	  contestability	  of	  law	  in	  a	  
constitutional	  democracy;	  to	  meet	  this	  challenge,	  rules	  must	  be	  embedded	  in	  such	  a	  
way	  that	  they	  share	  the	  nuance	  and	  flexibility	  of	  the	  natural-­‐language	  rules	  that	  
determine	  the	  written	  law.”949	  	  
The	  problem	  here	  is	  that	  laws	  are	  formulated	  in	  human	  language	  and	  inscribed	  in	  
written	  and	  printed	  script,	  whereas	  code	  rules	  are	  formulated	  in	  machine	  language.	  
Despite	  much	  research	  in	  computer	  science,	  the	  translation	  of	  human	  language	  
concepts	  into	  machine-­‐readable	  concepts	  remains	  a	  challenge.950	  This	  is	  particularly	  
true	  for	  legal	  concepts.951	  Hildebrandt	  and	  Koops	  point	  out	  that	  “software	  code	  can	  of	  
course	  be	  made	  more	  fexible,	  nuanced,	  and	  resilient	  than	  the	  architecture	  of	  a	  physical	  
object.	  Code	  can	  also	  ‘learn’	  from	  experience	  through	  the	  use	  of	  feedback	  loops	  and	  
evolutionary	  programming.	  The	  ‘ought’	  and	  ‘permissible’	  operators	  of	  deontic	  logic	  are	  
a	  welcome	  extension	  of	  the	  ‘is’	  and	  ‘not’	  of	  classic	  logic	  employed	  in	  computer	  science.	  
Nevertheless,	  machine	  language	  will	  still	  encounter	  difficulties	  in	  dealing	  with	  open	  
norms	  like	  ‘reasonable	  care’	  or	  ‘necessary	  in	  a	  democratic	  society’,	  which	  need	  to	  be	  
interpreted	  with	  considerable	  attention	  to	  the	  context	  of	  a	  concrete	  case.	  This	  will	  
require	  detailed	  refinements,	  specifying	  relevant	  circumstances	  and	  the	  weight	  that	  
must	  be	  attributed	  to	  them.”952	  
The	  second	  challenge	  that	  Hildebrandt	  and	  Koops	  identify	  is	  whether	  the	  articulation	  of	  
legal	  norms	  in	  digital	  technologies	  is	  legitimate	  in	  a	  democratic	  sense.953	  In	  their	  work,	  
they	  refer	  to	  the	  problem	  that	  Ambient	  Law	  in	  particular	  is	  intended	  to	  influence	  
human	  behaviour,	  and	  therefore	  needs	  to	  comply	  with	  criteria	  that	  society	  considers	  
important	  for	  public	  regulation.954	  This	  however,	  is	  true	  for	  technology	  that	  is	  intended	  
to	  be	  law-­‐complicit	  in	  general,	  particularly,	  if	  it	  is	  designed	  to	  execute	  law	  enforcement	  
actions.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
948	  Hildebrandt/Koops,	  note	  939,	  at	  452.	  
949	  Hildebrandt/Koops,	  note	  939,	  at	  452.	  
950	  J	  Olive,	  C	  Christianson,	  J	  McCary	  (eds)	  Handbook	  of	  Natural	  Language	  Processing	  and	  
Machine	  Translation	  (New	  York,	  Heidelberg,	  London:	  Springer,	  2011),	  vii.	  
951	  E	  Francesconi,	  S	  Montemagni,	  W	  Peters,	  D	  Tiscornia	  (eds)	  Semantic	  Processing	  of	  Legal	  Texts:	  
Where	  the	  Language	  of	  Law	  Meets	  the	  Law	  of	  Language	  (Berlin,	  Heidelberg:	  Springer,	  2010).	  
952	  Hildebrandt/Koops,	  note	  939,	  at	  453.	  
953	  Hildebrandt/Koops,	  note	  939,	  at	  452.	  
954	  Hildebrandt/Koops,	  note	  939,	  at	  454.	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Legitimacy	  has	  various	  dimensions	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Ambient	  Law.	  Koops	  has	  
developed	  a	  full	  account	  of	  these	  in	  his	  work.	  955	  Substantive	  elements	  include,	  for	  
example,	  human	  rights	  and	  moral	  values.	  Procedural	  elements	  relate	  to	  the	  rule	  of	  law,	  
transparency	  of	  the	  rule-­‐making	  process,	  and	  accountability;	  result	  criteria	  ensure	  that	  
the	  rules	  should	  be	  flexible	  and	  transparent.	  	  
Hildebrandt	  and	  Koops	  derive	  from	  these	  legitimacy	  challenges	  that	  a	  digital	  literacy	  of	  
those	  who	  enact	  laws	  and	  those	  who	  guard	  the	  internal	  and	  external	  coherence	  of	  the	  
legal	  system	  is	  required.956	  They	  rightly	  point	  out	  that	  these	  matters	  cannot	  be	  left	  to	  be	  
solved	  by	  technology	  developers.957	  The	  embodiment	  of	  laws	  into	  technology	  changes	  
the	  nature	  of	  the	  rule.	  Therefore,	  new	  tests	  and	  balances	  for	  the	  process	  of	  inscribing	  
rules	  into	  technology	  are	  required.	  
	  
Thirdly,	  they	  find	  that	  challenges	  of	  political-­‐legal	  theory	  need	  to	  be	  addressed	  in	  order	  
to	  prevent	  an	  uncritical	  embrace	  of	  ‘digital	  law’.958	  This	  refers	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  above-­‐
discussed	  challenges	  of	  a	  technical	  and	  legal	  nature	  are	  cost-­‐intensive	  and	  it	  needs	  to	  
be	  ensured	  that	  (particularly	  for	  the	  case	  of	  ambient	  technologies	  that	  are	  developed	  by	  
industry	  based	  on	  consumer	  demands)	  the	  development	  of	  Ambient	  Law	  does	  not	  
depend	  on	  market	  forces,	  and	  is	  therefore	  influenced	  by	  industry.959	  This	  is	  consistent	  
with	  traditional	  rules	  of	  law	  making,	  which	  require	  objective	  procedures	  to	  ensure	  that	  
legislation	  is	  neutral	  and	  fair.	  
	  
The	  successful	  incorporation	  of	  laws	  into	  technologies	  therefore	  requires	  that	  these	  
challenges	  are	  adequately	  addressed	  before	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘law	  in	  technologies’	  can	  be	  
used	  as	  a	  regulatory	  modality.	  This	  is	  particularly	  the	  case	  if	  technology	  is	  utilised	  by	  
the	  government	  to	  execute	  potentially	  highly	  infringing	  acts,	  such	  as	  the	  search	  and	  
seizure	  of	  private	  data.	  	  
	  
The	  analysis	  of	  Ambient	  Law	  has	  shown	  that	  provided	  a	  set	  of	  challenges	  is	  sufficiently	  
addressed,	  laws	  can	  be	  incorporated	  into	  technologies	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  technologies	  
are	  law-­‐complicit.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
955	  Koops,	  note	  876,	  at	  168.	  
956	  Hildebrandt/Koops,	  note	  939,	  at	  456.	  
957	  Ibid.	  
958	  Hildebrandt/Koops,	  note	  939,	  at	  452.	  
959	  Hildebrandt/Koops,	  note	  939,	  at	  457.	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The	  question	  is	  therefore	  whether	  these	  challenges	  can	  be	  sufficiently	  addressed	  for	  
the	  specific	  case	  of	  MIA	  technologies.	  
8.4 MIA Law? 
The	  previous	  sections	  have	  established	  that	  software	  code	  is	  a	  regulatory	  modality,	  and	  
can	  be	  designed	  to	  incorporate	  laws	  if	  a	  structured	  methodology	  is	  applied	  to	  the	  
process,	  and	  specific	  technical	  and	  legal	  challenges	  are	  sufficiently	  addressed.	  
	  
Lessig’s	  theorem	  code	  as	  law	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  the	  foundation	  for	  all	  subsequent	  
research	  in	  the	  area	  of	  ICT	  technology	  regulation.	  His	  work	  has	  identified	  code	  as	  a	  
modality	  in	  technology	  regulation,	  and	  arguably	  thereby	  prompted	  the	  convergence	  of	  
AI	  and	  law	  research	  in	  this	  field.	  	  
	  
However,	  as	  discussed	  above,	  the	  concept	  of	  code	  as	  law	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  question	  
in	  how	  far	  law-­‐compliant	  human	  behaviour	  can	  be	  stipulated	  through	  software	  code.	  960	  
It	  falls	  short	  to	  discuss	  in	  how	  far	  code	  could	  also	  serve	  to	  regulate	  technologies	  by	  
designing	  these	  to	  be	  law-­‐complicit.	  This	  is	  partly	  due	  to	  Lessig’s	  under-­‐
conceptualisation	  of	  ‘code’	  and	  its	  many	  facets,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  four	  modalities	  of	  
regulation.	  However,	  the	  main	  reason	  is	  that	  Lessig	  wanted	  to	  contribute	  with	  his	  work	  
to	  the	  broader	  debate	  over	  freedom	  of	  expression,	  and	  not	  explore	  fundamental	  issues	  
of	  ICT	  regulation.961	  	  
Subsequent	  research	  building	  on	  Lessig’s	  work,	  in	  particular	  the	  work	  of	  Hildebrandt	  
and	  Koops,	  has	  explored	  the	  many	  more	  facets	  of	  code	  as	  a	  regulatory	  modality,	  but	  
remained	  entirely	  theoretical,	  and	  mainly	  focused	  on	  the	  theoretical	  legal	  aspects	  of	  
incorporating	  laws	  into	  technologies.	  Like	  Lessig’s	  work	  and	  that	  of	  others,962	  a	  
discussion	  of	  how	  concepts	  such	  as	  Ambient	  Law	  could	  be	  technically	  realised	  are	  
lacking.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  theoretical	  framework	  that	  has	  evolved	  from	  this	  research	  is	  
of	  great	  significance	  for	  any	  work	  on	  this	  topic,	  thus	  also	  for	  this	  thesis.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
960	  See	  p	  262.	  
961	  D	  S	  Wall,	  “Digital	  Realism	  and	  the	  Governance	  of	  Spam	  as	  Cybercrime”	  (2005)	  10	  European	  
Journal	  on	  Criminal	  Policy	  and	  Research,	  309,	  324.	  
962	  Hildebrandt/Koops,	  note	  939;	  Brownsword,	  note	  915;	  Reidenberg,	  note	  878;	  J	  P	  Kesan,	  R	  C	  
Shah,	  “Deconstructing	  Code”	  (2003-­‐04)	  6	  Yale	  Journal	  of	  Law	  &	  Technology,	  277;	  L	  F	  Asscher,	  
“’Code’	  as	  Law	  –	  Using	  Fuller	  to	  Assess	  Code	  Rules”	  in	  E	  J	  Dommering,	  L	  F	  Asscher	  (eds)	  Coding	  
Regulation.	  Essays	  on	  the	  Normative	  Role	  of	  Information	  Technologies,	  IT	  &	  Law	  Series	  vol	  12	  
(The	  Hague:	  TMC	  Asser	  Press,	  2006)	  85.	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However,	  any	  significant	  research	  into	  the	  feasibility	  of	  incorporating	  laws	  into	  
technologies	  requires	  exploring	  the	  technical	  details	  of	  this	  approach.	  In	  this	  regard,	  
the	  challenges	  developed	  by	  Hildebrandt	  and	  Koops	  provide	  a	  useful	  framework.	  Thus,	  
the	  regulatory	  approach	  of	  incorporating	  laws	  into	  technologies	  depends	  in	  particular	  
on	  whether	  laws	  can	  be	  adequately	  translated	  into	  a	  machine-­‐processable	  format.	  	  
As	  suggested	  by	  Hildebrandt	  and	  Koops,	  who	  developed	  the	  notion	  of	  Ambient	  Law	  for	  
the	  regulation	  of	  ambient	  technologies,	  such	  research	  requires	  a	  technology-­‐specific	  
approach.	  	  
As	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  5,	  technology	  legislation	  needs	  to	  be	  sufficiently	  technology-­‐
neutral	  to	  remain	  valid	  for	  a	  long	  time,	  but	  technology-­‐specific	  enough	  to	  develop	  
meaningful	  regulatory	  powers.963	  The	  same	  is	  true	  for	  other	  regulatory	  approaches.	  	  
ICT	  technologies	  differ	  fundamentally	  in	  design,	  leading	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  abilities	  and	  
characteristics.	  These	  differences	  greatly	  impact	  the	  feasibility	  of	  incorporating	  laws	  
into	  the	  code	  of	  a	  technology.	  This	  highlights	  again	  the	  importance	  of	  defining	  a	  new	  
class	  of	  technologies	  –	  MIA	  tools	  –	  in	  chapter	  5.	  
The	  analysis	  of	  the	  feasibility	  of	  incorporating	  laws	  into	  technologies	  is	  therefore	  
undertaken	  for	  MIA	  tools	  alone.	  	  
	  
As	  discussed	  previously,	  MIA	  technologies	  are	  similar	  in	  nature	  to	  Trojan	  software,	  and	  
share	  crucial	  features	  with	  autonomous	  agent	  software.964	  Thus	  any	  previous	  research	  
into	  the	  feasibility	  of	  incorporating	  laws	  into	  the	  code	  of	  these	  technologies	  can	  be	  
applied	  to	  MIA	  technologies.	  	  
The	  need	  to	  imbue	  software,	  and	  more	  explicitly	  autonomous	  agent	  software,	  with	  
explicit	  legal	  knowledge	  was	  first	  recognised	  in	  commercial	  applications.965	  With	  
advancements	  in	  autonomous	  agent	  design	  and	  e-­‐commerce	  applications,	  it	  became	  
clear	  that	  agents	  operating	  in	  a	  society	  need	  to	  be	  constrained	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  and	  
address	  conflicts,	  make	  agreements,	  reduce	  complexity,	  and,	  generally,	  to	  achieve	  a	  
desirable	  social	  order.966	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
963	  See	  p.	  122.	  
964	  For	  the	  technical	  particulars	  of	  MIA	  technologies	  see	  chapters	  4	  and	  5	  above.	  
965	  See	  e.g.	  C	  Hahn	  et	  al.,	  “Self-­‐regulation	  through	  social	  institutions:	  A	  Framework	  for	  the	  
Design	  of	  Self-­‐Regulation	  of	  Open	  Agent-­‐based	  Electronic	  Marketplaces”	  (2006)	  12:1-­‐2	  
Computational	  &	  Mathematical	  Organization	  Theory.	  Special	  Issue	  on	  Normative	  Multiagent	  
Systems,	  181-­‐204.	  
966	  d’Inverno/Luck,	  note	  274,	  at	  182.	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As	  established	  above,	  the	  feasibility	  of	  incorporating	  laws	  into	  the	  code	  of	  a	  technology	  
depends	  in	  particular	  on	  whether	  laws	  can	  be	  adequately	  translated	  into	  machine-­‐
processable	  format.	  However,	  a	  prerequisite	  for	  the	  capability	  of	  processing	  laws	  
adequately,	  and	  adopting	  and	  complying	  with	  rules,	  is	  that	  technologies	  are	  capable	  of	  
acting	  on	  and	  reasoning	  about	  them.	  	  
The	  following	  simple	  example	  demonstrates	  why	  these	  capabilities	  are	  important.	  	  
If	  a	  MIA	  tool	  is	  employed	  during	  an	  investigation	  and	  the	  suspect	  travels	  abroad	  taking	  
his	  laptop	  that	  was	  previously	  infiltrated	  by	  the	  MIA	  tool,	  the	  tool	  needs	  to	  ‘understand’	  
that	  all	  data	  downloaded	  and	  any	  communication	  data	  that	  has	  been	  generated	  since	  
crossing	  the	  border	  is	  protected	  by	  sovereignty,	  which	  triggers	  a	  corresponding	  
disability	  by	  the	  tool	  to	  collect	  information	  unless	  there	  is	  also	  a	  superseding	  power	  to	  
grant	  authority	  over	  the	  data,	  such	  as	  a	  privilege	  by	  the	  country	  where	  the	  data	  
originates.	  	  
Thus	  the	  MIA	  tool	  would	  as	  a	  default	  rule	  stop	  analysing	  data	  once	  it	  “knows”	  it	  is	  
outside	  the	  country	  of	  origin.967	  Crossing	  the	  border	  therefore	  triggers	  by	  default	  an	  
immunity	  of	  the	  suspect.	  
This	  reasoning	  is	  based	  on	  legal	  principles	  and	  laws	  integrated	  into	  the	  design	  of	  the	  
software.	  However,	  the	  software	  needs	  to	  be	  capable	  of	  processing	  this	  information,	  
applying	  it	  to	  the	  context,	  and	  communicating	  it	  to	  other	  pieces	  of	  software	  and	  the	  
operator.	  If	  the	  software	  is	  incapable	  of	  such	  actions,	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  laws	  can	  
be	  adequately	  translated	  into	  machine-­‐processable	  format	  is	  irrelevant.	  
The	  question	  is	  therefore	  whether	  MIA	  technologies	  are	  capable	  of	  such	  adaptive	  
reasoning	  and	  acting.	  
8.4.1 Computational Legal Reasoning 
Several	  authors	  have	  addressed	  the	  issue	  and	  developed	  different	  approaches	  to	  imbue	  
autonomous	  agents	  with	  legal	  reasoning	  capabilities.	  At	  the	  core	  of	  these	  approaches	  is	  
the	  development	  of	  a	  suitable	  agent	  communication	  language	  (ACL).	  This	  language	  
enables	  the	  software	  tools	  to	  reason	  about	  facts	  and	  circumstances,	  draw	  conclusions	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
967	  Discussing	  the	  technical	  details	  of	  how	  a	  MIA	  tool	  can	  ‘know’	  that	  the	  suspect	  has	  crossed	  a	  
border	  would	  go	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  thesis.	  For	  example,	  the	  accessing	  the	  Internet	  from	  a	  
foreign	  telephone	  line,	  the	  assigned	  IP	  address	  are	  indicators	  for	  the	  suspect	  residing	  in	  a	  
different	  jurisdiction.	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and	  make	  decisions	  independently,	  and	  communicate	  with	  other	  software	  tools	  and	  
operators.968	  	  
8.4.1.1 Agent Communication Languages 
A	  suitable	  ACL	  is	  a	  crucial	  factor	  in	  the	  process	  of	  enabling	  software	  tools	  to	  reason	  and	  
act	  about	  their	  environment,	  facts	  and	  situations	  autonomously.	  It	  is	  also	  the	  key	  
component	  for	  any	  dialogue	  and	  communication	  with	  its	  operator	  and	  other	  software	  
tools.969	  Natural	  language	  in	  humans	  was	  developed	  through	  evolution,	  and	  arguably	  
has	  been	  a	  decisive	  element	  in	  the	  establishment	  of	  complex,	  long-­‐lived	  
communities.970	  ACLs,	  on	  the	  contrary,	  have	  evolved	  through	  standardisation	  efforts.971	  	  
At	  the	  technical	  level,	  as	  Labrou	  and	  Finin	  explain,	  “ACLs	  handle	  propositions,	  rules,	  
and	  actions	  instead	  of	  simple	  objects	  with	  no	  semantics	  associated	  with	  them.	  They	  
describe	  a	  desired	  state	  in	  a	  declarative	  language,	  rather	  than	  a	  procedure	  or	  
method.”972	  	  	  
Chaib-­‐Draa	  and	  Dignum	  provide	  a	  short	  description	  of	  ACLs:	  “ACLs	  exist	  in	  a	  logical	  
layer	  above	  transport	  protocols	  such	  as	  TCP/IP,	  HTTP,	  or	  IIOP.	  Such	  protocols	  deal	  
with	  communication	  issues	  at	  the	  level	  of	  data	  and	  message	  transport,	  while	  ACLs	  
address	  communication	  on	  the	  intentional	  and	  social	  level.	  ACLs	  themselves	  are	  
complex	  structures	  composed	  of	  different	  sublanguages	  that	  specify	  the	  message	  
content,	  interpretation	  parameters	  such	  as	  the	  sender	  and	  the	  ontology,	  the	  
propositional	  attitude	  under	  which	  the	  receiver	  should	  interpret	  the	  message	  content,	  
and	  several	  other	  components.	  Typical	  ACLs	  also	  have	  a	  characteristic	  mentalistic	  
semantics	  that	  is	  far	  more	  complex	  than	  standard	  distributed	  object	  protocols.	  This	  
means	  that	  ACL	  design	  is	  a	  delicate	  balance	  between	  the	  communicative	  needs	  of	  the	  
agent	  with	  the	  ability	  of	  receivers	  to	  compute	  the	  intended	  meaning	  of	  the	  message.	  
Further,	  it	  is	  important	  that	  the	  syntax,	  semantics,	  and	  pragmatics	  of	  the	  various	  
components	  of	  an	  ACL	  are	  as	  precise	  and	  explicit	  as	  possible,	  so	  that	  the	  agent	  system	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
968	  See	  e.g.	  Y	  Labrou,	  T	  Finin,	  “Semantics	  for	  an	  Agent	  Communication	  Language”	  (1998)	  1365	  
Intelligent	  Agents	  IV	  Agent	  Theories,	  Architectures,	  and	  Languages,	  209-­‐214,	  209;	  B	  Chaib-­‐Draa,	  F	  
Dignum,	  “Trends	  in	  Agent	  Communication	  Language”	  (2002)	  18:2	  Computational	  Intelligence,	  
89-­‐101,	  89.	  
969	  Ibid.	  
970	  Y	  Labrou,	  T	  Finin,	  Y	  Peng,	  “Agent	  Communicaction	  Languages:	  The	  Current	  Landscape”	  
(1999)	  IEEE	  Intelligent	  Systems,	  45-­‐52,	  45.	  
971	  Ibid.	  
972	  Y	  Labrou,	  T	  Finin,	  “History,	  State	  of	  the	  Art	  and	  Challenges	  for	  Agent	  Communication	  
Languages”	  (2000)	  Swiss	  Federation	  of	  Information	  Processing	  Societies,	  1-­‐16,	  3.	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using	  that	  ACL	  can	  be	  as	  open	  and	  accessible	  to	  developers	  beyond	  the	  original	  
group.”973	  	  
This	  short	  description	  of	  ACLs	  highlights	  why	  these	  are	  of	  such	  importance	  for	  artificial	  
legal	  reasoning.	  They	  enable	  intelligent	  reasoning	  and	  communication,	  as	  opposed	  to	  
the	  mere	  data	  exchange	  of	  standard	  software	  applications.	  
Synchronously	  with	  the	  software	  agent	  development,	  ACLs	  evolved	  initially	  in	  the	  
1990s	  in	  the	  military	  domain.974	  Research	  was	  then	  expanded	  to	  commercial	  
applications,	  in	  line	  with	  the	  increased	  integration	  of	  software	  agents	  into	  e-­‐commerce	  
applications.975	  
The	  common	  problem	  of	  ACLs	  is	  that	  of	  interoperability.	  Generally,	  (and	  particularly	  
for	  MIAs)	  it	  is	  important	  that	  agents	  built	  by	  different	  organisations	  using	  different	  
hardware	  and	  software	  platforms	  are	  able	  to	  communicate	  with	  one-­‐another	  via	  a	  
common	  language	  with	  a	  universally	  agreed	  semantics.976	  
This	  need	  for	  interoperability	  has	  led	  to	  the	  evolvement	  of	  many	  standardised	  ACLs.977	  	  
Verifying	  whether	  a	  specific	  ACL	  indeed	  satisfies	  a	  certain	  standard	  and	  conforms	  with	  
interoperability	  criteria	  is	  a	  difficult	  task.978	  One	  of	  the	  most	  important	  aspects	  is	  that	  
an	  ACL	  must	  be	  based	  on	  a	  valid	  formal	  system.979	  
8.4.1.1.1 Agent Communication Languages For the Legal Domain 
As	  indicated	  above,980	  discussing	  all	  existing	  ACLs	  would	  go	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  
work.	  While	  the	  fundamentals	  of	  all	  relevant	  ACLs	  are	  identical,	  the	  respective	  
application	  domain	  significantly	  influences	  the	  details	  of	  ACLs,	  and	  thus	  shapes	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
973	  Chaib-­‐Draa/Dignum,	  note	  968,	  at	  90.	  
974	  Labrou/Finin,	  note	  970,	  at	  3;	  Chaib-­‐Draa/Dignum,	  note	  968,	  at	  90.	  
975	  See	  e.g.	  M	  Wooldridge,	  “Semantic	  Issues	  in	  the	  Verification	  of	  Agent	  Communication	  
Languages”	  (2000)	  3	  Autonomous	  Agents	  and	  Multi-­Agent	  Systems,	  9-­‐31.	  
976	  Wooldridge,	  ibid,	  at	  3;	  Chaib-­‐Draa/Dignum,	  note	  968,	  at	  95.	  
977	  The	  discussion	  of	  all	  these	  ACLs	  would	  go	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  work.	  See	  e.g.,	  J	  Mayfield,	  
Y	  Labrou,	  T	  Finin,	  “Evaluating	  KQML	  as	  an	  Agent	  Communication	  Language”	  in	  M	  Wooldridge,	  J	  
P	  Müller,	  M	  Tambe	  (eds.)	  Intelligent	  Agents	  II	  (LNAI	  Volume	  1037)	  (Berlin:	  Springer,	  1996)	  347-­‐
360,	  for	  a	  representative	  summary	  of	  relevant	  ACLs.	  	  
978	  See	  Wooldridge,	  note	  975,	  who	  develops	  a	  framework	  in	  his	  work	  for	  verifying	  the	  
conformity	  of	  ACLs	  with	  interoperability	  standards.	  	  
979	  Wooldridge,	  note	  975,	  at	  12.	  
980	  See	  footnote	  977.	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requirements	  for	  the	  underlying	  formal	  system.981	  Relevant	  for	  this	  thesis	  are	  ACLs	  
developed	  for	  the	  legal	  domain	  and	  the	  focus	  is	  solely	  on	  discussing	  details	  of	  these.	  	  
Work	  on	  ACLs	  for	  the	  legal	  domain	  initially	  evolved	  in	  the	  area	  of	  legal	  argumentation	  
automation,	  where	  the	  formal	  study	  of	  human	  argument	  and	  dialogue	  was	  proposed	  as	  
a	  model	  for	  agent	  interactions.	  982	  However,	  deeper	  conceptual	  work	  on	  ACLs	  for	  the	  
legal	  domain	  evolved	  in	  the	  AI	  &	  Law	  research	  community	  following	  the	  increase	  in	  
autonomous	  agent	  research.983	  
As	  stated	  above,	  the	  underlying	  formal	  system	  is	  of	  great	  relevance	  for	  the	  
development	  of	  a	  valid	  ACL.	  This	  is	  particularly	  the	  case	  for	  ACLs	  developed	  for	  the	  
legal	  domain	  because	  (artificial)	  legal	  reasoning	  requires	  detailed	  understanding	  of	  all	  
facts	  and	  arguments	  relevant	  for	  the	  matter	  at	  hand	  and	  the	  decision	  making	  process.	  
Thus	  analysing	  the	  formal	  fundaments	  of	  ACLs	  is	  crucial	  for	  assessing	  their	  validity	  and	  
suitability,	  and	  determining	  which,	  if	  any,	  existing	  ACL	  is	  suitable	  for	  implementation	  in	  
MIA	  tools,	  and	  enables	  these	  tools	  to	  undertake	  legal	  reasoning	  at	  the	  required	  level.	  
8.4.1.1.2 Formal System 
Several	  formal	  approaches	  have	  been	  discussed	  in	  connection	  with	  ACLs	  for	  the	  legal	  
domain.984	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
981	  C	  Krogh,	  H	  Herrestad,	  “Hohfeld	  in	  Cyberspace	  and	  Other	  Applications	  of	  Normative	  
Reasoning	  in	  Agent	  Technology”	  (1999)	  7	  Artificial	  Intelligence	  and	  Law,	  81-­‐96,	  83.	  
982	  See	  e.g.	  P	  McBurney,	  S	  Parsons,	  “Games	  That	  Agents	  Play:	  A	  Formal	  Framework	  for	  
Dialogues	  between	  Autonomous	  Agents”	  (2002)	  11	  Journal	  of	  Logic,	  Language	  and	  Information,	  
315-­‐334;	  P	  McBurney,	  S	  Parsons,	  M	  Wooldridge,	  “Desiderata	  for	  Agent	  Argumentation	  
Protocols”	  (2002)	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  First	  International	  Conference	  on	  Autonomous	  Agents	  and	  
Multiagent	  Systems	  (AAMAS-­02),	  Bologna,	  Italy;	  N	  Maudet,	  B	  Chaib-­‐Draa,	  “Commitment-­‐baswd	  
and	  dialogue-­‐game-­‐based	  Protocols:	  New	  Trends	  in	  Agent	  Communication	  Languages”	  (2002)	  
17:2	  The	  Knowledge	  Engineering	  Review,	  157-­‐179.	  
983	  See	  in	  particular	  C	  Heesen,	  V	  Homburg,	  M	  Offereins,	  “LACA:	  An	  Architecture	  For	  Legal	  
Agents”	  in	  J	  C	  Hage,	  T	  J	  M	  Bench-­‐Capon,	  M	  J	  Cohen,	  H	  J	  van	  den	  Herik	  (eds)	  Legal	  Knowledge	  
Based	  Systems	  JURIX	  ’95:	  Telecommunication	  and	  AI	  &	  Law	  (Lelystad:	  Koninklijke	  Vermande,	  
1995)	  23-­‐32;	  N	  Graca,	  P	  Quaresma,	  “How	  to	  Model	  Legal	  Reasoning	  Using	  Dynamic	  Logic	  
Programming:	  A	  Preliminary	  Report”	  in	  D	  Bourcier	  (ed)	  Legal	  Knowledge	  and	  Information	  
Systems	  Jurix	  2003:	  The	  Sixteenth	  Annual	  Conference	  (Amsterdam:	  IOS	  Press,	  2003)	  163-­‐172;	  J	  
Gelati,	  A	  Totolo,	  G	  Sartor,	  G	  Governatori,	  “Normative	  Autonomy	  and	  Normative	  Co-­‐ordination:	  
Declarative	  Power,	  Representation,	  and	  Mandate”	  (2004)	  12:1-­‐2	  Artificial	  Intelligence	  and	  Law,	  
53-­‐81;	  G	  Sartor,	  “Doing	  Justice	  to	  Rights	  and	  Values:	  Teleological	  Reasoning	  and	  Proportionality,	  
(2010)	  18:2	  Artificial	  Intelligence	  and	  Law,	  175-­‐215.	  
984	  Discussing	  all	  would	  go	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  chapter.	  See	  e.g.	  J	  Hage,	  “A	  Theory	  of	  Legal	  
Reasoning	  and	  A	  Logic	  to	  Match”	  (1996)	  4	  Artificial	  Intelligence	  and	  Law,	  199-­‐273;	  A	  Jøsang,	  V	  A	  
Bondi,	  “Legal	  Reasoning	  with	  Subjective	  Logic”	  (2000)	  8:4	  Artificial	  Intelligence	  and	  Law,	  289-­‐
315,	  for	  an	  analysis	  of	  different	  approaches.	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However,	  in	  particular	  Hohfeld’s	  formal	  system	  of	  rights	  and	  duties	  has	  been	  proposed	  
as	  a	  framework	  for	  ACLs	  in	  the	  legal	  domain,	  enabling	  the	  reasoning	  about	  rules.985	  	  
Hohfeld	  developed	  a	  theory	  of	  rights	  describing	  what	  he	  called	  the	  fundamental	  legal	  
conception:986	  right,	  duty,	  no-­right,	  privilege,	  power,	  liability,	  disability,	  and	  immunity.987	  	  
Hohfeld’s	  rights	  were	  intended	  to	  serve	  as	  the	  smallest	  common	  denominators	  in	  
jurisprudential	  reasoning.	  However,	  in	  his	  work	  he	  does	  not	  provide	  definitions	  of	  
these	  concepts,	  rather,	  he	  tries	  to	  systematise	  them.	  Right	  and	  duty,	  for	  example,	  are	  
correlatives,	  right	  and	  no-­right	  are	  opposites,	  and	  so	  forth.	  
These	  denominators	  have	  subsequently	  been	  used	  as	  the	  basis	  to	  develop	  formal	  legal	  
theories.988	  	  
Other	  attempts	  at	  computational	  implementation	  of	  Hohfeld’s	  theory	  have	  been	  
developed	  in	  the	  wider	  AI	  and	  law	  community,	  but	  not	  for	  use	  with	  autonomous	  agents	  
in	  mind.	  Allen	  and	  Saxon’s	  language	  “A-­‐Hohfeld”989	  and	  Sergot’s	  analysis	  of	  normative	  
positions990	  have	  been	  the	  most	  developed	  approaches	  so	  far.	  However,	  their	  intended	  
use	  as	  interpretative	  tools	  for	  text	  analysis	  and	  analysis	  of	  bureaucratic	  organisations,	  
respectively,	  make	  a	  transfer	  of	  these	  ideas	  to	  ACLs	  less	  straightforward.	  	  	  
The	  original	  work	  of	  Hohfeld	  was	  primarily	  concerned	  with	  private	  law	  concepts,	  and	  it	  
is	  at	  least	  not	  obvious	  how	  his	  framework	  could	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  criminal	  law,	  and	  
criminal	  procedure	  law	  setting.	  However,	  there	  has	  been	  an	  intensive	  debate	  in	  
analytical	  jurisprudence	  following	  Hohfeld’s	  paper	  and	  further	  positions	  and	  
correlations	  have	  been	  identified.991	  	  
Due	  to	  their	  intended	  use	  in	  jurisprudence,	  they	  do	  not	  take	  computational	  
characteristics	  at	  their	  heart,	  but	  offer	  the	  advantage	  of	  considerably	  extending	  the	  
expressive	  power	  of	  the	  resulting	  formalism,	  thus	  providing	  expressive	  power	  that	  may	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
985	  See	  e.g.	  Krogh/Herrestad,	  note	  981.	  
986	  W	  N	  Hohfeld,	  “Some	  Fundamental	  Legal	  Conceptions	  As	  Applied	  in	  Judicial	  Reasoning”	  
(1913-­‐1914)	  23	  Yale	  Law	  Journal,	  16;	  W	  N	  Hohfeld,	  Fundamental	  Legal	  Conceptions	  as	  Applied	  in	  
Judicial	  Reasoning	  and	  Other	  Legal	  Essays	  (New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  1923).	  
987	  Hohfeld	  (1913-­‐1914),	  ibid,	  at	  30;	  Hohfeld	  (1923),	  ibid,	  at	  63.	  
988	  See	  e.g.	  S	  Kanger,	  “New	  Foundations	  For	  Ethical	  Theory”,	  (1957)	  Technical	  Report,	  Stockholm	  
Unversity;	  S	  Kanger,	  “Law	  and	  Logic”	  (1972)	  38	  Theorica,	  105-­‐132;	  D	  Makison,	  “On	  the	  Formal	  
Representation	  of	  Rights	  Relations”	  15	  Journal	  of	  Philosophical	  Logic,	  403-­‐425.	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  S	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  to	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  Systems”	  in	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  Deontic	  Logic	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  Transactions	  on	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well	  be	  necessary	  to	  represent	  the	  legal	  concepts	  necessary	  for	  law-­‐compliant	  
behaviour.	  	  
Hohfeld’s	  theory	  and	  subsequent	  other	  formal	  legal	  theories	  based	  on	  his	  work	  are	  
premised	  on	  the	  logic	  that	  if	  x	  then	  y,992	  which	  is	  deontic	  logic.	  	  
Deontic	  logic	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  logic	  to	  reason	  about	  ideal	  and	  actual	  behaviour.993	  
As	  such,	  as	  highlighted	  by	  Hohfeld’s	  system	  above,	  it	  is	  concerned	  with	  concepts	  such	  
as	  obligation	  and	  permission.	  It	  studies	  logical	  relations	  among	  obligations	  and	  
permissions,	  and	  more	  particularly	  violations	  and	  contrary-­‐to-­‐duty	  obligations,	  
permissions	  and	  their	  relation	  to	  obligations,	  and	  the	  dynamics	  of	  obligations	  over	  
time.994	  Deontic	  logic	  has	  traditionally	  been	  used	  to	  analyse	  the	  structure	  of	  normative	  
law	  and	  normative	  reasoning	  in	  law.995	  It	  is	  therefore	  the	  obvious	  choice	  for	  the	  
representation	  of	  norms	  and	  laws.996	  Insights	  from	  deontic	  logic	  can	  be	  used	  to	  
represent	  and	  reason	  with	  norms.997	  	  
Generally,	  in	  its	  most	  basic	  form,	  deontic	  logic	  can	  be	  presented	  as:	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	   ⃝p,	  which	  is	  read	  as	  ‘p	  ought	  to	  be	  (done)’;	  	  
Fp	  as	  ‘p	  is	  forbidden	  to	  be	  (done)’;	  and	  	  
Pp	  as	  ‘p	  is	  permitted	  to	  be	  (done)’.998	  
	  
As	  indicated	  above,	  deontic	  logic	  has	  been	  proposed	  for	  the	  formal	  representation	  of	  
norms	  in	  autonomous	  agents.999	  However,	  there	  are	  several	  problems	  with	  deontic	  
logic	  as	  the	  sole	  means	  for	  the	  representation	  of	  norms	  and	  laws.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
992	  A	  R	  Anderson,	  “The	  Logic	  of	  Hohfeldian	  Propositions”	  (1971-­‐72)	  33	  University	  of	  Pittsburgh	  
Law	  Review,	  29,	  31.	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  (eds)	  Deontic	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  17.	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(2003)	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  Annals	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  and	  Artificial	  Intelligence	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  Van	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  previous	  footnotes,	  C	  Castelfranchi	  et	  al.,	  “Deliberative	  Normative	  
Agents:	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  (2000)	  1757	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  S	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  Applied	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Most	  importantly	  as	  pointed	  out	  by	  Boella	  et	  al.	  there	  are	  several	  aspects	  of	  laws,	  which	  
are	  not	  covered	  by	  constraints	  nor	  by	  deontic	  logic,	  such	  as	  the	  relation	  between	  the	  
cognitive	  abilities	  of	  agents	  and	  the	  global	  properties	  of	  norms.1000	  Other	  problems	  of	  
representing	  laws	  with	  deontic	  logic	  are,	  for	  example,	  how	  conflicts	  of	  norms	  can	  be	  
taken	  into	  account,	  and	  how	  explicit	  permissions	  relate	  to,	  and	  change,	  an	  agent’s	  
obligations.1001	  
However,	  taking	  the	  short	  example	  above,	  it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  MIA	  tools	  need	  to	  be	  
capable	  of	  dealing	  with	  conflicting	  laws,	  or	  explicit	  permissions.	  	  
If	  generally	  the	  investigation	  of	  ICT	  devices	  on	  foreign	  territory	  is	  impermissible,	  this	  
can	  be	  permitted	  (exceptionally)	  under	  certain	  circumstances,	  for	  example	  if	  a	  
permission	  of	  the	  country	  in	  question	  is	  granted.	  Thus	  MIA	  tools	  need	  to	  be	  flexible	  
enough	  and	  capable	  of	  such	  “defeasible”	  reasoning:	  applying	  a	  general	  rule	  first,	  but	  
capable	  of	  revising	  the	  result	  of	  the	  rule	  application	  if	  exceptions	  are	  triggered.	  
Sartor	  has	  shown	  how	  these	  legal	  relations	  can	  be	  expressed	  formally	  in	  a	  system	  that	  
combines	  action	  logic	  with	  a	  minimal	  deontic	  logic	  using	  a	  formalisation	  of	  basic	  legal	  
concepts	  inspired	  by	  Hohfeld’s	  work,	  but	  intended	  for	  agent	  communication.1002	  	  
Laws	  are	  complex	  artefacts	  that	  attempt	  to	  prescribe	  how	  something	  should	  be;	  
meaning,	  it	  describes	  the	  properties	  of	  the	  desired	  situation,	  out	  of	  all	  the	  possible	  
alternative	  situations.1003	  	  This	  means	  that	  the	  most	  basic	  function	  of	  law	  is	  the	  
stipulation	  of	  an	  action.	  	  
This	  requires	  as	  a	  first	  step	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  an	  action	  is	  formalised.	  Sartor	  
distinguishes	  between	  two	  characterisations	  of	  actions:1004	  (1)	  the	  behavioural	  
characterisation,	  which	  consists	  of	  describing	  the	  type	  of	  behaviour	  that	  an	  agent	  is	  
holding,	  abstracting	  from	  the	  consequences	  of	  such	  behaviour;	  and	  (2)	  a	  productive	  
characterisation,	  which	  consists	  in	  describing	  the	  results	  that	  the	  agent’s	  behaviour	  
produces,	  abstracting	  from	  the	  behaviour	  that	  produced	  those	  results.	  
Behavioural	  characterisation	  can	  be	  expressed	  formally	  as	  “Does	  (x,t)”.	  Productive	  
characterisation	  can	  be	  expressed	  formally	  as	  “Brings	  (x,	  t)”.	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  Proceedings	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  deontic	  logic.	  
1002	  G	  Sartor,	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  A	  Formal	  and	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(2006)	  14	  Artificial	  Intelligence	  and	  Law,	  101-­‐142.	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  A	  Siena,	  et	  al.,	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  a	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  (2009)	  
IEEE	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  31st	  International	  Conference	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  1002,	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Applying	  this	  to	  the	  case	  scenario	  introduced	  above,	  these	  two	  operators	  can	  be	  used	  to	  
express,	  for	  example,	  the	  following:1005	  
	  
1.	  Does	  (MIA,	  t)	  [search]	  
This	  can	  be	  read	  as	  “the	  MIA	  tool	  undertakes	  a	  search	  at	  time	  t”.	  	  
	  
2.	  Brings	  (MIA,t)	  [evidence]	  
This	  can	  be	  read	  as	  “the	  MIA	  tool	  brings	  about	  evidence	  at	  time	  t”.	  
	  
However,	  in	  addition	  to	  actions	  that	  can	  be	  stipulated	  by	  laws,	  these	  also	  pose	  
constraints	  for	  these	  actions	  in	  form	  of	  obligations	  and	  permissions.	  Sartor	  states	  that	  
by	  applying	  the	  usual	  basic	  deontic	  modalities	  to	  actions,	  such	  obligations	  and	  
permissions	  can	  be	  formalised.1006	  
Generally,	  obligations	  can	  be	  expressed	  formally	  through	  “Obl	  A”,	  meaning	  that	  A	  is	  
obligatory.	  These	  can	  then	  be	  supplemented	  by	  the	  above-­‐introduced	  formulas.	  
Thus	  applied	  to	  the	  case	  scenario,	  the	  following	  example	  can	  be	  formalised:	  
	  
Obl	  DoesMIA	  [respect	  territoriality	  principle]	  
This	  can	  be	  read,	  as	  “it	  is	  obligatory	  that	  the	  MIA	  tool	  respects	  the	  territoriality	  
principle.	  
	  
By	  contrast,	  a	  “bring	  about”	  sentence	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  Obligation	  modality	  can	  
express	  the	  idea	  that	  a	  MIA	  tool	  may	  have	  to	  “forget”	  or	  exclude	  data	  that	  it	  obtained	  
during	  an	  investigation,	  for	  instance	  if	  it	  copied	  sensitive	  private	  data	  (such	  as	  a	  diary	  
or	  medical	  records)	  in	  Germany,1007	  before	  the	  seized	  data	  can	  be	  transmitted	  back	  to	  
the	  operator	  of	  the	  tool.	  This	  could	  be	  expressed	  formally	  in	  the	  following	  way:	  
	  
Obl	  BringsMIA	  [suspect’s	  personal	  data	  are	  cancelled]	  	  
This	  can	  be	  read,	  as	  “it	  is	  obligatory	  that	  MIA	  brings	  it	  about	  that	  the	  suspect’s	  personal	  
data	  are	  cancelled.	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  Appropriate	  axiomatisations	  for	  both	  the	  temporal	  and	  the	  action	  logic	  dimension	  can	  be	  
found	  in	  the	  work	  of	  J	  Horty,	  Agency	  and	  Deontic	  Logic	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2001).	  
1006	  Sartor,	  note	  1002,	  at	  104.	  
1007	  See	  p	  47ff	  above,	  for	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  BVerfG	  on	  the	  illegitimacy	  of	  such	  actions.	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This	  allows	  at	  least	  partly	  for	  the	  adequate	  handling	  of	  the	  changing	  status	  of	  evidence	  
over	  time	  by	  the	  MIA	  tool.	  
	  
In	  addition,	  when	  opposed	  to	  the	  obligation	  to	  perform	  a	  certain	  action,	  this	  is	  
(exceptionally)	  forbidden;	  this	  can	  constitute	  absolute	  investigative	  prohibitions.	  For	  
example,	  carrying	  out	  extraterritorial	  investigative	  actions	  abroad	  without	  the	  explicit	  
permission	  of	  the	  target	  state	  violates	  international	  law.1008	  	  
This	  can	  be	  expressed	  formally	  in	  the	  following	  way:	  
	  
Forb	  DoesMIA	  [undertake	  search	  and	  monitoring	  activities	  while	  ICT	  device	  is	  abroad]	  
	  
This	  can	  be	  read,	  as	  “it	  is	  forbidden	  that	  the	  MIA	  tool	  undertakes	  search	  and	  monitoring	  
activities	  while	  the	  suspect’s	  ICT	  device	  is	  abroad”.	  
	  
As	  discussed	  above,	  this	  is	  a	  defeasible	  norm	  that	  can	  be	  overridden	  once	  the	  
permission	  has	  been	  granted.1009	  Such	  permission,	  meaning	  the	  qualification	  of	  an	  
action	  as	  being	  not	  forbidden,	  can	  be	  formally	  expressed	  as	  follows	  (assuming	  that	  the	  
MIA	  tool	  is	  operated	  by	  German	  law	  enforcement	  and	  the	  ICT	  device	  located	  in	  UK):	  
	  
Perm	  BringsUK	  [PermMIA	  carry-­‐out	  investigative	  action	  X]	  
	  
This	  can	  be	  read,	  as	  “it	  is	  permitted	  that	  the	  UK	  allows	  that	  the	  MIA	  tool	  can	  undertake	  
investigative	  action	  X.	  
	  
In	  this	  case,	  the	  UK	  grants	  German	  law	  enforcement	  a	  permission	  to	  undertake	  the	  
specified	  investigative	  actions	  on	  their	  territory.	  This	  changes	  the	  normative	  position	  of	  
the	  MIA	  tool.	  It	  is	  particularly	  important	  for	  the	  use	  of	  MIA	  technologies	  that	  the	  
normative	  position	  of	  the	  tools	  can	  be	  changed	  according	  to	  needs,	  as	  this	  is	  a	  typical	  
situation	  that	  these	  cyber-­‐cops	  will	  face.	  
	  
Hohfeld,	  and	  in	  his	  subsequent	  work,	  Sartor	  consider	  these	  types	  of	  interaction	  
important	  and	  disctinct	  enough	  to	  merit	  their	  own	  category.	  Hohfeld	  has	  coined	  this	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1008	  See	  chapter	  6,	  particularly	  p.	  198.	  
1009	  G	  Sartor	  et	  al.,	  “Norm	  Modifications	  in	  Defeasible	  Logic”,	  in	  M-­‐F	  Moens	  (ed.)	  Proceedings	  of	  
Jurix	  2006	  (Amsterdam:	  IOS,	  2006)	  13-­‐22.	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category	  “privilege”1010,	  whereas	  Sartor	  refers	  to	  it	  as	  “potestative	  right”.1011	  To	  provide	  
a	  full	  analysis	  of	  these	  categories,	  and	  all	  higher-­‐level	  notions	  based	  on	  these,	  would	  go	  
beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  chapter.1012	  However,	  one	  example,	  of	  a	  higher-­‐level	  notion	  
based	  on	  the	  potestative	  right	  discussed	  by	  Sartor	  in	  his	  work,1013	  will	  provide	  
sufficient	  insight	  into	  the	  significance	  of	  this	  concept	  for	  this	  work.	  	  
This	  example	  introduces	  the	  notion	  legal	  power,	  which	  refers	  to	  having	  the	  ability	  to	  
determine	  certain	  legal	  results,	  through	  one’s	  action.1014	  
The	  example	  is	  based	  on	  a	  scenario	  from	  Roman	  private	  law:	  	  
A	  previously	  ownerless	  animal,	  through	  capture,	  becomes	  owned	  by	  its	  captor.	  That	  is,	  
the	  captor	  has	  a	  privilege	  to	  perform	  a	  certain	  act	  (he	  may	  or	  may	  not	  capture	  the	  
animal);	  but	  once	  he	  performs	  this	  act,	  the	  legal	  relation	  between	  the	  animal	  and	  
anybody	  else	  changes.	  Whereas	  everyone	  initially	  has	  the	  same	  privilege,	  once	  one	  
person	  substantiates	  it,	  this	  privilege	  changes	  into	  a	  no-­‐right.	  
Formally	  expressed:	  
	  
FORANY	  (x,	  y)	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  IF	  [animal	  y	  does	  not	  belong	  to	  anybody]	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  THENn	  IF	  Doesx	  [capture	  y]	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  THENn	  it	  starts	  that	  [x	  is	  the	  owner	  of	  y]	  	  
This	  can	  be	  read	  as	  “for	  any	  person	  x	  and	  animal	  y,	  if	  y	  does	  not	  belong	  to	  anybody,	  
then	  x	  has	  the	  potestative	  right	  of	  becoming	  the	  owner	  of	  the	  animal,	  by	  capturing	  y”.	  
	  
Applied	  to	  the	  use	  of	  MIA	  tools,	  this	  simple	  formalism	  can	  already	  capture	  some	  of	  the	  
issues	  expressed	  above.	  Firstly,	  it	  can	  be	  used	  to	  “tell”	  the	  agent	  that	  unless	  certain	  
conditions	  are	  met,	  it	  has	  no	  right	  collecting	  certain	  data.	  In	  connection	  with	  a	  suitable	  
meta-­‐rule	  that	  enshrines	  aspects	  of	  the	  legality	  principle,	  in	  particular	  the	  idea	  that	  an	  
agent	  can	  only	  act	  if	  it	  has	  an	  explicit	  legal	  basis	  to	  do	  so,	  follows	  that	  the	  agent	  is	  
prohibited	  from	  collecting	  data,	  unless	  a	  suitable	  antecedent	  is	  met.	  	  
For	  example,	  person	  P	  displayed	  suspicious	  behaviour	  y,	  this	  allows	  the	  agent	  to	  switch	  
the	  legal	  status	  of	  P	  to	  a	  suspect	  S,	  and	  to	  start	  investigative	  actions.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1010	  Hohfeld	  (1913-­‐1914),	  note	  988,	  at	  30.	  
1011	  Sartor,	  note	  1002,	  at	  105.	  
1012	  See	  Sartor,	  note	  1002,	  for	  more	  details	  about	  this,	  and	  higher-­‐level	  notions.	  
1013	  Sartor,	  note	  1002,	  at	  118.	  
1014	  Sartor,	  note	  1002,	  at	  118.	  




	  	  	  	  	  IF	  [person	  P	  displays	  behaviour	  y]	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  THENn	  IF	  CanMIA	  [Person	  P	  to	  Suspect	  S]	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  THENn	  it	  starts	  that	  [MIA	  investigative	  actions]	  	  
	  
	  
The	  above	  analysis	  of	  the	  formal	  foundations	  of	  ACLs	  has	  shown	  that	  generally	  
Hohfeld’s	  formal	  system	  is	  the	  ideal	  underlying	  fundament	  for	  ACLs	  deployed	  for	  legal	  
reasoning	  tasks.	  In	  particular,	  Sartor’s	  model	  is	  well	  suited	  to	  enable	  MIA	  tools	  to	  
reason	  at	  the	  required	  level.	  Hence,	  his	  model	  and	  ACL	  will	  be	  used	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  this	  
thesis.	  
	  
The	  above	  analysis	  of	  logical	  and	  computational	  theories	  applied	  to	  agent	  
communication	  languages	  has	  evidenced	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  design	  and	  incorporate	  
code	  into	  the	  software	  of	  tools,	  which	  ultimately	  enables	  them	  to	  reason	  about	  legal	  
correlations,	  and	  act	  accordingly.	  	  
The	  analysis	  of	  the	  technical	  details	  has	  remained	  rather	  basic;	  however,	  of	  real	  
importance	  for	  this	  thesis	  is	  the	  basic	  concept,	  and	  the	  knowledge	  that	  these	  technical	  
possibilities	  exist.1015	  	  
Another	  issue	  that	  has	  not	  been	  addressed	  here	  is	  the	  problem	  of	  multi-­‐jurisdictional	  
usage	  of	  these	  tools,	  and	  the	  problems	  arising	  from	  this.1016	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1015	  See	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  more	  detailed	  technical	  analyses	  e.g.	  G	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  L	  van	  der	  Torre,	  “Regulative	  and	  
Constitutive	  Norms	  in	  Normative	  Multiagent	  Systems”	  (2004)	  Proceedings	  of	  9th	  International	  
Conference	  on	  the	  Principles	  of	  Knowledge	  Representation	  and	  Reasoning,	  255-­‐265;	  A	  Garcia-­‐
Camino,	  P	  Noriega,	  J	  A	  Rodriguez-­‐Aguilar,	  “Implementing	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  Institutions”	  
(2005)	  Proceedings	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  the	  fourth	  international	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  conference	  on	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multiagent	  systems,	  667-­‐673;	  G	  Governatori,	  A	  Rotolo,	  “BIO	  Logical	  Agents:	  Norms,	  Beliefs,	  
Intentions	  in	  Defeasible	  Logic”	  (2007)	  Dagstuhl	  Seminar	  Proceedings	  07122,	  1-­‐34;	  J	  Vazquez-­‐
Salceda	  et	  al.,	  “From	  Human	  Regulations	  to	  Regulated	  software	  Agents’	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  Connecting	  the	  
abstract	  declarative	  norms	  with	  the	  concrete	  operational	  implementation”	  (2008)	  16	  Artificial	  
Intelligence	  and	  Law,	  73-­‐87;	  R	  Paes	  et	  al.,	  “Specifying	  Laws	  in	  Open	  Multi-­‐Agent	  Systems”	  (2009)	  
82:4	  Journal	  of	  Systems	  and	  Software,	  629-­‐649;	  F	  Dignum	  et	  al.,	  “A	  Modal	  Approach	  to	  Intentions,	  
Commitments	  and	  Obligations:	  Intention	  plus	  Commitment	  yields	  Obligations”	  in	  M	  Brown,	  J	  
Carmo	  (eds.)	  Deontic	  Logic,	  Agency	  and	  Normative	  Systems	  (Berlin:	  Springer	  Verlag,	  1996)	  80-­‐
97.	  For	  an	  example	  of	  a	  multi-­‐agent	  system	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  to	  incorporate	  laws	  see	  e.g	  the	  outcomes	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  POIROT	  project:	  B	  Schafer	  et	  al.,	  “Towards	  a	  Financial	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  Ontology:	  A	  Legal	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Approach”	  (2006)	  12	  Artificial	  Intelligence	  and	  Law,	  419-­‐446;	  A	  Siena	  et	  al.,	  “Designing	  Law-­‐
Compliant	  Software	  Requirements”	  in	  A	  H	  F	  Laender	  et	  al.	  (eds)	  Conceptual	  Modeling	  –	  ER	  2009,	  
Lecture	  Notes	  in	  Computer	  Science	  (Berlin,	  Heidelberg:	  Springer	  Verlag,	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  472-­‐486.	  
	   282	  
	  
Summarising	  the	  technical	  findings	  above,	  it	  can	  be	  concluded	  that	  MIA	  tools	  can	  be	  
designed	  to	  abide	  rules,	  and	  reason	  about	  circumstances	  and	  legal	  correlations.	  This	  
means	  for	  the	  legal	  problems	  identified	  in	  the	  previous	  chapters,	  that	  these	  can	  be	  
addressed	  through	  design.	  The	  examples	  have	  highlighted	  how	  this	  can	  be	  done	  for	  the	  
issues	  arising	  from	  extraterritorial	  searches.	  In	  addition	  it	  could	  also	  enhance	  the	  
currently	  slow	  mutual	  assistance	  procedures1017	  if	  every	  country	  would	  design	  agents	  
that	  sit	  on	  network	  gateways	  and	  communicate	  to	  potential	  MIA	  tools	  the	  acceptable	  
conditions	  for	  their	  operation.1018	  Should	  the	  conditions	  suffice	  for	  the	  specific	  
operation,	  no	  human	  would	  have	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  the	  “permission	  procedure”	  and	  
operations	  could	  therefore	  be	  executed	  swiftly.	  
	  
The	  examples	  above	  have	  also	  highlighted	  how	  privacy	  and	  data	  protection	  issues	  
discussed	  in	  chapter	  2	  can	  be	  addressed	  through	  code.1019	  
	  
Addressing	  these	  problems	  contributes	  to	  the	  legal	  reliability	  of	  MIA	  tools,	  and	  
therefore,	  in	  turn	  to	  the	  reliability	  of	  the	  evidence	  collected.	  In	  addition,	  the	  code	  of	  MIA	  
tools	  can	  be	  designed	  to	  enable	  as	  a	  general	  rule	  the	  production	  of	  safe	  copies,	  and	  to	  
incorporate	  techniques	  such	  as	  the	  digital	  evidence	  bag	  as	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  
chapter.1020	  	  
	  
Having	  determined	  that	  it	  is	  technically	  feasibille	  to	  endow	  MIA	  tools	  with	  legal	  
reasoning	  capabilities	  and	  therefore	  enable	  them	  to	  behave	  law-­‐complicit,	  the	  question	  
is	  whether	  legislation	  can	  be	  translated	  adequately	  into	  machine-­‐processable	  format.	  	  
8.4.2 Translating Laws Into Machine-Processable Format 
	  The	  problem	  with	  laws	  in	  general	  is,	  as	  has	  been	  pointed	  out,	  that	  these	  are	  formulated	  
in	  human	  natural	  language.	  More	  specifically,	  “the	  characteristic	  feature	  of	  the	  language	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1016	  Since	  this	  issue	  is	  not	  essential	  for	  the	  cemtral	  question	  of	  this	  chapter,	  whether	  MIA	  tools	  
can	  be	  designed	  to	  be	  law-­‐complicit,	  this	  has	  been	  neglected	  here.	  However,	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  
this	  issue	  see	  W	  Abel,	  B	  Schafer,	  “Big	  Browser	  Manning	  the	  Thin	  Blue	  Line	  -­‐	  Computational	  Legal	  
Theory	  Meets	  Law	  Enforcement”	  (2008)	  2	  Problema,	  51,	  75.	  
1017	  See	  p.170ff	  for	  details.	  
1018	  See	  e.g.	  p.	  114ff	  	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  how	  agent	  software	  can	  communicate	  with	  other	  agents	  
to	  reach	  a	  conclusion.	  
1019	  See	  example	  on	  p.	  280.	  	  
1020	  See	  p.	  247ff	  for	  details.	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of	  legislation	  is	  that	  it	  uses	  natural	  language	  to	  express	  general	  rules,	  in	  order	  to	  
regulate	  human	  affairs.	  To	  be	  effective	  for	  this	  purpose,	  it	  needs	  to	  be	  more	  precise	  
than	  ordinary	  language	  and,	  as	  much	  as	  possible,	  it	  needs	  to	  be	  understood	  by	  different	  
people	  in	  the	  same	  way.”1021	  	  
Thus	  the	  problem	  with	  legal	  texts	  (i.e.	  laws)	  is	  that	  these	  are	  composed	  in	  a	  specific	  
natural	  language	  that	  differs	  from	  the	  ordinary	  spoken	  natural	  language.	  The	  need	  for	  
precision	  leads	  to	  the	  use	  of	  law-­‐specific	  termini	  and	  concepts.	  In	  particular	  in	  criminal	  
and	  criminal	  procedure	  law,	  legislation	  needs	  to	  clearly	  define	  what	  constitutes	  
criminal	  behaviour,	  and	  how	  this	  is	  punished.	  	  
	  
A	  brief	  example	  illustrates	  this:	  
Under	  the	  UK	  Theft	  Act	  1968	  S.1(1)	  “Theft”	  is	  defined	  as	  “A	  person	  is	  guilty	  of	  theft	  if	  he	  
dishonestly	  appropriates	  property	  belonging	  to	  another	  with	  the	  intention	  of	  
permanently	  depriving	  the	  other	  of	  it”.	  	  
	  
This	  example	  highlights	  that	  legal	  natural	  language	  is	  highly	  conceptual	  and	  hieratic.	  
The	  question	  is	  thus	  whether	  this	  language	  can	  be	  adequately	  translated	  into	  a	  formal,	  
machine-­‐processable	  format.	  	  
The	  formal	  translation	  of	  laws,	  including	  the	  particular	  termini	  and	  concepts	  has	  been	  a	  
central	  issue	  in	  the	  field	  of	  AI	  and	  law.	  	  
Kowalski	  established	  that	  the	  legal	  language	  shares	  crucial	  features	  with	  the	  language	  
of	  logic	  programming.1022	  He	  establishes	  in	  his	  work,	  that	  the	  linguistic	  style	  in	  which	  
legislation	  is	  drafted	  combines	  in	  one	  language	  the	  expressive	  power	  of	  computer	  
languages	  for	  such	  diverse	  areas	  as	  programming,	  program	  specification,	  database	  
description	  and	  query,	  integrity	  constraints,	  and	  knowledge	  representation	  in	  AI.1023	  
What	  he	  suggests	  with	  this	  is	  that	  legislation	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  programming	  
language,	  to	  be	  executed	  by	  humans.	  As	  such,	  he	  suggests	  that	  this	  analogy	  could	  lead	  
to	  a	  solution	  for	  the	  translation	  of	  legislation	  into	  formal,	  computer-­‐processable	  format.	  
He	  concludes	  in	  his	  work	  that	  logic	  programming	  techniques	  offer	  suitable	  tools	  for	  the	  
translation	  of	  legislation	  into	  formal	  format.	  He	  derives	  this	  conclusion	  from	  the	  fact	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1021	  R	  A	  Kowalski,	  “Legislation	  as	  Logic	  Program”	  in	  G	  Comyn,	  N	  E	  Fuchs,	  M	  J	  Ratcliffe	  (eds)	  
Logic	  Programming	  in	  Action	  (Berlin,	  Heidelberg:	  Springer	  Verlag,	  1992)	  203.	  
1022	  Kowalski,	  ibid,	  at	  203.	  
1023	  Kowalski,	  ibid,	  at	  227.	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that	  in	  his	  opinion,	  legislation	  is	  generally	  an	  expression	  of	  a	  factual	  situation	  followed	  
by	  consequences.	  	  
While	  this	  is	  true	  to	  some	  extent,	  the	  problem	  of	  his	  approach	  is	  that,	  for	  example,	  
definitions	  of	  the	  termini	  cannot	  be	  represented	  with	  Kowalski’s	  approach.	  Another	  
problem	  is	  the	  referencing	  of	  laws	  by	  laws.	  	  
However,	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  general	  idea	  of	  applying	  logic	  programming	  techniques	  
to	  the	  task	  of	  translating	  laws	  into	  formal	  language	  is	  an	  important	  one.	  	  
Similarly,	  Biagioli	  et	  al.	  specify	  that	  normative	  texts	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  composed	  by	  
formal	  partitions	  (articles,	  paragraphs,	  etc)	  or	  by	  semantic	  units	  containing	  fragments	  
of	  a	  regulation	  (provision).1024	  They	  state	  that	  this	  abstraction	  of	  the	  legislative	  system	  
is	  necessary,	  because	  “the	  legal	  system	  usually	  suffers	  from	  scarce	  transparency,	  which	  
is	  caused	  by	  a	  non-­‐systematic	  organisation	  of	  the	  legal	  order”.1025	  Considering	  
examples	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  depicting	  logical	  programming	  language	  examples,	  it	  
can	  be	  observed	  that	  unambiguous	  information	  and	  a	  hierarchical	  relationship	  
between	  the	  conditions	  is	  necessary	  for	  formalisations	  to	  be	  feasible.	  	  
Accordingly,	  Raz	  suggests	  in	  his	  work	  that	  the	  entire	  body	  of	  law,	  with	  its	  articles	  and	  
paragraphs,	  may	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  set	  of	  provisions,	  intended	  as	  rules	  and	  carried	  by	  
linguistic	  acts,	  and	  therefore	  propositions,	  whether	  simple	  or	  complex,	  endowed	  with	  
meaning.1026	  
Thus	  far,	  it	  can	  be	  ascertained	  that	  one	  prerequisite	  of	  the	  translation	  of	  laws	  into	  
machine-­‐processable	  format	  is	  the	  structuring	  of	  the	  laws	  to	  make	  these	  easier	  
accessible	  to	  logical	  programming	  languages.	  	  
De	  Maat	  and	  Winkels	  in	  their	  work	  confirm	  this,	  specifying	  further	  that	  laws	  can	  be	  
distinguished	  into	  two	  types:	  primary	  and	  secondary	  rules.1027	  Here,	  the	  primary	  rules	  
are	  the	  rules	  that	  refer	  to	  human	  behaviour,	  whereas	  secondary	  rules	  are	  actually	  rules	  
about	  primary	  rules,	  and	  form	  a	  meta-­‐level.	  This	  meta-­‐level	  consists	  of	  three	  sub-­‐
groups:	  (1)	  rules	  of	  recognition,	  (2)	  rules	  of	  change,	  and	  (3)	  rules	  of	  adjucation.1028	  	  
The	  structuring	  of	  laws	  and	  recognition	  of	  normative	  rules	  therefore	  enables	  the	  
translation	  of	  laws	  into	  machine-­‐processable,	  formal	  language.	  Such	  a	  recognition	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1024	  C	  Biagioli	  et	  al.,	  “Automatic	  Semantics	  Extraction	  in	  Law	  Documents”	  (2005)	  Proceedings	  of	  
the	  International	  Conference	  on	  Artificial	  Intelligence	  and	  Law	  ’05,	  6.	  
1025	  Ibid,	  at	  6.	  
1026	  J	  Raz,	  The	  Concept	  of	  a	  Legal	  System	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1980,	  2nd	  ed)	  45.	  
1027	  E	  de	  Maat,	  R	  Winkels,	  “Automated	  Classification	  of	  Norms	  in	  Sources	  of	  Law”	  in	  E	  
Francesconi	  et	  al.	  (eds)	  Semantic	  Processing	  of	  Legal	  Texts	  (Berlin,	  Heidelberg:	  Springer	  Verlag,	  
2010)	  171.	  
1028	  de	  Maat/Winkels,	  ibid,	  at	  171.	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rules	  and	  provisions	  in	  a	  normative	  text	  requires	  an	  analytic	  effort,	  in	  which	  all	  the	  
possible	  distinctions	  among	  the	  elements,	  understood	  as	  rules	  that	  constitute	  the	  
legislative	  text,	  are	  made,	  and	  the	  nature	  and	  function	  of	  each	  one	  is	  identified	  where	  
possible.1029	  This	  includes,	  according	  to	  Biagioli	  et	  al.	  among	  other	  things:1030	  
-­‐ Viewing	  the	  legal	  order	  as	  a	  rule-­‐based	  system	  and	  the	  text	  as	  a	  set	  of	  rules;	  
-­‐ Clearly	  defining	  the	  rule	  functions	  in	  terms	  of	  provision	  types;	  
-­‐ Individuate	  the	  logically	  necessary	  components	  of	  each	  individual	  provision;	  
-­‐ Analyse	  the	  recurring	  and	  privileged	  relationships	  among	  the	  different	  rules.	  
A	  brief	  (simplified)	  example	  can	  better	  illustrate	  this	  translation	  process	  from	  natural	  
language	  legislation	  to	  formal	  representation.	  
Taking	  the	  above	  example	  of	  the	  definition	  of	  “Theft”	  according	  to	  S.1(1)	  UK	  Theft	  Act	  
1968:	  
	  “A	  person	  is	  guilty	  of	  theft	  if	  he	  dishonestly	  appropriates	  property	  belonging	  to	  
another	  with	  the	  intention	  of	  permanently	  depriving	  the	  other	  of	  it”.	  	  
	  
The	  following	  relevant	  elements	  and	  rules	  can	  be	  identified:	  
	  
Addressee:	   “a	  person”	  
Action:	  	  “dishonestly	  appropriating	  property	  belonging	  to	  another”	  
Intention:	  	   “permanently	  depriving	  the	  other”	  
	  














This	  can	  be	  read	  as	  “a	  thief	  is	  person	  x	  if	  he	  dishonestly	  appropriated	  property	  x,	  which	  
belongs	  to	  y,	  and	  has	  the	  intention	  to	  permanently	  depriving	  y.	  
	  
Thus	  the	  conclusion	  is,	  that	  it	  is	  generally	  feasible	  to	  translate	  natural	  language	  laws	  
into	  formal,	  computer-­‐processable	  format.	  Bain	  and	  Subirana	  show	  that	  this	  is	  also	  true	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1029	  Biagioli	  et	  al.,	  note	  1024,	  at	  7.	  
1030	  Biagioli	  et	  al.,	  note	  1024,	  at	  7.	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for	  autonomous	  agent	  software	  (and	  thus	  for	  MIA	  tools),	  explaining	  that	  logic	  
programming	  languages	  enable	  agents	  to	  incorporate	  legal	  rules.1031	  	  
	  
However,	  the	  process	  of	  translating	  laws	  into	  a	  formal	  language	  is	  extremely	  labour-­‐
intensive	  and	  time-­‐consuming.1032	  Considering	  the	  amount	  of	  legislation	  that	  MIA	  tools	  
need	  to	  incorporate	  it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  the	  manual	  translation	  of	  all	  this	  legislation	  
would	  be	  an	  enormous	  task.	  
To	  circumvent	  this	  problem,	  several	  researchers	  have	  developed	  methods	  to	  automate	  
the	  translation	  process,	  or	  some	  part	  of	  it.1033	  	  
State-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	  applications	  are	  capable	  of	  autonomously	  translating	  not	  only	  codified	  
laws	  but	  even	  complex	  syntactic	  constructions,	  such	  as	  judgments	  of	  appellate	  courts	  
and	  other	  legal	  documents.1034	  These	  methodologies	  are	  based	  on	  the	  development	  of	  
so	  called	  parsers1035	  that	  produce	  output,	  which	  can	  be	  processed	  automatically.	  The	  
technical	  details	  of	  these	  approaches	  are	  not	  relevant	  for	  this	  thesis.1036	  However,	  
relevant	  is	  the	  finding	  that	  the	  automatic	  translation	  of	  natural	  language	  legal	  texts	  into	  
formal,	  machine-­‐processable	  format	  is	  possible	  and	  feasible.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1031	  M	  Bain,	  B	  Subirana,	  “Towards	  legal	  programming:	  the	  incorporation	  of	  legal	  criteria	  in	  
software	  agent	  design	  –	  Current	  proposals	  and	  future	  prospects”	  (2004)	  20:1	  Computer	  Law	  &	  
Security	  Report,	  44-­‐52.	  
1032	  L	  T	  McCarty,	  “Deep	  Semantic	  Interpretations	  of	  Legal	  Texts”	  (2007)	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  
International	  Conference	  on	  Artificial	  Intelligence	  and	  Law	  ’07,	  217.	  
1033	  See	  e.g.	  K	  Al-­‐Kofahi,	  B	  Grom,	  P	  Jackson,	  “Anaphora	  resolution	  in	  the	  extraction	  of	  treatment	  
history	  language	  from	  court	  opinions	  by	  partial	  parsing”	  (1999)	  International	  Conference	  on	  
Artificial	  Intelligence	  and	  Law	  ’99,	  138-­‐146;	  S	  Bruninghaus,	  K	  D	  Ashley,	  “Improving	  the	  
Representation	  of	  Legal	  Case	  Texts	  with	  Information	  Extraction	  Methods”	  (2001)	  Proceedings	  of	  
the	  International	  Conference	  on	  Artificial	  Intelligence	  and	  Law	  ’01,	  42-­‐51;	  J	  J	  Daniels,	  E	  L	  Rissland,	  
“Finding	  Legally	  Relevant	  Passages	  in	  Case	  Opinions”	  (1997)	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  International	  
Conference	  on	  Artificial	  Intelligence	  and	  Law	  ’97,	  39-­‐46;	  P	  Jackson	  et	  al.,	  “Information	  extraction	  
from	  Case	  Law	  and	  Retrieval	  of	  Prior	  Cases	  By	  Partial	  Parsing	  and	  Query	  Generation”	  (1998)	  
Proceedings	  of	  the	  International	  Conference	  on	  Artificial	  Intelligence	  and	  Law	  ’98,	  60-­‐67;	  M-­‐F	  
Moens,	  C	  Uyttendaele,	  J	  Dumortier,	  “Abstracting	  of	  Legal	  Cases:	  The	  SALOMON	  Experience”	  
(1997)	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  International	  Conference	  on	  Artificial	  Intelligence	  and	  Law	  ‘97,	  114-­‐
122;	  P	  Quaresma,	  I	  P	  Rodrigues,	  “A	  Question-­‐Answering	  System	  for	  Portuguese	  Juridicial	  
Documents”	  (2005)	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  International	  Conference	  on	  Artificial	  Intelligence	  and	  Law	  
’05,	  256-­‐257;	  T	  M	  van	  Engers,	  et	  al.,	  “POWER:	  Using	  UML/OCL	  for	  Modelling	  Legislation	  –	  An	  
Application	  Report”	  (2001)	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  International	  Conference	  on	  Artificial	  Intelligence	  
and	  Law	  ’01,	  157-­‐167;	  C	  Biagioli	  et	  al.,	  note	  1025,	  133-­‐140;	  de	  Maat/Winkels,	  note	  1029,	  170-­‐
191;	  E	  de	  Maat,	  R	  Winkels,	  “Suggesting	  Model	  Fragments	  for	  Sentences	  in	  Dutch	  Law”	  (2010)	  
Proceedings	  of	  the	  Third	  International	  Workshop	  on	  Juris-­informatics,	  19-­‐28.	  
1034	  McCarty,	  note	  1032,	  at	  217;	  see	  also	  M	  Collins,	  “Head-­‐driven	  Statistical	  Models	  for	  Natural	  
Language	  Parsing”	  (2003)	  29:4	  Computational	  Linguistics,	  589-­‐637.	  
1035	  A	  parser	  is	  a	  computer	  program	  that	  breaks	  down	  text	  into	  recognised	  strings	  of	  characters	  
for	  further	  analysis,	  Merriam-­Webster	  Dictionary	  ,	  available	  online	  at	  http://www.merriam-­‐
webster.com/dictionary/parser.	  
1036	  See	  for	  further	  details,	  references	  in	  footnotes	  1015,	  1016.	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To	  conclude	  it	  can	  be	  summarised	  that	  combined	  with	  the	  capabilities	  of	  software	  to	  be	  
rule-­‐complicit,	  and	  reason	  about	  circumstances	  and	  adapt	  their	  actions	  according	  to	  
situations,	  the	  incorporation	  of	  laws	  into	  MIA	  tools	  to	  enable	  these	  to	  act	  law-­‐complicit	  
seems	  possible.1037	  	  
	  
However,	  some	  problems	  remain.	  In	  particular,	  as	  Hildebrandt	  and	  Koops	  point	  out,	  
machine	  language	  will	  encounter	  difficulties	  dealing	  with	  open	  norms	  like	  “reasonable	  
care”	  or	  “reasonable	  suspicion”,	  which	  need	  to	  be	  interpreted	  with	  considerable	  
attention	  to	  the	  context	  of	  a	  concrete	  case.1038	  Overcoming	  this	  problem	  will	  require	  
detailed	  refinements,	  specifying	  relevant	  circumstances	  and	  the	  weight	  that	  must	  be	  
attributed	  to	  them.	  MIA	  tools	  are	  particularly	  suited	  for	  such	  refinements,	  because	  the	  
use	  of	  these	  tools	  is	  clearly	  defined,	  thus	  the	  relevant	  open	  legal	  norms	  and	  concepts	  
could	  be	  determined	  before	  the	  design	  of	  these	  tools.	  	  
	  
The	  previous	  two	  sections	  have	  shown	  that	  it	  is	  technically	  feasible	  to	  develop	  law-­‐
abiding	  MIA	  tools.	  However,	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  technical	  requirements	  involved	  has	  
also	  highlighted	  that	  these	  rely	  on	  state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	  research,	  which	  is	  still	  developed	  at	  
the	  moment.	  This	  means	  that	  incorporating	  these	  techniques	  into	  MIA	  tools	  might	  give	  
rise	  to	  problems	  of	  robustness	  and	  reliability	  of	  the	  tools.	  However,	  the	  clear	  restriction	  
of	  the	  use	  of	  these	  tools	  for	  specific	  purposes,	  i.e.	  investigative	  actions,	  provides	  a	  frame	  
for	  the	  design	  of	  the	  necessary	  technical	  requirements,	  and	  therefore	  adds	  to	  the	  
reliability	  of	  the	  techniques,	  and	  eventually	  the	  tools.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1037	  The	  focus	  of	  this	  chapter	  has	  been	  on	  the	  ability	  of	  software	  to	  behave	  rule-­‐complicit,	  and	  
the	  translation	  of	  natural	  language	  laws	  into	  formal	  language.	  However,	  in	  addition	  to	  these	  
requirements,	  for	  software	  to	  act	  law-­‐complicit	  and	  enable	  it	  to	  fully	  “understand”	  the	  meaning	  
of	  incorporated	  rules,	  meaning	  needs	  to	  be	  ascribed	  to	  concepts	  and	  rules,	  e.g.	  “dishonestly”	  and	  
“appropriating”	  in	  the	  above	  example.	  This	  can	  be	  achieved	  through	  ontologies	  that	  are	  
incorporated	  into	  the	  software.	  See	  for	  a	  general	  introduction	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  ontology	  e.g.	  B	  
Smith,	  C	  Welty,	  “FOIS	  Introduction:	  Ontology	  –	  Towards	  a	  New	  Synthesis”	  (2001)	  Proceedings	  of	  
the	  International	  Conference	  on	  Formal	  Ontology	  in	  Information	  Systems,	  3-­‐9;	  B	  Smith,	  “Beyond	  
Concepts:	  Ontology	  as	  Reality	  Representation”	  in	  A	  C	  Varzi,	  L	  Vieu	  (eds)	  Formal	  Ontology	  in	  
Information	  Systems	  (Amsterdam:	  IOS	  Press,	  2004)	  73-­‐84.	  See	  for	  an	  application	  of	  ontologies	  
to	  the	  legal	  domain	  e.g.	  J	  Breuker,	  R	  Winkels,	  A	  Valente,	  “A	  Core	  Ontology	  for	  Law”	  in	  K	  van	  
Marcke,	  W	  Daelemans	  (eds)	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  9th	  Dutch	  AI	  Conference	  (Antwerpen:	  NVKI,	  
1997),	  115-­‐126;	  R	  Hoekstra	  et	  al.,	  “The	  LKIF	  Core	  Ontology	  of	  Basic	  Legal	  Concepts”	  (2007)	  
Proceedings	  of	  the	  Workshop	  on	  Legal	  Ontologies	  and	  Artificial	  Intelligence	  Techniques	  (LOAIT	  
2007),	  43-­‐63.	  
1038	  Hildebrandt/Koops,	  note	  939,	  at	  453.	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Nevertheless,	  these	  technical	  challenges	  also	  prompt	  concerns	  of	  a	  political-­‐legal	  
nature,	  as	  discussed	  above.1039	  Developing	  and	  implementing	  the	  technical	  
requirements	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  very	  cost-­‐intensive.	  However,	  as	  discussed	  above,	  
outsourcing	  these	  tasks	  to	  private	  industry	  could	  lead	  to	  a	  loss	  of	  objective	  law	  making	  
and	  therefore	  negatively	  impact	  the	  principles	  of	  a	  democratic	  society.	  Given	  the	  fact	  
that	  these	  tools	  are	  designed	  for	  use	  by	  law	  enforcement	  agencies,	  and	  therefore	  a	  need	  
for	  confidentiality	  of	  the	  exact	  details	  of	  the	  design	  exists,	  the	  outsourcing	  of	  the	  
development	  of	  these	  tools	  is	  not	  without	  risks.	  This	  was	  confirmed	  during	  the	  
interviews	  by	  representatives	  of	  both,	  the	  UK	  and	  the	  German	  government.1040	  It	  was	  
explained	  that	  the	  preferred	  –albeit	  not	  always	  realisable	  approach-­‐	  is	  the	  development	  
of	  such	  tools	  internally.	  This	  would	  diminish	  concerns	  that	  industry	  demands	  and	  
needs	  could	  influence	  the	  development	  of	  the	  tools	  negatively.	  
	  
It	  can	  be	  concluded,	  that	  the	  development	  of	  a	  MIA	  Law,	  i.e.	  the	  design	  of	  law-­‐complicit	  
tools,	  to	  enable	  their	  governance	  through	  design,	  is	  possible.	  
8.5 Assessing the Risks of a MIA Law 
So	  far,	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  chapter	  has	  been	  on	  the	  legal	  and	  technical	  feasibility	  of	  
regulating	  MIA	  technologies	  through	  code.	  However,	  a	  notion	  of	  MIA	  Law,	  meaning	  the	  
incorporation	  of	  laws	  into	  MIA	  technologies	  to	  enable	  law-­‐complicit	  behaviour,	  is	  not	  
without	  problems	  of	  a	  legal	  and	  conceptual	  nature.	  Assessing	  these	  risks	  is	  important	  
for	  the	  consideration	  of	  the	  implementation	  of	  this	  approach.	  	  
This	  section	  considers	  the	  risks	  that	  can	  be	  deduced	  from	  the	  above	  analysis,	  and	  the	  
envisaged	  use	  of	  the	  tools.	  This	  is	  therefore	  by	  no	  means	  a	  discussion	  of	  all	  possible	  
risks	  involved	  in	  the	  implementation	  of	  a	  MIA	  law.	  
	  
As	  discussed	  above,	  the	  technical	  challenges	  of	  this	  approach	  as	  a	  regulatory	  
instrument	  arise	  from	  the	  novelness	  of	  the	  relevant	  techniques.	  This	  prompts	  two	  
somewhat	  connected	  risks:	  (1)	  the	  risk	  of	  developer	  failure,	  and	  (2)	  the	  risk	  of	  design-­‐
failure.	  	  
The	  development	  of	  law-­‐abiding	  MIA	  tools	  requires	  the	  incorporation	  of	  state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐
art	  techniques,	  and	  scientific	  findings.	  This	  necessarily	  requires	  that	  the	  developers	  are	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1039	  See	  p.	  269	  for	  details.	  	  
1040	  See	  p.	  67ff.	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capable	  of	  dealing	  appropriately	  with	  these	  novel	  technologies,	  and	  able	  to	  apply	  and	  
modify	  these	  to	  the	  specific	  requirements	  of	  MIA	  tools.	  As	  such,	  it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  
there	  is	  a	  significant	  risk	  that	  developers	  could	  fail	  to	  achieve	  this,	  and	  thereby	  
negatively	  impact	  the	  accurate	  functioning	  of	  the	  MIA	  tools.	  Therefore,	  thorough	  
selection	  of	  suitable	  IT	  specialists	  is	  mandatory	  for	  the	  successful	  implementation	  of	  
this	  design-­‐based	  regulatory	  approach.	  
	  
Another	  risk	  that	  arises	  from	  the	  novel	  technologies	  required	  for	  the	  realisation	  of	  law-­‐
abiding	  MIA	  tools	  is	  the	  potential	  for	  design-­‐failure.	  These	  can	  occur	  in	  two	  ways:	  
firstly	  through	  the	  mal-­‐functioning	  and	  unreliability	  of	  the	  tool	  in	  its	  entirety,	  and,	  
secondly,	  through	  the	  failure	  of	  implementing	  the	  relevant	  laws	  effectively.	  	  
Generally,	  the	  robustness	  and	  reliability	  of	  information	  systems	  and	  technologies	  
depends	  on	  the	  stability	  and	  robustness	  of	  their	  components.1041	  	  
	  
Robustness	  can	  be	  considered	  as	  a	  degree	  to	  which	  a	  system	  can	  function	  correctly	  in	  
the	  presence	  of	  inputs	  different	  from	  those	  assumed,	  alternatively	  it	  guarantees	  the	  
maintenance	  of	  desired	  system	  characteristics	  despite	  fluctuations	  in	  the	  behaviour	  of	  
the	  system	  components	  or	  its	  environment.1042	  It	  also	  includes	  resilience	  and	  measured	  
degradation	  in	  the	  event	  of	  failures,	  attacks,	  faulty	  assumptions,	  and	  erroneous	  use.1043	  
Given	  the	  intended	  use	  of	  MIA	  tools,	  fluctuations	  of	  the	  network	  environment	  are	  likely.	  
To	  ensure	  robustness	  and	  reliability	  of	  technologies,	  the	  different	  components	  need	  to	  
be	  validated.1044	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  different	  components	  each	  have	  different	  
characteristics,	  so	  the	  challenge	  is	  to	  compose	  heterogeneous	  components	  to	  ensure	  
their	  correct	  interoperation.1045	  	  
Robustness	  therefore	  requires	  a	  broad	  spectrum	  of	  properties,	  such	  as	  safety,	  security,	  
and	  availability.1046	  	  These	  properties	  need	  to	  be	  developed	  for	  the	  specific	  applications,	  
and	  sufficiently	  tested	  before	  using	  the	  tool.	  Nevertheless,	  there	  is	  always	  the	  risk	  of	  
system	  failure,	  particularly	  when	  new	  technologies	  are	  used.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1041	  M	  Burgin,	  “Robustness	  of	  Information	  Systems	  and	  Technologies”	  (2009)	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  
8th	  WSEAS	  International	  Conference	  on	  Data	  Networks,	  Communications,	  Computers,	  67.	  
1042	  S	  Ali	  et	  al.,	  “Definition	  of	  a	  Robustness	  Metric	  for	  Resource	  Allocation”	  (2003)	  Proceedings	  
of	  the	  17th	  International	  Symposium	  on	  Parallel	  and	  Distributed	  Processing,	  42.	  
1043	  T	  A	  Henziger,	  J	  Sifakis,	  “The	  Discipline	  of	  Embedded	  Systems	  Design”	  (2007)	  IEEE	  Computer	  
Society,	  37.	  
1044	  Burgin,	  note	  1041,	  at	  67.	  
1045	  Burgin,	  note	  1041,	  at	  67.	  
1046	  Henziger/Sifakis,	  note	  1043,	  at	  38.	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The	  other	  potential	  design-­‐failure	  relates	  to	  the	  successful	  embedding	  of	  the	  relevant	  
laws.	  The	  problem	  here	  is	  that	  despite	  careful	  attention	  to	  the	  translation	  of	  laws,	  these	  
may	  nevertheless	  fail	  to	  bring	  about	  the	  desired	  policy	  objectives	  and	  results.	  This	  can	  
be	  due	  to	  the	  imperfect	  match	  of	  traditional	  laws	  and	  new	  technologies.	  Traditional	  
legislation	  has	  been	  drafted	  with	  the	  parameters	  of	  the	  physical	  world,	  and	  a	  human	  
interpreter	  in	  mind.	  Translating	  these	  into	  machine-­‐processable	  format	  can	  lead	  to	  
undesired	  imperfections	  between	  the	  rule	  and	  its	  purpose,	  and	  the	  interpretation	  and	  
execution	  of	  this	  by	  the	  MIA	  tool.	  This	  could	  be	  the	  case	  because	  of	  the	  fundamental	  
differences	  between	  the	  online	  and	  offline	  sphere.	  	  
Koops	  also	  discusses	  this	  point	  in	  his	  work,	  asking	  how	  rules	  that	  are	  implemented	  into	  
technology	  should	  be	  assessed,	  given	  that	  technology	  has	  special	  characteristics	  when	  
it	  enforces	  or	  establishes	  legal	  norms.1047	  Thus	  it	  might	  be	  necessary	  that	  those	  
responsible	  for	  the	  selection	  of	  the	  relevant	  legislation	  adapt	  this	  appropriately,	  
without	  changing	  the	  intention	  of	  the	  law.	  This	  requires	  as	  highlighted	  by	  Flanagan	  et	  
al.,1048	  collaboration	  between	  lawyers	  and	  scientists.	  The	  reason	  why	  this	  has	  not	  
happened	  more	  frequently	  in	  the	  past	  is	  that	  in	  both	  areas	  knowledge	  and	  
methodologies	  are	  traditionally	  far-­‐flung	  and	  self-­‐contained.	  However,	  this	  state	  needs	  
to	  be	  overcome,	  as	  collaboration	  is	  essential	  for	  the	  successful	  implementation	  of	  laws	  
into	  technologies.	  In	  addition,	  a	  test-­‐run	  phase	  is	  necessary,	  where	  legal	  experts	  assess	  
the	  outcome	  of	  the	  engineering	  efforts.	  Again,	  collaboration	  is	  an	  essential	  factor	  at	  this	  
stage.	  	  
However,	  despite	  the	  best	  efforts	  of	  experts	  from	  both	  disciplines,	  in	  particular	  because	  
both	  design-­‐failure	  options	  can	  trigger	  each	  other,	  these	  are	  risks	  that	  remain.	  
	  
In	  addition	  to	  technology-­‐inherent	  risks,	  there	  are	  legal	  risks	  that	  arise	  from	  the	  
translation	  of	  the	  legislation	  into	  machine-­‐processable	  format.	  
The	  rules	  embedded	  into	  the	  technology	  are	  unlikely	  to	  be	  exactly	  the	  same	  as	  the	  
original	  rules	  established	  by	  legislature.	  This	  is	  not	  only	  because	  the	  translation	  
process	  from	  natural	  into	  formal	  language	  by	  default	  changes	  the	  rule,	  but	  also	  because,	  
as	  discussed	  above,	  rules	  might	  have	  to	  be	  changed	  before	  they	  are	  incorporated	  into	  
technologies.	  Thus,	  in	  the	  translation	  process,	  choices	  and	  reductions	  take	  place,	  and	  
these	  choices	  are	  not	  necessarily	  made	  by	  the	  responsible	  legislative	  public	  authorities	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  Koops,	  note	  876,	  at	  159.	  
1048	  Flanagan/Howe/Nissenbaum,	  note	  920,	  at	  324.	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subject	  to	  democratic	  checks	  and	  balances,	  but	  by	  technology	  developers	  who	  are	  at	  
best	  subject	  to	  EDP	  auditors.1049	  The	  regular	  checks	  and	  balances	  of	  law	  making	  
therefore	  risk	  to	  be	  circumvented	  by	  MIA	  tools,	  and	  democratic	  and	  constitutional	  
criteria	  are	  thus	  a	  fortiori	  relevant	  for	  these	  technologies.	  	  
It	  is	  therefore	  essential	  to	  develop	  a	  systematic	  approach	  for	  the	  evaluation	  of	  the	  
translation	  process,	  and	  the	  formal	  rules	  embedded	  into	  MIA	  tools.	  Asscher	  has	  
developed	  a	  still	  fairly	  rough	  and	  tentative	  set	  of	  criteria,	  presented	  in	  the	  from	  of	  
questions	  for	  the	  evaluation	  of	  “code	  rules”,	  and	  thus	  MIA	  law:1050	  
	  
1.	  Can	  code	  rules	  be	  understood?	  If	  so,	  are	  they	  transparent	  and	  accessible	  to	  the	  
general	  public?	  
2.	  Can	  the	  rules	  be	  trusted?	  Are	  they	  reliable	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  predictability?	  
3.	  Is	  there	  an	  authority	  that	  makes	  the	  code	  rules?	  
	  
Koops	  summarises	  this	  set	  as:	  transparency,	  reliability,	  and	  accountability.1051	  
A	  system	  to	  evaluate	  the	  translation	  of	  laws	  into	  formal	  format	  needs	  to	  take	  these	  
criteria	  into	  account.	  	  
	  
The	  last	  risk	  to	  be	  discussed	  in	  this	  chapter	  can	  be	  derived	  from	  the	  previously	  
discussed	  one,	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  MIA	  tools	  operate	  clandestinely.	  
If	  the	  formal	  rules	  of	  MIA	  law	  cannot	  be	  evaluated	  appropriately,	  and	  the	  tools	  are	  
deployed	  in	  a	  way	  that	  targeted	  suspects	  and	  other	  citizens	  cannot	  directly	  observe	  the	  
investigative	  actions,	  this	  may	  lead	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  trust	  of	  people	  in	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  
Internet,	  and	  arguably	  more	  seriously,	  the	  integrity	  of	  law	  enforcement.	  Suspects	  and	  
third	  parties	  (such	  as	  lawyers)	  can	  observe	  traditional	  investigative	  actions	  (such	  as	  
the	  search	  of	  a	  premise),	  and	  therefore	  verify	  the	  adherence	  of	  law	  enforcement	  to	  
relevant	  legislation	  governing	  the	  investigative	  actions.	  	  
This	  is	  not	  the	  case	  if	  a	  MIA	  tool	  undertakes	  the	  investigative	  actions	  without	  the	  
knowledge	  of	  the	  suspect.	  If	  the	  laws	  implemented	  into	  MIA	  tools	  are	  not	  evaluated	  
through	  a	  democratic	  and	  public	  system	  of	  checks	  and	  balances,	  this	  can	  lead	  to	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1049	  Koops,	  note	  876,	  at	  161.	  An	  EDP	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  an	  analysis	  of	  an	  organisation’s	  computer	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information	  system	  in	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  to	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  security	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  Free	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impression	  that	  the	  state	  potentially	  deploys	  investigative	  tools	  that	  violate	  privacy	  and	  
data	  protection	  rights	  of	  the	  targeted	  suspects,	  and	  do	  not	  abide	  appropriately	  to	  other	  
legislation	  regulating	  investigative	  actions.	  	  
This	  would	  lead	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  trust	  in	  the	  use	  of	  the	  Internet,	  since	  MIA	  tools	  might	  
potentially	  be	  present	  at	  all	  times	  to	  monitor	  user	  behaviour,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  lack	  of	  trust	  in	  
the	  democratic	  system	  in	  general,	  since	  governments	  would	  undermine	  the	  main	  
pillars	  of	  democratic	  law-­‐making	  through	  the	  use	  of	  these	  technologies.	  
	  
The	  risks	  discussed	  in	  this	  section	  have	  highlighted	  that	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  MIA	  Law	  
is	  tied	  to	  fundamental	  technical	  and	  legal	  problems.	  These	  need	  to	  be	  addressed	  and	  
balanced	  against	  the	  benefits	  of	  the	  design	  of	  law-­‐abiding	  technologies	  before	  these	  can	  
be	  introduced.	  
8.6 Conclusion 
This	  chapter	  has	  covered	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  issues	  relating	  to	  the	  regulatory	  challenges	  
analysed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapters.	  The	  hypothesis	  that	  the	  technical	  abilities	  of	  MIA	  
tools	  can	  be	  used	  to	  design	  these	  to	  be	  law-­‐complicit	  has	  been	  confirmed.	  	  
	  
This	  is	  an	  important	  finding	  for	  the	  development	  of	  a	  sustainable	  governance	  model	  for	  
MIA	  tools,	  and	  the	  new	  cyber-­‐policing	  system	  as	  a	  whole.	  Given	  the	  highly	  intrusive	  
nature	  of	  investigations	  by	  MIA	  tools	  and	  the	  relevance	  of	  the	  virtual	  living	  space,	  
developing	  such	  a	  model	  is	  an	  urgent	  matter.	  	  
	  
The	  discussion	  of	  the	  regulatory	  modality	  code	  has	  confirmed	  what	  the	  previous	  two	  
chapters	  have	  indicated:	  that	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  regulate	  ICT	  technologies	  through	  law	  
alone.	  	  
Code,	  or	  the	  technology’s	  architecture,	  plays	  a	  crucial	  factor	  in	  its	  regulation.	  Code	  can	  
be	  modified	  to	  manipulate	  human	  behaviour,	  however,	  it	  can	  also	  be	  modified	  to	  
influence	  technology	  behaviour,	  and	  thereby	  assist	  the	  traditional	  regulatory	  modality	  
law	  in	  adequately	  regulating	  ICT	  technologies.	  	  
	  
This	  chapter	  has	  developed	  the	  notion	  of	  MIA	  law.	  This	  notion	  is	  premised	  on	  Lessig’s	  
finding	  that	  code	  is	  a	  regulatory	  modality,	  the	  work	  of	  Nissenbaum	  et	  al.	  that	  rules	  can	  
be	  implemented	  into	  code,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  notion	  of	  Ambient	  law	  developed	  by	  Koops	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and	  Hildebrandt.	  However,	  these	  works	  have	  remained	  entirely	  theoretical	  and	  did	  not	  
explore	  in	  how	  far	  these	  notions	  are	  technically	  feasible.	  This	  thesis	  has	  closed	  this	  gap	  
for	  the	  specific	  notion	  of	  MIA	  law.	  	  
	  
The	  analysis	  of	  the	  technical	  requirements	  for	  implementing	  relevant	  legislation	  into	  
MIA	  tools	  has	  indicated	  that	  the	  necessary	  techniques	  are	  state-­‐of-­‐the	  art	  research.	  This	  
means	  that	  only	  specialists	  are	  capable	  of	  developing	  MIA	  law	  and	  issues	  of	  reliability	  
and	  robustness	  of	  the	  MIA	  tools	  arise.	  This	  makes	  an	  immediate	  implementation	  of	  this	  
governance	  model	  doubtful.	  	  
	  
However,	  these	  risks	  need	  to	  be	  addressed	  in	  the	  near	  future	  to	  enable	  the	  successive	  













	   294	  
9 SOFT MIA LAW NOTION 
	  
The	  previous	  chapter	  (8)	  has	  developed	  the	  notion	  of	  MIA	  law	  as	  a	  regulatory	  model	  for	  
MIA	  tools,	  and	  the	  cyber-­‐policing	  system	  as	  a	  whole.	  This	  notion	  is	  premised	  on	  the	  
findings	  that	  code	  is	  a	  regulatory	  modality,1052	  and	  natural	  language	  laws	  can	  be	  
translated	  and	  implemented	  into	  software	  code	  to	  endow	  technologies	  with	  legal	  
reasoning	  capabilities.	  1053	  
	  
The	  notion	  of	  MIA	  law	  constitutes	  a	  sustainable	  solution	  for	  the	  governance	  of	  MIA	  
tools.	  The	  new	  cyber-­‐policing	  system	  and	  its	  software-­‐based	  investigative	  tools	  have	  so	  
far	  lacked	  a	  structured	  governance	  approach,	  which	  has	  caused	  insecurity	  about	  the	  
tools	  legality	  and	  rights	  violations	  of	  affected	  persons.	  	  
	  
However,	  as	  analysed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  the	  notion	  of	  MIA	  law	  is	  a	  technically	  
complex	  model,	  and	  necessary	  techniques	  are	  not	  yet	  standardised	  and	  therefore	  
unreliable.	  Implementing	  these	  into	  governmental	  investigative	  tools	  would	  prompt	  
further	  legal	  issues	  and	  increase	  the	  lack	  of	  trust	  and	  legal	  certainty	  into	  the	  cyber-­‐
policing	  system.	  Additionally,	  the	  urgent	  legal	  problems	  linked	  to	  the	  use	  of	  MIA	  tools	  
discussed	  in	  this	  thesis,1054	  and	  particularly	  the	  problem	  of	  evidential	  value	  of	  the	  data	  
seized	  by	  MIA	  tools	  would	  remain	  unsolved.	  This	  would	  impair	  the	  usability	  and	  
legality	  of	  MIA	  tools	  during	  investigations	  of	  the	  virtual	  living	  space.	  
	  
This	  chapter	  therefore	  develops	  a	  variation	  of	  MIA	  law,	  a	  “soft	  MIA	  law”,	  which	  still	  
relies	  on	  endowing	  software	  with	  legal	  reasoning	  capabilities	  but	  focuses	  more	  on	  the	  
outcomes	  of,	  rather	  than	  the	  replicating	  of	  the	  legal	  reasoning	  process.	  	  
While	  this	  approach	  in	  some	  ways	  lacks	  the	  level	  of	  abstraction	  deployed	  by	  Sartor	  et	  
al.	  in	  their	  work	  and	  introduced	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  it	  is	  a	  solution	  that	  can	  provide	  
greater	  impact	  and	  robustness	  of	  MIA	  tools	  in	  the	  short	  term	  than	  the	  more	  complex	  
and	  state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	  MIA	  law	  developed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1052	  See	  Lessig	  (1999),	  note	  24;	  Lessig	  (2006),	  note	  627.	  
1053	  See	  p	  274ff;	  Sartor,	  note	  982;	  Gelati/	  Rotolo/Sartor/Governatori,	  note	  982.	  
1054	  See	  chapters	  6	  and	  7.	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The	  notion	  of	  soft	  MIA	  law	  equally	  relies	  on	  legal	  reasoning	  abilities	  of	  the	  software	  and	  
the	  translation	  of	  laws	  and	  legal	  norms	  into	  machine-­‐readable	  format.	  However,	  the	  
reasoning	  and	  decision-­‐making	  demands	  on	  the	  software	  tool	  are	  reduced,	  and	  thus	  the	  
required	  level	  of	  programming	  complexity.	  	  
	  
This	  means	  that	  the	  robustness	  and	  reliability	  of	  the	  MIA	  tools	  is	  increased,	  as	  well	  as	  
the	  demands	  on	  the	  operator.	  This	  simplifies	  the	  development	  and	  design	  of	  MIA	  tools,	  
and	  therefore	  also	  reduces	  the	  costs.1055	  This	  also	  means	  that	  capable	  software	  
developers	  can	  be	  contracted	  more	  easily.	  In	  addition,	  this	  approach	  requires	  less	  
technical	  knowledge	  from	  the	  operator	  of	  the	  tool.	  This	  means	  that	  personnel	  can	  be	  
trained	  more	  easily	  and	  problems	  due	  to	  operating	  mistakes	  avoided.1056	  
	  
The	  proposed	  system	  is,	  in	  short,	  a	  firewall	  type	  protocol	  that	  serves	  as	  an	  
intermediary	  between	  the	  MIA	  tool	  and	  the	  operating	  authority	  to	  filter	  data	  and	  
communication	  that	  cannot	  be	  lawfully	  transmitted,	  and	  communicate	  commands	  and	  
requests	  to	  the	  MIA	  tool.	  This	  system,	  which	  is	  standardised	  and	  can	  be	  operated	  by	  
any	  officer	  requiring	  the	  use	  of	  a	  MIA	  tool	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  quasi	  digital	  judge,	  
making	  decisions	  about	  the	  usability	  and	  admissibility	  of	  data	  collected,	  and	  depending	  
on	  for	  example	  the	  type	  of	  warrant	  underlying	  the	  search	  and	  seizure	  action,	  making	  
decisions	  regarding	  the	  permissible	  actions.	  	  
Thus	  the	  firewall	  is	  acting	  as	  an	  information	  gateway	  between	  the	  MIA	  tool	  and	  the	  
operating	  authority.	  
	  
The	  first	  part	  of	  this	  chapter	  reviews	  in	  section	  9.1	  the	  particular	  technical	  problems	  
identified	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  and	  introduces	  three	  short	  case	  scenarios	  that	  
highlight	  how	  the	  nature	  of	  MIA	  tools	  causes,	  at	  this	  stage,	  problems	  for	  reliability	  and	  
robustness	  if	  a	  strong	  notion	  of	  MIA	  law	  is	  implemented.	  	  The	  second	  part	  introduces	  in	  
section	  9.2	  the	  soft	  MIA	  law	  notion	  in	  more	  detail,	  and	  depicts	  how	  this	  can	  serve	  to	  
overcome	  the	  technical	  problems	  of	  the	  strong	  MIA	  law	  notion	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  
solving	  the	  current	  issues	  linked	  to	  the	  policing	  of	  the	  virtual	  living	  space	  by	  MIA	  tools.	  
Section	  9.3	  concludes	  with	  the	  main	  findings	  of	  this	  chapter.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1055	  The	  problem	  of	  high	  development	  costs	  was	  one	  of	  the	  key	  problems	  identified	  by	  the	  
experts.	  See	  chapter	  3,	  p.	  68.	  
1056	  This	  was	  another	  key	  problem	  identified	  by	  the	  experts.	  See	  chapter	  3,	  p.	  68.	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9.1 Problems of the Strong MIA Law Notion 
The	  previous	  chapters	  have	  analysed	  the	  technical	  and	  legal	  issues	  of	  the	  use	  of	  MIA	  
tools	  for	  the	  policing	  of	  the	  virtual	  living	  space.1057	  This	  analysis,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  
empirical	  research	  results,	  have	  evidenced	  that	  MIA	  tools	  challenge	  in	  particular	  
existing	  privacy	  and	  data	  protection	  rights,	  sovereignty	  principals,	  and	  evidence	  
principals	  and	  laws.	  Solving	  these	  problems	  through	  the	  traditional	  regulatory	  
modality	  law	  alone	  is	  insufficient	  due	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  MIA	  tools.	  These	  investigative	  
tools	  police	  the	  virtual	  living	  space	  autonomously	  and	  replace	  human	  investigators	  for	  
core	  policing	  tasks.	  This	  means	  that	  these	  tools	  must	  adhere	  to	  existing	  legislation,	  
which	  requires,	  as	  shown	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  a	  regulation	  through	  code	  approach.	  	  
	  
The	  analysis	  of	  the	  technical	  foundations	  of	  MIA	  law	  has	  however	  evidenced	  that	  the	  
required	  technical	  standard	  for	  a	  successful	  implementation	  of	  this	  regulatory	  
approach	  relies	  on	  state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	  technology,	  which	  is	  not	  yet	  available	  as	  “off	  the	  
shelf”	  products,	  and	  particularly	  not	  for	  the	  legal	  domain.	  	  
This	  creates	  further	  problems	  for	  the	  regulation	  of	  the	  most	  pressing	  legal	  issues	  
identified	  above.	  	  
	  
Three	  short	  case	  scenarios	  tailored	  to	  these	  legal	  issues	  (violations	  of	  privacy	  and	  data	  
protection	  rights,	  sovereignty	  rights,	  and	  evidence	  principles	  and	  laws)	  are	  presented	  
below.	  These	  case	  scenarios	  serve	  to	  highlight	  the	  particular	  technical	  problems	  of	  the	  
implementation	  of	  the	  strong	  MIA	  law	  notion.	  This	  analysis	  is	  important	  for	  the	  
development	  of	  the	  soft	  MIA	  law,	  which	  is	  focused	  on	  avoiding	  the	  technical	  problems	  
of	  the	  strong	  MIA	  law.	  
The	  case	  scenarios	  focus	  is	  on	  the	  case	  study	  of	  this	  thesis,	  the	  online	  searching	  of	  
ICTs,1058	  as	  a	  confirmed	  investigative	  measure	  of	  the	  virtual	  living	  space.	  
	  
Scenario	  a.:	  A	  search	  warrant	  is	  granted	  for	  a	  remote	  search	  of	  the	  computer	  and	  
other	  ICT	  devices	  of	  suspect	  X.	  	  He	  is	  suspected	  to	  be	  member	  of	  a	  group	  in	  
Germany,	  which	  is	  planning	  to	  attack	  a	  mosque.	  The	  evidence	  linking	  him	  to	  the	  
group	  is	  strong	  but	  no	  urgency	  is	  indicated.	  The	  search	  warrant	  allows	  for	  the	  
search	  of	  relevant	  documentation	  stored	  on	  the	  ICT	  devices,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  
monitoring	  of	  relevant	  communication.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1057	  See	  particularly	  chapters	  6	  and	  7.	  
1058	  See	  chapter	  2.	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Variation	  aa.:	  The	  evidence	  linking	  X	  to	  the	  group	  suggests	  that	  the	  attack	  is	  
imminent,	  and	  therefore	  urgent	  measures	  are	  required.	  Thus	  the	  search	  warrant	  
allows	  for	  the	  search	  of	  all	  documentation	  stored	  on	  the	  ICT	  devices,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  
monitoring	  of	  all	  communication.	  	  
	  
In	  case	  scenario	  a.	  the	  MIA	  tool	  needs	  to	  be	  capable	  of	  selecting,	  copying	  and	  
transmitting	  solely	  data	  that	  is	  directly	  relevant	  and	  linked	  to	  the	  planned	  attack.	  Due	  
to	  German	  data	  protection	  rights,	  the	  operating	  authority	  is	  not	  allowed	  to	  view	  and	  
use	  any	  other	  material,	  and	  in	  particular	  not	  material	  from	  the	  core	  area	  of	  private	  
life.1059	  	  
In	  the	  case	  variation	  aa.	  the	  MIA	  tool	  may	  copy	  any	  data	  stored	  on	  the	  ICT	  devices,	  and	  
monitor	  any	  communication	  by	  the	  suspect.	  	  
However,	  information	  from	  the	  core	  area	  of	  private	  life	  needs	  to	  be	  excluded	  in	  this	  
case,	  too.	  	  
Based	  on	  the	  analysis	  in	  chapter	  8	  of	  ACLs	  and	  formalisation	  of	  natural	  language,1060	  
these	  scenarios	  can	  be	  formally	  expressed	  as:	  
	  	  
Scenario	  a.:	  Does	  (MIA,t)	  [undertake	  search	  and	  monitoring	  activities	  of	  systems	  
X]	  THENn	  	  Obl	  DoesMIA	  [search	  only	  relevant	  data]	  	  
THENn	  	  Obl	  DoesMIA	  [disregard	  core	  private	  data]	  
This	  can	  be	  read	  as	  “the	  MIA	  tool	  undertakes	  searching	  and	  monitoring	  
activities	  of	  systems	  X	  at	  time	  t,	  and	  it	  is	  obligatory	  that	  MIA	  searches	  relevant	  
data	  only,	  and	  disregards	  core	  private	  data”.	  
	  
In	  addition,	  such	  formally	  expressed	  commands	  require	  the	  “knowledge”	  of	  the	  MIA	  









disregard_core_private(medical	  records,	  diary	  entries,	  bank	  
statementsbelonging	  to	  y)].	  
This	  can	  be	  read	  as	  “data	  is	  any	  data	  x	  if	  it	  is	  relevant,	  which	  is	  data	  pertaining	  
to	  suspect	  X	  and	  topic	  Y,	  and	  not	  from	  the	  core	  area	  of	  private	  life,	  which	  are	  
medical	  records,	  diary	  entries,	  and	  bank	  statements	  belonging	  to	  suspect	  X”.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1059	  See	  p.	  47ff.	  
1060	  See	  p.	  285ff.	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Variation	  aa.:	  Does	  (MIA,t)	  [undertake	  search	  and	  monitoring	  activities	  of	  
systems	  X]	  
THENn	  	  Obl	  DoesMIA	  [disregard	  core	  private	  data]	  
This	  can	  be	  read	  as	  “the	  MIA	  tool	  undertakes	  searching	  and	  monitoring	  
activities	  of	  systems	  X	  at	  time	  t,	  and	  it	  is	  oblifatory	  that	  MIA	  disregards	  core	  
private	  data”.	  
	  
In	  addition,	  these	  formally	  expressed	  commands	  require	  the	  “knowledge”	  of	  the	  MIA	  






→any(ICT	  system	  of	  personX)	  
€ 
∧ 	  
disregard_core_private(medical	  records,	  diary	  entries,	  bank	  
statementsbelonging	  to	  y)].	  
This	  can	  be	  read	  as	  “data	  is	  any	  data	  x	  if	  located	  on	  ICT	  systems	  of	  suspect	  X,	  
and	  which	  does	  not	  pertain	  to	  the	  core	  area	  of	  private	  life,	  which	  are	  medical	  
records,	  diary	  entries,	  and	  bank	  statements	  belonging	  to	  suspect	  X”.	  
	  
Scenario	  b.	  A	  search	  warrant	  is	  granted	  for	  a	  remote	  search	  of	  the	  computer	  and	  
other	  ICT	  devices	  of	  suspect	  X.	  	  He	  is	  suspected	  to	  be	  member	  of	  a	  group	  in	  
Germany,	  which	  is	  planning	  to	  attack	  a	  mosque.	  Shortly	  after	  the	  search	  has	  
commenced	  suspect	  X	  travels	  to	  the	  UK.	  	  
	  
Variation	  bb.	  The	  UK	  grants	  German	  authorities	  the	  right	  to	  conduct	  
investigative	  actions	  on	  their	  sovereignty.	  
	  
Case	  scenario	  b.	  requires	  the	  MIA	  tool	  to	  be	  capable	  of	  detecting	  when	  the	  suspect	  
leaves	  German	  sovereignty,	  and	  stop	  all	  investigative	  actions	  while	  the	  suspect	  is	  
abroad.	  
Variation	  bb.	  requires	  the	  MIA	  tool	  to	  be	  capable	  of	  overriding	  the	  general	  rule	  that	  
investigative	  actions	  outside	  of	  German	  sovereignty	  are	  forbidden,	  and	  continue	  search	  
and	  monitoring	  actions	  on	  UK	  sovereignty.	  
Based	  on	  the	  analysis	  in	  chapter	  8	  of	  ACLs	  and	  formalisation	  of	  natural	  language,1061	  
these	  scenarios	  can	  be	  formally	  expressed	  as:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1061	  See	  285ff.	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Scenario	  b.:	  Does	  (MIA,t)	  [undertake	  search	  and	  monitoring	  activities	  of	  
systems	  X]	  
Forb	  DoesMIA	  [undertake	  search	  and	  monitoring	  activities	  while	  ICT	  device	  is	  
outside	  sovereignty]	  
This	  can	  be	  read	  as	  “the	  MIA	  tool	  undertakes	  searching	  and	  monitoring	  
activities	  of	  systems	  X	  at	  time	  t,	  but	  it	  is	  forbidden	  to	  undertake	  search	  and	  
monitoring	  actions	  while	  the	  suspect’s	  ICT	  device	  is	  outside	  of	  German	  
territory”.	  
	  
In	  addition,	  these	  formally	  expressed	  commands	  require	  the	  “knowledge”	  of	  the	  MIA	  










This	  can	  be	  read	  as	  “sovereignty	  is	  a	  geographic	  area	  x,	  if	  Germany	  has	  supreme	  
and	  independent	  authority	  over	  it,	  which	  is	  the	  case	  if	  the	  IP	  address	  can	  be	  
assigned	  to	  Germany”.1063	  
	  
Variation	  bb.:	  Does	  (MIA,t)	  [undertake	  search	  and	  monitoring	  activities	  of	  
systems	  X]	  
Forb	  DoesMIA	  [undertake	  search	  and	  monitoring	  activities	  while	  ICT	  device	  is	  
outside	  sovereignty]	  
Perm	  BringsUK	  [PermMIA	  carry-­‐out	  investigative	  action	  X]	  
This	  can	  be	  read	  as	  “the	  MIA	  tool	  undertakes	  searching	  and	  monitoring	  
activities	  of	  systems	  X	  at	  time	  t,	  but	  it	  is	  forbidden	  to	  undertake	  search	  and	  
monitoring	  actions	  while	  the	  suspect’s	  ICT	  device	  is	  outside	  of	  German	  
sovereignty,	  unless	  the	  UK	  has	  permitted	  that	  the	  MIA	  tool	  carries	  out	  the	  
investigative	  action	  X	  on	  its	  sovereignty.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1062	  In	  this	  particular	  case,	  the	  legal	  concept	  “sovereignty”	  needs	  to	  refer	  to	  German	  sovereignty.	  
Furthermore,	  a	  technical	  element	  that	  allows	  the	  MIA	  tool	  to	  autonomously	  detect	  whether	  an	  
ICT	  device	  is	  operated	  in	  a	  specified	  sovereignty	  is	  required.	  
1063	  The	  reason	  for	  choosing	  an	  IP	  address	  as	  the	  technical	  element	  to	  detect	  where	  the	  ICT	  
device	  is	  operated	  is	  that	  several	  open	  access	  web	  portals	  exist,	  where	  an	  IP	  address	  can	  be	  
entered	  and	  its	  origin	  checked.	  An	  example	  of	  such	  a	  web	  portal	  is:	  http://software77.net/geo-­‐
ip/.	  Obviously,	  this	  approach	  has	  weaknesses,	  such	  as	  for	  users	  of	  virtual	  private	  networks	  
(VPNs).	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In	  addition,	  these	  formally	  expressed	  commands	  require	  the	  “knowledge”	  of	  the	  MIA	  
tool	  about	  the	  legal	  concept	  “sovereignty”.1064	  
	  
Scenario	  c.	  A	  search	  warrant	  is	  granted	  for	  a	  remote	  search	  of	  the	  computer	  and	  
other	  ICT	  devices	  of	  suspect	  X.	  	  He	  is	  suspected	  to	  be	  member	  of	  a	  group	  in	  
Germany,	  which	  is	  planning	  to	  attack	  a	  mosque.	  All	  data	  seized	  by	  the	  MIA	  tool	  
needs	  to	  be	  authentic	  and	  reliable	  for	  it	  to	  be	  used	  as	  evidence.	  	  
	  
Case	  scenario	  c.	  requires	  the	  MIA	  tool	  to	  be	  capable	  of	  creating	  bit-­‐stream	  copies	  of	  all	  
data	  seized,	  which	  feature	  time	  stamps	  so	  that	  the	  data	  can	  be	  used	  as	  evidence	  in	  court	  
proceedings,	  and	  thus	  has	  any	  value	  for	  the	  investigation.	  
Based	  on	  the	  analysis	  in	  chapter	  8	  of	  ACLs	  and	  formalisation	  of	  natural	  language,1065	  
these	  scenarios	  can	  be	  formally	  expressed	  as:	  
	  
Does	  (MIA,t)	  [undertake	  search	  and	  monitoring	  activities	  of	  systems	  X]	  
Obl	  BringsMIA	  [create	  bit-­‐stream	  image	  of	  data	  X]	  	  
Obl	  BringsMIA	  [add	  time	  stamps	  to	  data	  X]	  	  
This	  can	  be	  read	  as	  “the	  MIA	  tool	  undertakes	  searching	  and	  monitoring	  
activities	  of	  systems	  X	  at	  time	  t,	  and	  it	  is	  obligatory	  that	  the	  MIA	  tool	  brings	  it	  
about	  that	  a	  bit-­‐stream	  copy	  of	  data	  X	  is	  created,	  and	  time	  stamps	  are	  added	  to	  
data	  X.	  
	  
In	  addition,	  these	  formally	  expressed	  commands	  require	  the	  “knowledge”	  of	  the	  MIA	  






→set_of_files(exact	  copy	  of	  hard	  
drive	  X))]	  
This	  can	  be	  read	  as	  “a	  bit-­‐stream	  image	  is	  a	  bit-­‐by-­‐bit	  copy	  of	  data	  X	  if	  the	  set	  of	  




¬proof	  (time	  of	  which	  event	  occured)	  
€ 
→sequence	  of	  
characters(time	  at	  which	  event	  is	  recorded	  by	  computer))]	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1064	  See	  above	  under	  b.	  for	  the	  formal	  expression	  of	  the	  legal	  concept	  “sovereignty”.	  
1065	  See	  p.	  285ff.	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This	  can	  be	  read	  as	  “a	  timestamp	  is	  a	  proof	  of	  a	  time	  at	  which	  an	  event	  
occurred,	  if	  the	  sequence	  of	  characters	  is	  the	  time	  at	  which	  the	  event	  is	  
recorded	  by	  the	  computer.	  
	  
These	  three	  examples,	  highlighting	  the	  most	  pressing	  legal	  challenges	  arising	  from	  the	  
use	  of	  MIA	  tools	  (violation	  of	  privacy	  and	  data	  protection	  rights,	  sovereignty,	  use	  as	  
evidence)	  have	  deliberately	  been	  kept	  very	  simple.	  More	  complex	  scenarios	  would	  
have	  made	  the	  formal	  representation	  far	  more	  complicated,	  and	  thus	  more	  difficult	  to	  
comprehend.	  	  	  
	  
The	  aim,	  however,	  was	  to	  depict	  the	  technical	  challenges	  arising	  from	  the	  
implementation	  of	  the	  strict	  MIA	  law	  notion.	  For	  this,	  simple	  case	  scenarios	  are	  
sufficient	  and	  in	  fact	  more	  adequate.	  If	  the	  arguments	  against	  the	  implementation	  of	  
the	  strict	  MIA	  law	  notion	  are	  applicable	  to	  these	  simple	  scenarios	  they	  are,	  a	  fortiori,	  to	  
more	  complex	  scenarios.	  	  
	  
While	  all	  three	  scenarios	  (including	  the	  case	  modifications)	  are	  focused	  on	  a	  different	  
legal	  problem	  they	  highlight	  the	  technical	  difficulties	  faced	  by	  software	  developers	  of	  
MIA	  tools.	  	  
	  
Chapters	  4	  and	  5	  have	  analysed	  the	  general	  technical	  abilities	  of	  MIA	  tools.1066	  The	  
most	  significant	  being	  mobility,	  intelligence	  and	  autonomy,	  which	  enable	  these	  tools	  to	  
replace	  human	  officers	  for	  policing	  tasks	  and,	  for	  example,	  undertake	  text	  analysis,	  data	  
retrieval,	  link	  analysis,	  and	  platform	  migration.	  	  
Designing	  software	  tools	  featuring	  these	  capabilities	  requires	  a	  high	  standard	  of	  
technical	  knowledge	  and	  sophisticated	  software.	  As	  shown	  in	  chapter	  4,1067	  software	  
solutions	  featuring	  some	  of	  these	  abilities	  exist	  and	  are	  already	  deployed	  by	  various	  
authorities.	  This	  means	  that	  these	  systems	  are	  robust	  and	  reliable,	  as	  well	  as	  
sufficiently	  predictable	  in	  their	  operations	  and	  outputs.	  	  
Reliability	  and	  robustness,	  as	  well	  as	  predictability	  are	  crucial	  attributes	  of	  software	  
tools	  in	  general,	  but	  particularly	  if	  they	  operate	  autonomously	  and	  are	  deployed	  for	  
sensitive	  tasks,	  such	  as	  the	  searching	  of	  ICT	  devices	  of	  suspects	  during	  investigations.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1066	  See	  p.	  84ff,	  123ff.	  
1067	  See	  p.	  119.	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The	  challenge	  for	  designers	  is	  thus	  to	  design	  “high-­‐level	  programming	  models	  that	  
expose	  the	  reaction	  and	  execution	  properties	  of	  a	  system	  in	  a	  way	  that	  
1.	  permits	  the	  programmer	  to	  express	  desired	  reaction	  and	  execution	  requirements	  
and,	  2.	  permits	  the	  compiler	  and	  run-­‐time	  system	  to	  ensure	  that	  these	  requirements	  
are	  satisfied.”1068	  This	  in	  turn	  facilitates	  robustness	  and	  predictability	  of	  the	  software	  
tools.	  	  
	  
Robustness	  in	  software	  systems	  requires	  that	  the	  systems	  feature	  robust	  behaviour	  in	  
the	  presence	  of	  perturbations.1069	  Hence,	  that	  a	  system	  is	  able	  to	  function	  correctly	  and	  
coherently	  in	  a	  changing	  environment,	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  invalid	  or	  conflicting	  inputs,	  
and	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  situations	  not	  considered	  during	  the	  design	  phase.1070	  	  
The	  more	  complex	  the	  systems	  the	  more	  challenging	  is	  the	  task	  of	  ensuring	  system	  
robustness.	  This	  is	  because	  it	  is	  extremely	  difficult	  and	  sometimes	  impossible	  to	  
anticipate	  all	  the	  possible	  scenarios	  in	  which	  these	  complex	  systems	  will	  perform	  so	  as	  
to	  make	  the	  appropriate	  tests.1071	  Particularly	  challenging	  is	  the	  task	  of	  testing	  
autonomic	  elements	  and	  verifying	  that	  they	  behave	  correctly,	  because	  it	  is	  harder	  to	  
anticipate	  their	  environment,	  particularly	  if	  it	  extends	  across	  multiple	  administrative	  
domains	  or	  enterprises.1072	  	  
	  
Predictability	  in	  software	  systems	  refers	  to	  the	  ability	  to	  predict	  behaviour	  of	  
systems.1073	  Thus	  predictability	  is	  closely	  linked	  to	  robustness	  of	  software	  systems,	  but	  
is	  focused	  on	  the	  outputs	  of	  the	  software,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  timely	  execution	  of	  tasks.	  
Predictability	  in	  dynamic	  systems	  can	  be	  summarised	  as	  the	  ability	  to	  predict	  the	  
timing	  requirements	  of	  critical	  tasks	  with	  100%	  guarantee	  over	  the	  life	  of	  the	  system,	  
to	  assess	  overall	  system	  performance	  over	  various	  time	  frames,	  and	  to	  assess	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1068	  T	  A	  Henziger,	  “Two	  Challenges	  in	  Embedded	  Systems	  Design:	  Predictability	  and	  
Robustness”	  (2008)	  Philosophical	  Transactions	  of	  the	  Royal	  Society,	  2.	  
1069	  Ibid,	  at	  7.	  
1070	  M	  N	  Huhns,	  V	  T	  Holderfield,	  R	  L	  Z	  Gutierrez,	  “Achieving	  Software	  Robustness	  via	  Large-­‐
Scale	  Multiagent	  Systems”	  in	  C	  J	  Pereira	  de	  Lucena	  et	  al.	  (eds)	  Software	  Engineering	  for	  Multi-­
Agent	  Systems	  II,	  Research	  Issues	  and	  Practical	  Applications	  (Berlin,	  Heidelberg:	  Springer	  Verlag,	  
2003)	  199-­‐215,	  199.	  
1071	  Ibid.	  
1072	  J	  O	  Kephart,	  D	  M	  Chess,	  “The	  Vision	  of	  Autonomic	  Computing”	  (2003)	  36:1	  IEEE	  Computer,	  
41-­‐50,	  41.	  
1073	  Huhns/Holderfield/Gutierrez,	  note	  1070,	  at	  3.	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individual	  task	  and	  task	  group	  performance	  at	  different	  times	  and	  as	  a	  function	  of	  the	  
current	  system	  state.1074	  
If	  robustness	  and	  predictability	  are	  achieved,	  the	  software	  tool	  can	  be	  considered	  
reliable.	  	  
Given	  the	  significant	  legal	  values	  that	  are	  at	  stake,	  reliability,	  thus	  robustness	  and	  
predictability	  of	  the	  MIA	  tool	  is	  mandatory	  for	  it	  usage.	  	  
However,	  as	  the	  brief	  definitions	  of	  robustness	  and	  predictability	  of	  software	  have	  
shown,	  the	  more	  complex	  software	  is,	  and	  the	  higher	  the	  degree	  of	  autonomy	  the	  more	  
difficult	  it	  is	  to	  achieve	  these	  attributes.	  In	  addition,	  the	  high	  complexity	  of	  a	  tool	  
combined	  with	  its	  use	  on	  a	  multitude	  of	  systems	  and	  platforms	  complicates	  the	  
anticipation	  and	  testing	  of	  all	  potentially	  possible	  scenarios	  the	  system	  will	  have	  to	  
perform	  in.	  	  
	  
The	  case	  scenarios	  above	  have	  shown	  that	  the	  strict	  MIA	  law	  notion	  requires	  the	  
implementation	  of	  very	  complex,	  and	  state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	  techniques.	  In	  addition,	  it	  has	  
highlighted	  that	  particularly	  in	  the	  legal	  domain	  oftentimes	  unpredictable	  situations	  
arise,	  which	  require	  the	  MIA	  tool	  to	  undertake	  legal	  reasoning	  on	  a	  high	  level.	  While	  the	  
case	  scenarios	  have	  deliberately	  been	  kept	  simple	  much	  more	  complex	  reasoning	  by	  
MIA	  tools	  is	  required	  during	  investigations	  of	  the	  virtual	  living	  space.	  The	  previous	  
chapters	  have	  highlighted	  some	  of	  the	  pertinent	  legal	  issues.1075	  
As	  mentioned	  above,	  the	  “core	  abilities	  and	  functions”	  of	  MIA	  tools	  already	  require	  a	  
high	  technological	  standard.	  However,	  given	  the	  sophistication	  of	  these	  techniques,	  and	  
mainstream	  usage	  of	  tools	  incorporating	  these	  techniques,	  these	  tools	  can	  function	  
under	  changing	  circumstances,	  as	  well	  as	  deal	  with	  unpredictable	  situations,	  thus	  
feature	  software	  robustness.	  Their	  actions	  are	  also	  sufficiently	  predictable,	  given	  the	  
amount	  of	  research	  undertaken	  in	  this	  area.1076	  
However,	  the	  required	  techniques	  to	  implement	  a	  strict	  MIA	  law,	  namely	  the	  
incorporation	  of	  an	  advanced	  ACL	  and	  natural	  language	  processing	  abilities,	  are	  at	  the	  
point	  of	  writing	  this	  chapter	  still	  very	  much	  a	  work	  in	  progress.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1074	  J	  A	  Stankovic,	  K	  Ramamritham,	  “What	  is	  Predictability	  for	  Real-­‐Time	  Systems?”	  (1990)	  2	  
Real-­Time	  Systems,	  247-­‐254,	  254.	  
1075	  See	  chapters	  6	  and	  7.	  
1076	  See	  chapters	  4	  and	  5	  for	  a	  summary	  of	  important	  research	  results,	  also	  for	  the	  legal	  domain.	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While	  the	  techniques	  already	  exist,	  for	  the	  legal	  domain	  these	  are	  currently	  
predominantly	  developed	  in	  the	  academic	  arena,	  and	  therefore	  have	  not	  yet	  been	  
implemented	  into	  a	  wide	  array	  of	  commercially	  available	  software	  tools.	  	  
This	  means	  that	  knowledge	  about	  the	  functioning	  of	  tools	  in	  a	  changing	  environment	  is	  
very	  limited,	  if	  existing	  at	  all,	  and	  it	  is	  also	  unclear	  how	  these	  tools	  would	  cope	  with	  
unpredictable	  situations.	  	  
In	  addition,	  their	  actions	  during	  investigations	  are	  not	  predictable,	  given	  the	  lack	  of	  
appropriate	  tests.	  This	  is	  particularly	  true	  for	  MIA	  tools,	  due	  to	  their	  anticipated	  use	  for	  
sensitive	  purposes.	  	  
Chapters	  2	  and	  3	  have	  highlighted	  the	  need	  for	  secrecy	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  publicly	  
available	  information	  about	  the	  exact	  details	  of	  the	  use	  of	  MIA	  tools.	  This	  need	  for	  
secrecy	  impacts	  on	  the	  ability	  of	  software	  designers	  to	  sufficiently	  test	  relevant	  
scenarios	  during	  the	  development	  stage.	  	  
Thus,	  MIA	  tools	  possessing	  the	  necessary	  technical	  requirements	  to	  implement	  a	  strict	  
MIA	  law	  can	  be	  designed,	  however,	  lack	  robustness	  and	  predictability,	  and	  therefore	  
reliability.	  This	  means	  that	  their	  value	  for	  sensitive	  criminal	  investigations	  is	  severely	  
impaired.	  
In	  addition	  to	  these	  technical	  concerns,	  there	  are	  also	  concerns	  about	  the	  sharing	  of	  the	  
data	  seized	  by	  MIA	  tools.	  As	  briefly	  indicated	  in	  case	  scenarios	  a.	  and	  aa.,	  the	  seized	  
data	  may	  only	  be	  shared	  with	  authorised	  officers.	  	  
Authorisation,	  however,	  can	  vary	  depending	  on	  the	  urgency	  and	  the	  type	  of	  warrant.	  
This	  means	  that	  the	  MIA	  tool	  needs	  to	  be	  capable	  of	  verifying	  whether	  the	  officer	  
requesting	  the	  data	  is	  in	  fact	  also	  authorised	  to	  receive	  it.	  This	  adds	  another	  element	  to	  
the	  reasoning	  process	  the	  MIA	  tool	  needs	  to	  accomplish,	  and	  therefore	  to	  the	  technical	  
capabilities	  of	  these	  tools.	  	  
It	  is,	  however,	  of	  great	  importance	  that	  the	  seized	  data	  is	  solely	  shared	  with	  authorised	  
officers.	  Privacy	  and	  data	  protection	  rights	  of	  the	  suspect	  would	  be	  breached	  if	  
unauthorised	  officers	  would	  have	  access	  to	  the	  personal	  data.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  it	  can	  be	  
equally	  important	  that	  all	  authorised	  officers	  receive	  the	  relevant	  data.	  Thus	  failure	  to	  
disclose	  the	  data	  can	  be	  as	  harmful	  as	  the	  disclosure	  of	  data	  to	  unauthorised	  officers	  
because	  it	  can	  negatively	  affect	  the	  investigative	  progress.	  	  
Adding	  this	  element	  to	  the	  reasoning	  process	  of	  MIA	  tools	  further	  complicates	  the	  
technical	  process,	  and	  thus	  challenges	  the	  reliability	  of	  the	  tools.	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Hence,	  the	  implementation	  of	  a	  strong	  MIA	  law	  to	  solve	  the	  legal	  problems	  of	  deploying	  
MIA	  tools	  during	  investigations	  of	  the	  virtual	  living	  space	  is	  at	  the	  current	  stage	  of	  
technological	  development	  inadvisable.1077	  	  
The	  analysis	  of	  the	  problems	  of	  implementing	  a	  strong	  MIA	  law	  has	  evidenced	  that	  the	  
main	  issue	  of	  this	  notion	  is	  the	  high	  technical	  demand	  on	  already	  complex	  software	  
tools.	  The	  legal	  domain	  requires	  absolute	  reliability	  of	  the	  tools	  to	  ensure	  no	  rights	  
violations	  occur	  during	  investigations	  and	  the	  evidence	  seized	  can	  be	  used	  during	  court	  
proceedings.	  At	  the	  current	  state	  of	  the	  art	  of	  technology	  research	  this	  cannot	  be	  
guaranteed.	  This	  is	  particularly	  the	  case	  because	  MIA	  tools	  operate	  on	  different	  
platforms	  and	  migrate	  on	  the	  Internet,	  a	  heterogeneous	  network.	  This	  unstable	  
environment	  puts	  additional	  demands	  on	  the	  software	  and	  complicates	  the	  test	  phase	  
of	  the	  software	  tools,	  and	  thus	  challenges	  its	  reliability.	  
However,	  the	  technical	  analyses	  in	  chapters	  4,	  5	  and	  8,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  previous	  section	  
have	  revealed	  that	  the	  relevant	  technologies	  and	  technical	  applications	  to	  develop	  MIA	  
tools	  and	  the	  MIA	  law	  exist.	  The	  problem	  at	  this	  stage	  is	  the	  implementation	  of	  MIA	  law	  
into	  MIA	  tools.	  The	  governance	  modality	  code	  however	  remains	  the	  best-­‐suited	  
approach	  to	  ensure	  law-­‐complicit	  behaviour	  of	  MIA	  tools	  and	  thus	  avoid	  rights	  
violations	  and	  enable	  the	  awful	  use	  of	  these	  tools.	  
The	  following	  section	  therefore	  develops	  a	  soft	  MIA	  law	  notion,	  which	  still	  relies	  on	  
endowing	  software	  with	  legal	  reasoning	  capabilities	  but	  avoids	  the	  technological	  
challenges	  of	  the	  strong	  MIA	  law	  notion.	  	  
9.2 Soft MIA Law  
Generally,	  at	  the	  core	  of	  any	  investigation	  of	  the	  virtual	  living	  space	  is	  the	  need	  for	  data	  
selection	  and	  verification,	  as	  well	  as	  data	  sharing	  with	  authorised	  persons.	  	  
As	  highlighted	  by	  the	  case	  scenarios	  in	  the	  previous	  section,1078	  most	  of	  these	  
requirements	  can	  be	  relatively	  well	  defined	  in	  advance.	  For	  example,	  it	  can	  be	  
determined	  that	  as	  a	  general	  rule,	  the	  MIA	  tool	  is	  not	  allowed	  to	  seize	  data	  abroad	  
without	  permission	  of	  the	  country	  in	  question.	  Furthermore,	  core	  private	  data	  cannot	  
be	  used	  during	  investigations.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1077	  This	  does	  not	  mean,	  however,	  that	  this	  is	  generally	  not	  a	  suitable	  regulatory	  model.	  As	  
analysed	  in	  chapter	  8,	  principally	  this	  approach	  offers	  significant	  benefits	  over	  the	  traditional	  
“regulation	  through	  law”	  approach.	  Hence,	  once	  the	  necessary	  technological	  development	  has	  
been	  accomplished,	  a	  strict	  MIA	  law	  notion	  should	  be	  implemented.	  
1078	  See	  p.	  299ff.	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Thus,	  specific	  rules,	  derived	  from	  laws	  and	  principles	  that	  govern	  the	  investigative	  
actions	  and	  the	  recording,	  access	  to,	  and	  use	  of	  the	  seized	  data	  can	  be	  established.	  	  
The	  soft	  MIA	  law	  notion	  is	  a	  system	  that	  transfers	  the	  legal	  reasoning	  process	  about	  
these	  rules	  to	  a	  static	  system,	  and	  therefore	  circumvents	  the	  technical	  problems	  of	  the	  
strong	  MIA	  law	  notion	  analysed	  above.	  The	  MIA	  tool	  carries	  out	  the	  investigative	  
actions,1079	  but	  is	  not	  burdened	  with	  the	  additional	  task	  of	  ensuring	  law-­‐complicit	  
behaviour.	  The	  reasoning	  about	  the	  investigative	  actions	  of	  the	  MIA	  tool	  is	  conducted	  
by	  an	  additional	  system.	  
This	  system	  serves	  as	  a	  filter	  to	  ensure	  that	  certain	  data	  is	  not	  shared	  at	  all	  (e.g.	  core	  
private	  data),	  specific	  rules	  are	  enforced	  (e.g.	  no	  investigative	  actions	  on	  foreign	  
sovereignty),	  and	  data	  is	  only	  shared	  with	  authorised	  personnel.	  Hence	  this	  system	  
assists	  and	  complements	  the	  work	  of	  the	  MIA	  tools,	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  guarantees	  
reliability	  and	  legality	  of	  the	  results.	  	  
	  
This	  is	  accomplished	  by	  a	  software	  agent-­‐based	  “Single	  Point	  of	  Contact	  (SPoC)”	  model,	  
which	  is	  implemented	  as	  software	  agents	  that	  serve	  as	  gateways	  for	  data	  control	  and	  
information	  requests.	  Such	  a	  system	  works	  similarly	  to	  a	  firewall	  within	  a	  computer	  
network,	  and	  ensures	  that	  the	  specified	  rules	  are	  adhered	  to.	  
	  
At	  a	  basic	  level,	  firewalls	  use	  a	  defined	  set	  of	  rules	  to	  either	  permit	  or	  deny	  network	  
traffic.1080	  Similarly,	  the	  suggested	  SPoC	  agent	  system	  validates	  requests	  for	  data	  
delivery	  and	  information	  exchange	  based	  on	  rules,	  derived	  from	  organisational	  policies	  
and	  legislative	  requirements,	  as	  defined	  in	  relevant	  laws	  and	  policies.	  	  
This	  means,	  for	  example,	  that	  the	  agent	  attempts	  to	  match	  the	  request	  for	  access	  to	  
data	  against	  the	  rules	  defined	  in	  relevant	  data	  sharing	  regulations	  and	  implemented	  
into	  the	  SPoC	  system.	  If	  the	  request	  does	  not	  match	  a	  rule,	  the	  agent	  will	  then	  attempt	  
to	  match	  the	  request	  against	  the	  next	  rule	  and	  so	  on.	  Once	  a	  match	  is	  found,	  the	  agent	  
will	  carry	  out	  the	  action	  (permit	  or	  deny),	  as	  defined	  by	  that	  rule,	  and	  end	  the	  searching	  
(as	  a	  firewall	  would).	  If	  no	  matching	  rule	  is	  found	  in	  the	  set,	  the	  agent	  will	  deny	  the	  
request.	  This	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  an	  implicit	  deny	  criterion	  used	  by	  firewalls	  where	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1079	  See	  chapter	  4	  p.	  84ff	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  these	  details.	  
1080	  See	  e.g	  M	  K	  Khan,	  M	  Mahmud,	  K	  S	  Alghathbar,	  “Security	  Analysis	  of	  Firewall	  Rule	  Sets	  in	  
Computer	  Networks”	  (2010)	  Fourth	  International	  Conference	  on	  Emerging	  Security	  Information	  
Systems	  and	  Technologies	  (SECURWARE),	  51-­‐56.	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no	  matching	  rule	  is	  found.	  In	  the	  case	  that	  a	  request	  is	  denied,	  the	  agent	  will	  return	  
information	  indicating the	  reason	  for	  the	  denial.	  	  
Similarly,	  the	  agent	  matches	  data	  delivered	  by	  the	  MIA	  tool	  against	  the	  rules	  defined	  in	  
relevant	  data	  protection	  and	  privacy	  legislation,	  implemented	  into	  the	  SPoC	  system.	  If	  
the	  data	  does	  not	  match	  a	  rule,	  the	  agent	  will	  attempt	  to	  match	  the	  data	  against	  the	  next	  
rule	  and	  so	  on.	  	  
Once	  a	  match	  is	  found,	  the	  agent	  will	  carry	  out	  the	  action	  (permit	  or	  deny),	  as	  defined	  
by	  the	  rule,	  and	  end	  the	  searching.	  Contrary	  to	  the	  data	  access	  request	  however,	  if	  no	  
matching	  rule	  is	  found,	  the	  data	  will	  be	  permitted	  into	  the	  system.	  This	  is	  based	  on	  the	  
assumption	  that	  unlawful	  data	  (e.g.	  core	  private	  data)	  is	  generally	  filtered	  out	  by	  an	  
existing	  rule,	  and	  additionally	  any	  data	  may	  be	  highly	  relevant,	  thus	  rejecting	  data	  
because	  it	  cannot	  be	  matched	  to	  an	  existing	  rule	  could	  have	  serious	  consequences.	  
However,	  similarly	  to	  red	  flagging	  of	  data	  by	  firewalls,	  such	  “unknown”	  data	  is	  red-­‐
flagged,	  and	  access	  to	  it	  strictly	  limited	  (for	  example	  to	  the	  investigative	  judge	  only).	  
The	  advantage	  of	  two	  software	  agent-­‐based	  systems1081	  is	  that	  the	  communication	  
between	  the	  systems	  is	  not	  an	  issue	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  standardised	  ACLs	  can	  be	  used	  
for	  communication.1082	  
The	  below	  figure	  provides	  a	  visualisation	  of	  the	  communication	  between	  the	  MIA	  tool,	  
the	  SPoC	  agent,	  and	  the	  operating	  agency.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1081	  As	  discussed	  in	  chapters	  4	  and	  5,	  MIA	  tools	  share	  crucial	  features	  with	  software	  agent	  
technology,	  and	  particularly	  for	  the	  communication	  capabilities.	  
1082	  See	  particularly	  4.3.3	  p.	  114,	  explaining	  multi-­‐agent	  systems.	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Figure 1: Overview of the architecture 
	  
9.2.1 Technical Details 
As	  highlighted	  in	  Figure	  1,	  the	  SPoC	  system	  serves	  as	  a	  quasi	  firewall,	  which	  takes	  on	  
the	  legal	  reasoning	  task	  and,	  for	  example,	  evaluates	  the	  data	  seized	  by	  the	  MIA	  tool,	  and	  
verifies	  access	  rights	  of	  requesting	  officers.	  	  
	  
As	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  sections,	  adding	  the	  SPoC	  system	  to	  the	  investigation	  
process	  ensures	  that	  the	  data	  seized	  during	  investigations	  is	  more	  reliable,	  and	  MIA	  
tools	  operate	  lawfully.	  Additionally,	  the	  system	  ensures	  that	  only	  authorised	  officers	  
can	  access	  the	  seized	  data,	  therefore	  ensuring	  that	  data	  protection	  and	  privacy	  rights	  of	  
the	  suspect	  are	  maintained.	  	  
	  
The	  reasons	  why	  the	  SPoC	  system	  is,	  at	  this	  stage,	  better	  suited	  for	  executing	  these	  
tasks	  are	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  section.	  One	  of	  the	  crucial	  factors	  is	  that	  the	  SPoC	  
system	  is	  more	  stable	  than	  MIA	  tools.	  This	  is	  the	  case	  because	  it	  does	  not	  have	  to	  
function	  on	  different	  platforms	  and	  operates	  by	  applying	  pre-­‐defined	  rules	  and	  filters.	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Generally,	  firewalls	  are	  deployed	  on	  computer	  networks	  to	  serve	  as	  components	  for	  
computer	  security.	  A	  firewall	  is	  essentially	  a	  filter,	  either	  a	  software	  program	  or	  a	  
hardware	  device,	  used	  in	  a	  computer	  system	  to	  prohibit	  forbidden	  information	  from	  
passing	  through,	  while	  allowing	  approved	  information.1083	  
“In	  the	  enterprise	  security	  environment,	  the	  firewall	  serves	  as	  the	  frontline	  security	  
device	  effectively	  delineating	  the	  perimeter	  between	  various	  zones	  of	  security	  control	  
within	  the	  network	  of	  an	  organization.	  These	  zones	  of	  control	  can	  range	  from	  guarding	  
sensitive	  data	  repositories	  such	  as	  a	  large	  database	  of	  personnel	  information	  to	  
separating	  individual	  departments	  from	  one	  another	  to	  simply	  protecting	  the	  internal	  
network	  from	  outside	  attacks	  originating	  in	  the	  Internet.”1084	  
Firewalls	  have	  gained	  such	  significance,	  that	  they	  have	  become	  nearly	  ubiquitous	  with	  
deployment	  levels	  approaching	  97%	  within	  modern	  enterprises.1085	  
While	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  SPoC	  system	  is	  not	  on	  security,	  the	  architecture	  is	  nevertheless	  
identical	  to	  that	  of	  conventional	  firewalls.	  “Security	  is	  a	  complex	  property,	  and	  several	  
diverse	  factors	  need	  to	  be	  considered	  to	  assess	  the	  security	  of	  a	  system's	  
architecture.”1086	  Generally,	  the	  underlying	  model	  must	  contain	  classes,	  attributes,	  and	  
class-­‐relationships.1087	  Hence,	  it	  is	  very	  similar	  in	  nature	  to	  the	  requirements	  for	  the	  
SPoC	  system,	  where	  classes	  and	  class-­‐relationships	  (for	  example	  the	  different	  types	  of	  
data),	  as	  well	  as	  attributes	  of	  data	  are	  highly	  relevant.	  	  
The	  below	  figure	  illustrates	  the	  similarities	  between	  the	  proposed	  SPoC	  system	  and	  a	  
standard	  firewall.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1083	  CheckPoint,	  “Firewall”,	  available	  online	  at	  
http://www.checkpoint.com/resources/firewall/.	  
1084	  M	  J	  Chapple,	  A	  Striegel,	  C	  R	  Crowell,	  “Firewall	  Rulebase	  Management:	  Tools	  and	  
Techniques”,	  in	  M	  Quigley	  (ed)	  ICT	  Ethics	  and	  Security	  in	  the	  21st	  Century:	  New	  Developments	  
and	  Applications	  (Hershey:	  IGI	  Global,	  2011)	  254-­‐276,	  255.	  
1085	  Ibid.	  
1086	  T	  Sommestad,	  M	  Ekstedt,	  P	  Johnson,	  “A	  Probabilistic	  Relational	  Model	  for	  Security	  Risk	  
Analysis”	  (2010)	  29:6	  Computers	  &	  Security,	  659-­‐679,	  660.	  
1087	  Ibid.	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Figure 2: The location of a firewall in a computer system.1088 
 
This	  means	  that	  all	  existing	  research	  into	  the	  functioning	  of	  firewalls	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  
the	  SPoC	  system.	  Since	  firewalls	  are	  already	  a	  mainstream	  technology,	  reliability	  of	  the	  
underlying	  techniques	  is	  not	  a	  matter	  of	  high	  concern.	  
Generally,	  firewalls	  are	  premised	  on	  a	  rule-­‐based	  model.	  A	  so-­‐called	  “policy”,	  
implemented	  into	  the	  firewall	  contains	  all	  the	  rules	  describing	  what	  traffic	  is	  allowed	  
and	  what	  should	  be	  filtered	  out.1089	  	  
Different	  models	  have	  been	  proposed	  for	  the	  design	  of	  the	  “policy”,	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  
rule-­‐based	  decision	  making	  ability	  of	  the	  firewall.1090	  	  
	  
A	  discussion	  of	  all	  these	  models	  would	  go	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  thesis,	  and	  is	  not	  
relevant	  for	  this	  chapter.	  Relevant	  is	  the	  method	  applied	  to	  define	  the	  rules:	  the	  rule	  
granularity	  and	  the	  rule	  enforcement.1091	  This	  is	  because	  the	  rules	  and	  the	  functioning	  
of	  the	  rule	  enforcement	  are	  crucial	  for	  the	  success	  of	  the	  firewall.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1088	  Bruno	  Pedrozo,	  CC	  Attribution-­‐Share	  alike.	  
1089	  K	  Ingham,	  S	  Forrest,	  “A	  History	  and	  Survey	  of	  Network	  Firewalls”	  (2002)	  Technical	  Report	  
2002-­37,	  University	  of	  New	  Mexico	  Computer	  Science	  Department,	  1-­‐42,	  2,	  available	  online	  at	  
http://www.cs.unm.edu/~treport/tr/02-­‐12/firewall.pdf.	  
1090	  See	  Ingham/Forrest,	  ibid,	  and	  Chapple/Striegel/Crowell,	  note	  1084,	  for	  an	  overview	  of	  
architecture	  designs	  of	  firewalls.	  Sommestad/	  Ekstedt/Johnson,	  note	  1086,	  discuss	  a	  
probabilistic	  approach	  to	  rule-­‐based	  decision	  making.	  	  
1091	  A	  Herzog,	  N	  Shahmehri,	  “Usability	  and	  Security	  of	  Personal	  Firewalls”	  in	  H	  Venter,	  M	  Eloff,	  L	  
Labuschagne,	  J	  Eloff,	  R	  von	  Solms	  (eds)	  IPIP	  International	  Federation	  for	  Information	  Processing,	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This	  is	  equally	  the	  case	  for	  the	  rules	  implemented	  into	  the	  SPoC	  system.	  	  
	  
If,	  for	  example,	  a	  firewall	  policy	  includes	  anomalies,	  such	  as	  where	  a	  packet	  may	  match	  
with	  two	  or	  more	  different	  filtering	  rules,	  this	  can	  cause	  malfunction	  of	  the	  system.	  
Such	  malfunction	  of	  the	  SPoC	  system	  could	  have	  serious	  consequences,	  if,	  for	  example,	  
core	  private	  data	  is	  transmitted.	  Hence,	  when	  the	  filtering	  rules	  are	  defined,	  serious	  
attention	  has	  to	  be	  given	  to	  rule	  relations	  and	  interactions	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  the	  
proper	  rule	  ordering	  and	  guarantee	  correct	  security	  policy	  semantics.	  As	  the	  number	  of	  
filtering	  rules	  increases,	  the	  difficulty	  of	  writing	  a	  new	  rule	  or	  modifying	  an	  existing	  one	  
also	  increases.	  It	  is	  very	  likely,	  in	  this	  case,	  to	  introduce	  conflicting	  rules	  such	  as	  one	  
general	  rule	  shadowing	  another	  specific	  rule,	  or	  correlated	  rules	  whose	  relative	  
ordering	  deter-­‐	  mines	  different	  actions	  for	  the	  same	  packet.	  In	  addition,	  a	  typical	  large-­‐
scale	  enterprise	  network	  might	  involve	  hundreds	  of	  rules	  that	  might	  be	  written	  by	  
different	  administrators	  in	  various	  times.	  This	  significantly	  increases	  the	  potential	  of	  
anomaly	  occurrence	  in	  the	  firewall	  policy,	  jeopardizing	  the	  security	  of	  the	  protected	  
network.1092	  	  
Therefore,	  the	  effectiveness	  and	  reliability	  of	  firewalls	  and	  the	  firewall-­‐like	  SPoC	  
system	  depends	  on	  the	  accuracy	  of	  the	  rules	  and	  the	  policy	  management.	  	  
Of	  particular	  relevance	  is	  the	  modelling	  of	  rule	  relations	  to	  avoid	  anomalies	  and	  
malfunctioning	  of	  the	  systems.	  For	  the	  successful	  functioning	  of	  the	  SPoC	  system	  it	  is	  
relevant	  that	  the	  system	  “knows”	  for	  example,	  the	  relation	  between	  the	  concept	  
sovereignty	  and	  investigative	  power,	  to	  enable	  the	  system	  to	  prompt	  the	  command	  “stop	  
all	  investigative	  actions”	  when	  data	  is	  being	  collected	  outside	  of	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  the	  
operating	  authority,	  and	  thus	  no	  investigative	  powers	  exist.	  	  
Relevant	  is	  also	  knowledge	  about	  authorised	  officers	  asking	  for	  access	  to	  the	  seized	  
data.	  Here,	  the	  SPoC	  system	  needs	  to	  know	  the	  relation	  between	  the	  rank	  of	  an	  officer	  
and	  the	  type	  of	  warrant.	  As	  discussed	  above,1093	  perceived	  imminent	  danger	  leads	  to	  
broader	  access	  rights	  to	  the	  seized	  data.	  	  
	  To	  express	  these	  rules	  and	  relations	  in	  a	  machine-­‐readable	  format,	  these	  need	  to	  be	  
formalised	  and	  formally	  represented.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Volume	  232,	  New	  Approaches	  for	  Security.	  Privacy	  and	  Trust	  in	  Complex	  Environments	  (Boston:	  
Springer,	  2007)	  37-­‐48,	  37.	  
1092	  E	  S	  Al-­‐Shaer,	  H	  H	  Hamed,	  “Modeling	  and	  Management	  of	  Firewall	  Policies”	  (2004)	  IEEE	  
Transactions	  on	  Network	  and	  Service	  Management,	  2-­‐10,	  2.	  
1093	  See	  p.	  306.	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Generally,	  all	  relevant	  and	  possible	  rules	  and	  relations	  need	  to	  be	  determined	  and	  
expressed	  formally.	  However,	  presenting	  a	  full	  account	  of	  all	  these	  would	  go	  beyond	  
the	  scope	  of	  this	  thesis.	  In	  any	  case,	  relevant	  for	  this	  chapter	  is	  not	  the	  representation	  
of	  all	  existing	  rules	  and	  relations	  but	  the	  presentation	  of	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  SPoC	  
system	  in	  general.	  For	  this,	  it	  is	  important	  and	  sufficient	  to	  discuss	  the	  basic	  functioning	  
of	  the	  policy	  and	  present	  examples	  of	  selected	  scenarios.	  	  
	  
On	  a	  very	  basic	  functional	  level,	  each	  rule	  in	  the	  policy	  is	  of	  the	  form:	  
⟨predicate⟩	  →	  ⟨decision⟩ 
where	  the	  predicate	  is	  a	  Boolean	  expression1094	  over	  the	  different	  fields	  of	  a	  packet	  of	  
data,1095	  and	  the	  decision	  is	  either	  “a”	  for	  accept	  or	  “r”	  for	  reject.	  	  
To	  reach	  a	  decision	  concerning	  a	  packet	  of	  data,	  the	  rules	  in	  the	  sequence	  are	  examined	  
one	  by	  one	  until	  the	  first	  rule,	  whose	  predicate	  is	  satisfied	  by	  the	  packet	  field,	  is	  found.	  
The	  decision	  of	  this	  rule	  is	  then	  applied	  to	  the	  packet	  of	  data.	  	  
To	  be	  capable	  of	  reaching	  the	  decision	  about	  the	  various	  packets	  of	  data	  received	  by	  the	  
SPoC	  system,	  the	  rules	  for	  the	  Boolean	  expression	  need	  to	  be	  determined.	  	  
	  
These	  are:	  
Definition	  1	  —	  Rules	  Rx	  and	  Ry	  are	  completely	  disjoint	  if	  every	  field	  in	  Rx	  is	  not	  a	  
subset	  nor	  a	  superset	  nor	  equal	  to	  the	  corresponding	  field	  in	  Ry.	  
Definition	  2	  —	  Rules	  Rx	  and	  Ry	  are	  exactly	  matching	  if	  every	  field	  in	  Rx	  is	  equal	  to	  the	  
corresponding	  field	  in	  Ry.	  
Definition	  3	  —	  Rules	  Rx	  and	  Ry	  are	  inclusively	  matching	  if	  they	  do	  not	  exactly	  match	  
and	  if	  every	  field	  in	  Rx	  is	  a	  subset	  or	  equal	  to	  the	  corresponding	  field	  in	  Ry.	  Rx	  is	  called	  
the	  subset	  match	  while	  Ry	  is	  called	  the	  superset	  match.	  
Definition	  4	  —	  Rules	  Rx	  and	  Ry	  are	  partially	  disjoint	  (or	  partially	  matching)	  if	  there	  is	  
at	  least	  one	  field	  in	  Rx	  that	  is	  a	  subset	  or	  a	  superset	  or	  equal	  to	  the	  corresponding	  field	  
in	  Ry,	  and	  there	  is	  at	  least	  one	  field	  in	  Rx	  that	  is	  not	  a	  subset	  and	  not	  a	  superset	  and	  not	  
equal	  to	  the	  corresponding	  field	  in	  Ry.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1094	  “A	  Boolean	  expression	  is	  an	  expression	  that	  evaluates	  to	  a	  value	  of	  the	  Boolean	  Data	  Type:	  
True	  or	  False.	  Boolean	  expressions	  can	  take	  several	  forms.	  The	  simplest	  is	  the	  direct	  
comparison	  of	  the	  value	  of	  a	  Boolean	  variable	  to	  a	  Boolean	  literal”	  (e.g.	  If	  loginData	  =	  True	  Then	  
redirect	  to	  account);	  msdn	  Microsoft	  Library,	  Boolean	  Expressions	  (Visual	  Basic),	  available	  
online	  at:	  http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-­‐us/library/dya2szfk.aspx.	  
1095	  Packet	  of	  data	  refers	  to	  data	  seized	  and	  submitted	  by	  the	  MIA	  tool	  and	  requests	  made	  by	  
officers.	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Definition	  5	  —	  Rules	  Rx	  and	  Ry	  are	  correlated	  if	  some	  fields	  in	  Rx	  are	  subsets	  or	  equal	  
to	  the	  corresponding	  fields	  in	  Ry,	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  fields	  in	  Rx	  are	  supersets	  of	  the	  
corresponding	  fields	  in	  Ry.	  
	  
These	  basic	  functions	  of	  the	  SPoC	  system	  highlight	  the	  need	  for	  clear	  and	  non-­‐
ambiguous	  rules	  for	  the	  policy.	  It	  has	  been	  highlighted	  in	  previous	  chapters	  
however,1096	  that	  legal	  rules	  and	  regulations	  are	  particularly	  prone	  to	  ambiguities	  and	  
problems	  with	  interpretation.	  In	  addition,	  the	  vast	  number	  of	  various	  authorities	  
(national	  and	  international)	  and	  (software	  and	  hardware)	  platforms	  involved	  in	  the	  
investigation	  of	  the	  virtual	  living	  space	  can	  cause	  difficulties	  relating	  to	  translation	  of	  
the	  rules	  and	  thus	  result	  in	  misunderstandings	  and	  malfunctioning	  of	  both,	  the	  SPoC	  
system	  and	  the	  MIA	  tool.	  	  
The	  result,	  often,	  is	  that	  valuable	  semantics	  can	  be	  lost	  in	  the	  exchange,	  which	  degrades	  
the	  efficiency	  of	  the	  decision-­‐making	  mechanism.	  It	  is	  therefore	  crucial	  to	  find	  the	  best	  
approach	  for	  the	  translation	  of	  those	  rules,	  which	  adequately	  translates	  the	  rules	  into	  
formal,	  machine-­‐readable	  language	  and	  ensures	  that	  no	  information	  gets	  lost	  or	  
misinterpreted.	  	  
Important	  is	  in	  particular	  that	  common	  logical	  definitions,	  which	  constrain	  possible	  
interpretations	  of	  any	  given	  concept	  to	  a	  finite	  set	  are	  agreed	  upon	  before	  
communication	  can	  occur.	  	  
	  
A	  syntactic	  approach	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  information	  exchange	  between	  the	  SPoC	  system,	  
the	  MIA	  tool	  and	  the	  authorities	  simplifies	  the	  creation	  and	  implementation	  of	  rules,	  
and	  is	  therefore	  the	  best	  suited	  approach	  for	  the	  translation	  of	  the	  rules	  in	  the	  policy.	  	  
The	  focus	  of	  syntactic	  systems	  is	  not	  simply	  on	  the	  interpretation	  of	  data	  but	  mainly	  on	  
deeper	  reasoning	  and	  an	  attempt	  at	  the	  computer	  analysis	  and	  understanding	  of	  the	  
data.1097	  This	  is	  relevant	  for	  the	  SPoC	  system	  because	  it	  needs	  to	  be	  capable	  of	  
reasoning	  about	  the	  data	  delivered	  by	  the	  MIA	  tool	  to	  properly	  classify	  and	  match	  it	  
with	  data	  access	  requests	  from	  authorities,	  or	  formulate	  commands	  for	  the	  MIA	  tool	  
(such	  as	  stop	  all	  investigative	  actions	  in	  case	  of	  cross-­‐border	  activities).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1096	  See	  particularly	  p.	  285ff.	  
1097	  L	  Ogiela,	  “Syntactic	  Approach	  to	  Cognitive	  Interpretation	  of	  Medical	  Patterns”	  in	  C	  Xiong	  et	  
al.	  (eds)	  Intelligent	  Robotics	  and	  Applications:	  First	  International	  Conference,	  ICIRA	  2008	  (Berlin,	  
Heidelberg:	  Springer,	  2008)	  456-­‐462,	  457.	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Generally,	  the	  system	  attempts	  to	  capture	  syntactic	  characteristics	  of	  the	  machine-­‐level	  
byte	  sequence	  of	  the	  incoming	  data,	  and	  matches	  and	  then	  classifies	  it	  with	  existing	  
syntactic	  rules.1098	  Thus,	  in	  essence	  it	  is	  a	  translation	  of	  queries	  between	  heterogeneous	  
sources.	  Syntactic	  rules	  are	  used	  to	  map	  selection	  predicates	  from	  one	  database	  to	  that	  
of	  another.1099	  	  
Figure	  3	  below	  outlines	  the	  syntax	  of	  the	  rule	  request	  and	  of	  the	  policy	  rule,	  which	  
provide	  a	  close	  match	  to	  each	  other.	  Most	  of	  the	  fields	  within	  these	  rules	  are	  defined	  
within,	  and	  generated	  from,	  the	  relevant	  legislation,	  but	  the	  [Subject]	  field	  is	  kept	  as	  a	  
free	  format	  field,	  so	  that	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  databases	  within	  the	  domain	  does	  not	  
have	  to	  be	  exposed	  to	  other	  domains.	  All	  of	  the	  other	  fields	  within	  the	  rules	  are	  thus	  
used	  to	  match	  the	  request.	  
	  
	  
Figure 3: Overview of the request and policy implementation syntax 	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1098	  M	  Dalla	  Preda	  et	  al.,	  “A	  Semantics-­‐based	  Approach	  to	  Malware	  Detection”	  (2007)	  
Proceedings	  of	  the	  34th	  Annual	  ACM	  SIGPLAN-­SIGACT	  Symposium	  on	  Principles	  of	  Programming	  
Languages,	  377-­‐388,	  377.	  
1099	  A	  Kementsietsidis,	  “Data	  Sharing	  and	  Querying	  for	  Peer-­‐to-­‐Peer	  Data	  Management	  Systems”	  
in	  W	  Lindner	  et	  al.	  (eds)	  Current	  Trends	  in	  Database	  Technology	  –	  EDBT	  2004	  Workshops	  (Berlin,	  
Heidelberg:	  Springer,	  2004)	  177-­‐186,	  181.	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Adding	  key	  security	  elements	  to	  this	  structure	  yields	  the	  proposed	  syntax	  for	  policy	  
rules,	  which	  are	  implemented	  into	  the	  SPoC:	  
1.	  For	  communication	  with	  the	  operating	  agency:	  
[permit	  |	  deny]	  [Requester]	  requests	  [Attribute]	  of	  [Subject]	  with	  [Context]	  
from	  [MIA]	  for	  [N]	  records	  in	  [TimeWindow]	  using	  [Compliance]	  
	  
2.	  For	  communication	  with	  the	  MIA	  tool:	  
Submit	  [Request]	  and/or	  [Command]	  to	  MIA	  from	  [Requester]	  and/or	  [SPoC]	  
	  
A	  similar	  matching	  syntax	  can	  then	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  request	  messages:	  	  
[Requester]	  requests	  [Attribute]	  of	  [Subject]	  with	  [Context]	  from	  [MIA]	  within	  
[Start]	  to	  [End]	  
	  
And	  to	  submission	  messages	  from	  the	  MIA	  tool:	  
MIA	  submits	  [Data]	  about	  [Subject]	  with	  [Context]	  within	  [Start]	  to	  [End]	  
	  
Elements	  of	  this	  syntax	  are	  defined	  as:	  
• [permit	  |	  deny]:	  This	  part	  of	  the	  rule	  syntax	  indicates	  the	  action	  of	  the	  rule	  and	  
defines	  whether	  a	  message	  meeting	  the	  rule	  criteria	  will	  be	  permitted	  or	  
denied.	  	  
• Requester:	  This	  identifies	  an	  exposed	  role	  defined	  in	  applicable	  legislation	  and	  
regulations.	  For	  example,	  this	  role	  might	  be	  a	  Detective	  Constable	  (DETCST)	  in	  
the	  Police	  Services	  (POL)	  domain,	  a	  Judge	  (JGE)	  in	  the	  Judicial	  services	  (JUD)	  
domain,	  or	  a	  Secret	  Service	  Agent	  (SSA)	  in	  the	  Law	  Enforcement	  Services	  (LES)	  
domain.	  	  
• Subject:	  This	  refers	  to	  any	  person	  suspected	  of	  being	  involved	  in	  serious	  
criminal	  activities.	  It	  is	  a	  free-­‐form	  field.	  	  
• Data:	  Any	  digital	  signal	  recorded	  and	  seized	  from	  ICT	  devices	  of	  suspects	  
during	  investigative	  actions	  by	  the	  MIA	  tool.	  
• Attribute:	  This	  is	  a	  unit	  of	  information	  describing	  an	  object.	  Attributes	  may	  
include	  details	  about	  location	  (address,	  mobile	  phone	  tracking),	  identity	  (name,	  
insurance	  number),	  history	  (prior	  convictions,	  documented	  allegations),	  
behavior	  (calm,	  violent)	  and	  association	  (group	  memberships,	  known	  
associates).	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• Context:	  This	  identifies	  the	  reason	  why	  data	  is	  being	  seized	  and	  shared.	  The	  
context	  also	  governs	  the	  level	  of	  access	  and	  permissions	  associated	  with	  
information	  exchange	  and,	  hence,	  affects	  the	  priority	  accorded	  to	  information	  
requests.	  For	  example,	  a	  terrorism	  investigation	  poses	  a	  potential	  threat	  to	  life	  
and	  will	  require	  a	  higher	  priority	  allocation	  than	  a	  vandalism	  context.	  
• 	  [N]	  records	  in	  [TimeWindow]	  This	  is	  a	  part	  of	  the	  rule	  syntax	  that	  defines	  the	  
number	  of	  records	  permitted	  over	  a	  period	  of	  time,	  where	  [N]	  can	  be	  any	  
positive	  integer,	  and[TimeWindow]	  uses	  the	  ISO	  8601	  Coordinated	  Universal	  
Time	  (UTC)	  format	  (YYYY-­‐MM-­‐DD).	  In	  practice,	  it	  prevents	  fishing	  expeditions	  
• [Compliance]:	  This	  is	  part	  of	  the	  rule	  syntax	  that	  refers	  to	  policies	  and	  
legislative	  requirements	  that	  affect	  the	  exchange	  of	  information.	  Such	  as	  the	  
Data	  Protection	  Act,	  the	  Human	  Rights	  Act,	  the	  Freedom	  of	  Information	  Act,	  and	  
so	  on.	  
• [Start]:	  This	  is	  part	  of	  the	  request	  that	  identifies	  the	  start	  of	  the	  date/time	  
period	  over	  which	  sharing	  is	  requested,	  such	  as	  for	  ISO	  8601	  (UTC)	  standard.	  
• [End]:	  This	  is	  part	  of	  the	  request	  that	  identifies	  the	  end	  of	  the	  date/time	  period	  
over	  which	  sharing	  is	  requested.	  
9.2.2 Context Information 
A	  key	  feature	  in	  the	  proposed	  system	  is	  the	  use	  of	  context	  information	  for	  a	  request.	  
Here	  the	  relevant	  regulations	  and	  laws	  define	  access	  rights	  based	  on	  the	  context	  of	  the	  
request.	  For	  example,	  the	  access	  rights	  to	  data	  are	  stricter	  within	  the	  context	  of	  a	  
terrorism	  investigation	  than	  for	  a	  vandalism	  investigation.	  Equally,	  the	  seriousness	  of	  a	  
crime	  to	  be	  investigated	  determines	  the	  amount	  of	  core	  private	  data	  transmitted	  to	  
authorised	  officers.1100	  	  	  
It	  is	  therefore	  important	  that	  the	  context	  levels	  and	  associated	  rights	  are	  clearly	  
defined.	  Hence,	  context	  information	  about	  the	  seriousness	  of	  the	  suspected	  criminal	  
activity	  is	  animportant	  factor	  for	  the	  classification	  of	  a	  request.	  
Generally,	  determining	  crime	  seriousness	  is	  a	  complex	  issue,	  and	  one	  that	  cannot	  be	  
discussed	  here	  in	  its	  entirety.	  On	  a	  basic	  level,	  “two	  conceptual	  issues	  exist	  in	  crime	  
seriousness	  research:	  the	  meaning	  of	  seriousness	  and	  the	  representation	  of	  crimes.”1101	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1100	  See	  above	  p.	  306	  for	  a	  more	  detailed	  explanation	  of	  this.	  
1101	  Y	  K	  Kwan,	  L	  L	  Chiu,	  W	  C	  Ip,	  “Measuring	  Crimes	  Seriousness	  Perceptions:	  Methods	  and	  
Demonstration”	  in	  K	  T	  Froeling	  (ed)	  Criminology	  Research	  Focus	  (New	  York:	  Nova	  Science	  
Publishers,	  Inc,	  2007)	  7-­‐19,	  8.	  
	   317	  
A	  standard	  definition	  of	  seriousness	  does	  not	  exist,	  however,	  Rossi	  et	  al.	  find	  that	  
participants	  of	  relevant	  experiments	  understand	  the	  concept	  of	  seriousness	  without	  
any	  difficulty.1102	  	  
Based	  on	  the	  use	  of	  MIA	  tools,	  the	  codified,	  and	  hence	  highly	  conceptual,	  German	  
Criminal	  Law	  proffers	  itself	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  a	  conceptual	  hierarchy	  of	  seriousness.	  While	  
this	  hierarchy	  is	  tailored	  to	  the	  German	  legal	  system,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  it	  is	  
inapplicable	  to	  other	  legal	  systems.	  In	  fact,	  the	  hierarchy	  of	  the	  German	  system	  can	  be	  
detected	  in	  common-­‐law	  systems,	  too,	  albeit	  not	  in	  codified	  form.	  For	  example,	  
murder1103	  is	  classified	  as	  more	  serious	  than	  manslaughter1104	  in	  both	  the	  German	  
(codified)	  system,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  UK	  system.	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  this	  hierarchical	  classification	  of	  seriousness	  of	  crimes,	  a	  proxy	  to	  weight	  
severity	  within	  a	  category	  (e.g.	  murder	  vs.	  manslaughter	  as	  “offences	  against	  the	  life”)	  
by	  the	  minimum	  punishment	  that	  the	  crimes	  carry	  should	  be	  adopted.1105	  
This	  additional	  context	  element	  serves	  as	  a	  further	  guarantee	  that	  privacy	  and	  data	  
protection	  rights,	  sovereignty	  and	  evidence	  principles	  are	  adhered	  to.	  It	  can	  be	  
regarded	  as	  an	  enabler	  for	  the	  SPoC	  system	  to	  better	  “understand”	  and	  thus	  classify	  
requests	  from	  both,	  the	  relevant	  agency	  and	  the	  MIA	  tool.	  
9.2.3 Documentation 
The	  above-­‐discussed	  features	  of	  the	  proposed	  syntax	  and	  incorporated	  SPoC	  system	  
are	  crucial	  to	  ensure	  that	  robustness	  and	  reliability	  of	  the	  technical	  components	  of	  the	  
soft	  MIA	  law	  notion	  are	  maintained.	  However,	  the	  mere	  promise	  of	  a	  technical	  ability	  of	  
the	  syntax	  is	  insufficient	  to	  ensure	  legally	  binding	  reliability	  and	  thus	  legal	  certainty	  of	  
the	  approach	  and	  the	  data	  seized	  during	  online	  searches.	  It	  is	  therefore	  crucial	  that	  the	  
syntax	  is	  capable	  of	  creating	  legally	  binding	  documentation	  about	  all	  requests	  
submitted,	  and	  its	  reasoning	  process	  and	  decisions.	  	  
This	  also	  ensures	  that	  any	  abuse	  of	  the	  system	  (e.g.	  labelling	  a	  minor	  offence	  as	  a	  
terrorism	  suspicion)	  can	  be	  traced.	  
Creating	  such	  documentation	  is	  relatively	  straightforward,	  and	  thus	  easily	  
incorporated	  into	  the	  syntax.	  In	  fact,	  most	  operating	  systems	  already	  automatically	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1102	  P	  H	  Rossi,	  E	  Waite,	  C	  E	  Bose,	  R	  E	  Berk,	  “The	  Seriousness	  of	  Crimes:	  Normative	  Structure	  and	  
Individual	  Differences”	  (1974)	  39:2	  American	  Sociology	  Review,	  224-­‐237.	  
1103	  Murder	  is	  regulated	  by	  §211	  German	  Penal	  Code.	  
1104	  Manslaughter	  is	  regulated	  by	  §212	  German	  Penal	  Code.	  Thus	  in	  the	  same	  section,	  “offences	  
against	  the	  life”,	  but	  in	  hierarchical	  order.	  	  	  
1105	  See	  Kwan/Chiu/Ip,	  note	  1101,	  for	  an	  analysis	  of	  such	  a	  proxy	  solution.	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create	  records	  of	  all	  computer	  activity.	  Microsoft	  Windows,	  for	  example,	  features	  an	  
application	  called	  “Security	  Log”,	  which	  is	  a	  log	  that	  contains	  records	  of	  login/logout	  
activity	  and	  other	  security-­‐related	  events	  specified	  by	  the	  system’s	  audit	  policy.1106	  	  
In	  addition,	  free	  software	  programs	  and	  web	  tools	  are	  available	  that	  enable	  users	  to	  
record	  all	  computer	  activity	  including	  the	  websites	  visited,	  the	  applications	  run	  on	  the	  
computer	  etc.1107	  	  
	  
Thus	  the	  technology	  to	  create	  such	  documentation	  and	  records	  is	  commercially	  
available,	  and	  therefore	  sufficiently	  robust	  and	  reliable.	  Implementing	  such	  an	  
application	  into	  the	  syntax	  is	  therefore	  technically	  feasible	  and	  provides	  the	  necessary	  
documentation	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  use	  of	  the	  syntax	  produces	  legally	  binding	  results.	  	  
9.3 Conclusion 
The	  proposed	  soft	  MIA	  law	  provides	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  current	  technical	  challenges	  and	  
problems	  of	  incorporating	  explicit	  legal	  reasoning	  capacities	  into	  MIA	  tools.	  It	  serves	  as	  
an	  intermediary	  between	  the	  MIA	  tool	  and	  the	  relevant	  authorities.	  It	  complements	  the	  
key	  features	  (mobility,	  intelligence	  and	  autonomy)	  of	  the	  MIA	  tool	  by	  ensuring	  that	  
relevant	  regulations,	  principles	  and	  rights,	  such	  as	  privacy	  and	  data	  protection	  rights	  of	  
suspects,	  as	  well	  as	  best	  evidence	  principles	  and	  sovereignty	  rights	  of	  affected	  states,	  
and	  applicable	  legislation,	  such	  as	  evidence	  laws	  and	  criminal	  procedure	  laws	  are	  
adhered	  to.	  	  
Due	  to	  the	  static	  nature	  of	  the	  syntax	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  fluctuant	  nature	  of	  the	  MIA	  tool	  
compliance	  with	  these	  regulations,	  principles,	  rights	  and	  laws	  is	  technically	  realisable.	  
As	  discussed	  above,	  the	  MIA	  tool	  would	  suffer	  from	  a	  lack	  of	  robustness	  and	  reliability	  
if	  explicit	  legal	  reasoning	  capacities	  that	  are	  required	  for	  the	  strong	  MIA	  law	  notion	  
were	  implemented	  at	  this	  stage.	  This	  would	  mean	  that	  MIA	  tools	  would	  have	  no	  or	  only	  
very	  limited	  legal	  value.	  	  
	  
The	  proposed	  soft	  MIA	  law	  notion,	  based	  on	  the	  suggested	  syntax	  offers	  the	  required	  
level	  of	  robustness	  and	  reliability,	  and	  thus	  provides	  a	  unique	  solution	  to	  the	  strong	  
MIA	  law	  notion	  developed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1106	  R	  F	  Smith,	  The	  Windows	  Security	  Log	  Encyclopedia	  (North	  Charleston,	  SC:	  Booksurge	  Llc,	  
2007).	  
1107	  See	  for	  a	  list	  of	  such	  programs	  and	  a	  discussion	  of	  these,	  
http://www.labnol.org/software/organize/record-­‐computer-­‐usage-­‐online-­‐activity/3817/.	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The	  SPoC	  agents	  incorporated	  into	  the	  syntax	  ensure	  compliance	  with	  legislation	  and	  
domain	  policies,	  and	  ensure	  that	  only	  valid	  requests	  for	  data	  sharing	  and	  permissible	  
information	  are	  transmitted	  between	  the	  MIA	  tool	  and	  the	  authorities.	  
Ultimately,	  the	  interaction	  between	  the	  MIA	  tool	  and	  the	  syntax	  should	  ensure	  that	  a)	  
only	  data	  protection	  compliant	  information	  is	  transmitted,	  b)	  records	  of	  all	  requests	  
and	  activities	  are	  created	  to	  ensure	  that	  sufficient	  documentation	  is	  available	  and	  abuse	  
can	  be	  traced,	  and	  c)	  offer	  a	  robust	  and	  reliable	  enough	  solution	  to	  produce	  legally	  valid	  
data	  and	  results.	  
For	  this	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  prove	  abstractly	  that	  only	  law	  compliant	  interactions	  are	  
permitted	  by	  the	  system.	  For	  this	  purpose	  in	  particular,	  incorporating	  an	  explicit	  
representation	  of	  legal	  concepts	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  Sartor	  et	  al.,1108	  as	  discussed	  and	  
shown	  above,	  is	  particularly	  promising.	  	  
	  
However,	  the	  soft	  MIA	  law	  notion	  has	  disadvantages	  caused	  by	  its	  static	  syntax.	  While	  
this	  static	  syntax	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  facilitates	  the	  development	  of	  a	  technically	  feasible	  
governance	  approach	  for	  MIA	  tools,	  it	  hinders	  MIA	  tools	  to	  reach	  their	  full	  potential	  
during	  investigations	  on	  the	  other	  hand.	  	  
The	  syntax	  is	  a	  separate	  software	  layer,	  which	  needs	  to	  be	  installed	  on	  all	  computers	  
used	  to	  operate	  the	  MIA	  tools.	  This	  requirement	  constrains	  the	  flexible	  use	  of	  MIA	  tools	  
during	  investigations	  and	  restricts	  their	  use	  to	  agencies	  and	  operators	  with	  the	  
relevant	  software	  in	  place.	  	  
The	  syntax	  also	  adds	  another	  step	  to	  the	  investigative	  process,	  which	  is	  potentially	  
time-­‐consuming	  depending	  on	  the	  required	  amount	  of	  communication	  between	  the	  
SPoC	  system,	  MIA	  tool	  and	  the	  requesting	  agency,	  and	  the	  amount	  of	  legal	  reasoning	  
the	  SPoC	  system	  needs	  to	  undertake.	  As	  discussed	  above,1109	  time	  can	  be	  a	  crucial	  
factor	  for	  investigations	  of	  the	  virtual	  living	  space.	  Data	  can	  be	  shifted	  within	  seconds	  
to	  external	  storage	  media.	  
Furthermore,	  MIA	  tools	  are	  designed	  to	  operate	  as	  autonomous	  entities,	  or	  cyber-­‐cops,	  
during	  investigations.	  Their	  real	  potential	  lies	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  these	  tools	  are	  not	  
dependent	  on	  operator	  commands,	  and	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  govern	  and	  regulate	  their	  
own	  actions.	  This	  makes	  them	  so	  predestined	  for	  the	  investigation	  of	  the	  virtual	  living	  
space,	  which	  is	  difficult	  to	  govern	  from	  the	  physical	  world	  by	  human	  officers	  alone.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1108	  See	  Sartor,	  note	  1002.	  
1109	  See	  chapter	  6,	  p.	  170ff.	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Hence	  the	  strong	  MIA	  law	  notion	  developed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  is	  the	  preferable	  
long-­‐term	  approach.	  However,	  given	  the	  highly	  intrusive	  nature	  of	  MIA	  tool	  actions	  and	  
the	  potential	  for	  rights	  violations,	  the	  relevant	  techniques	  required	  to	  implement	  the	  
strong	  MIA	  law	  notion	  need	  to	  be	  reliable	  before	  this	  approach	  can	  be	  realised.	  
	  
For	  the	  interim	  period,	  the	  soft	  MIA	  law	  notion	  offers	  an	  ideal	  solution	  for	  the	  
governance	  problems	  of	  MIA	  tools.	  As	  highlighted	  by	  the	  empirical	  research	  results	  the	  
most	  pressing	  problem	  of	  practitioners	  is	  the	  lack	  of	  adequate	  regulatory	  instruments	  
for	  the	  new	  generation	  of	  cyber-­‐cops.	  	  Given	  the	  constitutional	  relevance	  of	  the	  virtual	  
living	  space,	  and	  the	  inability	  of	  the	  existing	  legal	  framework	  to	  ensure	  law-­‐compliant	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10 CONCLUSION 
 
The	  aim	  of	  this	  thesis	  has	  been	  to	  develop	  a	  sustainable	  regulatory	  model	  for	  software-­‐
based	  investigative	  tools	  deployed	  for	  the	  policing	  of	  the	  virtual	  living	  space	  by	  law	  
enforcement	  and	  secret	  services.	  In	  recognition	  of	  the	  ever	  increasing	  reliance	  on	  ICTs	  
and	  the	  growing	  importance	  of	  the	  virtual	  living	  space	  for	  people,	  I	  argue	  that	  a	  
solution	  needs	  to	  be	  developed	  while	  these	  technologies	  are	  still	  in	  its	  infancy,	  to	  avoid	  
rushed	  and	  ill-­‐drafted	  legislation,	  as	  well	  as	  illegitimate	  use	  of	  investigative	  powers.	  	  
	  
Looking	  back	  at	  past	  technology	  regulation,	  the	  preferred	  methodology	  of	  legal	  
practitioners	  is	  either	  to	  reason	  by	  analogy	  from	  traditional	  legal	  concepts	  to	  new,	  
technology-­‐based	  phenomena,	  or	  to	  “black	  box”	  the	  entire	  process,	  categorise	  it	  as	  a	  
purely	  technical	  issue	  and	  to	  put	  their	  trust	  in	  the	  computer	  forensics	  experts.	  This	  
thesis	  has	  argued	  that	  neither	  approach	  is	  satisfactory	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  
deployment	  of	  autonomously	  operating	  software	  by	  the	  state.	  	  
“Black	  boxing”	  circumvents	  potentially	  necessary	  legal	  safeguards	  put	  in	  place	  to	  
protect	  citizens.	  In	  this	  case	  a	  technocratic	  discourse	  supplements	  necessary	  political	  
debates	  that	  are	  to	  be	  had	  about	  civil	  rights.	  It	  also	  can	  result,	  as	  was	  argued	  in	  chapter	  
7,	  in	  a	  degree	  of	  blind	  trust	  that	  prevents	  lawyers	  from	  evaluating	  the	  strength	  and	  
reliability	  of	  the	  evidence	  in	  a	  sufficiently	  open,	  accountable,	  and	  reliable	  way.	  	  
Reasoning	  by	  analogy	  by	  contrast	  is	  a	  necessary	  and	  crucial	  instrument	  of	  lawyers.	  Any	  
regulation	  that	  tries	  to	  be	  so	  detailed	  as	  to	  prevent	  it	  altogether	  is,	  as	  argued	  above,	  
likely	  to	  have	  very	  limited	  shelf	  life,	  as	  with	  necessity	  it	  has	  to	  be	  very	  specific	  to	  the	  
technology	  that	  is	  regulated.	  Even	  though	  some	  respondents	  to	  the	  interviews	  felt	  
deeply	  uneasy	  with	  using	  analogical	  reasoning	  in	  the	  field	  of	  computer	  forensic	  
evidence,	  this	  thesis	  argues	  that	  the	  problem	  is	  mainly	  due	  to	  their	  insecurity	  with	  the	  
technology	  –	  they	  do	  not	  know	  if	  the	  analogies	  are	  valid.	  	  	  
However,	  this	  approach	  is	  indeed	  much	  more	  likely	  to	  fail	  when:	  
• the	  difference	  between	  the	  traditional,	  real	  world,	  and	  the	  new,	  digital	  
counterpart	  is	  wide,	  and	  	  
• when	  in	  addition	  inevitable	  security	  concerns	  have	  to	  hide	  some	  of	  the	  
technical	  features	  from	  open	  debate,	  and	  	  
• the	  specific	  field	  of	  law	  is	  structured	  adversarial,	  through	  irreconcilable	  
conflicts	  between	  parties.	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The	  solution	  to	  which	  this	  thesis	  hopes	  to	  contribute	  does	  not	  try	  to	  prevent	  analogous	  
reasoning,	  but	  rather	  wants	  to	  prepare	  the	  conditions	  to	  enable	  it.	  Regarding	  point	  a)	  
above,	  it	  did	  so	  by	  analysing	  the	  pertinent	  features	  of	  the	  technology	  and	  their	  legal	  
relevance.	  	  Looking	  at	  c),	  in	  the	  first	  chapter	  this	  thesis	  took	  note	  of	  the	  parallel	  debate	  
regarding	  autonomous	  agents	  for	  commercial	  applications.	  There	  too,	  the	  academic	  
debate	  had	  initially	  suggested	  far	  reaching	  analogies	  that	  in	  some	  cases	  would	  have	  
given	  the	  software	  the	  status	  of	  a	  legal	  person.	  We	  can	  see	  here	  how	  strong	  our	  
tendency	  to	  anthropomorphise	  autonomously	  operating	  software	  code	  is.	  The	  
emerging	  consensus	  in	  that	  discussion	  however	  seems	  to	  be	  that	  much	  less	  radical	  
analogies	  are	  necessary,	  and	  that	  very	  simple	  equivalents	  between	  offline	  and	  online	  
behaviour	  can	  be	  found.	  However,	  I	  argue	  that	  this	  was	  enabled	  by	  the	  convergence	  of	  
interests	  in	  the	  private	  law	  setting	  –	  ultimately,	  it	  is	  in	  nobody’s	  interest	  to	  prevent	  
valid	  contract	  formation	  due	  to	  formalistic	  worries	  about	  the	  concept	  of	  “acceptance”	  
or	  “intent”	  in	  agent	  negotiated	  transactions.	  	  	  
This,	  however,	  is	  radically	  different	  in	  criminal	  law	  settings,	  where	  the	  asymmetric	  
distribution	  of	  power	  means	  that	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  state	  and	  that	  of	  suspects	  are	  less	  
likely	  to	  be	  reconcilable	  easily.	  In	  such	  an	  environment,	  regulation	  through	  markets	  is	  
bound	  to	  fail.	  Here,	  our	  tendency	  to	  anthropomorphise	  software	  code,	  to	  think	  of	  them	  
not	  just	  metaphorically	  as	  cyber-­‐cops,	  but	  to	  use	  this	  as	  a	  hook	  to	  enable	  legal	  
argumentation	  about	  the	  respective	  rights	  and	  duties	  of	  citizens	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  that	  
technology,	  is	  something	  we	  may	  need	  to	  exploit.	  This	  is	  reflected	  by	  the	  current	  policy	  
system,	  which	  is	  premised	  on	  legislation	  rooted	  deeply	  in	  legal	  concepts	  tailored	  to	  the	  
analogue	  world.	  The	  thesis	  therefore	  tried	  a	  three-­‐pronged	  approach:	  	  
• increase	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  technology	  and	  match	  its	  features	  to	  legal	  
problems,	  	  
• show	  how	  we	  can	  “make	  the	  metaphor	  real”,	  by	  embedding	  directly	  into	  the	  
software	  code	  features	  that	  mimic	  reasoning	  of	  real,	  biological	  police	  officers,	  	  
• highlight	  where	  even	  this	  will	  still	  leave	  conceptual	  gaps	  between	  technological	  
reality	  and	  the	  legal	  metaphors	  that	  may	  be	  in	  need	  for	  formal	  legislation,	  but	  
on	  a	  suitably	  abstract	  level	  
	  
Taken	  together,	  these	  measures	  should	  help	  lawyers	  to	  reason	  about	  the	  legal	  issues	  
raised	  by	  the	  use	  of	  autonomously	  operating	  software	  tools	  in	  investigations	  more	  
confidently,	  but	  also	  more	  accurately.	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Deeper	  technological	  knowledge	  is	  therefore	  essential	  for	  the	  development	  of	  a	  
regulatory	  model	  for	  software-­‐based	  investigative	  tools.	  This	  thesis	  brought	  together	  in	  
an	  interdisciplinary	  approach	  insights	  and	  findings	  from	  law,	  computer	  science,	  and	  
artificial	  intelligence.	  This	  interdisciplinary	  approach	  has	  guaranteed	  that	  the	  research	  
in	  this	  thesis	  is	  well	  grounded.	  	  
10.1 Research Goals and Answers Developed 
This	  interdisciplinary	  approach	  was	  also	  reflected	  in	  the	  structure	  of	  this	  thesis.	  
Chapters	  4	  and	  5	  constituted	  the	  technical	  foundation	  of	  this	  work	  and	  addressed	  the	  
first	  research	  goal	  of	  this	  thesis,	  to	  develop	  a	  generic	  concept	  of	  current	  and	  future	  
software-­‐based	  investigative	  tools	  that	  identified	  the	  family	  of	  legal	  issues	  that	  every	  
technology	  in	  this	  class	  will	  inevitably	  face.	  	  
In	  chapter	  4	  I	  determined	  in	  detail	  the	  technical	  specifics	  of	  the	  software	  tool	  of	  the	  
case	  study	  of	  this	  thesis:	  the	  online	  searching	  of	  ICTs.	  This	  has	  so	  far	  been	  neglected	  in	  
existing	  research	  on	  the	  topic.	  It	  was	  established	  that	  this	  comparatively	  task-­‐oriented	  
and	  simple	  technology	  already	  exhibits	  all	  the	  regulatory	  problems	  that	  also	  much	  
more	  intelligent	  future	  tools	  will	  also	  face.	  	  
I	  argued	  in	  chapter	  5	  that	  to	  enable	  future-­‐proof	  regulation	  of	  cyber-­‐cops,	  the	  policy	  
system	  needs	  to	  move	  away	  from	  the	  currently	  deployed	  approach	  of	  regulating	  single	  
technologies.	  Instead,	  regulation	  needs	  to	  focus	  on	  classes	  of	  technology	  that	  share	  key	  
concepts	  and	  attributes.	  Based	  on	  this	  finding,	  I	  developed	  a	  new	  category	  of	  software-­‐
based	  investigative	  technologies	  –	  mobile,	  intelligent,	  and	  autonomous	  (MIA)	  policing	  
tools.	  The	  development	  of	  this	  class	  is	  a	  significant	  contribution	  to	  existing	  research,	  
and	  can	  facilitate	  future	  policy	  making	  on	  this	  topic.	  	  
	  
Chapters	  6	  and	  7	  formed	  the	  legal	  foundation	  of	  this	  thesis.	  These	  chapters	  addressed	  
the	  second	  research	  goal	  of	  this	  PhD	  project,	  the	  evaluation	  of	  the	  existing	  legal	  
framework	  regulating	  police	  investigations	  in	  the	  light	  of	  MIA	  policing	  tools.	  This	  part	  
is	  influenced	  by	  the	  empirical	  research	  results	  and	  the	  focus	  was	  on	  those	  topics	  
identified	  as	  most	  pressing	  by	  the	  legal	  experts	  involved	  in	  the	  use	  of	  current	  MIA	  tools.	  	  
In	  chapter	  6,	  I	  analysed	  the	  problems	  of	  cross-­‐jurisdictional	  investigations	  by	  MIA	  tools	  
for	  traditional	  concepts	  of	  sovereignty	  and	  territoriality.	  In	  chapter	  7,	  I	  examined	  the	  
problems	  of	  digital	  data	  as	  evidence,	  and	  particularly	  the	  “double	  digital	  paradigm”,	  i.e.	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digital	  evidence	  seized	  from	  live	  systems	  by	  software	  tools,	  and	  the	  problems	  this	  
causes	  for	  traditional	  evidence	  concepts	  and	  the	  admissibility	  of	  this	  evidence	  for	  court	  
proceedings.	  
The	  analysis	  in	  these	  chapters	  evidenced	  that	  reasoning	  by	  analogy	  is	  difficult,	  and	  
often	  unsuccessful	  for	  these	  specific	  legal	  issues.	  In	  answering	  the	  overarching	  question	  
of	  this	  thesis,	  whether	  existing	  legislation	  is	  sufficient	  to	  regulate	  the	  use	  of	  MIA	  
policing	  tools,	  these	  chapters	  found	  that	  existing	  legislation	  is	  limited	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  
new	  class	  of	  software	  tools,	  and	  a	  new	  regulatory	  model	  is	  required.	  
	  
Chapters	  8	  and	  9	  addressed	  the	  third	  research	  goal	  of	  this	  thesis,	  and	  developed	  the	  
outline	  of	  a	  novel	  regulatory	  model	  for	  the	  governance	  of	  MIA	  policing	  tools.	  The	  
proposed	  regulatory	  model	  is	  a	  direct	  result	  of	  the	  interdisciplinary	  research	  approach.	  	  
Building	  on	  existing	  research	  in	  the	  field	  of	  technology	  regulation,	  and	  particularly	  the	  
notion	  of	  “code	  is	  law”	  by	  Lessig,	  and	  research	  into	  computational	  legal	  reasoning,	  in	  
chapter	  8	  I	  developed	  a	  model	  of	  MIA	  law.	  This	  strong	  MIA	  law	  notion	  proposes	  the	  
implementation	  of	  legal	  reasoning	  capabilities	  into	  the	  software	  code	  of	  MIA	  tools	  to	  
design	  law-­‐abiding	  software.	  This	  ensures	  that	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  these	  software	  tools	  
are	  likely	  to	  perform	  in	  a	  law	  abiding	  way,	  moving	  away	  from	  the	  traditional	  rule	  of	  law	  
to	  address	  rule	  violations	  and	  to	  ensure	  compliance	  as	  a	  design	  feature.	  At	  the	  same	  
time,	  this	  approach	  gives	  traction	  to	  traditional	  legal	  reasoning	  skills	  and	  makes	  it	  
easier	  to	  bring	  these	  technologies	  under	  the	  existing	  conceptual	  framework.	  This	  
strong	  MIA	  law	  notion	  relies	  on	  state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	  research,	  which	  makes	  this	  model	  
timely,	  but	  also	  causes	  problems	  for	  its	  instant	  implementation.	  
In	  chapter	  9	  I	  therefore	  developed	  a	  soft	  MIA	  law	  model,	  which	  addresses	  the	  current	  
implementation	  problems	  of	  the	  strong	  MIA	  law	  notion.	  It	  still	  relies	  on	  legal	  reasoning	  
capacities	  of	  software	  tools,	  but	  by	  introducing	  a	  static	  syntax,	  distributes	  the	  
responsibility	  for	  the	  legal	  reasoning	  process.	  This	  model	  relies	  on	  established	  
research,	  and	  as	  a	  result,	  is	  robust	  and	  therefore	  reliable.	  
	  
Although	  the	  implementation	  of	  a	  MIA	  law	  model	  (strong	  and	  soft)	  would	  be	  a	  novel	  
development	  for	  regulators,	  I	  believe	  that	  this	  is	  a	  necessary	  step	  for	  the	  adequate	  
regulation	  of	  these	  intelligent	  and	  autonomously	  operating	  policing	  tools.	  This	  
regulatory	  approach	  reflects	  and	  addresses	  the	  current	  problems	  of	  those	  directly	  
involved	  in	  the	  use	  of	  these	  tools,	  and	  legal	  practitioners	  in	  general.	  I	  further	  believe	  
that	  an	  implementation	  of	  the	  soft	  MIA	  law	  model	  into	  the	  current,	  comparatively	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simple	  tools	  is	  essential	  to	  facilitate	  a	  future	  implementation	  of	  a	  strong	  MIA	  law	  notion	  
into	  more	  sophisticated	  and	  complex	  MIA	  policing	  tools.	  
10.3 Future Work 
A	  novel	  research	  topic	  always	  prompts	  a	  mirage	  of	  issues	  that	  are	  interesting	  and	  
crucial.	  This	  one	  is	  no	  different.	  There	  are,	  however,	  limitations	  to	  what	  can	  be	  
discussed	  in	  a	  PhD	  thesis.	  	  
The	  selection	  of	  topics	  in	  this	  thesis	  was	  influenced	  by	  the	  empirical	  research	  results	  to	  
ensure	  that	  this	  work	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  pure	  academic	  value	  also	  has	  a	  practical	  value	  
for	  those	  stakeholders	  directly	  involved	  in	  the	  use	  of	  MIA	  tools.	  This	  has	  meant	  that	  
some	  issues	  could	  only	  be	  mentioned	  but	  not	  fully	  elaborated	  in	  this	  work.	  	  
Particularly,	  the	  point	  of	  legal	  status	  of	  intelligent	  and	  autonomous	  software	  that	  
replaces	  human	  beings	  for	  crucial	  policing	  duties	  is	  one	  that	  deserves	  more	  scrutiny	  in	  
the	  future.	  I	  argue	  in	  this	  thesis	  that	  in	  the	  future,	  much	  more	  intelligent	  and	  
autonomously	  operating	  cyber-­‐cops	  will	  execute	  core	  policing	  tasks	  of	  the	  virtual	  living	  
space.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  actions	  and	  their	  consequences	  of	  these	  software	  tools	  will	  
not	  be	  distinguishable	  to	  those	  of	  human	  police	  officers.	  Hence,	  rights	  and	  duties,	  
usually	  reserved	  for	  a	  specifically	  educated	  group	  of	  people,	  will	  be	  conferred	  to	  these	  
software	  tools.	  How	  the	  law	  can	  and	  should	  deal	  with	  this	  situation	  is	  a	  question	  that	  
needs	  to	  be	  addressed	  in	  future	  research.	  What	  the	  thesis	  had	  largely	  to	  ignore,	  
regrettably,	  are	  therefore	  the	  wider	  ethical	  and	  jurisprudential	  implications	  of	  the	  
solution	  suggested	  here.	  	  
It	  is	  as	  a	  result	  “conservative”	  in	  two	  ways:	  Firstly,	  it	  tries	  to	  ensure	  that	  our	  existing	  
framework	  regulating	  police	  activities	  and	  providing	  the	  necessary	  protection	  for	  
suspects,	  continues	  to	  work	  in	  the	  new,	  digital	  age,	  without	  depriving	  unnecessarily	  the	  
police	  of	  needed	  tools.	  That	  assumes	  of	  course	  that	  the	  regulation	  of	  traditional,	  offline	  
police	  work	  is	  adequate.	  Maybe	  we	  get	  the	  balance	  wrong	  already,	  and	  any	  attempt	  to	  
project	  our	  present	  approach	  to	  regulate	  police	  activity	  into	  cyberspace	  is	  therefore	  the	  
continuation	  of	  a	  failed	  approach.	  Secondly,	  it	  also	  takes	  for	  granted	  that	  we	  can	  
remove	  the	  personal	  element	  of	  police	  work	  without	  a	  serious	  loss	  of	  “quality”	  of	  the	  
human	  interaction.	  Being	  questioned	  by	  a	  physical	  police	  officer	  can	  be	  intimidating	  
and	  worrying.	  But	  at	  least	  one	  interacts	  with	  another	  human	  being,	  can	  plead,	  scream	  
or	  complain	  about	  him.	  To	  interact	  instead	  with	  a	  machine	  may	  look	  superficially	  
attractive,	  as	  it	  removes	  some	  of	  the	  threatening	  physicality	  from	  the	  interaction	  –	  who	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really	  wants	  a	  squad	  of	  coppers	  going	  through	  one’s	  living	  room?	  But	  by	  reducing	  a	  
police	  officer	  to	  his	  legal	  function	  (and	  only	  that	  is	  what	  even	  the	  most	  ambitious	  
software	  programs	  can	  aim	  at),	  we	  may	  also	  diminish	  further	  the	  humanity	  of	  the	  
interaction.	  In	  this	  new	  world,	  the	  “officer”	  and	  we	  are	  quite	  literally	  only	  a	  number.	  
Whether	  this	  is	  desirable	  would	  require	  a	  different	  study	  with	  different	  tools.	  The	  only	  
thing	  this	  thesis	  could	  hope	  to	  accomplish	  is	  to	  ground	  this	  debate	  in	  what	  is	  
technologically	  possible.	  	  
10.4 Closing Remarks 
In	  this	  thesis	  I	  developed	  a	  regulatory	  model	  for	  a	  newly	  defined	  class	  of	  software-­‐
based	  investigative	  tools.	  	  
	  
This	  “code-­‐based”	  model	  is	  a	  result	  of	  the	  interdisciplinary	  nature	  of	  this	  thesis.	  The	  
empirical	  research	  has	  shown	  that	  the	  introduction	  of	  ever	  more	  intelligent	  and	  
autonomously	  operating	  investigative	  software	  tools	  requires	  ongoing	  collaboration	  
between	  the	  different	  relevant	  disciplines	  and	  practitioners.	  This	  ensures	  that	  early	  
stage	  research	  is	  developed	  with	  practical	  issues	  and	  problems	  in	  mind,	  and	  the	  
different	  disciplines	  can	  voice	  their	  respective	  needs.	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1. What	  are	  the	  existing	  technology-­‐based	  investigative	  measures	  for	  the	  policing	  of	  
the	  Internet?	  	  
	  
	  
2. Has	  the	  remote	  online	  searching	  of	  ICTs	  been	  introduced	  in	  the	  respective	  country?	  
	  
	  




4. What	  were	  the	  reasons	  for	  developing	  the	  technology-­‐based	  investigative	  measures	  
in	  the	  respective	  countries?	  
	  
	  
Detailed	  Technical	  Questions:	  	  
	  
	  
1. What	  are	  the	  technologies	  underlying	  the	  new	  software-­‐based	  investigative	  
tools	  for	  the	  policing	  of	  the	  Internet?	  
	  
2. What	  are	  the	  technical	  details	  of	  the	  software	  used	  for	  online	  searches	  of	  ICTs	  
(if	  this	  measure	  has	  been	  adopted	  in	  the	  country)?	  
	  
3. Is	  the	  online	  searching	  of	  ICTs	  technically	  feasible?	  
	  
4. What	  other	  technical	  investigative	  measures	  are	  currently	  feasible?	  
	  
5. Is	  it	  technically	  feasible	  to	  infiltrate	  a	  specific	  ICT	  device	  of	  a	  suspect?	  
	  
6. What	  are	  the	  capabilities	  of	  investigative	  software	  (and	  in	  particular	  software	  
used	  for	  online	  searches	  of	  ICTs)?	  
	  
7. What	  is	  the	  degree	  of	  autonomy	  of	  these	  software-­‐based	  investigative	  tools?	  
	  
8. Is	  the	  software	  capable	  of	  functioning	  without	  a	  human	  operator?	  
	  
9. How	  much	  in	  known	  about	  these	  software	  tools	  in	  the	  hacking	  community?	  
	  
10. What	  counter-­‐measures	  are	  generally	  possible,	  and	  are	  any	  being	  discussed	  in	  
the	  hacking	  community?	  
	  
11. Is	  it	  possible	  to	  circumvent	  commercial	  protection	  software	  (anti-­‐virus	  
software,	  firewalls	  etc)	  with	  these	  investigative	  tools?	  
	   370	  
	  
12. Will	  the	  target	  system	  be	  compromised	  by	  the	  infiltration	  with	  the	  investigative	  
software	  and	  investigative	  actions?	  
	  
13. What	  are	  the	  security	  concerns	  of	  the	  use	  of	  software-­‐based	  investigative	  tools?	  
For	  example,	  could	  third	  parties	  detect	  and	  utilise	  such	  tools?	  
	  
14. Did	  the	  government	  and	  other	  organisations	  and	  institutions	  play	  a	  role	  in	  the	  
development	  of	  these	  software-­‐based	  investigative	  tools?	  
	  
15. Who	  is	  financing	  the	  development	  of	  these	  software	  tools?	  
	  
16. Who	  evaluates	  the	  results	  of	  these	  measures?	  
	  
17. What	  are	  the	  experiences	  with	  the	  adopted	  measures?	  
	  
18. What	  are	  the	  future	  technologies	  to	  be	  deployed?	  
	  
	  
Detailed	  Legal	  Questions:	  	  
	  
	  
1. How	  are	  the	  software-­‐based	  investigative	  measures	  regulated,	  if	  at	  all?	  	  
	  
2. Are	  these	  measures	  based	  on	  a	  valid	  legal	  basis?	  
	  
3. Was	  new	  legislation	  introduced	  to	  regulate	  these	  new	  software-­‐based	  
investigative	  measures?	  
	  
4. Was	  any	  case	  law	  generated	  dealing	  with	  the	  introduction	  and	  use	  of	  these	  new	  
investigative	  measures?	  	  
	  
5. What	  are	  the	  greatest	  legal	  concerns	  linked	  to	  the	  use	  of	  these	  software-­‐based	  
investigative	  tools?	  
	  
6. What	  are	  the	  greatest	  legal	  concerns	  connected	  to	  the	  online	  searching	  of	  ICTs?	  
	  
7. How	  are	  legal	  practitioners	  classifying	  these	  tools?	  
	  
8. How	  is	  the	  evidence	  seized	  by	  these	  tools	  classified?	  
	  
9. Who	  is	  involved	  in	  the	  regulation	  of	  these	  tools?	  
	  
	  
